

Chapter 6

Public Support for Integration in the Newly Enlarged EU: Exploring Differences Between Former Communist Countries and Established Member States

John Garry and James Tilley
Queen's University Belfast and Jesus College, Oxford

1. Introduction

In 2004 the European Union (EU) changed dramatically with the inclusion of ten new member states, eight of whom were former communist states of central and eastern Europe. Given their unique historical, social, cultural and political context, are former communist countries different from other member states in terms of how citizens view the EU? Are citizens in former communist countries more (or less) supportive of closer integration than other EU citizens are? If so, why? Are their views on integration driven by the same factors that shape the views of citizens in other EU states (or are citizens in former communist states fundamentally different in terms of what determines their attitudes to the EU)?

Previous analyses of public support for EU integration have *either* focused on (some or all) of the established members (EU 15) *or* a selection of central and eastern European states.¹ Thus, these analyses could not systematically assess the *relative importance* of various theoretical interpretations of support for integration in the two contexts (EU 15 and former communist

states). Here we draw on responses to a core set of questions from the European Election Study (2004) that were asked in all 25 EU member states (apart from Malta). This data source facilitates the simultaneous testing of hypotheses in both 'east' and 'west' and allows us to formally model cross-context differences.

We begin by briefly outlining the key theoretical approaches to understanding public attitudes to the EU. Then, in the context of these theoretical discussions, we suggest ways in which citizens in former communist states might be expected to be different from EU citizens in established member states. We are particularly interested in testing the claim of Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2006) that factors relating to economic utilitarianism (the approach that has dominated scholarship to date) are likely to be less salient in former communist states than in established member states (and factors relating to identity, democratic performance and values are likely to be more salient in former communist states than in established EU member states). In subsequent sections, we describe the data that we use to formally explore possible 'east' versus 'west' differences, report our results and discuss the implications of our findings for our understanding of whether there are indeed one or two 'publics' ('east' and 'west') in the newly enlarged and apparently very diverse EU.

Our findings in brief are as follows. Citizens in former communist countries are somewhat more in favour of closer EU integration than citizens in established EU member states and this difference can be accounted for by variations in how wealthy different countries are. Thus, the relative poverty of former communist states seems to be the key factor leading citizens in such states to be relatively supportive of EU integration. In terms of the *determinants* of attitudes to integration, we find mixed support for Rohrschneider and Whitefield's argument. We find that certain economic factors (namely, prospective economic evaluations) are *more* important in the

east than in the west and certain other economic factors (namely, economic xenophobia) are *less* important in the east than in the west.

2. Theories of Public Support for EU Integration

What are the main interpretations of why some citizens support EU integration and others do not?²

Egocentric economic utilitarianism

The ‘economic utilitarianism’ approach (also referred to as ‘economic rationality’ or ‘economic instrumentalism’) focuses on the economic costs and benefits of integration. Simply stated, citizens who are likely to fare well, economically speaking, from further EU integration are hypothesised to support integration while citizens who are likely to economically suffer from further integration are expected to be much less supportive of integration. According to this approach citizens with relatively high levels of human capital will be positively disposed towards integration because such citizens are well placed to avail of the market opportunities that result from the economic liberalisation (free movement of labour and capital) associated with the integration process. Specifically, middle class citizens with relatively high levels of education and occupational skills will be able to successfully adapt to the competitive market environment arising from closer integration (and the competition for jobs in that environment). In contrast, working class citizens with relatively low levels of human capital are likely to be vulnerable to, and therefore fear, the economically competitive environment generated by closer integration (Anderson and Reichert, 1996, Gabel, 1998a, 1998b).

