The Impact of Europeanization on the Determinants of Success and Duration of German Legislation
Our contribution to fundamental research will entail the production of a complete data set covering the procedural details of German federal legislation between 1949 and 2009 (extended period under study). We will also create a corresponding data set covering the specific positions of the legislative actors across fourteen policy areas and five ideological cleavages. Furthermore we will use the two data sets in order to evaluate the usefulness of present theories on divided government in explaining success and duration of legislative proposals (preference- and partisan perspectives).
To examine the conditionality of parliamentary power, we modeled German federal legislation with the consideration of the phenomenon of Europeanization that divides the sample into two subsamples. The starting points for this modeling were the veto players theory and the principal-agent theory. In our empirical work, we concentrated on the identification of the precise degree of the Europeanization of legislative and executive law in the period from 1949 to 2012. The measurement is based on corrected information about EU impulses and a complete content analysis of legislative proposals and acts. Additionally, we want to assess the complexity of the law’s content and systematically control for institutional variables.