Chapter 4

Split-Ticket Voting in Multi-Level Electoral Competition: European, National and Regional Concurrent Elections in Spain

Alberto Sanz
*Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain*

**Abstract**

This paper is intended to shed new light on the causes of split-ticket voting in concurrent multi-level European, national and regional elections. Up to now, differences in electoral outcomes shown in Spanish concurrent regional elections have been understood as being a product of higher levels of tactical voting associated with second-order elections. Evidence against this interpretation is presented and alternative explanations drawn from international literature are then tested. Preliminary evidence shows that Spanish ticket-splitters weight their European, regional and local electoral choices in a different manner: while they are particularly noticeable for basing their local vote on personal interests (egotropic vote), they are also outstanding in the regional arena for using regional interests as criteria for
voting. Finally, in European elections – in the absence of real executive power – ticket-splitters tend to vote on the basis of their ideological preferences more often than do the rest of the electorate. As a whole, the evidence reviewed in this paper suggests the possible existence of a gradient in the impact that ideology has in concurrent electoral choice. Understanding ideology as being a heuristic, the closer the elector is to the focus of election, the less relevant the ideological shortcut appears to be; the further the focus of election is from the voter, the more useful the ideological shortcut.

Introduction

The appearance of new political entities such as the European Union or the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías, offers a challenge to some classical theories of electoral behaviour, since these new institutional settings allow new behaviours – such as split-ticket voting – for which those theories can not account.

Split-ticket voting appears when one elector simultaneously chooses two or more different party options in different elections that are held concurrently. When this happens, split-ticket voting provides particularly interesting electoral behaviour, since the simultaneity of the elections offers a quasi-experimental situation in which many of the socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics of the elector remain constant across the different electoral situations, but despite this a proportion of electors behave differently in each electoral arena. Up to now, the field of horizontal split-ticket voting has been intensively studied and specific explanations have been found within the majoritarian and presidential American political system (Campbell and Miller 1957, DeVries and Tarrance 1972, Fiorina 1992, Jacobson 1990, Petrocik and Dohety, 1996) or in the context of parliamentary democracies with mixed-member electoral systems, such as Germany or New Zealand (Jesse 1988, Karp et al. 2002, Gschwend and van der Kolk 2006, Gschwend,
2007). On the other hand, theory is far less developed in the field of vertical split-ticket voting, and it has not been empirically studied, an exception being the recent work of Elklit and Kjaer (2005, 2006) on vertical split-ticket voting in Sweden and Denmark.

**Research question and goals**

What causes voters to behave differently on each of the electoral levels in a situation where there are concurrent elections in countries with proportional electoral systems and multi-level government, the socio-demographic dimensions of the electors being controlled? Is it possible to identify some general behavioural pattern?

In Spain, discrepancies in the results of concurrent elections have usually been assumed to be an outcome of some of the mechanisms identified by Reif and Schmitt (1980) in the European Elections, understood then as being second-order national elections (Montero, 1988a; Montabes, 1996; Pallarés and Keating, 2003); however, none of these studies tested the aforementioned mechanisms.

In order to answer the research question, this study has set three goals. The first is to show that the mechanisms associated with second-order national elections cover a limited range, in order to explain split-ticket voting in the case of concurrent multilevel elections in Spain. Our second goal is to review and test, in the case of Spain, other classic explanations of split-ticket voting, such as the balancing hypothesis of Morris Fiorina (1992) or the accidental theory of Gary Jacobson (1990). Finally, in the light of the evidence presented, we will search for some pattern in that evidence.

**Vertical split-ticket voting in Spain**

Until now, national and regional elections have taken place concurrently four times in Spain. At the end of the first Regional Parliament legislature in
Andalucía autonomous community (1982–1986), national prime minister Felipe Gonzalez called for national elections to take place concurrently with the regional elections which had already been arranged. Since then, regional and national elections have been held concurrently in Andalucía in 1986, 1996, 2000 and 2004. With almost 8 million inhabitants, Andalucía is the most populated region in Spain, and it is also one of the so-called historical autonomous communities.

