

# B3.5 The New Eurocrats: What Exposure to EU Policy-Making Does to Public Administrations




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## Background

- Public administration reform became a condition for EU membership in 1995
- 'adjustment of administrative structures' necessary for the *acquis communautaire*
- But** the EU has *no* major treaty-based competencies over the organisation of national public administrations
- 'Adjustment' conceptualised as **professionalisation**
- Does working on the EU professionalise administrators? If so, *how*?

## Data

- OECD/Sigma web-based survey of CEE public administrators (2009 & ongoing)
- Sigma *Twinning Programme* records: Source and target country, ministry, and investment level
- Elite Interviews



## Contexts

- Countries:** Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
- Ministries:** interior, finance, regional, health, agricultural, PM's office, foreign, labour, education, justice, economic, environmental, culture and transport

## Subjects

- Bureaucrats are more likely to work on EU topics when
- They are **younger** (<40): 64% more likely
  - They hold a **managerial position**: 67%
  - They are **male**: 50%
  - They have been **educated abroad**: 76%
  - Know more **foreign languages**: 50% increase for each

## Measuring Professionalisation

### Conceptualisation

Roughly *non-partisan* and *meritocratic* principles and institutions for:

- Recruitment, Promotion, Dismissal, Rewards, Discipline

### Normative Problems

- Not much agreement on the nature of adjustment to 'professionalisation'...
- Old EU* prefers 'Weberian' principles of seniority and steady progression of pay and promotions
- New EU* prefers 'New Public Management' principles of performance measurement and results-based pay and promotion (sometimes...)

### Measurement

- Need measures of both *actual* and *ideal* professionalisation, so roughly parallel question structures to construct scales

### Corresponding Practical Problems

- Mokken's AISP indicates that our items reflect *multiple weak scales*
- For our actual professionalisation, depoliticised recruitment, promotion and pay procedures scale together, and *separately* seniority-based pay and promotion
- For our ideal professionalisation measures, *separate* scales for depoliticised recruitment and promotion procedures, seniority-based pay and promotion, performance related pay, examinations, and private sector work
- Implies *wide cross-country/ministry variation* in the concept of and aspirations to professionalisation

## Mechanisms of Professionalisation

- conditionality:** Consequence of change in civil service law
- social learning:** Sigma's Twinning Programmes (from 1992), monitoring (from 1999) & EUPAN
- functional adaptation:** prompted by challenges of EU legislation
- norm diffusion:** study abroad, languages spoken give exposure to professional norms

Each individual-level mechanism can be realised in two ways:

- Selection:** Ministries preferentially hire individuals that *already have* professionalised norms for EU work
- Exposure:** Working on EU *generates* more professionalised norms

## Effects of Working on the EU

Estimated effect of working on the EU on professionalisation preferences (scale standard deviation units, fixed effects for country-ministry):

**0.16** [0.08, 0.23]

About the *same size difference* as holding a managerial position **0.18** [0.1, 0.26] and around *five times smaller* than country and ministry effects.

### Selection or Exposure?

Estimated effect of **hours worked on EU topics** on professionalisation preferences

**0.002** (ns)

Estimated effect of importance of **projection activity** (in standard deviation units)

**0.03** (ns)

Estimated effect of importance of **reception activity** (in standard deviation units)

**0.07** [0.01, 0.12]