



# Chapter 16

## Europe as our new nation: trust and legitimacy in the EU

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### Abstract

Citizenship as a set of roles and expectations on a level of individual is in a process of transformation. In a modern view it was attached to a nation state. The question for an empirical research is if the EU as new institutional and political entity resembles the type of emotionally leaden attachment typical for national states, or is the attachment of citizens to it of a more dispersed and unaffected kind. The transformation resembles that of a change in territorial identity in a process of globalisation. Moreover it is interesting to compare the old and new members of EU, and to look at the factors influencing the support to institutions at different levels in a hierarchy. One may contemplate different strategies that actors are choosing fulfilling their interests as members of groups in a political and social spectrum, much of it traversing national state boundaries, but including also national elites' interests, like exit or veto strategies. The topic is important for evaluation of legitimacy of institutions.

## Introduction

The relationship between citizens' evaluation of democratic institutions on a national and on a European level has received considerable attention in recent studies. Most of the studies dealt with the impact that evaluation on a national level might have on support for integration, European identity and evaluation of regime performance. A common finding is that correlations are high and positive. Our analysis starts from that perspective. We have set a modest goal of exploring possible factors that might lay behind those correlations in a comparative context. Our emphasis is to put East European new member states on the research agenda. We know from previous studies that national contexts are important in understanding patterns of relations among various levels of explanation (Brinegar and Jolly 2005, etc.).

Initial explanations for the considerable support in some countries for European institutions as compared with national institution starts from perspective that the meaning of what is European is different in contexts where there is no particular political and interests cleavages in relation to European institutions. Italy is quoted as a case in that respect. (M. Koenig-Archibugi). In East European countries European accession and reforms associated with that are often perceived as inevitable. There is basic consensus that it is better than to staying outside, as ideal that brings benefits to all.

Low levels of trust and support for political entities at the national level in Italy is connected with sharp cleavages in historical periods of a process of nation state building (M. Koenig-Archibugi). Again the East European political situation can stay in parallel with the generally low level of trust and support of national institutions, as a consequence of sharp political dissensus about national priorities. Divisions, which are consequences of "ideological wars", make national identity weak (M. Koenig-Archibugi, 86). There is

hope that European influence would enhance better functioning of national institutions.

Support for institutions in societies with long established democratic traditions and in new democracies has different sources and different meaning. Therefore, the relationship between support of national and European institutions can tell us a lot about the formation of attitudes.

## **Citizens' identity**

A concept of national citizens' identity has specific meaning when European level is taken into consideration. There is the thesis of a protest vote or secondary elections, when citizens that are not satisfied with the national government can chose to punish national government by withdrawal of a support for European processes and institutions. The European level is but one additional problem of internal political debate.

The conception of citizens' identity in that context is very much a consequences of negotiations between political actors and interest groups, it represent type of a 'thin' locality on a national and European level. It does not suppose strong connection among members of a group.

Politics at the domestic level is a 'nested game'; here strategies that are suboptimal at one level can be optimal if political outcome at another level is taken into account. (Hix and Goetz 2000:271). Actors may choose to exit the domestic area, or can use veto strategies to promote their cause, or use information advantage to achieve additional benefits in domestic area (Hix and Goetz 2000:271). There is an inherent interplay between the two levels.

Citizens' identity on European level does not resemble that of a nation state; citizenship is separate from national identity. Allegiances that the EU seeks to elicit are of post-national kind (Fossum 2005). The EU is pursuing the

modern idea of statehood, as divorced from nationhood: the polity is not bound by pre-political bonds. (Eriksen and Fossum 2004)). Europe citizens' identity consists of networks independent of national boundaries and as such is not in a conflict with national citizens identification, which itself is in a process of transformation.

What constitute a citizen's identity is a social power as a potential that can be realised by expressing opinions and making judgement about national and European institutions as one of a form of citizens activity. Both positive and negative support of political system shows that kind of identity and belonging. (Franklin and Van der Eijk, 1996).