Table 1. Electoral results for the main parties in national and regional elections in Andalucía. Entries are vote percentages. In parenthesis the number of parliamentary seats.

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>46.44</td>
<td>56.53</td>
<td>21.89</td>
<td>22.47</td>
<td>17.58</td>
<td>8.02</td>
<td>5.78</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>43.78</td>
<td>46.39</td>
<td>33.75</td>
<td>35.18</td>
<td>13.88</td>
<td>13.40</td>
<td>6.62</td>
<td>3.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>44.03</td>
<td>43.55</td>
<td>37.77</td>
<td>40.28</td>
<td>8.05</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>7.39</td>
<td>5.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>50.03</td>
<td>52.54</td>
<td>31.58</td>
<td>33.48</td>
<td>7.46</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>4.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
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Source: www.eleweb.net

Electoral results in the concurrent elections show important advantages in the outcomes that the parties obtain in each of the electoral arenas, while turnout levels were almost identical. Tables 1 and 2 show the results for the main parties in each electoral arena, and the regional advantages in the vote for those parties expressed in percentage points. 
Table 2. Regional and national aggregate vote advantages by year and party. Entries are regional percentage advantages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>-10.10</td>
<td>-2.58</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>-2.71</td>
<td>-3.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP/PP*</td>
<td>-3.00</td>
<td>-1.45</td>
<td>-2.59</td>
<td>-2.00</td>
<td>-2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>9.80</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total regional advantage</td>
<td>12.90</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>6.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total national advantage</td>
<td>-13.10</td>
<td>-4.03</td>
<td>-3.04</td>
<td>-4.71</td>
<td>-6.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For 1986 AP + CDS

Source: Ministerio del Interior and Junta de Andalucía

The PSOE and the AP/PP/CDS appear as vote losers in the regional elections (and therefore as vote winners at national level), while the IU and the PA obtain positive balances in the regional elections and negative ones at national level. The greatest advantages are found in 1986, with 13 percentage points, and the lowest in 2000, with an advantage of just over 3 percentage points. The average of the advantages in the elections studied is slightly over 6 percentage points. This data shows the existence of differences between electoral results in the regional and national arenas, and raises the question of the possible existence of split-ticket voting patterns between certain electoral options. We have studied these patterns at individual level by constructing transference tables for regional and national vote, using data from CIS post-electoral surveys. These tables (appendix I) demonstrate that of all possible vote transferences, split-ticket voting only takes place in the national (Nat.) to regional (Reg.) direction and that it follows three patterns: intra-block ticket splitting from the PSOE (Nat.) to the IU (Reg.) in 1986, regionalist ticket splitting from majority national parties to the PA (Reg.) and inter-blocks ticket splitting from the PP (Nat.) to the PSOE (Reg.).
Figure 1 represents the evolution of the levels of these three types of split-ticket voting between 1986 and 2004.

**Figure 1. Percentage of split-ticket voters, by type of transfer and year.**

![Graph showing the percentage of split-ticket voters by type and year from 1986 to 2004.](image)

*From all parties to PA. Source: Banco de datos del CIS.

Elsewhere (Sanz, 2006) we studied all three types of split-ticket voting in depth; here, because of space constraints, we will focus on the case of intrablock (PSOE-IU) vertical split-ticket voting.

**Theoretical frame and hypothesis**

In the seminal work by Reif and Schmitt (1980) a series of mechanisms operating in (not necessarily concurrent) European Elections was identified. These mechanisms, accounting for discrepancies between national and European electoral results, allowed us to understand this last type of elections as second-order national elections. As we have mentioned, many of those who have published on the Spanish situation have understood the discrepancies between concurrent regional and national elections in Andalucía as being the result of their intrinsic nature as second-order elections. Here we will review the mechanisms proposed for European Elections by Reif and Schmitt (1980) [and revisited by Schmitt (2005)], in
the context of concurrent national and regional elections in Andalucía; and we will deduce some contrastable hypotheses.