Sociotropic economic utilitarianism

Other economic interpretations are sociotropic rather than egocentric in that they focus on national level rather than personal level economic factors. One

national level factor that may flow from the egocentric utilitarianism just discussed relates to what may be termed 'economic xenophobia'. Some citizens may feel very concerned about the free movement of labour that is such a key feature of the economic liberalisation that resulted from the Single European Act (1987) and may believe that workers from their own country should not be vulnerable to non-nationals from other EU countries coming in and competing for jobs. 'In group' versus 'out group' feelings of animosity may develop whereby citizens believe that there should be economic discrimination in favour of nationals and against non-nationals.³

Also, citizens may live in a member state that 'gets a lot out of' the EU while other citizens reside in states that contribute a lot of resources to the EU. Specifically, member states vary in terms of EU budget benefits; certain countries typically contribute much more than others. Citizens in net-beneficiary states would be expected to be supportive of EU integration while citizens in net-contributory states would be expected to be relatively unsupportive of integration. Furthermore, it might be expected that citizens who live in relatively poor countries may calculate that integrating with the other relatively wealthy EU members may result in an increase in their own country's wealth (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000, Christin, 2005).

Finally, citizens' subjective perceptions of national economic performance may effect their views of the integration process. As Hooghe and Marks, for example, state: 'citizens who feel confident about the economic future – personally and for their country – are likely to regard European integration in a positive light, while those who are fearful will lean towards Euroskepticism' (2004, p2). Thus, variation in citizens' evaluations of the national economy may drive support for – or opposition to – EU integration.

Identity

Another theoretical approach that seeks to explain citizens' attitudes to integration relates to identity. McLaren (2004) laments the paucity of analysis linking national identity and opposition to integration and is critical of the assumption that opposition to integration should be necessarily linked to economic instrumental/utilitarian factors:

Even if integration itself has been economic in nature, ordinary Europeans may not perceive it this way. Moreover, with moves to establish a common citizenship with an EU passport, the elimination of national currencies, coordination of asylum and immigration policies and the creation of a European military force, integration is beginning to appear less and less economic in nature ... integration seems to pose a threat to national identity by seeking to reduce nationalist sentiment (pp896-7).

One might initially expect that a strong sense of national identity would be associated with opposition to EU integration. However, Hooghe and Marks (2004) make the important point that it is not a strong national identity *per se* that leads to scepticism. Rather, it is an *exclusive* sense of national identity that is likely to lead to scepticism. In other words, it is perfectly possible for a strongly patriotic Welshman to be pro-integration, or for a very strongly Irish Irishwoman to be a keen EU fan. However, a Welshman who is Welsh and Welsh alone is likely to frown upon EU integration (as would a merely Irish Irishwoman). Hooghe and Marks (2004, p2) emphasise 'the basic distinction between exclusive and inclusive national identity'. The authors hypothesize that 'citizens who conceive of their national identity as exclusive of other territorial identities are likely to be considerably more Eurosceptical than those who conceive of their national identity in inclusive terms' (p2). Thus, one's sense of identity is hypothesised to be of crucial importance when evaluating whether one is in favour of or opposed to EU integration.⁴

Democratic performance

Another important possible determinant of attitudes to integration relates to concerns over democratic performance. One of the fundamental aims of the European Union is the preservation of peace and democratic stability. Some citizens may reasonably calculate that further EU integration will buttress, or cement, democracy in their own country. So, citizens who are not very satisfied with national democratic performance and do not trust their domestic political institutions may be in favour of integration, reckoning that tying their country as closely as possible to highly 'democratic' EU states will provide a fairly stable political context in which to bed down domestic democratic processes. On the other hand, citizens who are fairly satisfied with the nature of democracy in their own country may not see any democracy-related advantage to the EU. In fact, some citizens may regard the EU as suffering from a 'democratic deficit' and may not wish to imperil the relatively highly democratic context they live in by tying it into the somewhat flawed institutions of the EU. Essentially, EU citizens who see the EU as highly democratic may support integration while EU citizens who see it as undemocratic may oppose integration (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000, Rohrschneider, 2002, Christin, 2005).