We can conceive of a theoretical relationship between different types and objects of support to political system and broader identification with the system. This can be conceived more as a latent trait that lies behind various manifest forms of expressing judgements. Among synonyms of political trust or, in parallel to social capital, political capital are also citizenship as well as civic duty, political participation, political interest and knowledge, and so on. It signals a common political identity with fellow citizens (Newton 1999:5)

Explicit symbolic identity with European symbols is not necessary part of a broader citizens' identify formed on a base of democratic character of a system (Bruter, 1149). A definition of citizens' identity remains based on identification with the political system as an institutional framework that supports a base for commonality with other citizens. (Bruter, 1155). In that definition we have explicit mention of a relationship between citizens and an institutional framework. That itself is, on a concrete level, encompassed in relationship to functioning of political institutions. And there is no reference on formation of belonging to a social group (Bruter, 1156).

Connected with the definition of citizens' identity in a context of evaluation of institutions at European level is a question of democratic deficit. The European Union can be conceived as an elitist project without widespread public support (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005). What constitute a debate about democratic deficit is reconsideration of Identity and legitimacy in a European context. (Cerutti, 2003) Citizenship can be made through active searching of post-national identity (Eriksen 2005), a new conceptualization of culture and feelings of belonging, where ambivalence, transition and being more historically informed are some key elements. (Stråth 2002).

Reforms imposed on European level have indirect distributional effects. Many of the reforms are also of common benefit. The enlargement/integration process constrained democratic principles because of its inevitability, speed and requirement for expertise. However, as globalization weakens the overall ability of nation-states to control developments in society, one can talk about a global citizenship (Turner 2002). The new Eastern EU members would hardly have more space for choice in domestic politics if they had stayed outside the EU. (de Vreese, and Boomgaarden 2005)

The European governmental model can be conceived also as a pluralist model (Coultrap, 1999) Institutions that are deemed inefficient in a parliamentary democracy model can be efficient in a pluralist model.

We use two pairs of indicators of trust in political institutions on a national and European level. We want to reveal what is common and what remains specific in attitudes to institution at different levels, while sets of measures are parallel in a form of scales and referents. Attitudes to National and European political representative and executive institutions are used as measures of that broader citizens identity. Correlations between the two levels are a result of congruence of specific and general factors of identity formation.

## Explanatory factors

Therefore we use explanatory variables that can shed light on specific components of each of the aspect, national or European. We allow for contextual factors to reinforce the character of that specific background in meaning of each level nationally. We allow exploring domestic politics as explanatory factor in relation to European institutions – and also a reverse effect, European as an explanatory factor in domestic political situation (Hix and Goetz 2000).

The variables that are expected to have more in common with the national institutions are those that are directly related to their evaluation. Trust in national institutions is dependent on institutional performance, both in old members and in new EU members. In post-communists societies there is a situational component more in at front then deeply rooted cultural gained trust in institution (Mishler and Rose (2001; 2005). In evaluation of institutions citizens evaluate the representational capacity of national institutions (Rohrschneider, 2005). We use retrospective and prospective sociotropic economic evaluation and approval of [country] government's record. Attendance at religious services is used as a proxy for the cultural political cleavages that are effective in most of the European countries. These same variables would affect also trust in European political institutions. A simple explanation here would be that those institutions are deemed accountable for what happened in a national frame as well (Gelleny and Anderson, 2000), or a second order elections (Hooghe and Marks 2005; similar to a punishment trap theory (Ray). Cue theory follows the reasoning that national political elites that are strongly divided lead the followers of the parties to express similar opinions (Kitzinger 2003)

Two measures of perceived benefit from the EU societally and individually – EU in the interest of [country] EU in respondent's interest – tap the factors that connect the evaluation of European institutions to national institutions. It

is those two measures that one would expect to see evidence of a transfer of evaluation between European institutions and domestic ones, showing also a degree of interconnectedness of national and European interest. (Franklin and Van der Eijk, 1996; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000)

Three other measures directed to European level show openness and tolerance towards a notion of social welfare and political rights of non-national citizens, where there is possibly a conflictual relationship at national level, on employment - priority to [country] members, citizens of EU countries in [resp. country] vote in [resp. country] and citizens of EU countries in [resp. country] social benefits of [country], and respondent's attitude to European unification (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005, Luedtke 2005). Attachment to a nation is a question of emotional investment and rational expectations. One can preserve emotional investments by taking an inclusive identity, where e.g. ethnic and citizens identity do not overlap. (Kjerm: National Identities...Acta Sociologica 1998)

Anti-immigration attitudes are expected to be more important in old members than in new. Finally, two measures of what we may call European symbolic identity, a non-exclusive national identity and a European national pride: not only [country] citizen, but also European citizen and proud of EU citizenship, are close to a notion of undivided European and national identity (Hooghe and Marks 2005).


