The European Union in the United Nations. Effectively Speaking With One Voice?
Over the past decades, the European Union (EU) has become an increasingly prominent actor on the international stage. Nevertheless, only the EU member states, but not the EU itself, formally enjoy full membership in most International Organisations (IOs). In the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which is the arena with the broadest world-wide membership in regard to states, the EU has only an observer status. This talk examines the role of the EU in international multilateral negotiations in which it does not formally have full membership. Under which conditions is the EU able to develop common positions so that the EU members can speak with one voice in UNGA negotiations? How and under which conditions can the EU be successful in the UNGA? To answer these questions, a set of hypotheses is developed on the basis of two-level game approaches and put an empirical test. This reveals that the ability of EU member states to develop a common negotiation positions is influenced by two-level game dynamics and that the sensitivity of the issue at stake affects the opportunities to effectively use cutting-slack strategies. A common position is a precondition for the ability of the EU to speak with one voice in the UN, but it is not sufficient for the EU to be influential. In order to exert influence, the EU needs to adopt tied-hands strategies if its votes are crucial, but argumentative strategies in situations in which resolutions do not require the support of the EU members.