Agenda Setters, Shapers of Conflicts and Networkers of Cross Border Communication –

Comparing the National Press in Emerging European Public Sphere

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1.   The role of media as actors in a European Public Sphere

The request for public communication as an indispensable prerequisite for the democratisation of the EU has triggered a vivid scholarly debate about the emergence of a European public sphere. Such a European public sphere can be a source of legitimacy for the European political project (Kielmannsegg 1996) and an instrument for collective identity building that may help trigger a sense of belonging to a common European community. Discussing the conditions for such a forum of communication (Neidhardt et al. 2000), most scholars agree that the *national mass media* is the main arena for the representation of a European public sphere. Hence, national mass media are at the center of a rich strand of research that seeks to assess the degree and forms of Europeanisation of national public spheres by conducting content analyses (Wimmel 2005, Trenz 2004, Gerhards 2000, LeTorrec 2001, deVreese 2003, Brantner et al. 2005, Kevin 2003, Eilders/Voltmer 2003, van den Steeg 2005, Kleinen von Königslöw et al. 2005, Berkel 2005).

In most of these studies, the media's functions have not been clearly defined. So far research has neglected to take into account that media can fulfil *two functions* (see for such a distinction Koopmans and Pfetsch 2004). On the one hand, media serve as forum, that allows for self-observation in a society. On the other hand, media can legitimately raise their own voice and thus act as political actors in their own right. The latter takes up a trajectory of reasoning by political scientists and media scholars (Page 1996) that argue that media must be granted a role as autonomous actor in political communication. In this active role, media make their own contributions to public debate. This raises the question whether media use these contributions to argue for particular policies (Page 1996: 21). If they do so, they can – under certain conditions of cummulation and consonance (Noelle-Neumann 1973) – potentially influence and shape public opionion (Neidhardt et al. 2004:30-31). In fact, as Page, Shapiro and Dempsey (1987) have shown empirically, news commentators have a significant positive impact on public opinion. While political actors, such as governments, interest groups or social movements need to cater to the media logic in order to get their messages through, media the infrastructure and the resources to become public themselves. Moreover, if they speak up as actors, they do not need to rely on the daily hoops of news events driven by the institutional agenda or political public relations, but are free to comment on whatever issue they judge as relevant. By doing so, they can become producers of events –

contradicting the traditional division between media and politics (Kriesi 2004: 189). These characteristics make media as speakers a particularly important segment of the public sphere. Hence, to understand this important actor and single out its explicit role in building up a European public sphere, we will concentrate in this chapter on the media's genuine voice. In the genre of commentaries media depend less on external sources of information. Here, they are more than an arena of public exchange.

We want to distinguish three *roles of media as actors* when shaping processes of Europeanisation in public debates: media can be agenda-setters, shapers of conflict dimensions and networkers for cross-border flows of communication. The first role refers to the classical agenda-setting function, the other two roles refer to the function of framing an issue once it is set on the agenda. It is important to note that we understand framing as a process that involves selection and salience. "To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and / or treatment recommendation for the item described" (Entman 1993:52). In the following, we will describe these roles and show how media might use them to shape processes of Europeanisation.

The first role refers to the capacity of the media to attribute salience to topics of EU integration on the national agenda. In this role media serve as *agenda-setters (1)*. They may enhance Europeanisation by giving salience to EU integration issues prior to national issues. Thus studying the salience of EU integration issues allows us to gauge the media's willingness to discuss EU issues at all. In their second role, media as actors can be regarded as *shapers of conflict dimensions (2)*. Here media frame an issue that is on the agenda. To capture these framing processes we propose to stick to the idea of conflict lines (Voltmer 1998/99: 78f.). Conflict lines reflect deep political cleavages within societies. Such conflict lines divide opposing ideological positions. A conflict line thus has a binary structure describing ideal positions that lie at the starting and end point of a continuum. Conflict lines in substantial policy fields often reflect classical left-right cleavages. As questions of European integration do not necessarily fall within such a left-right cleavage in most countries (Mittag / Wessels 2003: 419), specific dimensions of conflict lines need to be developed. This point is stressed by Eilders and Voltmer (2003: 11). They claim that framing of European integration may overcome the traditional left-right cleavage to which the media are bound

with regard to domestic politics. In an inductive process we developed nine different conflict lines that capture conflicting positions in debates on EU-integration. By supporting specific positions on these conflict lines, media as actors may shape the dominant attributes of the issue in public perception. The specific poles of these conflict lines will be introduced in the empirical part of this paper.

In their third role, media as actors perform as *networker for cross-border flows of communication* (3). If the term Europeanisation is taken seriously, then the media's role in creating and strengthening transnational public communication across Europe comes to the fore. Does the press frame the issue of EU integration as a national problem or does the press portray the Union as an interdependent space in which different levels and nations are necessary for problem solving? Framing in this perspective asks whether the media as actors open up the national public space for European or member state actors and their positions. This framing perspective places cross-border flows of communication at the center of attention. In fact, we may treat the media as engine of Europeanisation, if they overcome their parochial nationally confined angles and reach beyond the territorial state. It is the specific potential to sustain intensified communicative interaction that may trigger a "European discourse public" (Wimmel 2005). This European discourse public is constituted by "the extension of social spaces which are constituted by dense transactions, beyond national borders" (Zürn 2000, 187). Following the work of Koopmans and Erbe (2004), we may identify this Europeanised discourse by investigating patterns of communicative interaction by various national media across Europe. The strength to which these media direct their communicative linkages to spaces outside the national realm define whether discourses can be described as "national", "transnational", or "European". This cross border flow of communication may emerge in two basic forms (Koopmans/Erbe 2004): While vertical Europeanisation captures communicative linkages between the national and the European level, horizontal Europeanisation consists of communicative interaction between different EU member states. The media's communicative interactions with other actors does not only reveal their openness towards the European space, but also how they structure this space by defining who is a friend and who is an enemy. Media thus can be networker for transnational actors while condemning them or media can be networker for transnational actors while supporting their positions.

The three functions of media gain relevance as they point to mechanisms that might affect *people's perceptions*. Due to one of the most powerful mechanisms media can attribute salience to issues and therefore shape what people think about. If the media act in their agenda-setting function on their own account, they are free to deviate from the news agenda which is most often dominated by political events and the competition over their interpretations by political actors. Within the recognized format of editorials and commentaries, the media may select issues and assign relevance and importance to those issues according to their own evaluations of and thereby stimulate and focus public debate (Eilders et al. 2004). Following agenda-setting research, we can suppose that the media effect on public salience is particularly strong regarding European issues. Zucker (1978: 227) found the agenda-setting effect on peoples perceptions of politics to be particularly strong, if the individuals have less direct experience with a given issue area. LeTorrec et al. (2001) claim that this potential accounts for particularly high media impact when it comes to political and institutional dimensions of European integration. Since European politics is not in the realm of the day to day political experience of the people, we may suggest the agenda-setting effect of the media to be quite powerful in this respect. The argument must not only relate to the salience of European issues, but does also account for the horizontal, member-state, dimension of European configurations. Thus, we would also expect a strong agenda-setting effect of national media with regard to the observance of politics in other EU-countries.

