This paper comprises a descriptive and theoretical analysis of the organizational representation structure within the Agricultural Advisory Committees of the European Commission. The descriptive analysis is focused on two main structural components: (1) share of seats held by organizations and (2) centrality of anorganization within the AACS. While in the theoretical part these two structural components are combined in one consistent social capital index corresponding to the political influence, an organization could gain from its structural position within the AACS. On the basis of the introduced social capital concept further analyses regarding the impact of organizational representation structures on political influence of organizations have been undertaken. Main results of the analyses are the following: (1) The overall structure of organizational representation within the AACS is characterized by a high relative and absolute concentration of the seat distribution in favor of the organizations of the agricultural lobby; (2) A cross-national comparison within the agricultural producer category implies that as long as the number of seats distributed by interest groups is variable, a decentral interest representation through multiple organizations is more effective compared to a central interest representation through one global organization. While a comparison between the different economic categories implies that if the total number of seats held by an interest group is exogenously determined and fixed, a central interest representation through one global organization seems to be more effective in comparison to a decentral interest representation through multiple organizations.