Participation is lower
In second-order elections the level of politicization is lower than in national elections. This would lead to differential mobilization in both types of elections. It has been suggested that in Spain these differences between the electorates that actually vote in each type of election explain the differences in the outcomes that some parties regularly get in each electoral arena. In the case of our study, the concurrence factor, with almost identical levels of participation in both electoral arenas, neutralises the potential impact of this mechanism as an antecedent of split-ticket voting.

Government Parties Lose
In second-order elections, parties in the national government systematically lose support in comparison with previous national elections. At least two mechanisms have been proposed to explain this. The first is the idea of a popularity function effect, in which support for the party represented at national executive level is at its maximum immediately after election day, is at its minimum in the middle of the legislature and is restored to the initial levels by the time of the next national election. Thus, the election timing for second-order election would be a factor in the differences in electoral outcomes, compared to national elections. Again, the concurrence factor neutralises any impact of this mechanism on split-ticket voting.

The second explanation for government parties losing is related to the opportunity for a number of electors to voice their dissatisfaction with the performance of the party for which they voted at national elections by voting for another party in an election at a level where this behaviour will have
lower costs. This mechanism is perfectly applicable in our case, and will be tested in the first hypothesis.

If split-ticket voting is to some extent the product of voicing dissatisfaction with the performance of the national executive at a regional level, then:

(H1) The greater the dissatisfaction with national executive performance, the higher the probability of ticket splitting.

In second-order elections big parties systematically lose ground to small ones. Again we find that at least two mechanisms have been suggested which might explain these differences.

The first is an institutional factor: it is suggested that differences in proportionality between regional and national electoral system can introduce differences in the incentive to vote strategically, that is to vote for a party other than the one that would be the elector’s first preference. In Spain, regional electoral systems are more proportional than the national one, and this can be seen as an encouragement to vote more sincerely in regional elections (which favour small parties) and more strategically in national elections (which penalise small parties).

The second mechanism proposed is that there are differences in what is at stake in each level of election. Since there is less in the balance in regional election it is suggested that electors may behave more sincerely in this type of elections, favouring small parties.

Both mechanisms (the one related to the electoral system and the one related to what is at stake) share a common structure of incentives, favouring a more honest vote in regional elections and a more strategic vote in national elections. These mechanisms are applicable to our case of concurrent elections, and will be tested in the second hypothesis.
If split-ticket voting is to some extent the product of a more honest regional electoral behaviour, then:

**H2** Split-ticket voters will vote for their first preference at the regional level and for their second preference at the national level.

Another explanation of split-ticket voting is found in the influential book *Divided Government* by Morris Fiorina (1992), where he suggests an intentional split-ticket voting model of policy balancing in the United States. According to his model, when voters split their tickets between two parties that present candidates to the Presidency and the Congress, the voters act as if they had the intention of favouring a divided electoral result, in such a manner that power would be distributed between two parties that, by dominating different institutions, would produce a situation of balance and mutual control. Ticket splitters would be moderate voters who do not fully identify with any of the electoral options that they perceive as being extreme and they would choose candidates of both parties simultaneously, with the final intention of obtaining moderate policies. Fiorina models voters’ behaviour, specifying that a voter will tend to split his vote when, in the space of the partisan identification, it is located between the parties for which it is possible to split the vote. Figure 2 represents an adaptation of his model to the left-right (L-R) ideological space, more suitable to the structure of European politics.

![Figure 2. Adaptation to the ideological Left Right space of Fiorina’s (1992) model for split-ticket voting.](image-url)
In this model, voter 2, located in the inner space defined by the positions of parties A and B in the L-R scale, will be more likely to split their vote between the two parties, than will voters 1 and 3; who are located in the space outside both parties because they are more extremist than the closer party, and it is therefore not possible to attribute to them any intention of obtaining a final situation of moderation in government policies. Fiorina’s intentional model was originally presented to account for split-ticket voting in the context of the American two party system. In our multi-partisan and multi-level context, the model maintains its original sense as long as the assumption is made that the parties for which it is possible to split the vote are contiguous on the main competition axis; that is to say, whenever there is no third party located ideologically between parties A and B, the parties between which the splitting of the vote takes place.

