Chapter 5
Second-Order Elections versus First-Order Thinking: How Voters Perceive the Representation Process in a Multi-Layered System of Governance

Robert Rohrschneider and Nick Clark
Indiana University, USA

Abstract

2nd-order election models are based on several assumptions about individual-level motivations. These can be summarized by a transfer hypothesis: individuals presumably apply their evaluations of national-level phenomena to the EU-level when voting in EU elections. In contrast, a 1st-order hypothesis stipulates that voters evaluate the EU on its own performance terms. This paper tests these competing hypotheses. We find considerable support for both models. In the election context, where national institutions—political parties—dominate the representation process, the transfer hypothesis receives considerable support. However, we also find surprisingly strong support for the 1st-order hypothesis: electoral choice in EU election is to a considerable extent influenced by EU-level factors. Furthermore, when voters evaluate the mechanisms of representation more broadly without a focus on elections per se, we find much more support for the 1st-order than for the transfer
hypothesis—voters clearly separate the two levels and evaluate each level on its own terms. These results have important implications, both for how we analyze voters’ decisions in European elections, and for how we view the sophistication of voters more broadly in the context of multi-layered institutions.

Introduction

The EU’s democracy deficit is becoming an increasing concern to analysts and observers of the European Union (Majone 1998; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; Rohrschneider 2002). A key element of the presumed deficit is that elections are not evaluations of the EU’s performance per se but typically reflect voters’ judgments about national political issues (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Marsh 1998; Hix and Marsh 2007). Accordingly, the EU may suffer from a democracy deficit because voters do not evaluate Europe-related issues but mainly use the EU-level to reward or penalize national governments. It is consistent with this argument that numerous studies show that the national economy influences EU election outcomes, national government parties lose vote shares in EU-elections, especially during the midterm of a parliamentary cycle, and smaller parties typically gain in EU-wide elections (Marsh 1998; Hix and Marsh 2007).

The key premise, then, of second-order election models is a transfer hypothesis: voters transfer evaluations from the national to the EU level. In light of the centrality of this premise, it is surprising how few analyses examine the individual-level mechanisms that presumably underlie the 2nd-order election phenomenon. Only recently have analysts begun to directly examine the transfer hypothesis at the individual-level (Carrubba 2005; Schmitt 2005). None, however, examines the extent to which voters’ evaluations of national and EU-based performance evaluations affect their
vote choice. Consequently, we know little about the reasons for voters’ electoral choice in a multi-layered system of governance.

This gap in our knowledge is unfortunate because there actually are several reasons why one might plausible argue that voters increasingly evaluate the EU *sui generis*. For the EU has become more important over time to individual citizens, certainly since the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties concluded in the 1990s. As European integration moves from economics to politics, citizens may increasingly rely on their preferences about integration, and their evaluations of the EU’s performance, when they judge the representation process at the EU-level (Schmitt 2005; Rohrschneider 2002). We will use the term 1st-order hypothesis when referring to the mechanism whereby citizens judge the EU on the basis of EU-related factors.

This paper, then, contributes to the growing body of research analyzing the transfer and 1st-order hypothesis by examining how voters perceive various mechanisms of representation. First, we will examine the extent to which citizens rely on national versus EU-based performance indicators in European elections. Second, while elections are clearly the most important mechanism to represent citizens, we will broaden the analysis by examining how citizens generally evaluate the process of representation at the national and EU-level, for reasons explained below.

**The Individual-level Foundation of Second-Order Elections Models**

Second order election models hinge on the motivation of voters. To the degree that voters actually perceive two separate institutional layers, these models assume that information from the national level informs voters’ decisions at the EU level (Hix and Marsh 2007). The main evidence for this model consists of three components. First, compared to national elections,
voters typically defect from government parties in European elections. This is consistent with the observation that large parties, who are likely to be included in national governments, tend to lose votes in European elections when compared to the last national elections. Second, smaller parties tend to increase their vote share from the last national election to a subsequent EU elections. Finally, this defection from larger to smaller parties is especially pronounced during the middle of parliamentary cycles. This is consistent with the observation that the extent of parties’ vote gains and losses is mediated by the national electoral cycle at the time an EU elections take place. Cumulatively, this evidence seems to indicate that voters transfer information from the performance of national party systems to the EU-level.