While the agenda-setting function of the media relates to issues, the much broader impact of media on public perceptions of politics is captured by the concept of framing. The concept of framing refers to the contextualization of issues, namely the construction of a framework of interpretative meaning around an issue, which then is taken as a basis for collective opinion formation. The framing approach has emphasized that people's attitudes and behavior towards objects or problems depend on how they conceive of them. For the European Union Le Torrec (2001: 5) has pointed out that media may undermine the acceptability of the distinctive features of EU multi-level governance by "playing down the EU decisionary role and presenting the European model through political categories inherited from national representative democracy". With regard to the possible impact of frames on people's perception, politicians and journalists compete over them in the media. Framing in this light plays a major role in the extertion of political power (Entman 1993:55). Since the early empirical studies in this tradition (Iyengar/Kinder 1987) it has been widely acknowledged that the media are effective actors in processes of framing political and social issues and thereby

causing political effects (Ghanem 1997, Entman 1993). "By disseminating commentaries, editorials, news analyses, and other interpretations of the news, the media tell their audiences how to react to what is going on around them." (Lasorsa, 1997: 162).

Yet processes of framing and agenda-setting are *context* sensitive. If we seek to explain and understand how media set the agenda and construct frames, the notion of context is important. As Gamson and Lasch (1983) point out, every political discourse exists within a certain "issue culture" in which groups and individuals use a catalogue of available idea elements and make use of a variety symbolic devices to express their ideas (Gamson and Lasch (1983: 397). National media as actors are not independent of these issue cultures that prevail within nation states. Moreover, they are deeply involved within them. This involvement of national media into issue – or we could also say political – cultures within each state, is at the core of Diez-Medrano's study (2003) which emphasizes that media's framing represents the long-term expectations of the impact of European integration on national collectivities and that national cultures are engrained in such framing processes. As a result, we should expect differences in salience attribution and framing of European issues in the commentating of the media of different countries.

Perhaps the most basic, but probably also one of the most crucial factors that shape national cultures with regard to EU integration is the depth of integration. We assume that the media in countries that are fully involved in the project of European integration, attribute more salience to the issue of EU integration and frame it differently compared to media in countries that can be regarded as hesitant members or that have not (yet) joined the EU. Europeanisation by the media can thus be regarded as interlinked with the political and economic involvement of a country into the project of European integration. Using a similar argument, Gerhards (2000: 292) has pointed out that the Europeanisation of public debates depends on certain structural and institutional prerequisites. He claims that a European public sphere will only develop when the EU has turned into a functioning democracy. Gerhards is convinced that democratic structures are necessary for Europeanisation as they force political actors to "go public" and win the votes of a European electorate. We argue in contrary that already common political structures and institutions, even if they are not fully legitimised by a European electorate, can stimulate the Europeanisation of public communication. We expect that a country's involvement in these common structures will affect how media shape European debates within their three specific roles.

So far we have treated media as a common entity within a country. However, research points to the fact that different media types shape European debates differently. The quality press is more open to processes of Europeanisation than boulevard newspapers or television news (Kevin 2003: 55f.; Schlecht 2002: 110f.). Our second hypothesis concerns the differences of the media within a country. We expect to observe a differentiated set of opinions and frames towards Europeanisation and variation regarding the openness towards European scopes within a national media system. In particular we focus on the press. Here we hypothesize the regional and boulevard press to be more parochial and more Europsceptic than the national quality press.

In order to single out the role of media as actors in the public sphere, we will present analyses that compare media commentating not only between seven countries – namely Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the UK –, but also within these countries according to specific press types. Following our hypothesis regarding the depth of integration, this selection of countries leads us to expect that commentating differs between three groups of countries. First, there is the continental European group constituted by Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. These countries are – with the exception of Spain – founding members of the European Union. In addition, all of them have joined the common currency, the Schengen agreement and thus can be regarded as fully involved into the integration project. A second group is solely constituted by the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is probably one of the most hesitating members of the Union regarding the shift of competences. By staying outside central projects as the common currency or the Schengen agreement, the UK has decided to limit the depth of integration within the EU. The third group consists of Switzerland. The Swiss have not joined the Union so far. Nevertheless, they are narrowly bound to the European Union by bilateral agreements. The Swiss thus are bound to, but not deeply involved into European integration.

In order to analyse differences within a media system, we chose four newspapers, which were to represent the most important segments of the print media system. Our analysis draws on one right wing and one left wing quality newspaper on the one hand and one boulevard title and one regional newspaper on the other hand. Within each country, we expect a clear-cut difference between the quality newspapers and the regional / boulevard ones. This difference might be especially strong in those countries that have a full-fletched boulevard press

(Germany, Switzerland and the UK).

Our analysis of media voices in different countries and different newspapers is guided by the three roles specified above. We present analyses which intend (1) to assess the capacity of the press to give salience to EU-integration as a political issue on the national media agenda; (2) to explore the framing of European integration in terms of conflict lines associated with EU policy; and (3) to describe how the press portrays actor constellations within the topical field of EU integration and thereby opens up the space for issue-specific communicative integration.

2.   Data and Methodology[1]

To capture the media's genuine voice, we need to distinguish whether the media themselves or other political actors speak up publicly. The institutionalised and legitimate format where media show their own positions is constituted by editorials and press commentaries. These editorials and press commentaries have been studied with the tools of quantitative content analysis. Each editorial or commentary is regarded as one claim of a journalist in which he makes demands. Since one can assume that the editorials represent the political and ideological commentary line of each newspaper, we take the aggregation of claims by individual commentators as the position of the media organization.

A claim is defined as an instance of strategic action in the public sphere. It consists of the expression of a political opinion by some form of physical or verbal action.[2] Such a claim analysis allows us to operationalise the three dimensions we identified as crucial for capturing Europeanisation. First of all, claims are deliminated by the issue field they are made in. As a result claims analysis can answer the question how much salience the press attributes to the field of EU integration in relation to other topics. Second, claims analysis captures the framing which the claimants respectively journalists employ. Therefore, this kind of analysis helps to identify the positions journalists take on political conflict lines. Third, claims have a relational structure which reveals the actor constellations within an issue field. Journalists as

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[1] The data have been collected within the Europub.com project. We want to thank all country teams for their effort in analysing editorials and press commentaries.