If split-ticket voting is to some extent the product of Fiorina’s intentional balancing:

(H3) Split-ticket voters will tend be ideologically self-positioned between the two parties for which they split the vote.

The last explanation of split-ticket voting that we will consider is the one introduced by Gary Jacobson (1990 and 1991), which is known as the accidental model of split-ticket voting. This explanation also arises in the American context, and proposes that voters’ decisions in both electoral arenas (Presidential and Congressional) are independent; that is to say, they do not depend on any preference of the voters about the final configuration of forces in different institutions. Thus, the reasons for voters to split their vote would reside in differences in the political offer that the parties present in each electoral scene, and most particularly in differences in the quality and visibility of candidates. On the other hand, Jacobson also suggests that split-ticket voting could happen because of differences in what the citizens
demand in each type of election. In the American case Jacobson maintains that, although the voters demand of the executive an effort to maximize collective goods, they demand of legislative power an effort to minimize individual risks, to optimize wealth distribution and to minimize local costs (Jacobson 1991: 641).

A final situation where divided government occurs would be accidental, or not arising from the intention of the voters, as they would not be looking for any type of compensation between powers. They would be simply maximizing their preferences, which are different in each type of election.

If split-ticket voting is to some extent the product of the offer of specially visible or valuable candidates in some of the electoral arenas then:

(H4.1) The better voters evaluate a candidate as being, the higher their probability of ticket splitting.
(H4.2) The higher the voter’s evaluation of two candidates from different parties, competing in different electoral arenas, the higher probability of ticket splitting.

It is important to note that while H4.1 proposes that split-ticket voting is about leadership on at least one electoral level, H4.2 proposes that split-ticket voting is about leadership on both electoral levels.

Summing up, we have reviewed three families of relevant explanations for split-ticket voting. The first one stresses the role of the voters. One mechanism proposed by Reif and Schmitt (1980) argues that electors voice national executive dissatisfaction in second-order elections; the other mechanism presented by Fiorina (1992), argues that ticket splitting is an intentional behaviour and proposes that it would depend on voters’ relative positions in respect to two partisan options. The second family of explanations, started by Jacobson, puts the emphasis on the role of parties in
presenting an offer that is different in quality for each type of election and also emphasizes the importance of the differences between the candidates in each election type. The third and final family emphasizes the importance of institutions when it proposes that split-ticket voting is a form of strategic vote, and that two possible mechanisms may be involved. For the strategic explanation, differences in the electoral system permissiveness would be an antecedent for split-ticket voting; whereas from second-order elections theory (Reif and Schmitt 1980), differences between what is at stake in each level of election would constitute a relevant incentive for differentiated electoral behaviour: more sincere in second-order elections, more strategic in first order.

**Data and method**

In this work we used data from a panel survey from the Spanish Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) (CIS 1536 and CIS 1546) with a representative sample of the electorate in Andalucía, in the 1986 regional and national elections. In order to test the aforementioned hypothesis, and at the current state of development of this research, we used both bivariate analysis and a multinomial logistic regression model. In the next development of the research we plan to operationalize the concepts related to hypotheses 2 and 3 in such way that they could also be tested concurrently in a unique multinomial logistic regression model, using data from the different (and bigger) available datasets, and also in different electoral years.

In the multinomial logistic regression model, the dependent variable had three possible values. The first was straight vote PSOE-PSOE (Nat-Reg) (base category), the second was straight vote IU-IU, and the last was split vote PSOE-IU (Nat-Reg). The independent variables were the evaluation of national executive performance (measured in a 1 to 5 scale), the ideological self-position (measured in a 1 to 10 scale), the PSOE national candidate
evaluation (incumbent Felipe Gonzalez, measured in a 0 to 10 scale) and the IU regional candidate evaluation (Julio Anguita) (measured in a 0 to 10 scale). As a control variable we used the vote recall from the recent NATO integration referendum which had taken place three months previously, in which the PSOE campaigned for a “Yes” vote, while prior to taking control of national executive in 1982 they had publicly defended the “No” option.

