Direktkandidaten und die Wahlerfolge ihrer Partei im deutschen Zweistimmensystem: Das Beispiel der Bundestagswahl 2013 in Stuttgart | Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung

Franz Urban Pappi, Thomas Bräuninger
Direktkandidaten und die Wahlerfolge ihrer Partei im deutschen Zweistimmensystem: Das Beispiel der Bundestagswahl 2013 in Stuttgart

Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 2014: 45, issue 4, pp. 775-795
ISSN: 0340-1758 (print); 0340-1758 (online)

District candidates in the German mixed electoral systems, if positively evaluated by the electorate help a party to win the district mandate and they may increase the local party (second) votes. But party evaluations are also important for both purposes. As an exit-poll for the two Stuttgart constituencies in 2013 shows, parties are on average better evaluated than candidates, if the latter get evaluated at all. If both get rated, evaluations of most voters agree concerning parties and their candidates and the candidate of the best rated party gets the first vote und the best party the second vote (consonance voters). If the ratings diverge, the two votes tend to diverge also (divergence voters) and candidate ratings become decisive for voting in the electoral plurality segment. In addition, the chances of victory also play a role which voters in the aggregate perceive quite clearly. Ratings discounted by the probability of winning get important. When SPD and Greens recommended to choose the Green candidate in one and the SPD candidate in the other Stuttgart constituency due to their respective higher chances of victory, this party strategy failed nevertheless. Some addressees would have been forced to choose a candidate whom they rated worse than the one of their own party. And we guess that a party degrades itself if it admits that it is not an object of consonance voting.