[2] The Codebook for content coding of commentaries was developed by Adam et al. (2002). It is available at https://europub.wz-berlin.de.

claimants attribute responsibility, support and critique to specific addressees. In addition, claimants define whose interest would be positively or negatively affected by their claim (object actors). The actor constellation thus shows the press' openness towards European actors and additionally reveals friend-enemy distinctions. The reliability of commentary coding with claims analysis was tested in all countries that were involved in the project. Reliability turned out to be highly satisfactory with an average match of 75% which corresponds to a reliability correlation of .87.[3]

As our hypotheses expect differences in the degree and form of Europeanisation not only between countries, but also within countries regarding different newspaper types, our research design needs to be comparative in a twofold manner. First of all, the press in different countries – namely Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom – is compared. Second, in order to capture the range of ideological positions within these countries, we selected four daily newspapers of different types in each country: a centre-left as well as a centre-right quality newspaper, a tabloid newspaper, as well as a regional newspaper in a region with a specific regional identity. Since not all media systems are able to fit into such a clear cut set of the theoretically defined dimensions, we had to make compromises in the selection of newspapers for the study. While we were able to detect a left and a right quality paper in all countries under study, we faced some difficulties with regard to the tabloids. There are different cultural notions about tabloids in the various countries and some media systems hardly include newspapers that would fit in the category at all. For instance, not all national media systems reveal such a sharp contrast between quality newspapers and tabloids like Germany, Switzerland or the UK. Thus in countries where the media landscape does not feature a clear cut yellow press, we tried to select newspapers for the study that can be regarded as functional equivalents to the tabloid press. In countries where we could not identify such a functional equivalent newspaper, we chose a second regional press title. An overview of the 28 newspapers under study is provided in appendix A1.

As we are interested to assess the press' genuine voice in contemporary public debate, we decided to concentrate our efforts on the years 2000 to 2002. For these years we draw a sample of editorials for analysis. However, sampling commentaries turned out to be difficult, since the number of editorials in the various newspapers under study and - more importantly -

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[3] For a detailed overview of the reliability of all variables see the Europub.com WP3 Reliability Test Report.

in the different countries of the project vary extremely. To reach a sufficient number of commentaries in all countries for coding and still be able to fulfil the workload of coding in those countries with a high number of commentaries, we decided to customize the samples for each country's setting. As a result of calculating the potential number of commentaries that come up for each country, we decided on the following strategy: In those countries with a low number of commentaries, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland, we selected all items that fit our seven issue fields in all of our four newspapers on every day of the year. In the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain – countries that yield a medium number of commentaries - we select and register the commentaries on average three days per week. Germany turned out to be the country with most commentaries. Thus we decided here to analyse commentaries on one respectively two days per week. On the days of the sample we looked through all four newspapers and selected all commentaries related to the seven issue fields (EU integration, agriculture, monetary politics, immigration, troops deployment, pensions, education). These sampling schemes have been applied to all the years under study and resulted in the number of claims presented in appendix A2.

3. Findings
3.1. Salience of European Integration on the Commentary Agenda

To assess the capacity of the press to give salience to the issue of EU integration, we compare the amount of commentating regarding the field of EU integration in our seven countries of study to the amount in six other issue fields between 2000 and 2002. The results are summarized in table 1. As each issue field has been defined differently in breadth, we shall not compare the figures within a country, but highlight the differences in the salience attributions between the seven countries under study.[4] Regarding the salience of European integration on the commentary agenda, the seven countries can be divided into three groups. First, there is a group of countries from continental Europe – namely Germany, Spain, France, Italy and to a lesser degree the Netherlands. Here the issue field of EU integration has a substantial share on the editorial agenda: between 21 and 29% of all commentating in the seven issue fields is coded as European integration. Second, there is the United Kingdom, which constitutes a separate group. The British press does not attribute as much salience to

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[4] We are aware of the fact, that we cannot judge the salience of the issue field EU integration on the overall commentary agenda. Nevertheless, we think that a seven-issue sample can serve as an indicator for the *relative* salience of the issue field within a country.

the issue field of EU integration as the press' of the continental European countries. De-emphasizing the crucial question of how European integration should proceed in the future (14,6%), the British press seems to discuss Europe in terms of the common currency and perhaps also as part of the troops deployment issue. Third, there is the only non-member of our sample, Switzerland. Contrary to our first hypothesis, the Swiss press attributes the highest salience to the issue field of EU integration within all countries under study. 38,5% of all coded commentaries in Switzerland deal with the issue of EU integration. The topic of EU integration thus stretches beyond the official borders of the European Community. Those staying outside may hotly debate questions of EU integration. This interpretation seems valid for Switzerland as here the relationship between the country and the European and global context has become the key political cleavage over the past decade (Kriesi, Grande et al. 2005). Table 1 shows clearly, that besides a common salience attribution to the political issue of EU integration, the delimited groups are internally divided on which topic should receive most attention. The Spanish press for example focuses in addition on monetary matters, whereas the French one deals with issues of troops deployment or the Dutch one with the education issue.

Table 1 about here

So far all four newspapers have been analysed together. In the following, we want to find out whether different newspapers within a country attribute a similar share of their overall commentating regarding the seven issue fields under study to the topic of European integration. Following our hypothesis regarding different newspaper types, we expect that the quality press is the one that puts the topic of European integration more prominently on the agenda than the regional or tabloid press. Table 2 shows, that this is the case for all countries that have been placed in group one, the continental European group. Here quality newspapers attribute a higher share of the overall commentating to the issue field of European integration than do regional or tabloid newspapers. The biggest gap can be seen in Italy: regional newspapers devote only slightly more than 20% of their commentating regarding the seven issue fields under study to the topic of European integration, whereas the quality newspapers' share amounts to more than 33%. For the other two groups, respectively countries, this hypothesis has to be rejected. No differences in the relative attention of quality versus regional / tabloid newspapers could be found.

Table 2 about here

A closer look at the tabloid press in Germany, Switzerland and the UK reveals that in Germany and to a lesser degree in the UK the tabloid newspapers are those, which neglect Europe the most on their commentary agenda. The German tabloid 'Bild' devotes only 14,3% of its overall commentating regarding the seven issues under study to the topic of EU integration, whereas the quality newspapers' share amounts to more than 27%. The British counterpart, the 'Sun', attributes only 11,4% of its commentating on the seven issue fields to the topic of EU integration. Nevertheless, this rather low share falls only shortly below the average of the British press. In Switzerland we cannot find differences on this indicator between the tabloids and the quality press.

Summing up, we can conclude that newspapers play different roles in the process of EU integration in most countries under study. The relative weight tabloids or regional newspapers attribute to the issue field of EU integration within their own commentary agenda is in most countries lower than the one of quality newspapers. In addition to that table 3 points out that at least some of the tabloid and regional newspapers also stay behind the quality press in absolute terms. Two thirds of all commentaries that have been coded within the topic of EU integration have been published by the quality press and only one third by the tabloid and regional ones. This gap is especially strong in Germany, Switzerland and to a lesser degree in Italy. In the former two less than 20% of all commentaries in the field of EU integration can be attributed to the tabloids and regional newspapers. The overall contribution of the yellow press to the debate on EU integration within countries is pretty low – mainly in Germany and Switzerland. In the former only 2,5% of all commentaries referring to the topic of EU integration come from the German tabloid 'Bild' (Switzerland 7,9%, UK 15,7%).