In addition, we explored the results from of another post-electoral CIS survey, conducted after European, regional and local elections took place concurrently in Spain in 1987. Using this data we studied the different declared reasons for voting, at the three levels, and explored the different levels of association between ideology and vote probability, again at the European, regional and local levels.

**Results**

The results of fitting a model of intra-block split-ticket voting to the 1986 national and regional elections in Andalucía show us that - when compared to the base (and majoritarian) behaviour of straight voting for the PSOE - straight voting for the IU is significantly related to ideology and to the evaluations of the regional communist (and charismatic) leader Julio Anguita. On the other hand split-ticket voting is statistically independent from ideology, and is significantly related to the positive evaluation of both national and regional candidates from the PSOE and the IU respectively. Positive evaluation of the national executive does not reach the level of statistical significance.

Finally, the control variable for NATO vote recall, while also not reaching significance levels is close to doing so (p-values of 0.06 and 0.09 for IU-IU and for PSOE-IU respectively), and both cases share the same pattern. Having voted ‘No’ in previous NATO referendum is related to a (non-
significant) increase in the probability of a straight IU vote or a split PSOE-IU vote.

Table 3. A multinomial model of vertical intra-block split-ticket voting in 1986 national and regional elections in Andalucia, Spain. Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Straight IU-IU</th>
<th>Split PSOE-IU</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of national executive²</td>
<td>-1.23</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.90)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology³</td>
<td>-1.17*</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOE national candidate evaluation (Felipe González)⁴</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>-0.67**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU Regional candidate evaluation (Julio Anguita)⁴</td>
<td>0.72*</td>
<td>0.51*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO ‘Yes’</td>
<td>-2.38</td>
<td>-1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
<td>(0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.40)</td>
<td>(3.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R²</td>
<td>0.64</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Base category is straight vote PSOE-PSOE.
² 1 Very bad, 5 Very well.
³ 1 Left, 10 Right
⁴ 0 Very Bad, 10 Very well.
* Significant at 5% ** Significant at 1%

In order to make the interpretation of the coefficients in the logistic model more accessible, we have presented the predicted probabilities derived from the equation coefficients in the form of graphs. Predicted probabilities were calculated, keeping the values of other independent variables at their means. Now we will review the impact of each of the independent variables on split-
ticket voting probability, and the implications of this for the hypothesis presented.

Figure 3 demonstrates the relationship between a positive evaluation of national executive performance and the probability of vote options IU-IU and PSOE-IU. In the case of a straight IU-IU vote (solid red line), an increase in this positive evaluation decreases the probability at the lower levels of the scale. In the case of split-ticket voting (green broken line), we can see a flat slope, indicating that split-ticket voting does not appear to be related to a (negative) national executive performance evaluation. This evidence is not favourable to H1, which relates a negative evaluation of national executive to voicing dissatisfaction only at the regional level.

Figure 3

![Fitted probabilities of Split-ticket Voting (PSOE-IU) and Straight Voting (IU-IU) in 1986 National and Regional Election, by National Executive Evaluation.](image-url)

Figure 4 shows the relationship between ideology (L-R) and the probability of vote options (IU-IU and PSOE-IU). In this case, and also in reference to voting straight PSOE-PSOE it can be clearly appreciated that the further on
the right an elector is, the less probability there is of a communist straight vote. On the other hand it also appears clear that a split social democrat-communist vote it is not related to the ideology of the elector. Another way to express the same idea is to say that ideology is related in the same way to issuing a straight PSOE-PSOE vote as to issuing a split PSOE-IU vote. Or, as we can also see in figure 8 (appendix II), the ideology of split-ticket voters is the same as the ideology of straight PSOE voters.

