Thomas König, Marc Debus
Veto Players, Reform Processes and Policy Change: Concluding Remarks

p. 269-283 in: Thomas König, George Tsebelis, Marc Debus (Eds.): Reform Processes and Policy Change: Veto Players and Decision-Making in Modern Democracies. 2010. New York: Springer
[Studies in Public Choice]

We recapitulate the main findings of the contributions of this book, which provides an evaluation of the current state of veto player theory for the analysis of reform making in modern democracies. The contributions of this book provide for further insights into three central aspects of veto player analysis in order to explain reforms in modern democracies. Given Tsebelis’ framework on the interaction between political actors’ institutional power, their preferences, and the location of the status quo, the book chapters stress (1) the identification of veto players’ preference for measuring their reform-making behaviour, (2) the interpretation of other phenomena in complex veto player systems, which can provide additional insight into reform making, and (3) the modelling of strategic reform-making behaviour in veto player systems.