Individual political ideology, general political interests, subjective middle and upper class, media exposure, education, and gender and generation cohort are among the remaining variables that are candidates for showing additional meaning of two indices of citizens identity, European and national trust.

## Method section: Results

Cross-country variations in levels of trust in institutions at European level are profound already on the level of expressed opinion (Figure 1). Due to a lack of information despite pre-accession media coverage and referendum campaigns, at the very low levels of opinion expression about EU institutions in new member states. This might reflect a notion of inevitability of European frame of living, which is consistent with the democratic deficit thesis that one has no influence and thus no need to act, and which lead to a political alienation, widespread among Eastern European countries, a power potential is also one of the basic prerequisites of citizens identification.

Excluding Slovakia and Cyprus, who are on the borderline, all new member countries citizens trust EU institutions more than national institutions are, (Figure 2). Those join old members Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. Italy is a special case because of its historical process of state building and rather unproblematic pro-European stance. New member states are all exposed to positive expectations from Europe, e.g. have also a positive budget exchange with the EU. On the other side, euro sceptic sentiment gains established position in public debate and in overall count of institutional support in Denmark, Sweden and Great Britain.


**Figure 1: No opinion on composite indices of trust in European and National institutions.**



Note: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Britain (GB), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Northern Ireland (NI), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE),

Do levels of national trust determine levels of EU trust in a country? Having an exclusive national identity would mean that it would suppress EU orientation. What is more common is having inclusive relations with both levels: one normally trust political institutions at both levels or do not trust any of them.


**Figure 2: Means on composite indices of trust in European and national institutions**



Note: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Britain (GB), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Northern Ireland (NI), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE),

This is confirmed also at the individual level correlations among indices of trust. These range from 0.2 to 0.9, with most of them around 0.6. This level of correlation is by most standards confirmation of a suggestion that both indices, at least in a large part, measure the same trait, a general citizens' identity and sense of participation in a common political space. Yet it is a notion of an undivided identity that is more profound in some of the countries than in other. This might show a congruence of effects of factors on both levels or a general congruence of national interest fulfilled also at European level. The remaining specificity of the two levels of citizens evaluations are subject of further inquiry.

**Figure 3: Correlations between composite indices of trust in European and national institutions**



Note: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Britain (GB), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Northern Ireland (NI), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE),

To test some possible explanations of congruence and divergence of two levels of trust in institutions, a set of factors is correlated with both levels and compared side by side in a Table 1. We have selected cases from different locations in previous results but most of East European new member states. Results again reveal a general congruence of indices. Most correlations, irrespective of the fact that some are measuring 'outputs' of institutions on a national level while others on a European level, are of a roughly same size and direction. Literature suggests that this might change after some powerful variables are controlled in a multivariate fashion. The highest correlation with the national institutional trust is government performance, followed by economic considerations and, what confirms a similarity of contents of both variables, indices of European symbolic identity and European interests variables. The exceptions in later indices are Italy and to some extent Denmark, which both show that there is a conflict in perception of national

and European level. This can be explained by the overtly eurosceptic orientation of respective governments. On the other hand these are the countries that show lowest correlations of national performance indicators with the European evaluation, which is a reverse side of a coin just mentioned.

**Table 1: Correlations of predictors with national political institutions trust and European political institution trust**