**Figure 4**

This evidence is contrary to H3, since, as can also be appreciated in the bivariate analysis presented in Figure 5, split-ticket voters do not show a characteristic ideological pattern that is different from both IU-IU and PSOE-PSOE straight voters (they are ideologically different from IU straight voters, but the same as PSOE straight voters).
In the same way this evidence completely contradicts H2, since split-ticket voters choose their first (ideological) preference (PSOE) at the national level.

So, if intra-block split-ticket voting seems to be about neither voicing dissatisfaction at the regional level, nor strategic or ideological voting, what can explain the fact that some electors, ideologically close to the PSOE and not influenced by national executive performance, vote for the IU in the regional elections?

Figures 6 and 7 give us some useful clues to the understanding of the 1986 high levels of intrablock split-ticket voting in Andalucía.
In figure 6 we can appreciate how a positive evaluation of the communist regional candidate Julio Anguita is directly (and significantly) related to an increase in the probability of a split PSOE-IU vote. This increase is comparable to the one shown by straight communist voters, as they rate the IU candidate more highly. This evidence supports H4.1, since the more highly the electors value the candidate who get inter-level vote advantages, the more probable it is that they will split the regional vote in his (party’s) favour.

Figure 6

Figure 7 gives us the opposite situation, since a positive evaluation of the national PSOE candidate Felipe González drastically decreases the probability of split-ticket voting, in favour of a straight PSOE-PSOE vote (base category). This evidence is contrary to H4.2, since it shows that it is not necessary that two visible leaders should pull the electorate in different directions, for different parties.
Section conclusions

In this section we have tested several hypotheses drawn from the literature on split-ticket voting on multi-level electoral competition in Europe and Spain. Through this process of hypothesis testing we have learned about several characteristics of intrablock split-ticket voters in Andalucía which give us a better picture of the situation. We know that ticket splitters vote for the PSOE at national level, that ideologically they are close to the PSOE, and that their main party identification is also with that party. We also know that they tended (though not significantly) to vote ‘No’ in the NATO referendum, that they give Prime Minister Felipe González a poor evaluation, and that they rate the communist regional leader Julio Anguita very highly.

While a formal procedure would lead us to reject all the hypotheses presented, with the exception to the Jacobson accidental theory, which is based on the differences in the visibility and quality of candidates supplied by the parties, a more contextual interpretation would draw a different
conclusion. In fact, we completely agree that 1986 inter-block split-ticket voting in Andalucía was not caused by ideological balancing, nor by the strategic considerations of the electorate. But although formal analysis would ask us to reject the regional voice of national dissatisfaction hypothesis we consider that it is still possible to defend the idea that a number of electors who fully belonged to the PSOE caucus, dissatisfied with the executive performance on the NATO issue, may have “channelled” their disgust through leader evaluation: their negative evaluation of Felipe Gonzalez and their positive evaluation of Julio Anguita (the latter strongly campaigned for ‘No’ to NATO) provides evidence for this. Again the task of disentangling second-order election voicing from the differences in the quality of candidate on offer does not appear to be simple and direct.

**Context and further research**

The small piece of research that we have just presented is part of a wider project. In that context these results gain in robustness and clarity since they are a replication of a part of a previous work (Sanz 2006) in which we have tested similar hypothesis on bigger datasets and at different moments in time. In that research we have studied intra-block, inter-block, and regionalist split-ticket voting in the concurrent national and regional elections of 1986, 1996 and 2000. These three modalities of vertical split-ticket voters have a number of peculiarities compared to other ticket splitting, but all of them show a regularity: Split-ticket voters in Andalucía tend to follow their ideological preferences at the national election level, while there are a number of changing factors (or issues) that pull the electors to cross their ideological lines at the regional level. To some extent this does not fit with those predictions from the second order elections paradigm that expect a more sincere (or more ideological) vote at the regional (rather than the national) second order elections.
Figure 8. Fitted vote probabilities for the PSOE (0) and the IU (1) in 1987 European, regional and local elections, by ideology.
Solid black lines represent straight voters.
Broken red lines represent ticket splitters.

