Daring to Fail: Input and Output-oriented Voting Under Supranational Constraints

The classic stylized fact from the literature of economic voting is that incumbents are rewarded for good outcomes and for delivering what is promised in the electoral campaign. A relatively recent literature, however, argues that with ever-increasing levels of globalization, governments have less room to influence policy and, consequently, voters in globally integrated economies will place less weight on outcomes to decide their vote. The question that remains less explored is how voters fill in this accountability gap.

We argue that in this context, voters move away from output-oriented voting towards input-oriented voting. Fulfilling their promises becomes less vital for governments insofar as they demonstrate effort to achieve their goals. We test this argument against a survey experiment we ran right just before the September 2015 election in Greece. In accordance with our theory, we do find a positive impact of government’s attempts to change the statu quo, despite their failed outcomes. We also unpack the mechanism driving the effect of input-recognition on incumbent vote share, showing that it provides information for prospective voting and it triggers nationalistic cues.