The 2nd order election model is not only supported empirically, it also makes a lot of sense from the perspective of party competition at the level of nation-states. Firstly, political parties in most European countries are ordered along a left-right division within nation-states. Given this programmatic commitment at the level of nation-states, they have few incentives to go against their programmatic tradition in EU-wide elections (Andeweg 1995; Gabel 2000). As parties fail to debate the EU on its own terms during EU elections, citizens never hear the necessary public discourse to consider the EU. This, in turn, severely restricts citizens’ ability to evaluate the EU sui generis since parties are the key representatives at both levels. Thus, unless an EU-related issue cuts across the left-right dimension, which increases a party’s capacity to develop stances that are not tied to its programmatic heritage, it is hard to see how parties can effectively deny that heritage in EU-elections. In short, they must connect their stances about integration to their domestic policies in order to maintain their credibility. For these reasons, students of party positions on European integration find that their left-right stance on domestic cleavages is a strong predictor of their integration stance (Dalton 2005; Marks et al. 2006; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2007). Thus, the institutionalized role of political parties as intermediaries between national
and EU-election reinforces the idea that citizens presumably transfer information from the national level to that of the EU. Finally, further reinforcing the transfer hypothesis is the fact that analyses about citizens’ EU support show that the popularity of national governments is taken as a proxy of how well the EU performs and, subsequently, affects citizens’ evaluations of the European Union (Anderson 1998). This too suggests that individuals transfer information from the level of nation-states to the level of the EU.

All in all, there exist plausible conceptual reasons and considerable empirical evidence in support of the transfer hypothesis. However, while the transfer hypothesis is not completely wrong, it is unlikely to be entirely right.

Problems of Second-Order Models

Despite the focus of 2nd-order models on voters’ choice, we actually know surprisingly little about why voters choose different parties in national and EU elections. This results from the focus of most 2nd-order elections models on aggregate election outcomes. The dependent variable is typically a vote loss/gain variable when election outcomes in national and supra-national elections are compared. Given this approach, it remains unclear precisely why voters defect from governmental parties.

Specifically, many patterns found at the aggregate level are actually consistent with both the transfer and 1st-order hypotheses. For example, small party support in EU elections is often taken as a sign that voters defect from large government parties because of their national performance as a governing party. As Hix and Marsh put it, “the main story is that ‘party size’ matters, as the second-order model predicts. Small parties gain and large parties…lose” (p. 22). This is no doubt the case in the aggregate. But what does this imply for how voters arrive at their vote choice in EU elections? The 2nd-order model interprets this pattern as evidence that voters generalize from the national to the supra-national level. Equally plausible is an interpretation that
voters view both institutional layers separately, and apply different criteria in their decision-making at each level: in our example, smaller parties (such as the Greens) may be supported because they are perceived to do a better job in performing at the EU-level than larger parties (Carrubba and Timpone 2005). Thus, while EP elections are no doubt less relevant in power terms, they may not be second-order in terms of the mechanisms that underlie people’s vote choice. In short, the aggregate approach is running the danger of committing the ecological fallacy.

Another problem is the empirical focus of most 2nd-order analyses on vote switching across the two levels. While the conceptual model itself speaks both to why voters defect from government parties (e.g., dissatisfaction with parties in government) or to why they stay with them (e.g. satisfaction), the aggregate approach entails analyses exclusively examining vote switching. Imagine a hypothetical scenario where all parties at the national and EU-level receive exactly the same aggregate vote share. In this case, there would be no variance across the two elections, and thus nothing could be explained with an aggregate model where parties’ vote gains and losses constitute the dependent variable. Once net switching is greater than zero, aggregate models do have an opportunity to explain gains and losses. In other words, the results of aggregate analyses are driven by (net) vote changes and ignore consistent vote choices across the two levels.

These shortcomings are unfortunate, for at least two reasons. Conceptually, it is worth knowing why voters maintain support for government and opposition parties at both levels. The transfer hypothesis assumes that voters are happy with the performance of parties at the national level if voters consistently support government parties. It is equally plausible that voters are happy with parties’ performance at the EU-level independently of their performance at the national-level. Second, most citizens vote consistently across the two levels. In short, consistency across levels is the norm; defectors constitutes a minority of voters. But the
aggregate approach focuses on the empirical minority, ignoring information from the majority of voters.