Fitted Vote probability in 1987 European Parliament election, by ideology
Fitted vote probability in 1987 regional election, by ideology

Fitted vote probability in 1987 local election, by ideology
In order to solve this apparent contradiction, we raised the question of what would happen in respect to vertical split-ticket voting if two (or more) second-order elections were held concurrently. At which electoral level would voters abandon their ideology and party identification? Spanish concurrent 1987 European, regional and local elections gave us an excellent opportunity to explore voting behaviour again in a quasi-experimental situation. On that occasion the level of vertical split-ticket voting was more than 15 percentage points. Again, the more frequent modality of ticket splitting was the intra-block PSOE-IU/IU-PSOE. Using data from the 1987 CIS post-electoral survey, we have fitted binomial logistic models of electoral choice between the PSOE (0) and the IU (1) separately at each of the electoral levels, using ideology as the independent variable and leader and national executive performance evaluations as the control variables.

As comparing the coefficients from different logistic regression models is not a commonly accepted method, we used the straight voters, who logically maintain a constant relationship between their ideology and their vote at all the levels, as our internal control for comparison. Figure 8 shows the fitted vote probabilities for voting for the PSOE (0) and the IU (1) in 1987 European, regional and local elections, by ideology and type of vote (straight or split). Solid black lines represent straight voters and broken red lines represent ticket splitters.

In figure 8 it can clearly be seen that for split-ticket voters the impact of ideology on the choice between the PSOE and the IU, reaches its maximum in the European elections (higher than for consistent voters), is intermediate in regional elections (lower than for consistent voters) and is at its minimum at the local level (much lower than for consistent voters).

Finally, and only for descriptive and exploratory reasons, we have studied what ticket splitters answer when they are openly questioned on their reasons for voting at each level of election.
Tables 4 and 5 show the different reasons for their vote given (in an open response question) by split-ticket and straight-ticket voters. Table 4 shows this comparison between split-ticket voting in the European and in the regional elections, and table 5 shows the same comparison for split and straight-ticket voting in regional and local elections.

### Table 4. Declared reasons for regional and European vote of straight- and split-ticket voters in 1987 concurrent regional and European elections in Spain. Figures are row percentages. In parenthesis Haberman’s standard residuals.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Declared Reasons for Regional Parliament Vote</th>
<th>Declared Reasons for European Parliament Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>straight vote</td>
<td>split vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Candidate</td>
<td>4.8 (-2.1)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Party</td>
<td>42.1 (3.6)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>9.6 (0.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Performance</td>
<td>7.8 (-1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Interest</td>
<td>3.7 (-2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Interest</td>
<td>1.0 (0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of information</td>
<td>0.0 (-3.0)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>31.0 (-0.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>n</th>
<th>1060</th>
<th>1025</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cramer’s V</td>
<td>0.173**</td>
<td>0.182**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Values over 1.96 indicate statistical significance (Haberman 1973).
* Significant at 5% ** Significant at 1%
Source: Banco de datos del CIS.
Table 5. Declared reasons for regional and local vote of straight and split-ticket voters in 1987 concurrent regional and local elections in Spain. Figures are row percentages. In parenthesis Haberman’s Standard residuals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Declared Reasons for Municipal Vote</th>
<th>Declared Reasons for Regional Parliament Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Straight Vote</td>
<td>Split Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Candidate</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-4.3)**</td>
<td>(4.3)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Party</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.5)**</td>
<td>(-4.5)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.5)**</td>
<td>(-2.5)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive (local/regional)</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>(-5.5)**</td>
<td>(5.5)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Interest</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
<td>(-0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Interest</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.5)**</td>
<td>(2.5)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of information</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
<td>(-0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>(-1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>1048</td>
<td>1060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cramer’s V</td>
<td>0.258**</td>
<td>0.117*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Values over 1.96 indicate statistical significance (Haberman 1973).

* Significant at 5% ** Significant at 1%

Source: Banco de datos del CIS.