Cues: parties and values

Another theory posits that many individuals are not particularly interested in, or knowledgeable about, EU matters and so rely on domestic cues (or proxies) when generating their attitudes to integration. Hooghe and Marks state that 'the underlying premise of cue theory is that underlying values and interests need to be primed to become politically salient ... the cues that appear most relevant to European integration arise in member states' (2005, p424-5). These cues may be taken from domestic political parties (Anderson, 1998, Franklin et al 1994, Franklin 2002). For example, supporters of incumbent governing parties may be more likely than non-supporters to favour moves towards EU integration. Gabel (1998, 339) summarises this argument as follows:

Voters tie their support for integration to their support for their government (president in France). The prime minister of each member state (the president in France) is responsible for negotiating all integrative reforms and for designing and representing his or her national positions vis-à-vis the EU. Consequently ... citizens project their evaluations of the party of the national leader onto integration.

Citizens may also rely on their underlying political values when generating their views on integration. Given that the EU has been long associated with economic liberalisation, EU integration may be associated in citizens' minds with free market capitalism, and the eradication of obstacles to free trade, and so integration might be favoured by those broadly on the political 'right'. There is also the possibility that the converse is true, that citizens with 'left wing' political values are likely to be supportive of integration given that integration 'has become a left-leaning project because it holds out the prospect of continental-wide regulation' (Hooghe and Marks 2005, p425).

Cognitive mobilisation

A final theoretical approach suggests that, due to the abstract nature of EU integration, citizens who are relatively highly cognitively mobilised are hypothesised to be relatively supportive of integration (Ingelhart, 1970, Ingelhart *et al.*, 1991, Jansen, 1991). Ingelhart (1970) argued that citizens who are relatively highly politically aware (cognitively mobilised) are likely to be relatively supportive of EU integration. This is due to fact that citizens need to be quite cognitively skilled to interpret information relating to the relatively abstract and distant notion of European unity. Ingelhart also argued that the relationship between being cognitively skilled and attitudes to integration is likely to be a positive one. The more information you process about EU integration the less threatened by, and cautious about, integration you are likely to become.

3. Are Citizens in Former Communist States Different from Other EU Citizens?

Citizens in former communist states may differ from other EU citizens in terms of 1/ the *extent* to which they support closer EU integration (i.e. their level of support), and 2/ the *determinants* of their attitudes to integration. First, in terms of 'levels', the simple descriptive graph in figure 1 shows us that citizens in former communist states do tend to be somewhat more favourably disposed toward closer integration than citizens in other states. Following on from the above theoretical discussions, there are a number of possible explanations of this difference, some more plausible than others. Perhaps in former communist states there are relatively large numbers of citizens who have characteristics that are associated with being supportive of closer integration (i.e. who are a/ high in human capital, b/ have positive perceptions of their country's future economic performance, c/ are *not* economically nationalist, d/ live in countries that receive a lot of money from the EU or live in countries that are relatively poor e/ have multiple identities, f/ have positive evaluations of the EU democratic nature, g/ are highly cognitively mobilised, h/ are supporters of the incumbent government, or i/ are left wing (or extreme on the left-right spectrum)). Of the above, perhaps b, c, d and f are the most plausible, given that former communist states are noted for being somewhat poorer than 'western' states and are also likely to see the democratic EU as a means of bedding down their quite recent transition to democracy.

Our second question relates to possible east-west heterogeneity in terms of the factors driving attitudes to EU integration. Do citizens in the east rely on different decision making mechanisms when generating their attitudes to the EU. In other words, are certain of our theoretical approaches much more important (or salient) in the east than in the west. Scholarship on attitudes in the western countries has long been dominated by the economic rationality hypothesis. Gabel (1998a) for example, tested a range of theoretical

approaches and found that economic factors had the greatest predictive power. Some analysts (such as Cicowski, 2000, Tucker *et al.*, 2002, Christin, 2005) argue that the economic approach is key to understanding attitudes to European integration in former communist states as well as the western established member states. For example, in their ‘winners and losers’ model Tucker *et al.* argue that citizens who have economically benefited from the initial transition from communism to democracy/free markets are also likely to benefit from – and therefore support – the transition to an integrated EU. Citizens who have done well materially out of the initial transition will seek to buttress the free market economic approach by advocating close cooperation with other free market states (i.e. they will advocate EU integration). Citizens who have done badly economically out of the initial transition to the free market and democracy are hypothesised to be sceptical of cementing the free market approach via closer EU integration. Tucker *et al.* (2002) analyse the responses of citizens in 10 former communist applicant countries and find support for their model. However, because they focus only on former communist countries their analysis cannot shed light on whether economic factors are *more likely to be important in former communist countries than in non-former communist countries*. Thus, in our analysis we include respondents from both contexts (former-communist and not) in order to systematically assess variation in attitude determinants across context.