Country: Trust/factors	AT		GB		CZ		DK		FI		DE		HU	
	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eu.	Nat.	Eu.	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eu.	Nat.	Eur.
ret_ec	0,19	0,15	0,30	0,24	0,19	0,17	0,27	0,09	0,25	0,20	0,21	0,16	0,35	0,18
pro_ec	0,24	0,21	0,23	0,22	0,29	0,27	0,24	0,12	0,29	0,25	0,29	0,25	0,22	0,06
gov_app	0,38	0,19	0,48	0,30	0,47	0,25	0,39	0,07	0,39	0,28	0,28	0,18	0,40	0,13
rel_at	0,18	0,02	0,08	0,05	0,07	0,00	0,11	0,07	0,13	0,03	0,04	0,03	0,02	0,02
cou_int	0,20	0,36	0,26	0,52	0,28	0,43	0,29	0,53	0,26	0,38	0,30	0,44	0,22	0,31
ind_int	0,22	0,35	0,24	0,51	0,23	0,45	0,28	0,53	0,29	0,43	0,32	0,39	0,21	0,31
empl	0,00	0,12	0,08	0,19	0,03	0,08	-0,02	0,12	0,03	0,06	-0,04	-0,05	-0,04	-0,03
loc_vote	0,08	0,30	0,08	0,24	0,10	0,27	0,05	0,12	0,07	0,16	0,14	0,17	0,14	0,07
soc_ben	0,11	0,14	0,09	0,16	0,09	0,16	-0,02	0,04	0,19	0,16	-0,10	-0,13	0,00	0,04
eu_cit	0,14	0,29	0,18	0,37	0,13	0,32	0,21	0,32	0,23	0,32	0,21	0,23	0,02	0,17
EU_prou	0,19	0,34	0,20	0,44	0,15	0,36	0,24	0,41	0,29	0,40	0,22	0,29	0,22	0,34
far_right	0,03	0,04	-0,03	-0,06	-0,06	-0,03	0,11	0,02	-0,07	-0,07	-0,10	0,05	-0,10	0,02
pol_int	0,13	0,10	0,10	0,05	0,10	0,15	0,15	0,13	0,17	0,11	0,20	0,11	0,02	0,12
mi_clas	0,14	0,17	0,06	0,04	0,10	0,18	0,26	0,20	0,10	0,17	0,07	0,01	0,01	0,04
up_clas	0,14	0,17	0,06	0,04	0,10	0,18	0,26	0,20	0,10	0,17	0,07	0,01	0,01	0,04
watch tv	0,03	0,01	0,09	-0,02	-0,06	-0,03	0,01	-0,05	-0,02	-0,01	0,06	0,00	0,10	0,11
read														
newspaper	0,03	0,00	0,04	-0,07	-0,04	-0,04	0,16	0,09	0,14	0,07	0,09	0,07	-0,04	0,03
age full-time														
education	0,11	0,18	0,09	0,15	0,13	0,20	0,14	0,18	0,23	0,20	0,15	0,00	-0,12	-0,02
men	0,02	0,02	0,08	-0,06	-0,06	-0,04	0,12	0,00	0,06	-0,01	-0,02	-0,08	-0,07	-0,02
year of birth	-0,05	0,13	0,03	0,21	0	0,16	0,05	0,21	0,04	0,1	-0,03	-0,04	-0,12	-0,01

**Table 1 (continued)**

Country:	IT		LV		PL		PT		SK		SI	
Trust/ factors	Nat.	Eur. Nat.	Eur. Nat.	Eur. Nat.	Eur. Nat.	Eur. Nat.	Eur. Nat.	Eur. Nat.	Eur. Nat.	Eur. Nat.	Eur.	Eur.
ret_ec	0,27	-0,09	0,19	0,18	0,24	0,27	0,28	0,24	0,25	0,29	0,28	0,25
pro_ec	0,34	-0,05	0,28	0,27	0,21	0,25	0,20	0,14	0,36	0,35	0,30	0,32
gov_app	0,48	-0,01	0,44	0,24	0,37	0,20	0,47	0,40	0,38	0,46	0,46	0,26
rel_at	0,17	0,08	0,10	0,04	0,09	-0,09	0,18	0,09	0,07	0,07	-0,12	-0,03
cou_int	0,08	0,43	0,15	0,32	0,27	0,38	0,33	0,41	0,34	0,36	0,28	0,40
ind_int	0,04	0,40	0,18	0,32	0,26	0,38	0,34	0,42	0,33	0,34	0,27	0,35
empl	-0,02	0,20	-0,04	0,00	0,05	0,06	-0,04	-0,07	0,07	0,08	0,03	-0,04
loc_vote	-0,08	0,17	-0,02	0,04	0,05	0,17	0,11	0,08	0,19	0,22	0,09	0,11
soc_ben	-0,06	0,04	-0,02	0,00	0,14	0,13	-0,05	-0,08	0,16	0,13	0,09	0,11
eu_cit	0,03	0,23	0,22	0,30	0,11	0,22	0,11	0,15	0,27	0,26	0,23	0,33
EU_prou	0,09	0,40	0,14	0,34	0,16	0,35	0,25	0,28	0,38	0,41	0,24	0,38
far_right	0,12	-0,01	-0,03	-0,04	-0,08	-0,05	0,20	0,17	0,09	0,13	0,02	0,15
pol_int	0,03	0,12	0,07	0,11	0,04	0,13	0,16	0,18	0,03	0,06	0,15	0,20
mi_clas	0,04	0,01	0,15	0,15	0,09	0,17	0,09	0,11	0,16	0,20	0,06	0,14
up_clas	0,04	0,01	0,15	0,15	0,09	0,17	0,09	0,11	0,16	0,20	0,06	0,14
watch tv	0,06	0,08	0,03	0,02	-0,05	0,07	0,07	0,05	0,04	0,04	0,11	0,06
read												
newspaper	0,02	0,01	0,12	0,04	0,04	0,15	-0,04	-0,03	0,08	0,08	0,05	0,03
age full-time												
education	-0,04	-0,02	0,01	0,05	0,00	0,08	-0,01	0,06	0,16	0,15	0,10	0,07
men	0,00	0,01	-0,04	-0,07	0,00	0,03	-0,03	-0,05	-0,06	-0,06	0,03	0,02
year of birth	-0,08	-0,06	-0,02	0,06	0,09	0,1	-0,1	0,02	0,09	0,08	-0,08	-0,01