Table 3 about here

So far the press' agenda-setting role regarding topics of European integration has been studied. But setting the issue of EU integration on the commentary agenda does not reveal how this issue is debated in different countries and within various media types. The next parts of our analysis thus seek to understand the press' framing strategies.

3.2 Framing European Integration: Conflict Lines on the Commentary Agenda

To explore the framing of European integration, we draw on the idea of conflict lines (see Voltmer 1998 /99: 78f.). On a very general level, we can distinguish between two types of conflict lines.[5] The first type is the one strictly oriented towards the EU's institutional design and future shape. The second type connects the topic of EU integration per se to substantial issue fields like monetary, foreign or social politics. For the first type, we distinguish between six general conflict lines. The first one deals with the most fundamental conflict that a society can face regarding European integration. Should a society become or remain a member of the European Union or should a society withdraw or reject from the integration process in general? This conflict line deals with the question of *'membership'*. The other conflict lines deal with the form of integration. Conflict line two to four refer to the question of the future institutional structure within the EU. Conflict line two refers to the *relation between the different member states*: should member states have an equal say or should there be the possibility that some member states proceed while others remain behind? It is a conflict line brought up by German foreign minister Fischer in his speech at the Humboldt University where he put forward the idea of a European Union proceeding in different speeds (Fischer 2000). Conflict line three refers to the *relation between the member states and the European Union*. The crucial question here becomes whether Europe should be a federation with strong supranational institutions or whether Europe should be a union characterized by strong nation states and strong intergovernmental institutions. This question becomes vivid for example when discussing whether nation states should keep the right to veto decisions or when proposals are put forward to strengthen the EU Council as representative of national interests or the EU Commission or Parliament as representatives of common interests. Conflict line four deals with the *relation between the European Union and the citizens* and thus highlights the often-mentioned democratic deficit of the European Union. The basic conflict here is whether citizens' rights should be extended or whether these rights should remain as they are. Conflict line five leaves behind the institutional discussion but sheds light on the *social base for EU integration*. EU integration, as some argue, needs citizens whose identities are not solely bound to the nation state anymore (see e.g. Scharpf 1999: 672; Kritzinger 2001: 5f.). Others state that it is sufficient for European integration if citizens remain with a purely national identity. Last but not least there is conflict line six that deals with the *future direction of EU integration*. On the one hand side there are those who emphasize the enlargement of the

Union while at the same time accepting a slowing down of the deepening process. On the other hand side there are those who see the main goal of the European Union in deepening the integration process, stepping beyond the economic integration and aiming for a politically unified Europe. Deepening is thus more important than further enlargement of the Union.

The second type of conflict lines connects the topic of EU integration with substantial policy issues. These conflict lines center on *monetary*, *foreign* and *social policy*. Here the role of the EU constitutes the center of the basic conflicts. Within monetary and foreign policy, one can propose that the EU has a strong role in shaping these fields or that the EU stays out leaving the steering to national actors. Regarding social policy, the EU can be seen as a provider of welfare or as a liberal market-driven union, that avoids any state interference into economic processes.

Table 4 shows the conflict lines that dominate the debate on EU integration in our seven countries under study. The groups that have been identified for the salience question are confirmed on the framing dimension. Once again, there is a continental European group of the press that discusses the topic of EU integration in terms of two dominant conflict lines. On the institutional dimension the discussion centers on how the relation between the member states and the European Union should look like. Additionally, commenting on EU integration refers to the future direction of the integration project, what means to the question of enlargement versus deepening. 70 to 80% of all conflict lines employed by the press in Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands in the issue field of EU integration refer to these two basic dimensions. The second group constituted by the United Kingdom in contrast, debates the topic of EU integration in another way. Whereas the continental European press agrees on the two central questions that further EU integration must answer, the British press does not. While attributing some importance to these questions too, the British press discusses the role of the European Union mainly in the light of two substantial issue fields, foreign and monetary policy. Questions concerning the EU's institutional design and future shape seem to have a hard time to gain attention in the British press. Primarily the discussion on the common currency seems to intermingle with the debate on EU integration. The British thus stick to a debate that has long been finished in continental Europe, but hardly take over the new issues that have shaped the Brussels arena in the time of our analysis: questions of possible forms of integration were hotly debated when searching for a common European Constitution and

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[5] Conflict lines have been coded on a very detailed level. For analysis they have been summarized. The

when preparing the Union for the largest enlargement round ever in its history. Last but not least, there is the third group constituted by the only non-member Switzerland. The Swiss press – not surprisingly – is the only one that does not show interest in the form of EU integration, but sticks to the basic conflict of whether Switzerland should become more strongly involved into the integration project or remain outside. Nearly 70% of all conflict lines coded in Switzerland refer to this fundamental conflict. Interestingly enough, questions of European integration are hardly debated in any country in the light of the often referred to democratic deficit of the Union and they hardly focus on the relation between the member states. The latter could be a result of our country selection. Most of the countries within our study can be regarded as part of an inner circle within Europe.

Table 4 about here

To examine whether regional and tabloid newspapers employ a different picture of conflict lines by framing the topic of European integration, a separate analysis is presented in table 5.[6] With the exception of Italy and the Netherlands, regional and boulevard newspapers in the continental EU-countries present a more simplified picture of conflict lines related to EU integration than does the quality press. If the German, French and Spanish regional press or boulevard newspapers employ conflict lines on the topic of EU integration at all, they attribute around twice as much attention to the enlargement-widening conflict than does the quality press. In the UK the Euro is a strong issue of concern of the yellow press. More than 43% of all coded conflict lines within regional and boulevard newspapers deal with this basic conflict relating to financial politics, whereas the quality press' attention lies around 20%. The same scheme holds for Switzerland where the nation here is divided on how to relate to the EU at all. This fundamental conflict thus dominates all newspapers, but even more the regional and boulevard ones.

Table 5 about here

So far we know which conflict lines dominate the press' commentating on EU integration within our seven countries, but we do not know which position within such conflict lines the press supports. An analysis of press' positions reveals again the same three groups. There is

categories underlying the 9 conflict lines can be seen in the appendix in table A 3.

the continental European group, where the press strongly supports a supranational model of integration against an intergovernmental one. An interesting case is France. Here the political elite is deeply divided on the question which role the 'grand nation' should have in a further integrating Europe (e.g. Goulard 2002; Ziebura 2003: 305). The press in contrast strongly pleas for a supranational model of EU integration thus breaking with the French tradition that places the nation state in the centre of political thought. Regarding the second important conflict line that shapes discourse in group one, table 6 reveals that all countries tend to stress the importance of deepened integration before enlargement. Thus the continental European press supports supranational ideas of EU integration aiming for a politically unified Europe. The British press can be regarded as a contrast point to the continental one. It supports an intergovernmental Europe, which is also reflected in the issue specific role attributions to the Union: in foreign policy matters, as well as in monetary matters the nation state should prevail over any common regulations. Thus 63% of all coded conflict lines refer directly or indirectly via the issue fields to the importance of national sovereignty. In addition the British press places the enlargement of the Union at the centre (16,7%) while claims in favour of deepened integration are the rare exception (1,9%). The clear distinction between these two groups supports the idea that media reflect national political cultures towards the EU. Nevertheless, the French case can be regarded as a first example, that a more closed-up picture might reveal differences between national political cultures and the press' framing. This is supported by the results of the third group constituted by Switzerland. Surprisingly, the Swiss press supports in unison the involvement into the European Union. Nearly 68% of all coded conflict lines in Switzerland regarding the topic of EU integration support the involvement. The framing of the press in this case does not reflect the opinions of the elites as a whole nor that of the public as Switzerland so far has rejected to join the Union. Table 6 summarizes the results on the press' positions within different countries.