We do not suggest that the transfer hypothesis never be applied. We suspect (though we do not know for certain) that this is how voters arrived at decisions during early European elections when the powers of the European Parliament were more restricted than they are now (Reif and Schmitt 1980). We also expect, however, that voters are beginning to evaluate the EU on its own terms given the growing importance of EU institutions in the policy-making process at the national level (Schmitt 2005: 654). Neither do we argue that the transfer hypothesis is entirely obsolete. We do suggest that the determination of the extent to which the two mechanisms underlie voters’ electoral choice in EU-elections is an empirical question. We therefore see a need to examine the individual-level assumption of the second-order model, in part because of the changing character of European integration, in part because the transfer hypothesis has hardly been directly tested.

Hypotheses

The logic of the 2nd-order model predicts:

*Hypothesis 1*: Voters’ performance evaluations of the national government and the national economy influence the extent to which voters defect from governmental parties in EU elections.

And, the following prediction is implied but has not been tested by 2nd-order models:

*Hypothesis 2*: Voters’ performance evaluations of the national government and the national economy influence the extent to which voters stay with the same party at the national and EU-level.

The 1st-order hypothesis, in turn, predicts that vote choices at the EU-level are made on the basis of EU-related factors. Specifically,
Hypothesis 3: The perceived performance of parties at the EU level influences the extent to which voters’ defect from government parties.

Hypothesis 4: Voters’ performance evaluations of parties at the EU level influence the extent to which voters stay with the same party at the national and EU-level.

Results

Our dependent variable in these analyses follows Carruba and Timbone (2005, p. 266). We created a new variable, based on parties’ recalled vote in the last national and EU elections. This new variable contains four cells: voters (1) support government parties in both elections; (2) move from government parties in national election to the opposition in EU elections; (3) defect from the opposition in national elections to (national) government parties in EU elections; (4) support opposition parties in both elections.\(^1\) As reported earlier in the text, consistency is the norm; defection in either direction the minority.

We use the 1999 European election study, which contains several performance indicators needed to test the hypotheses. We included two predictors located at the national level: perceptions of the economy; and evaluations of government performance. We also included two predictors located at the EU-level. One indicator measures voters’ evaluations of the performance of parties at the EU-level. This variable, while focused on national parties, attempts to separately gauge perception of how well parties handle EU affairs.\(^2\) Another variable measures citizens’ support for European integration. (All measures are described in detail in the appendix).

Since the four levels of the dependent variable constitute a nominal variable, we conducted a multi-nominal logit analysis. Table 1 shows the coefficients with government supporters at both levels serving as the reference category. The first column shows the coefficients for respondents who switch
Second-order elections versus first-order thinking.

from governmental parties in national elections to opposition parties in the
EU election. Note that the two EU-predictors are insignificant. Also note
that the national economic performance variable is insignificant. In contrast,
the governmental performance variable is significant. All of this is consistent
with the transfer hypothesis — the perception of national governments’
performance influences vote defection from governments to opposition
parties in EU elections. We also note that when the governmental
performance variable is dropped from the model, then the EU performance
variable becomes significant. This suggests that the transfer mechanism is
partly induced by the way that EU-wide elections are conducted through
national party systems, and not by a genuine, EU-wide party system
(Andeweg 1995).