Note: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Britain (GB), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), Germany (DE), , Hungary (HU), , Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI);

ret\_ec - retrospective and pro\_ec - prospective sociotropic economic evaluation, gov\_app - approval of [country] government's record; rel\_at - attendance at religious services; cou\_int - eu in the interest of [country]; ind\_int - eu in respondent's interest; empl - priority to [country] members, loc\_vote - citizens of eu countries in [resp. country] vote in [resp. country], and soc\_ben - citizens of eu countries in [resp. country] social benefits of [country]; eu\_cit - respondent's attitude to european unification; eu\_cit - not only [country] citizen, but also european citizen, and EU\_prou - proud of eu citizenship. far\_right - Individual political ideology, pol\_int - general political interests, mi\_clas - subjective middle, and up\_clas - upper class, All original non-intervale measurement scales are dichotomised.

New member countries are, as expected, not divided on the issue of limiting access to foreigners to employment and other benefits of nationality.

**Table 2: Differences among correlations of predictors with national political institutions trust and European political institution trust**

factors	Country													Avarage		
	AT	GB	CZ	DK	FI	DE	HU	IT	LV	PL	PT	SK	SI	Total	Old	New
ret_ec	0,04	0,06	0,02	0,18	0,04	0,06	0,17	0,36	0,01	-0,03	0,04	-0,04	0,03	0,07	0,10	0,03
pro_ec	0,03	0,02	0,03	0,12	0,04	0,04	0,15	0,39	0,01	-0,03	0,06	0,02	-0,03	0,06	0,09	0,03
gov_app	0,19	0,17	0,22	0,32	0,11	0,10	0,26	0,50	0,20	0,16	0,07	-0,07	0,20	0,19	0,20	0,17
rel_at	0,17	0,03	0,07	0,04	0,10	0,02	0,00	0,08	0,07	0,18	0,09	0,00	-0,09	0,06	0,09	0,04
cou_int	0,17	0,26	0,16	0,23	0,12	0,14	0,08	0,35	0,17	0,11	0,08	0,02	0,12	0,15	0,19	0,12
ind_int	0,13	0,27	0,22	0,25	0,13	0,07	0,10	0,37	0,15	0,13	0,07	0,00	0,09	0,15	0,18	0,13
empl	0,13	0,11	0,04	0,14	0,03	0,00	0,00	0,22	0,04	0,01	-0,03	0,01	-0,07	0,05	0,09	0,02
loc_vote	0,22	0,16	0,17	0,06	0,09	0,03	-0,07	0,26	0,06	0,12	-0,03	0,02	0,02	0,09	0,13	0,07
soc_ben	0,03	0,07	0,06	0,06	-0,03	-0,03	0,04	0,10	0,02	-0,01	-0,03	-0,03	0,02	0,02	0,03	0,02
eu_cit	0,14	0,19	0,19	0,11	0,10	0,01	0,14	0,20	0,09	0,11	0,04	-0,01	0,10	0,11	0,12	0,11
EU_prou	0,15	0,25	0,20	0,17	0,11	0,07	0,12	0,31	0,20	0,19	0,02	0,03	0,14	0,15	0,15	0,15
far_right	-0,01	0,03	-0,03	0,09	0,00	-0,16	-0,12	0,13	0,01	-0,03	0,03	-0,03	-0,13	-0,02	0,01	-0,05
pol_int	0,03	0,05	-0,05	0,01	0,06	0,09	-0,10	-0,09	-0,04	-0,10	-0,02	-0,03	-0,05	-0,02	0,02	-0,06
mi_clas	-0,03	0,02	-0,08	0,05	-0,07	0,06	-0,03	0,03	0,00	-0,08	-0,02	-0,04	-0,08	-0,02	0,00	-0,05
up_clas	-0,03	0,02	-0,08	0,05	-0,07	0,06	-0,03	0,03	0,00	-0,08	-0,02	-0,04	-0,08	-0,02	0,00	-0,05
watch tv	0,02	0,11	-0,03	0,05	-0,01	0,06	-0,02	-0,02	0,01	-0,13	0,02	0,00	0,04	0,01	0,03	-0,02
read newspaper	0,04	0,11	0,00	0,07	0,07	0,01	-0,07	0,00	0,07	-0,11	0,00	0,00	0,01	0,02	0,04	-0,01
age full-time																
education	0,07	0,06	0,07	0,04	-0,02	-0,15	0,10	0,02	0,05	0,08	0,07	-0,01	-0,03	0,03	0,02	0,04
men	0,00	0,14	-0,02	0,13	0,07	0,06	-0,05	-0,01	0,03	-0,03	0,02	0,01	0,01	0,03	0,05	-0,01
year of birth	0,17	0,18	0,16	0,16	0,06	-0,02	0,11	0,03	0,07	0,02	0,12	-0,01	0,08	0,09	0,11	0,08
Total	0,08	0,12	0,07	0,12	0,05	0,03	0,04	0,16	0,06	0,02	0,03	-0,01	0,02	0,06	0,08	0,04