At face value, it seems impossible to test the relative importance of the ‘winners and losers’ model because this is a context specific model based directly on the two transitions in eastern Europe. However, following Caplanova *et al.* (2004) we use education (and other social class factors) as measures of winners and losers and so can quite easily render this apparently context specific model comparable to the more theoretically general egocentric economic utilitarian model discussed above. In short, in both contexts, some people are more likely to do well out of economic integration (the winners) – the highly educated and skilled middle class – and some

people (the losers) are likely to do less well (specifically, the less well educated and lower skilled working class).

In contrast to this emphasis on economic factors, Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2006) suggest that economic rationality is likely to be less important in former communist states than in the 'western' states. They argue that existing literature is inadequate due to 'the predominance of instrumental reasoning about integration' (2006, 141). Their argument is not that instrumentalism will not be evident in former communist states but rather that it will play a *less important role* than it does in western states. Instead, they argue, citizens in former communist states will be more concerned about values, identity and democratic performance when generating their views on European integration.


In terms of the importance of values, the authors state that 'existing literature ... may be inadequate, primarily because it has assumed basic value consensus at mass and elite levels over market structure and the predominance of instrumental reasoning about integration' (2006, 141). The argument is that the free market is not fundamentally contested in western states; mainstream opinion is in favour of a liberal market regime and a consensus exists that there is no viable or plausible socialist alternative. Thus, the merits or otherwise of the free market is not a key political issue in the western states. Because of this lack of salience, arguments about the free market do not determine (or shape) citizens' views about the EU. In contrast, the argument goes, in eastern states the merits or otherwise of the free market is a live political issue. Thus, citizens' fundamental political values on economic management (are they leftist interventionists or do they favour the free market?) are at the heart of political debate in the eastern states. Because of the salience of this values area, it is likely to play a key role in determining whether one is in favour of or opposed to EU integration. Citizens who are economically 'right wing' and favour the free market are hypothesised to favour closer EU integration and the reverse is the case for economically

interventionist 'leftist' citizens. Rohrschneider and Whitefield argue that because this debate over political values and ideology is very significant in the former communist states, there is limited space for economic instrumentalism to shape citizens' preferences.

Additionally, in eastern Europe, states themselves are very new entities and are questioned within and outside the state. Thus, according to Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2006), factors relating to nationalism and national independence are likely to be relatively important in this context. The authors also emphasise the importance of democratic performance in eastern states. Citizens in countries which are performing very successfully in terms of their democratic institutions may not feel a strong need to tie their country into 'democratic' Europe (the EU). In contrast, citizens in countries that are performing badly in terms of democratic governance may be attracted to the EU and its strongly pro-democracy values. Whitefield et al, (2006) for example, found that in the Baltic states citizens' judgements about how well national institutions were performing were key predictors of citizens' attitudes to EU integration.

4. Data

We use the European Election Study 2004 pooled data set which contains responses to a core set of questions from representative samples of 24 of the 25 EU member states. Questions were asked which measured social class, education, prospective national economic perceptions, views on non-national EU members availing of jobs in one's country, whether the respondent has an exclusively national identity, and their relative level of trust in their home parliament and the EU parliament. Also asked were respondents' level of interest in politics, and their party support. Additionally data was collected for each country on budgetary contributions to the EU and GNP levels. See appendix for full details of these variables.

Figure 1: Support for further EU integration by member state, 2004

5. Results

Citizens in former communist countries – as noted earlier and illustrated in Figure 1 – are somewhat more in favour of EU integration than citizens in established member states. Why? We attempt to account for their relatively pro-integrationist views by first running a model in which all our individual level predictors are entered as well as a dummy variable capturing whether or not the respondent is a citizen of a post-communist state. As shown in Model 1 in Table 1, the co-efficient for this dummy variable remains highly statistically significant and suggests that, controlling for all included individual level factors, being from a post-communist state means that you are two thirds of a unit more positive on the 10 unit anti- versus pro-integration scale, a reasonably sizeable amount in substantive terms. We now introduce our contextual level economic variables.