Table 1: Predicting Support for Government Parties across National/EP
Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Choices:</th>
<th>Vote Govt. (National) &amp; Opposition (EU)</th>
<th>Vote Opposition (National) &amp; Govt. (EU)</th>
<th>Vote Opposition (National) and Opposition (EU)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parties’ Government Performance</td>
<td>-.41** (.11)</td>
<td>-.36** (.07)</td>
<td>-.76** (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Perceptions</td>
<td>-.23 (.13)</td>
<td>-.07 (.11)</td>
<td>-.23* (.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Support</td>
<td>.04 (.09)</td>
<td>-.53** (.14)</td>
<td>-.28** (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties’ EU Performance</td>
<td>-.06 (.05)</td>
<td>-.15* (.06)</td>
<td>-.16** (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of Party Attachment</td>
<td>-.28 (.4)</td>
<td>-1.03** (.28)</td>
<td>-.18 (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far-Left Ideology</td>
<td>-.53* (.24)</td>
<td>.22 (.21)</td>
<td>-.38 (.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Center Ideology</td>
<td>-.21 (.25)</td>
<td>.26 (.23)</td>
<td>-.44 (.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-Center Ideology</td>
<td>.28 (.26)</td>
<td>.35 (.18)</td>
<td>.53** (.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Ideology</td>
<td>-.23 (.35)</td>
<td>.06 (.18)</td>
<td>.61* (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far-Right Ideology</td>
<td>-.56 (.4)</td>
<td>-.13 (.27)</td>
<td>(.71) (.36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Turning to the group of voters who switch their vote from an opposition party in national elections to a government party in an EU election, we now note that the two EU-predictors are statistically significant. When voters believe that parties do a good job at the EU-level they are more likely to move towards national government parties regardless of their evaluations of national performance. Supporters of integration are also more likely to switch towards governmental parties. This constitutes clear evidence in support of the 1st-order hypothesis. In turn, the transfer model is also supported insofar as positive governmental performance is connected to a reduced tendency to move away from governmental supporters at both levels.

Finally, support for all four hypotheses emerges from the last group of voters. Here all performance predictors are statistically significant. Voters evidently transfer information from the national to the EU-level; and they evaluate the EU sui generis.

In order to convey a better sense of the predictive power of each variable, we plotted the predicted value of falling into one of the four categories against the theoretically relevant predictors (figure 1). The first two figures illustrate the impact of parties’ economic record and perceived government performance on whether voters support governmental or opposition parties in both elections, or exhibit cross-level defections. These graphs provide considerable support for the transfer hypothesis.
Figure 1: The Influence of Performance Evaluations on Cross-level Voting Pattern

National Economic Performance:

Government Performance:
Parties’ Performance at EU level:

Support European integration:
The next two figures show the impact of EU-related performance factors on vote choices. Visually, these are less strongly related to vote choices than, especially, evaluations of parties’ government performance. At the same time, they do matter. In fact, EU-based performance factors are nearly as important as national economic performance. All in all, this evidence provides support for the 1st-order hypothesis as well.

East-West differences in 2nd order elections?

Recent analyses have suggested that the 2nd-order election model does not appear to be supported in new democracies in East-Central Europe (Schmitt 2005; Koepke and Ringe 2006; Hix and Marsh 2007). This conclusion is based on the observation that aggregate vote changes in the East from national to EU elections do not connect to the same kind of predictors as in the West. This non-finding is actually consistent with the finding that national elections in new East-Central European democracies evidence a much higher level of volatility between elections than in Western Europe (Tavits 2005; Caramani 2006). The reason appears to be that East-Central Europeans do not link their performance evaluations as clearly to government and opposition parties as voters in the West because the organizational and programmatic instability after the democratic transition makes it difficult for voters to identify those parties most likely to solve a problem—or to identify the culprits responsible for it. Consequently, the 2nd-order model may not be applicable in East-Central Europe.

As we argued in the previous section, however, we would suggest that it is premature to characterize the motives of individual voters on the basis of aggregate change scores alone. So in order to test whether the transfer and 1st-order hypothesis does not apply to new democracies, we conducted an initial analysis of vote changes across national and EU-elections using the 2004 European Election study. We first constructed the same dependent variable as
in the previous analyses. Second, we included one variable measuring voter’s
evaluations of the government. Another variable measures perceptions of the
national economy (see the appendix). The EU-level performance variables
are less than ideal, however, because they do not measure parties’
performance at the EU-level. We therefore used one indicator of whether
citizens have developed a European identity - a democracy deficit at the EU-
level; another indicator measures whether citizens are for or against European
integration. The model also includes several control variables, including left-
right ideology, strength of partisanship, age, education, and gender.

