

# B2.17 The Impact of Europeanization on the Determinants of Success and Duration of German Legislation



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
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## Europeanization

- How and to what extent does Europeanization affect German legislation?
- Can governmental actors benefit from “closed rule” that excludes parliamentary amendment rights on Europeanized German legislation?
- And if so, how does this affect the relationship with parliament, in particular with the Bundesrat?
- And how about the effects for intra-governmental affairs when Europeanization “hits” differently ministerial portfolios?


## Portfolio-specific variation of Europeanization



## Multiparty governance

- Veto players perspective: Can the majority in the Bundesrat effectively use its veto power?
- Principal-agent perspective: Can coalition partners overcome partisan ministerial drift?
- Do European and bicameral restrictions affect the portfolio allocation?

## Intra-coalitional and inter-institutional conflict



## Success and duration

- What are the implications for the explanatory power of the veto players theory for the success of legislative proposals?
- What are the implications for the explanatory power of the principal-agent theory for the duration of legislation?

## Determinants (in our previous work)

### Successful proposals 1949-2012

	Coeff.	S.E.
Veto player distance	-0.289***	0.066
Formal initiator	1.452***	0.065
Party political camp	-2.167***	0.099
International agreement	2.351***	0.102
Amendment	3.097***	0.076
Mediation committee	0.297**	0.133
Cost implication	0.207***	0.062
Constant	-1.111***	0.056
N	12,019	
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.520	

Note: Logit regression;  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Duration of legislation (only successful government proposals)

	Coeff.	S.E.
Intra-coalitional conflict	-0.108***	0.020
Size of ministerial party	0.003***	0.000
Median position	0.076***	0.028
Mandatory legislation	-0.118***	0.028
International agreement	-0.322***	0.037
Amendment	-0.478***	0.036
Mediation committee	-0.628***	0.049
Cost implication	0.308***	0.028
Constant	-9.331***	0.103
α	1.668***	0.153
N	5,584	

Note: Weibull analysis;  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1