Table 1: Multi-level linear regression models predicting support for further European integration

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>
Intercept	5.10***	0.18	5.03***	0.18	5.89***	0.44
Degree educated	0.15***	0.04	0.15***	0.04	0.15***	0.04
Age (divided by 100)	-0.34***	0.12	-0.34***	0.12	-0.34***	0.12
Trade unionist	0.08*	0.04	0.08*	0.04	0.08*	0.04
Male	0.14***	0.04	0.14***	0.04	0.14***	0.04
Upper middle class	0.26***	0.07	0.27***	0.07	0.27***	0.07
Middle class	0.12**	0.05	0.12**	0.05	0.12**	0.05
Lower middle class	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.06
Working class	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Political interest	0.06**	0.02	0.06**	0.02	0.07**	0.03
Campaign interest (0 to 3)	0.16***	0.02	0.16***	0.02	0.16***	0.02
More trust in EP than NP (0 to 9)	0.14***	0.01	0.14***	0.01	0.14***	0.01
Retrospective economic perceptions (-2 to 2)	0.15***	0.02	0.15***	0.02	0.15***	0.02
Prospective economic perceptions (-2 to 2)	0.21***	0.02	0.21***	0.02	0.21***	0.02
European and national identity	1.20***	0.04	1.20***	0.04	1.20***	0.04
Exclusive employment rights (0 to 3)	-0.36***	0.02	-0.36***	0.02	-0.36***	0.02
Post-communist state	0.66**	0.27	0.58**	0.27	0.26	0.32
Net transfers from the EU (as % of GNP)			0.17	0.14		
GNP per capita (PP adj. \$, 2004)					-0.03**	0.01
Log likelihood	-39,682.6		-39,681.8		-39,680.7	


* p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01. N = 17,213, number of groups = 22. Source: EES 2004

Model 2 shows that introducing information relating to net EU budget transfers does not affect the importance of the post-communist dummy. However, as shown in model 3, the introduction of the GNP per capita variable renders the post-communist dummy variable insignificant and dramatically reduced in substantive size (down from 2/3 of a unit from model 1 to one quarter of a unit). This suggests that the reason that citizens in post-communist countries are more pro-integrationist than citizens in other

member states is that post-communist countries are poorer than other member states and this relative poverty leads to pro-EU attitudes.

We now move away from discussion *levels* of support for integration and instead focus on the *determinants* of support for the EU. In other words, do the decision making mechanisms that citizens rely on when generating their views about integration vary according to whether citizens reside in post-communist states or established member states? In Table 2 we report two models including all our explanatory variables, one model for former communist states and the other model for established member states.

Figure 2: Predicted changes in levels of support for further European integration for citizens in former communist countries and other member states



We also show – in bold – which particular variables are statistically significantly different from each other.⁵ For ease of interpretation we use the

co-efficients in the models to calculate maximum effects and we graphically illustrate the most important (the substantively largest) of these in Figure 2.

Table 2: Multi-level linear regression models separately predicting support for further European integration for the post communist countries and other EU member states

	Post communist states		Other EU states	
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>
Intercept	4.72***	0.76	5.93***	0.45
Degree educated	-0.01	0.08	0.18***	0.05
Age (divided by 100)	-0.03	0.02	-0.47***	0.14
Trade unionist	0.10	0.09	0.07	0.05
Male	-0.11	0.07	0.24***	0.04
Upper middle class	0.17	0.16	0.30***	0.08
Middle class	0.04	0.09	0.17***	0.06
Lower middle class	0.02	0.11	0.05	0.08
Working class	0.00	-	0.00	-
Political interest (0 to 3)	-0.05	0.05	0.10***	0.03
Campaign interest (0 to 3)	0.23***	0.05	0.13***	0.03
More trust in EP than NP (-9 to 9)	0.14***	0.02	0.15***	0.01
Retrospective economic perceptions (-2 to 2)	0.13***	0.04	0.16***	0.03
Prospective economic perceptions (-2 to 2)	0.40***	0.05	0.15***	0.03
European and national identity	0.89***	0.08	1.32***	0.05
Exclusive employment rights (0 to 3)	-0.11**	0.05	-0.40***	0.02
GNP per capita (PP adj. \$, 2004)	0.05	0.05	-0.03**	0.01
N (group)	7		15	
N (individuals)	4,621		12,592	
Log likelihood	-10,652.0		-28,964.8	