Table 2 shows the results for the 4 predictors that measure the transfer
hypothesis (governmental performance and evaluations of the economy) and
1st-order hypothesis (perceptions of a democracy deficit and European
identity). The reference group is, as in the previous analyses, whether voters
support the government parties at both levels. As a test of East-West
differences, we also included an interaction term between a predictor listed in
the left-most column and an East-West dummy variable. The interaction
terms were added separately for each equation. For example, we first
estimated a model that included an interaction term between governmental
performance evaluations and the East-West dummy. On the basis of these
results, we then computed the conditional coefficients listed in the table for
the East and the West. We also indicate whether an interaction term is
significant. Then, we estimated another model, this time including an
interaction term between evaluations of the national economy and the East-
West dummy. And so on.
Table 2: Predicting Support for Government Parties across National/EP Elections in Eastern and Western Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Choice:</th>
<th>Vote Govt. (National) &amp; Opposition (EU)</th>
<th>Vote Opposition (National) &amp; Govt. (EU)</th>
<th>Vote Opposition (National) and Opposition (EU)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interaction East West Significant:</td>
<td>Interaction East West Significant:</td>
<td>Interaction East West Significant:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>-0.92** -1.9*</td>
<td>-1.0** -2.0**</td>
<td>-1.6** -3.2**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-.19** -0.38**</td>
<td>-.21 -.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Represents</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.11 -.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Identity</td>
<td>-.50** .10</td>
<td>-.78** -.31**</td>
<td>-.46** -.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are conditional coefficients from a multi-nominal logit analysis. Government supporters at national and EU elections are the reference category. * and ** denotes significance at the .05 and .01 level, respectively. European weight is used. Source: 2004 European Election Survey.

The results underscore much of the previous analyses. First, national performance perceptions are very important in the West—but also in the East. Second, there is some evidence, again, for the 1st order hypothesis: perceptions of the democracy deficit affect vote choice in the predictable direction. For instance, when citizens believe the EU represents them, they are more likely to fall into the national opposition/EU government parties in EU elections. In other words, perceived positive democratic performance by the EU helps national governmental parties, just as a performance model would predict.

As far as East-West differences are concerned, they are mostly insignificant, except for the European identity variable. For nearly all coefficients, however, the sign is in the same direction, and the differences are negligible. Note also that most coefficients have the same sign but tend to be larger in the West. These preliminary analyses do not suggest that national
and EU elections are fundamentally viewed differently across the former East-West divide. Instead, they suggest that relationships are generally in the same direction, but the magnitude tends to be larger in the West, presumably because voters had more time in mature democracies to connect performance evaluations to parties’ status as a government or opposition party. In short, we see differences of degree but not a fundamentally different electorate.

Political representation and system satisfaction

All analyses presented hitherto are based on the premise that voters actually distinguish fairly clearly between the national and EU levels. That is, the transfer hypothesis assumes that voters generalize from the national to the supra-national level; the 1st-order hypothesis actually assumes that voters compare the two levels. Our indicators from the two election studies, however, are less-than-ideal to test whether voters actually perceive two different levels of representation, for two reasons. First, the indicators are less than ideal: they measure the performance of national conditions reasonably well but are quite imperfect for the EU-level. Second, the fact that parties are prominent at both levels means that voters inevitably pay considerable attention to the national level, even when they evaluate the EU. Is there evidence that allows us to examine how voters actually perceive the process of representation independently of political parties?

Fortunately, one Eurobarometer conducted in 1999 (52.0) contains several useful indicators that we use here to tease out whether citizens clearly discriminate between the two levels as the 1st-order hypothesis suggests a bit further. One set of indicators measures the representational performance of national regimes. A closely related set of indicators are found in the same question which asks about the EU’s representational performance:

“Many important decisions are made by the European Union. They might be in the interest of people like yourself, or they might not.
To what extent do you feel you can rely on each of the following bodies to make sure that these decisions are in the interest of people like yourself?”

Respondents evaluated a series of institutions, including the national parliament, the national government, the EU commission and the EU parliament on a ten point scale. Another set of questions asks whether citizens are satisfied with the way democracy works (swd) at the national and EU-level, again asked in the same question.

The 1st-order hypothesis would predict that citizens clearly distinguish between the two levels and, therefore, national representation perceptions should predict satisfaction with national democracies; EU-representation perceptions should predict satisfaction with EU democracy. And representation perceptions from one level should not predict satisfaction with democracy at the other level. This would be the clearest sign that citizens attribute representational responsibilities separately to each level. In contrast, the transfer hypothesis would predict that national performance perceptions affect satisfaction with the national and EU democracy.