As a group, when asked about voting decision criteria split-ticket voters tend to declare “Candidates” as a reason for their vote, more often do the rest of the electorate, and “partisanship” less often than do straight voters. But when we compare their given reason between electoral levels they stand out at the local level for a lesser use of ideology and a more intense use of personal interest, while at the regional level they stand out because they declare regional interest to be a key factor.
Conclusions

In this paper we have reviewed some preliminary findings about vertical split-ticket voting in national and regional elections in Spain. We have identified a variety of factors which persuade the electorate to cross their ideological preferences at the regional level. On the other hand, despite the variety of antecedents for vertical split-ticket voting, a regularity was also noticed: the majority of split-ticket voters tended to vote according to their ideological preferences at the upper or national level in the 1986, 1996 and 2000 concurrent elections in Spain. Since this did not seem to fit with the strategic predictions for second-order elections, the impact of ideology on split-ticket voters in 1987 concurrent European, regional and local elections in Spain was compared. Results from this comparison (together with those previously presented) suggest a possible gradient in the impact of ideology on split-ticket voters’ choices. The closer the elector is to the “object of election” the less will be the impact of ideology on their choice. The further the elector from the “object of election” the bigger will be the impact of ideology on their electoral choice. Further, more refined, confirmations of this hypothetical regularity are needed. In order to do this a cross-national comparative study (in the frame of my doctoral research) is under theoretical discussion. Concurrent elections in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden are candidates to take part in a comparative research design. If the suspected regularity were further confirmed, the suggestion that ideology has a role as a heuristic or cognitive shortcut would be strengthened, at least for the small group of sophisticated voters that split their votes across different electoral arenas.
Notes

1 Some examples of institutional settings that allow for split-ticket voting would be the Presidential and Congressional elections in the United States, simultaneous choices of seats and candidates in German and New Zealand national elections and other countries with mixed electoral systems, or the coincidence in time of regional, national or European Parliamentary elections in Spain and other European countries.

2 Following the Gschwend and van der Kolk (2006) categories, vertical split-ticket voting refers to a vote for two (or more) different parties in concurrent elections taking place to elect representatives to two (or more) supra-ordinate levels of governance (i.e.: European, national or regional concurrent elections).

3 This advantage index is calculated by subtracting the number of votes that each party received in regional elections from the number of votes received (only in Andalucía), in the national elections and expressing it as a percentage of candidature votes. The index provides us with a good measure of the vote advantage for each party, at each of the electoral levels. Positive values indicate regional advantage while negative values indicate national advantage.

4 There is a theoretical discussion on the definition and operationalization of the first preference concept. In this paper, for reasons of space and simplicity we will follow the one that understands first preference as being defined by ideological proximity and party identification.

5 This explanation, while being very tempting, is not exempt from problems as it is difficult to test because it encompasses two complementary sides of the problem. On the one hand, the accidental explanation signals the causes of ticket splitting on the supply side of the problem (differences in the quality and visibility of the candidate offer), but on the other hand and simultaneously, the reasons for ticket splitting are also signalled on the demand side (citizens demand a strong President but a risk-minimizing House). Therefore, it is difficult to disentangle the impact of general evaluations of competence on actual voting behaviour from the evaluation of competence specific to each of the electoral arenas. Being aware of this intrinsic difficulty we will try to test one side of the problem in this research.

6 Because of sample attrition this study has a limited sample size compared to other available studies for the same elections (i.e.: CIS 1539), but it offers the added value of being a panel survey. This fact allows us to measure the independent variables (ideology, executive performance, candidate evaluation, etc.) in the pre-electoral wave, along with the dependent variable (vote recall) in the post-electoral wave. This is important because measuring both the consequences and the antecedents at the same time raises concerns about the direction of causality. This is especially relevant when leaders and executive evaluations and vote recall are
measured concurrently. Despite its reduced sample size the analysis presented in this paper gains in robustness because there is good replication of previous analysis performed on data coming from the aforementioned bigger sample but only “one wave” pre-electoral survey (Sanz 2006).

1 In 1987 local and European elections took place in the whole of Spain. The same day were celebrated also regional elections in all autonomous communities except from Andalucía, Cataluña, Galicia and País Vasco.

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