* p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01. Unweighted N = 19156, number of groups = 23. Source: EES 2004. Statistically significant (at the 0.1 level) differences, as from a pooled model with interaction terms, between post-communist and other EU states are in bold

Overall, we see that attitudes in the post-communist countries are less structured than in established member states and that differences across

context are for most variables not very substantively large. However, for two of the economic variables important differences emerge. Prospective economic evaluations is a particularly important predictor in the east but not in the west. The reverse is the case for the economic xenophobia variable which has a much bigger impact in the west than in the east.

6. Discussion

Public opinion has a key impact on the development of the European Union. The attitudes of EU citizens and their political choices 'shape and constrain the process of European integration' (Gabel, 1998, p333). This is particularly apparent, for example, at the time of referendums. The defeat of the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark in 1992 and the defeat of the Nice Treaty in the Republic of Ireland in 2001 dramatically delayed institutional development. It is also apparent in terms of particular government decisions. For instance, the British Labour party's wavering over whether or not to adopt the Euro is in significant part a result of the British public's scepticism about integration (McLaren 2004). More generally, in addition to referendums and government policy decisions, the attitude of citizens to integration is crucial in terms of generating a political legitimacy for the EU. As Gabel (1988, p333) states, the views of citizens 'provide the political foundation for integration. Since EU law lacks a supranational means of enforcement, the endurance of the EU political system vitally depends on public compliance with and acceptance of EU law'. The EU essentially depends, for its continued functioning, on an acceptable level of backing from the public. The important question thus arises: why do some members of the public back the EU and others do not? This question has received a great deal of academic attention. Many analysts have assessed the relative merits of different theories of attitude formation. However, to date the impact of the recent dramatic enlargement of the EU has not been systematically addressed.

Our examination of possible differences between the new members from central and eastern Europe and established member states is important both in the substantive context of understanding EU politics and also more widely for political science models of individual behaviour. First, for our understanding of EU politics we need to know whether there are one or more ‘publics’ in the EU. If our different models work very differently in our two contexts (‘west’ and ‘east’) then we must concede an extra layer of complexity in our attempts to model EU citizen attitudes, and we must accept that the assumption that all EU citizens are essentially relying on the same decision making mechanisms is an overly strong one. Second, more generally for political science, we here have a test case in which we can assess the robustness of our models. If models of EU citizens’ behaviour that were initially generated for EU 15 actually ‘work’ on the newly democratised former communist EU 8 then this gives quite a deal of credence to the initial theories in that they can travel across what seems like very different contexts. In essence, the theories would have proved worthwhile because they generalise beyond the context in which they were initially elaborated and tested. Individuals would have proved to be pretty much the same wherever they are (or more specifically, individuals in former communist eastern European states would have proved pretty much the same as individuals in the rest of Europe in terms of what drives their views on EU integration). And, insofar as relatively minor differences in the performance of models do emerge, one may interpret this as a need to modify or refine – rather than jettison – existing theories of support for integration.