Table 3 shows the surprisingly clear results in support of the 1st-order hypothesis. Representational perceptions at each level predict satisfaction with democracies at each level. And representational perceptions at the national (EU) level do not influence evaluations of democracies at the EU (national) level. Note that these results emerge despite the fact that the question wording might easily have produced cross-level consistency because the representational indicators were asked in the same question as were the swd indicators. This provides strong support for the 1st order hypothesis because it shows, for West European voters at least, that they systematically distinguish between the representational mechanisms at the two levels. In other words, when voters view representation mechanisms independently of parties, they clearly distinguish between the two levels.
Table 3: Do Citizens Transfer Representational Responsibility from the National level to the EU?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>EU Democracy</th>
<th>National Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Inst’s Represent Citizens</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>-.099**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Inst’s Represent Citizens</td>
<td>-.08**</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Preference</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation Benefits</td>
<td>-.24**</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge about EU</td>
<td>.06**</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Economy positive</td>
<td>-.07**</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Economy positive</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age cohort: Young</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age cohort: Middle</td>
<td>-.08*</td>
<td>-.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.02**</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Ideology</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrist Ideology</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.04**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 1999.

Conclusion

There is considerable evidence that voters generalize the national performance to the EU level. There is also quite a bit of support for the idea that citizens distinguish between the transfer and 1st-order mechanisms. The aggregate approach tends to be biased in favor of the transfer hypothesis to
the detriment of the 1°-order mechanism. Both perspectives, however, are needed to explain more fully the complex nature of vote choices in multi-level systems of governance.

Notes

1 Unfortunately, Carrubba and Timbone do not use individual-level performance evaluations. Consequently, their analysis does not directly examine the motives of voters either.
2 The correlation coefficient between governmental performance and parties’ EU performance is substantial (r=.36) though far from perfect. This suggests that the two performance dimensions are partially independent.

References


**Dependent Variables:**

**Government Support across National/EP elections:** We coded respondents as (1) voted for a party in a governing coalition in the last EP election and the last general election, (2) voted for a party in a governing coalition in the last EP election and a party not in a governing coalition in the last general election, (3) voted for a party not in a governing coalition in the last EP election and a party in a governing coalition in the last general election and (4) voted for a party not in a governing coalition in the last EP election and the last general election.

**Independent Variables:**

**Parties' EU Performance:** “Thinking once again about European integration, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the current policy in <name of your country>? Are you (1) very satisfied, (2) somewhat satisfied, (4) somewhat dissatisfied or (5) very dissatisfied?” We included the small number of don’t know responses as a (3) middle category.
Parties’ Government Performance: “Let us now come back to <name of your country>. Do you (1) approve or (3) disapprove of the government's record to date?” We included the small number of don’t know responses as a (3) middle category.

Economic Perceptions: “How about the state of the economy, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the current policy in <name of your country>: are you (1) very satisfied, (2) somewhat satisfied, (4) somewhat dissatisfied or (5) very dissatisfied?” We included the small number of don’t know responses as a (3) middle category.

EU Support: “Generally speaking, do you think that <your country’s > membership of the European Union is (1) a bad thing, (2) neither a good nor a bad thing or (3) a good thing?” We placed the small number of don’t know responses in the (2) category.

Party Identification: We created a dichotomous variable: (1) if the respondent identified themselves as “very close to <their party of choice>, fairly close, or merely a sympathizer” and (0) if they did not identify with a party or gave did not know.

Far-Left Ideology: Taking the respondent’s self-placement on a10 point ideology scale (1-10), we classified them as (1) far-left if they answered 1-3 and (0) for any other answer.

Left-Center Ideology: Taking the respondent’s self-placement on a10 point ideology scale (1-10), we classified them as (1) left of center if they answered 4 and (0) for any other answer.

Right-Center Ideology: Taking the respondent’s self-placement on a10 point ideology scale (1-10), we classified them as (1) right of center if they answered 6 and (0) for any other answer.

Right Ideology: Taking the respondent’s self-placement on a10 point ideology scale (1-10), we classified them as (1) right if they answered 7 and (0) for any other answer.
Far-Right Ideology: Taking the respondent’s self-placement on a 10 point ideology scale (1–10), we classified them as (1) far-right if they answered 8–10 and (0) for any other answer.