Table 6 around here

A more detailed analysis shows (table 7) that there is consensus about the positioning on the conflict lines within a country. Quality newspapers and regional / tabloid newspapers do not support opposing extremes of specific conflict lines. All newspapers in Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands aim for a supranational integration model and for deepened integration processes. Newspapers in Switzerland agree on their support for the involvement

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[6] As the case numbers are small in some countries, these results must be treated cautiously.

within the European integration project. Those in the UK concur regarding the preference for enlargement and an intergovernmental Europe in general and in monetary issues. There is only one difference between the quality and tabloid or regional newspapers in the UK: regarding foreign policy the quality press asks for common policy arrangements whereas the tabloid and regional press remains more parochial demanding national autonomy.

Table 7 around here

Summing up, the analysis so far indicates that countries with similar levels of integration depth also show similar salience attributions to the topic of EU integration and framing strategies. Perhaps surprisingly, the differences between newspapers have not been as clear-cut as one might have expected. It is true, that boulevard and regional newspapers attribute less salience in relative and absolute terms to the topic of EU integration in most countries. Nevertheless, they employ not only similar conflict lines as the quality press, but also take similar positions on these conflict lines. For further testing of our hypotheses we seek to extend the classical framing analysis by taking into account the actor constellations brought forward by the press' commentating in the field of EU integration.

3.3 Actor Constellations within the field of European Integration on the Commentary Agenda

To describe how the press portrays the larger discourse on EU-integration in each country, we focus in the following on the actor constellations that become salient in the representation of the debate. In commentaries, newspaper talk about an issue thereby defining who is responsible for solving a problem (addressee) and who is affected or concerned by the problem or its solution (object actors). Now, regarding EU integration we can analyse the actor constellation and thereby identify how strongly the press in one country includes actors from other countries and the EU in their angle. Thus, we can see whether the national media open up the communicative space for trans-national actors – and thereby transcend the limitations of the national debate. Since media as actors in the either national or trans-national discourse also evaluate the actors to whom they refer, we can describe the actor constellation on a second, an evaluative dimension. If we compare the evaluations of national and European or EU member state actors we are able to see how the national media draw the line not only between friends and foes but also between national and European actors.

3.3.1 Openness

To evaluate the openness of the media debate towards European actors, we proceed in several steps. In a first step, we computed a summary variable that measures to what degree the press attributes responsibility (addressee) and attributes concern (object actor) to actors beyond the nation state. In order to identify the scopes of actor constellations, we divided the editorials on European integration into four categories. First, we can identify pieces that only mention addressees and object actors who come from the EU-member states or upcoming EU-member states. These editorials are regarded as fully Europeanised. The second category refers to commentaries that name only one European actor either as addressee or as object actor. They are referred to as partly Europeanised. Both types of commentaries are contrasted with editorials that only include national actors on the one hand and those that include international, but not European actors.

Regarding the openness of actor constellations, we can distinguish at least two, perhaps also three groups of countries (table 8). The five EU-countries on the continent once again constitute a relatively homogenous group. The newspapers of Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands are quite open in their actor constellations. Hence, between one half and two thirds of the commentaries in European integration politics are fully Europeanised. We also see that the press in Germany, France and Italy seldom restricts the picture by focussing on national perspectives only, as the share of fully national editorials is less than 10%. In Spain and the Netherlands the actor constellation is somehow more nationally contained, which is indicated by a share of around 20% fully national claims. Table 8 allows us to rank the countries within this group according to their openness towards European actors: Thus, we see that the press in France and Italy opens the communicative space strongest. The German press which is similar to France and Italy in the (rather low) level of featuring only national claims, shows a stronger tendency to involve actors from non-EU countries, particularly from Turkey. The Dutch and the Spanish press that also belong to the group of countries with rather Europeanised actor constellations show the highest mention of national claims. Compared to the continental EU-member states' press, the British newspapers once again must be classified as a counterpart. In the UK fully Europeanised claims make up for only 25%, whereas 45% of claims are completely confined to national actors. The British press thus does not only avoid discussing the topic of EU integration and attribute primarily sovereignty frames to it, but also closes its communicative space. Interestingly enough, in this respect the UK is similar to

Switzerland. The Swiss debate on EU integration is strongly bound to the nation state. Nearly 55% of the press claims in Switzerland must be categorized as fully national.

Table 8 around here

The aforementioned patterns of openness of actor constellations across countries also hold up if we include the newspaper type into the picture (table 9). Comparing the mean score of openness within countries between the tabloids and regional press on the one hand and quality newspapers on the other hand, we find hardly any or very little difference in the continental EU member states. In contrast, while the United Kingdom and Switzerland already engage in a rather parochial pattern of actor constellations, a major gap between the tabloid press and the broadsheets becomes apparent. Hence, while there is a generally low attention to European actors, the regional and the boulevard press are the frontrunners in focussing on national actors and thereby keeping the debate within the national realm.

Table 9 about here

In order to test the significance and the strength of variation across countries and newspaper types, we conducted an analysis of variance. Table 10 presents the results of two different models that test the influence of the independent variables "country" and "newspaper type" on the level of Europeanisation. In the first model all countries under study are included. In the second model we focus on Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom only. Since the press systems here are characterised by a distinctive tabloid sector, we might expect stronger differences between newspaper types than in press systems where equivalent conceptions of a tabloid do not exist. Both models confirm that the level of Europeanisation varies significantly across countries (Beta .38, resp. Beta .36), so that our interpretations regarding the openness of the debate are corroborated statistically. Moreover, in countries with a strong tabloid press, the variable "newspaper type" proves to yield significant effects. Thus, we can confirm the differences between quality newspapers on the one hand and the tabloid and regional press on the other hand with respect to the openness of the debate on European integration.

Table 10 about here

Regarding the framing of the debate on European integration, the next question relates to who is held responsible by the press for the realisation of claims. Looking at politics as a system of in- and output one can differentiate two main roles of actors (Easton 1965, 1990): The political *input* is delivered by interest groups and social movements and translated or realised in legislative, executive and judicative *outputs*. Actors can be categorised accordingly. The commentaries in all countries under study clearly attribute responsibilities to the output-side of political processes. Thus, between 85% (Switzerland) and 97% (Netherlands) of the addressees are state and party actors. This clear cut finding once again corroborates that the responsibility for European integration is pictured to overwhelmingly rest in the hands of the political elite. Here, the press seems to support the so-called permissive consensus which points to European integration as an elite-driven political project.

