Electoral Incentives and Legislative Behaviour
While the determinants of the success of legislative processes in parliamentary systems have been in the focus of an extensive literature, much less is known about the individual level strategies of the process, e.g. MP sponsoring of bills on a certain topic. There is an apparent discrepancy in the literatures on voting behavior and legislative politics with the former arguing that votes are taken on many reasons, notably candidate, party and issue characteristics, while legislative behavior of (assumingly vote-seeking) MPs is most often considered as being driven by party politics but nothing else. Without doubt, party discipline is an essential feature in parliamentary democracies leaving small leeway for MPs to create their own policy profile and/or represent interests of their geographical constituencies. Yet, parties are not the only factor generating motivation and restrictions for MPs. To understand legislative behavior of individual MPs, their links and ties to constituencies and colleagues within parliament have also to be taken into account. Hence, our research focuses on the connection of the legislative and the electoral arena. First, electoral systems and voter behavior provide MPs with distinct electoral incentives to pursue reelection via legislative behavior. Bill sponsorship, but also other activities like parliamentary questions could therefore be targeted at the electorate. Electoral incentives are expected to influence number and content of bills an MP sponsors or of questions an MP asks. Second, not exclusively following party directions doesn’t mean that MPs act in isolation. In their legislative behavior they interact with colleagues of their own or other parties. Especially the legislative activity of introducing bills reveals information on both contexts: on individual legislative activity that possibly relates to the constituency as well as on ties between MPs who support bills together. The patterns of cooperation in bill (co)sponsorship can also be expected to be influenced by electoral incentives. The project will shed light on the following questions: In how far are legislative activities a means for gaining a personal vote? What are the electoral motivations for introducing bills or parliamentary questions? Is bill sponsorship about constituency interests? Or does the motivation rather lie in targeting some party faction or in building networks with similar minded MPs? In how far are (co)sponsorship networks affected by electoral incentives of the initiators?
The aim of the project is to integrate individual factors and dynamic group processes in an analytical framework of legislative behaviour. This framework shall then be applied to newly acquired data on legislative decision-making of representatives with different electoral backgrounds. At the current stage, we prepare a grant proposal to be submitted in 2014.