Age: “What year were you born?”

Education: “How old were you when you stopped full-time education?”

Sex: (0) male, (1) female


Dependent Variables:

Government Support across National/EP elections: We coded respondents as (1) voted for a party in a governing coalition in the last EP election and the last general election, (2) voted for a party in a governing coalition in the last EP election and a party not in a governing coalition in the last general election, (3) voted for a party not in a governing coalition in the last EP election and a party in a governing coalition in the last general election and (4) voted for a party not in a governing coalition in the last EP election and the last general election.

Independent Variables:

EU Represents Citizens: An additive index of two questions about the government’s economic performance. “How much confidence do you have that decisions made by the European Union will be in the interest of (1) [country] and (2) people like you?” The indicator ranges from (2) doesn’t feel represented to (10) feels represented.
EU Identity: “Generally speaking, do you think that [country’s] membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?” 1 Bad thing 2 Neither, dk 3 Good thing.

Parties’ Government Performance: “Let us now come back to [country]. Do you approve or disapprove the government's record to date?” Respondents could answer (0) disapprove or (2) approve. We included the small number of don’t know responses as a (1) middle category.

Economic Perceptions: An additive index of two questions about the government’s economic performance. “What do you think about the economy? Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the general economic situation in this country is a lot worse, a little worse, stayed the same, a little better or a lot better?” and “Over the next 12 months, how do you think the general economic situation in this country will: get a lot worse, get a little worse, stay the same, get a little better or get a lot better?” The indicator ranges from (2) bad performance to (10) good performance.

Appendix C: Measurement of Representation
Variables – Eurobarometer 52.0 (1999)

Dependent Variables:
Satisfaction with EU Democracy: “On the whole are you (1) very satisfied, (2) fairly satisfied, (4) not very satisfied or (5) not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union?” We included the small number of don’t know responses as a (4) middle category.

Satisfaction with National Democracy: “On the whole are you (1) very satisfied, (2) fairly satisfied, (4) not very satisfied or (5) not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)?” We included the small number of don’t know responses as a (4) middle category.
Independent Variables:

National Inst’s and EU Inst’s Represent Citizens: “Many important decisions are made by the European Union. They might be in the interest of people like yourself, or they might not. To what extent do you feel you can rely on each of the following bodies to make sure that these decisions are in the interest of people like yourself?” Respondents placed the national government, national parliament, European Commission and European Parliament on 10-point scale, ranging from (1) cannot rely on it at all to (10) can rely on it completely.

Party Preference: Respondent would support a party in government if there were an election next Sunday (coded 1) or an opposition party (coded 0).

Nation Benefits: “Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?” We included the small number of don’t know responses as a middle category.

Knowledge about EU: A 4 point indicator (0–4) based on the number of correct answers to 4 factual questions about the (i) President of the EU Commission; (ii) a European commissioner appointed by national government; (iii) (National) Minister of Finance; (iv) National Minister of Foreign Affairs.

National Economy positive: An additive index of two questions about the future economic situation. “What are your expectations for the year to come: will 2000 be better, worse, or the same, when it comes to: (1) the economic situation in (OUR COUNTRY); (2) “the employment situation in (OUR COUNTRY)?” The indicator ranges from 2 (worse) to 6.

Personal Economy positive: Same question lead as for National Economy, after which respondents evaluated: (1) the financial situation of your household; (2) your personal job situation. The indicator ranges from 2 (worse) to 6.
**Age cohort: Young:** Dichotomous variable: (1) respondents aged 15-29; (0) respondents all other ages

**Age cohort: Middle:** Dichotomous variable: (1) respondents aged 30-50; (0) respondents all other ages

**Education:** years of schooling. Respondents “still studying” were coded to the mean year of schooling for that nation.

**Left Ideology:** Taking the respondent’s self-placement on a 10 point ideology scale (1-10), we classified them as (1) left if they answered 1-3 and (0) for any other answer.

**Centrist Ideology:** Taking the respondent’s self-placement on a 10 point ideology scale (1-10), we classified them as (1) center if they answered 4-6 and (0) for any other answer.

**Income:** 4 point indicator ranging from Low to High, with missing data recoded to the mean income for that country.