With regard to the political consequences of the debate on European integration, it is of particular interest who the media picture as responsible in the debate – is it again the actors of the own country or actors on the European level? Here, it is important to note, that the category "European actors" is not be limited to the EU institutions but includes also actors from other EU member states (Grundmann 1999: 137). In the following analyses both dimensions are analysed separately. Thus, actors of the EU institutions are referred to as "EU vertical" and actors of other EU-member states as "EU horizontal" (see Koopmanns/Erbe 2004). Table 11 which pictures the scope of addressees reveals that the countries under study can be divided into two groups (table 11). The print media in continental Europe draw a triangular scheme of responsibility. They address national, horizontal and vertical actors as responsible for the political outputs in the field of European integration. Hereby they put the highest salience on EU actors (between 30% in Italy and 56% in France). On a lower level, their neighbouring EU countries are almost equally visible as their own country actors. This Eurocentric approach is strongest in Germany where the press addresses only 16% of its claims to national actors, but 31% to EU horizontal and 38% to EU vertical actors. Again, the contrasting group is the UK and Switzerland where the press predominantly addresses national actors (nearly 60%). While the British press additionally sees political responsibilities in Brussels, the Swiss press refers more often to other European countries as responsible addressee. This difference may be an expression of the different geo-political linkages of both countries.

Tabel 11 about here

As the category "vertical" may represent a broad range of actors on the EU level, the analysis allows us to get insight in the representation of EU politics in national arenas (table 12). The most prominent vertical addressees in all countries are the supranational EU Commission and the intergovernmental EU Council. Only the Italian press refers rather often to the European Parliament as responsible institution (12%). If one considers the fact, that the EU institutions are not at all to be regarded as a homogeneous institutions, it is surprising how often the press addresses the EU "in general". The frequency with which this generalization comes up signalizes that the press also contributes to summary categories and stereotypical images of "us" versus "Brussels". This sort of general mention of EU is particularly strong in British, Italian and Swiss commentaries.

Table 12 about here

3.3.2 Friend-enemy distinctions

While the actor constellation in a political media debate refers the players who are responsible or do have stakes in the issue, the particular spin appears if the friends and foes are defined. Thus, by siding with addreeses or by opposing them, the media may form symbolic coalitions. This aspect is covered in our analysis by assessing the positive and negative references of the media which reveal friend-enemy distinctions. In the empirical analysis, each reference to an addressee was coded as neutral, positive or negative. The strength of "negativism" is reflected by the means of all evaluations. To get standardised means the number of negative evaluations is subtracted from the number of positive evaluations. The result is divided by the sum of all responsibility attributions. The most negative value is "-1" and indicates that all evaluations of a certain actor were negative, while "+1" indicates that all evaluations were positive.

The findings that are presented in table 13 indicate that a general negativism towards actors can be observed in all countries except for France and Spain. Taking into account that the Italian press is also less critical, this finding supports the impression that a relatively positive journalistic style may be typical for mediteranean press cultures (Hallin and Mancini 2004).

Across newspaper types the amount of negativism varies only in the "tabloid countries" Germany, United Kingdom and Switzerland. Here obviously the regional and boulevard newspapers comment in a far more accusing tone. Hence, the strongest forms of criticism originate from the commentaries in the tabloid newspapers.

table 13 about here

A comparison of the average evaluations of national compared to European actors shows that the positive tone in the Southern countries results mainly from a strict support for EU vertical actors (table 14). At the same time the commentators take a rather critical stance towards own national and horizontal actors. The press in the other countries addresses EU vertical actors in a far more negative manner. The opposition of an institutionalized Europe becomes particularly clear in the United Kingdom: No actor group is treated as critical in any other European country (-.53). But altogether it is not the EU itself that is the target of the main critique. In most countries, horizontal addressees are criticized stronger than vertical and even national actors. This finding implies that the national press across Europe tends to hold other EU member states as responsible for difficulties or problems that occur in the process of European integration.

Table 14 about here

An analysis of variance (table 15) reveals that the described variation of negativism across countries is a statistically significant pattern. Thus, if all countries are included in the model, the country variable (Beta .16) and addressee scopes (Beta .11, see table 16) yield significant effects, the level of the explained variance is very small though. If one regards the "tabloid countries" only, the country differences disappear. Instead differences between newspaper types become evident (Beta .11). This finding points to the fact that the tabloid sector has a strong impact on the (negative) tone of public communication in a country.

Table 15 about here

Amazingly, the country specific positive or negative attitude towards the EU hardly varies with regard to specific EU institutions (table 16). Again, this is even more surprising, if one considers the fact, that the EU institutions often take opposing positions in specific debates

(i.e. the European Parliament tends to claim more competences in the process of European integration while the EU Council rather aims to keep the political control in the hand of national governments). Different standpoints within the EU do not seem to interfere with the press' overall attitude towards the EU.

In sum, the EU institutions get rather mixed evaluations across countries. Only one institution is similarly judged in all studied countries. The European Convents seems to be the most appreciated EU actor in all countries under study. Though not very often addressed, the European Convents is obviously seen as capable to solve some of the problems of European integration.

Table 16

4. Conclusion

Our empirical analysis was guided by two main hypotheses. First, we argue that the degree to which a country is integrated in the European Union will positively affect the level of Europeanisation in public debates (H1). Secondly, we expect that the behavior of the press as actor will vary according to specific organizational settings. We predicted that the quality press provides a greater potential for Europeanisation than regional or tabloid newspapers (H2). The findings support fully our first hypothesis and partly our second. In the following we want to discuss possible implications of the main results.

- *Salience*

  H1 The salience of the issue European integration on the commentary agenda varies greatly across countries. We can distinguish three groups of countries: Newspapers in the continental EU member states, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain (group one) show a similar level of attention to the issue that is much stronger than that of the British press (group two). This difference between the UK and the continent implies that the salience of European issues can primarily be explained by political factors. Obviously the press attributes a higher salience to Europe in those countries that are involved in all major integration projects (e.g. the monetary union or "Schengen") and that have actively driven the political process of integration for many years (even since the very beginning, apart from Spain). The Swiss case (group three)

however, seems to compromise this impression. The press in the non-EU member country comments more often on issues of EU integration than in any other of the studied countries. The following analysis show how this contradiction can be resolved.

H2 A difference between newspaper types is only revealed in the countries of group one. Here, the quality press evidently attributes a higher salience to Europe than the regional and tabloid outlets.

