The Impact of Europeanization on the Determinants of Success and Duration of German Legislation
Does the Europeanization of German legislation change the relationship between government and parliament in general, and between coalition parties in particular? In our follow-up project we want to apply a time series cross section analysis in order to empirically investigate whether the policy area-specific patterns of legislative democracy in Germany have changed over time as a consequence of Europeanization. In general one can expect that the government’s role is stronger in Europeanized affairs, while the German Bundestag is weaker. However, it remains an open question for which legislative activities this pattern exists. From a coalition perspective, we will also ask whether Europeanization affects coalition tensions, which inherently exist between the minister in charge and the coalition partner. The empirical answer to these questions does not only close a gap in the literature on governance and coalition politics, which hardly compares the characteristics of Europeanized and non-Europeanized legislation. Furthermore, the results will be important for the public discourse, that is little based on concrete empirical measurement of Europeanization and its consequences for the relationship between government and parliament respectively minister and coalition partner.
To examine the conditionality of parliamentary power, we modeled German federal legislation with the consideration of the phenomenon of Europeanization that divides the sample into two subsamples. The starting points for this modeling were the veto players theory and the principal-agent theory. In our empirical work, we concentrated on the identification of the precise degree of the Europeanization of legislative and executive law in the period from 1949 to 2012. The measurement is based on corrected information about EU impulses and a complete content analysis of legislative proposals and acts. Additionally, we want to assess the complexity of the law’s content and systematically control for institutional variables.