Note: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Britain (GB), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), Germany (DE), , Hungary (HU), , Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI);

ret\_ec - retrospective and pro\_ec - prospective sociotropic economic evaluation, gov\_app - approval of [country] government's record; rel\_at - attendance at religious services; cou\_int - eu in the interest of [country]; ind\_int - eu in respondent's interest; empl - priority to [country] members, loc\_vote - citizens of eu countries in [resp. country] vote in [resp. country], and soc\_ben - citizens of eu countries in [resp. country] social benefits of [country]; eu\_cit - respondent's attitude to european unification; eu\_cit - not only [country] citizen, but also european citizen, and EU\_prou - proud of eu citizenship. far\_right - Individual political ideology, pol\_int - general political interests, mi\_clas - subjective middle, and up\_clas - upper class, All original non-intervale measurement scales are dichotomised.

Table 2 shows the same results in terms of differences between correlations between parallel institutions and respective predictors. Positive differences show a dominance of a national character. Citizens of new countries can more easily make the jump in understanding of their self in terms of abstract European and national citizens. This, however, might be a process of cognitive opinion formation based on most salient information which one

have, and not an indication of discernment of the subtleties of differences between institutions on different levels.

The extremes of correlations between two trust indices in Figure 3 are matched well in a tendency of parallel correlations with predictors. Where there is a divergent pattern of correlations with predictors, this might explain a weaker correlation among indicators of trust, as in the case of Italy, Denmark, Austria and Great Britain. And a convergent pattern might be a common source of covariation, as it is in Finland and Portugal. New member states have on average more congruent patterns of predictors.

## **Conclusions**

In this preliminary analysis we followed a logic that citizens' identity can be conceptualised as based on simultaneity of judgement about institutions in political soundings at different levels. Both national state level citizenship and European level citizenship influence one another in actors' strategies to seek gains and influence in on one or another level.

A positive message of a story for new eastern European members is that, despite internal difficulties in reaching a consolidated democracy with certain above minimum level of trust in national institutions, citizens in those countries did not project the same criticism onto European level. There is a broad consensus that EU common future is inevitable and, overall, good.

A general conclusion is that situational factors, some deeply rooted in a country's historic tradition, as is case with the eurosceptic attitude in Great Britain, some probably also accounted for by the composition of current government coalitions, underlie the correlation of two measures of trust.

What remains to be checked is to reveal are some possible interaction effects between types of trust in different levels, like inclusive, exclusive and

cosmopolitan identities, in relation to underlying factors. A multivariate model also remains to be tested.

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