Pivotal Politics and Public Policy in Cabinet Governments

06.05.2013 - 12:00
A 5,6 Raum A 231
Art der Veranstaltung: 
AB B-Kolloquium
Dr. Alexander Herzog
Zugehörigkeit des Vortragenden: 
London School of Economics
The assignment of cabinet portfolios to parties has a
profound effect on the policies adopted by cabinet governments.
However, the relationship between portfolio allocation and public
policy outcomes has not been adequately addressed in the literature.
In this paper, I present a formal model of intra-cabinet
decision-making that incorporates the strategic interaction between
cabinet members. The model shows under which conditions either the
prime minister or the minister of finance is the pivotal member in the
cabinet. Based on these results, I derive the necessary and sufficient
conditions under which a cabinet is either a Gridlock cabinet, a Prime
ministerial cabinet, or a Ministerial cabinet. Each of these cabinets
refers to a different ideal type that has been discussed in the
literature. Using data on social spending from 11 Western European
parliamentary systems over a time period of 45 years, I show that the
main implications of the model are supported by the data.