- *Framing I (Conflict lines)*

H1 The conflict lines employed by the commentators support the grouping of the countries. The press of the countries that root strongest in the European community agrees widely on the two most urgent questions that the further process of integration has to deal with: The question about how the relation between the member states and the EU should look like (the press argues pro "supranational model") and the question about the future direction of the integration project (the press favors "deepening before enlargement"). The similarity of the preferred solution on these dominant conflict lines is amazing. In the United Kingdom and Switzerland the press shapes the issue of European integration in completely different ways. The British press pays far less attention to the EU's institutional design but discusses the role of the EU mainly in the light of two substantial issue fields, foreign and monetary policy (in both areas the press pleas to stay outside). Finally, the Swiss press focuses on one central conflict: The question whether Switzerland should become a member of the EU or not (the press argues in unison pro membership). These textual frames are a clear sign that a more distanced discussion on Europe dominates in the United Kingdom and Switzerland. The press in the other countries seems to be more involved and the commentators do not hesitate to argue about specific internals of the EU.

H2 The influence of organizational settings of different newspaper types weighs less. The quality press like the regional and boulevard outlets in a country argue more or less within the same conflict lines. With one – small, but interesting – difference: Regional and boulevard newspapers tend to stress those conflict lines that are of greater concern to a broad population (e.g. the question of enlargement in France, Germany and

Spain). This evidently indicates that in this press sector audience tastes are more emphasized.

- *Framing II (Actor Constellations)*

H1 The dominant actor constellations support once more that the depth of integration positively influences the use of European frames. In the stronger integrated countries of group one the press attributes responsibility more strongly to European actors (horizontal and vertical) than to national ones. At the same time the press states clearly that the debate is about European interests first and second about national interests. In contrary, the British and the Swiss commentators primarily point to national actors as those responsible. When attributing responsibility beyond the nation state, the British press focuses on the EU itself, whereas the Swiss press mainly refers to member countries. As dominant object of the debate the press sees the own country: In the United Kingdom the press comments primarily with regard to British interests, in Switzerland with regard to Swiss interests.

The evaluation of addressees reveals an interesting pattern that goes beyond the country grouping that we have found so far: In France, Spain and Italy EU actors are assessed in a positive way, while they are criticized in the other countries. This EU euphoria may be rooted in the hope of theses countries that the EU is seen as appropriate actor to solve national problems.

H2 The influence of the variable "newspaper type" for the first time overrules the influence of the variable "country" with regard to the evaluation of addressees in the countries with a distinctive tabloid sector. In Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, the commentaries of the boulevard press introduce a remarkable negative tone in the public debate. However, a similar difference is not valid for the other countries. For the first time however, it is not the depth of integration that yields explanative power. The analysis has shown that the French, Italian and Spanish commentaries generally refer in a more positive way to responsible actors. Possibly this "friendliness" expresses a similar *media culture* that unifies these countries. Due to a recent typology of Hallin and Mancini (2004) the French, Italian and Spanish press systems can be categorised as mediterannean. This model is characterized - at

least historically – by a close relation between the media and the state (Hallin/Mancini 2004: 124). The press in the other countries show higher degrees of negativism.

Our analysis has shown that the European press argues in amazingly similar patterns about issues of European integration. In the countries that can be regarded as inner circle of the EU the press commentators appear to form a community of European speakers that argue with similar vigour and in a similar direction. They attribute similar salience to the issue of European integration and shape similar attributes of this issue in the public perception. The British and the Swiss case show however, that this potential to form a common space of communication depends on large parts on the political settings. The further a country is integrated within the European community, the stronger the press takes part in a common European debate. Compared to these settings the influence of specific media cultures or media formats seems to weigh less.

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APPENDIX A

A1: Newspapers under study

	Quality Press		Regional Press	Tabloid Press
	centre left	**center right**		
Germany	Süddeutsche Zeitung	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	Leipziger Volkszeitung	Bild-Zeitung
Switzerland	Neue Zürcher Zeitung	Le Temps	Le Matin	Blick
Spain	El Pais	Abc	La Vanguardia	El Mundo
Italy	La Repubblica	Il Corriere della Sera	Il Mattino	La Nazione
United Kingdom	The Guardian	The Times	The Scotsman	The Sun
France	Le Monde	Le Figaro	Ouest France	L`Humanite
Netherlands	De Volkskant	Het Algemeen Dagblad	De Limburger	De Telegraaf

Note : In the case of the Netherlands, De Telegraaf fits best the Dutch conception of tabloid. In France however, the only newspaper that could in some respect serve as a functional equivalent for a tabloid newspaper was L'Humanite. Even if the official newspaper by the Communist party is not read by the "masses" it claims to speak for the working people and has some "popular" touch. In Italy and Spain, instead of a tabloid, a second regional newspaper was chosen.

A2: Number of claims

	Ger	Sp	F	It	Nl	UK	CH	Total
N (Total)	1003	594	677	694	732	910	681	5291
N (EU Integration)	285	186	237	224	194	178	278	1582

A3: Dimensions of conflict lines

Conflict Line	Dimensions
Membership	- most suitable degree of regional involvement for European states (withdrawal, full involvement)
Relation between member states	- balance of member state power that works best for EU (dominance, equal say) - Europe a la carte (similar speed, different speeds)
Relation between mem. States and EU	- vision of fully functioning Europe (Europe of nations, federal Europe) - competent political organisations (sovereignty, supranationality) - appropriate decision-making structures (national veto, qualified majority) - effective reform of EU structures (power to Council, power to supranational institutions) - defence of interests (national interest paramount, common interest paramount) - values of EU member states (nationalism, cosmopolitan values) - level of problem solving (national level, EU level)
Relation with EU citizens	- functioning democracy (representative democracy, citizen participation) - level of accountability (sufficient, more rights for citizens)
Citzens	- sense of belonging (preservation of identities, change towards plural identities)
Widening- deepening	- depth of integration that works best for EU (more integration, less integration) - appropriately sized EU (widen, don't widen) - type of entity (economic trading bloc, also political / social entity) - Reforms and enlargement (reforms before enlargement, enlargement before reforms)
Foreign policy	- enhanced security for EU (traditional arrangements, common arrangements) - strength in global affairs (individual strength, common strength) - Europe's position in the world (common strength by integration, middle power without integration)
Monetary policy	- strong EU economies (common monetary policy, traditional monetary policy)
Social policy	- fully functioning and prosperous economy (liberalisation, state intervention) - responsibility for welfare (individual, state)

Appendix B: Tables and Figures

Table 1: Issues on the commentary agenda of the national press

%	Ger	Sp	F	It	Nl	UK	CH	Total
Monetary Politics	18,1	24,7	13,9	19,2	11,5	21,5	14,7	17,7
Agriculture	8,1	9,3	8,7	3,0	12,0	10,9	4,3	8,2
Immigration	10,8	15,0	5,8	7,1	14,6	7,4	9,7	9,9
Troops Depl.	16,5	9,1	26,9	18,7	13,1	21,6	7,6	16,6
Retirement / Pen.	12,1	5,7	9,5	4,5	4,9	2,7	16,0	7,9
Education	8,6	9,3	7,8	19,0	22,3	21,2	9,3	14,1
EU Integration	25,9	26,9	27,5	28,5	21,6	14,6	38,5	25,6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1003	594	677	694	732	910	681	5291