To a significant extent, our study has been exploratory. We have simply sought to assess the extent to which there is – or is not – variation across context in terms of the determinants of attitudes to the EU. Our results are, we think instructive. We found that it is not possible to conclude that economic instrumentalism *per se* is either stronger or weaker in one particular context. What matters is *which particular type* of economic

instrumentalism is focused on. The two biggest differences across the two contexts relate to economic instrumental variables. Prospective national economic perceptions were much more important in the east than the west and economic xenophobia was much more important in the west than the east. Perhaps the conclusion to draw is that the xenophobia issue is of relatively low salience in the east *because few workers from the west actually want to travel east and compete for jobs there*. In contrast, the issue of economic immigration is of high salience in the west precisely because there is a large flow of workers from the east to the west rather than the reverse. Thus, the relative likelihood of being effected by non-nationals competing for jobs probably accounts for the greater importance of economic xenophobia in the west (rather than citizens in the west being fundamentally more insular than citizens in the east). Furthermore, the high salience of the economic perceptions in the east may perhaps be accounted for by a high level of enthusiasm among entrants. Because former communist countries have just become members of the EU maybe they reckon they will yield some economic dividend fairly quickly (and thus economic perceptions and attitudes to integration are so closely associated in this context at this time).

In relation to all the other factors studied, what emerges is the similarity between west and east. Egocentric utilitarianism, national identity and political interest are all larger predictors in the western context than in the eastern context but in substantive terms the effects are not particularly large. It is also interesting to note that our control variables – age and sex – also act quite differently in the two contexts. Being younger and being male are predictors of a positive disposition towards integration in the west but not in the east. Overall, attitudes to integration are less structured (i.e. less predictable with the theories tested here) in the east than in the west, citizens in both contexts are roughly similar in terms of the reasons that they favour or oppose integration but key differences do emerge in terms of different aspects of economic utilitarianism: economic xenophobia particularly drives

attitudes in the west and prospective economic evaluations particularly drives attitudes in the east.

Notes

¹ On the pre-enlargement EU see, for example, McLaren (2004), de Vreese and Boomgaaden (2005) and Hooge and Marks (2005). On analyses focusing on central and eastern European states see, for example, Christin (2005), Caplanova et al (2004) and Tucker et al (2002).

² We summarise existing models simply in enough detail to provide a theoretical platform for our next section which discusses possible ‘east’ versus ‘west’ differences. See Hooge and Marks (2005) for a much more detailed description of current interpretations.

³ This particular interpretation has not been explicitly addressed in existing research and should not be confused with an interpretation based on general attitudes to immigrants which would incorporate a range of non-economic as well as economic factors and would not be confined to (non-national) EU citizens (see, for example, de Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005). Unfortunately the EES 2004 data did not include questions about immigrants and so a measure of attitudes to immigrants could not be included in our analysis.

⁴ One’s sense of identity may be correlated with one’s level of economic nationalism, mentioned above, but the two are conceptually distinct. On identity and attitudes to integration see also Carey (2002).

⁵ This was done by running a model of the pooled dataset with interaction terms.

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Appendix: Question Wording

'European Unification has already gone too far' versus 'European unification should be pushed further' (1-10 scale, with high score indicating pro-integration position) [dependent variable]

If you were asked to choose one of these five names for your social class, which one would you say you belong to? Working class, Lower Middle Class, Middle Class, Upper Middle Class, Upper Class, Other [subjective class]

How old were you when you stopped full time education? Please write age in years _____ (Or tick the 'still studying' option) [degree (age 21 or over)]

And now a question about the economy. Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the general economic situation in Britain is: A lot better, a little better, stayed the same, a little worse, a lot worse? [retrospective economic evaluation]

And over the next 12 months, do you think the general economic situation in Britain will: get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, get a lot worse? [prospective economic evaluation]

*Please indicate how strongly you agree with the following ... statements.
'When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people from [own*

country] over citizens from other EU member countries who want to work here': strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree [prioritise own people for jobs]

As well as your current citizenship, do you also think of yourself as a citizen of the European Union? Often, sometimes, never [exclusive citizenship]

To what extent are you interested in politics – are you: very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, not at all interested? [interest in politics]

Thinking back to just before the elections for the European Parliament were held on 10th June, how interested were you in the campaign for those elections? Were you: very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, not at all interested? [interested in EP election campaign]

Please tell me on a score of 1-10 how much you personally trust each of the institution below. "1" means that you do not trust an institution at all, and "10" means you have complete trust. Firstly, how much do you trust [home] parliament, European Parliament, [home] [relative trust in home and EU parliament]