Basis: Commentaries coded within the seven issue fields
Analysis: First issue field x country
χ 651, df=36, p<0,001

Table 2: Press' issue agenda – quality press versus regional / boulevard

%	Ger		Sp		F		It		Nl		UK		CH		Total	
	Q	RB	Q	RB	Q	RB	Q	RB	Q	RB	Q	RB	Q	RB	Q	RB
EU Integration	27,3	19,7*	30,3	23,3	30,2	25,0	33,3	21,9	25,6	17,8	14,1	15,3*	38,8	37,3*	28,3	21,4
Other six topics	72,7	80,3	69,7	76,7	69,8	75,0	66,7	78,1	74,4	82,2	85,9	84,7	61,2	62,7	71,7	78,6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	820	183	307	287	325	352	402	292	355	377	511	399	547	134	3267	2024

Basis: Commentaries coded within the seven issue fields
Analysis: First issue field x country x newspaper type
Explanation: Q = Quality press; RB = regional and boulevard press
* Tabloid: Germany (14,3%), UK (11,4%), CH (37,3%)

Table 3: Share of claims about EU-integration across media type

%	Ger	Sp	F	It	Nl	UK	CH	Total
Quality	87	57	53,6	67,4	56,1	51,7	81,6	67
Boulevard / Regional	13	43	46,5	32,6	43,8	48,3	18,3	33
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	285	186	237	224	194	178	278	1582

Basis: EU integration only (first, second, third issue field)

Table 4: Conflict lines in the national press

	%	Ger	Sp	F	It	Nl	UK	CH	total
Fundamental Conflict	Membership (yes – no)		1,1	6,1	2,9	0,8	4,8	67,6	12,6
Institutional Conflict	Relation between Member States	9,6	6,7	7,2	7,2	5,9	0,8	5,0	6,2
	Relation between MS and EU	33,8	30,3	39,2	41,3	39,8	20,0	9,4	30,9
	Relation between EU and citizens	3,7	4,5	9,4	0,7	5,1	4,0	2,2	4,4
Social base	Citizens (identity)	1,5			3,6				0,8
Future direction	Widening Deepening	39,7	36,0	28,2	28,3	39,8	18,4	10,8	28,2
Conflict on role of EU	Foreign policy	9,6	10,1	4,4	15,2	4,2	17,6	4,3	9,1
	Monetary policy	0,7	4,5	3,3	0,7	2,5	32,0	0,7	6,0
	Social policy	1,5	6,7	2,2	0,0	1,7	2,4	0,0	1,8
	N	136	89	181	138	118	125	139	926

Table 5: Press' conflict lines – quality press versus boulevard / regional

%	Ger Q	Ger RB	Sp Q	Sp RB	F Q	F RB	It Q	It RB	Nl Q	Nl RB	UK Q	UK RB	CH Q	CH RB	Total Q	Total RB
Membership			1,9		8,8	3,3	3,2	2,3		2,3	6,7	3,1	59,2	91,7	13,0	12,0
Relation between member states	10,9		5,8	8,1	12,1	2,2	5,3	11,4	4,1	9,1	1,7		6,8		7,3	4,2
Relation between mem. States and EU	36,1	17,6	34,6	24,3	37,4	41,1	43,6	36,4	36,5	45,5	18,3	21,5	12,6		31,5	29,7
Relation with EU citizens	4,2		7,7		4,4	14,4	1,1		5,4	4,5	6,7	1,5	2,9		4,2	4,8
Citzens	1,7						4,3	2,3							1,0	0,3
Widening-deepening	35,3	70,6	25,0	51,4	19,8	36,7	27,7	29,5	45,9	29,5	26,7	10,8	12,6	5,6	27,3	29,7
Foreign policy	9,2	11,8	13,5	5,4	8,8		14,9	15,9	5,4	2,3	18,3	16,9	5,8		10,3	6,9
Monetary policy	0,8		3,8	5,4	6,6			2,3	2,7	2,3	20,0	43,1		2,8	3,9	9,9
Social policy	1,7		7,7	5,4	2,2	2,2				4,5	1,7	3,1			1,5	2,4
N	119	17	52	37	91	90	94	44	74	44	60	65	103	36	593	333

Explanation: Q = Quality press; RB = regional and boulevard press

Table 6: Press' position on conflict lines

%		Ger	Sp	F	It	NI	UK	CH	total
Relation between EU-states	Un-equality	5,1	6,8	6,8	4,3	2,2		1,3	3,9
	Equality	8,1		0,7	4,3	4,4		7,8	3,4
Integration model (supr – interg.)	Intergovernmental	7,1	3,4	1,4	7,6	6,7	20,4		6,8
	Supranational	21,2	22,0	29,7	30,4	30,0	0,9	3,9	20,4
Membership (yes – no)	Withdrawal			0,7			0,9		0,3
	Full involvement			5,4	2,2	1,1	1,9	67,5	9,7
Relation with EU citizens	Citizens' role remains	2,0					0,9		0,4
	Strengthen citizen	3,0	5,1	10,8	1,1	6,7	3,7	3,9	5,3
Citizens themselves	National identities								
	Plural identities	1,0			1,1				0,3
Widening – Deepening	Focus: deepening	25,3	18,6	25,0	21,7	23,3	1,9	3,9	17,7
	Focus: widening	17,2	13,6	6,1	9,8	16,7	16,7	6,5	12,0
Foreign policy	Traditional	1,0	1,7		2,2	2,2	11,1		2,7
	Common	8,1	15,3	6,8	14,1	2,2	5,6	5,2	7,7
Monetary policy	Traditional						31,5		5,1
	Common	1,0	5,1	4,1	1,1	2,2	1,9		2,2
Social policy	Liberal		8,5	0,7		2,2	2,8		1,6
	Welfare			2,0					0,4
N		99	59	148	92	90	108	77	673

Note: case numbers are lower than in table 21. Reason: here only explicit positions have been analysed.

Table 7: Press' position on conflict lines – quality press versus boulevard / regional

%		Ger		Sp		F		It		NI		UK		CH		total	
		Q	RB	Q	RB	Q	RB	Q	RB	Q	RB	Q	RB	Q	RB	Q	RB
Relation bt. Member states	Un-equality	5,8		5,7	8,3	12,7	1,3	4,6	3,7		6,3			1,7		4,7	2,4
	Equality	9,3				1,4		1,5	11,1	3,4	6,3			10,0		4,2	2,0
Integration model (supr – interg.)	Intergovernmental	8,1		2,9	4,2	2,8		6,2	11,1	6,9	6,3	18,4	22,0			6,4	7,6
	Supranational	23,3	7,7	20,0	25,0	23,9	35,1	35,4	18,5	29,3	31,3	2,0		5,0		20,8	19,7
Membership (yes – no)	Withdrawal					1,4							1,7			0,2	0,4
	Full involvement					7,0	3,9	3,1			3,1	2,0	1,7	58,3	100	10,1	8,8
Relation with EU citizens	Citzns' role remains	2,3					16,9				6,3	2,0	1,7			0,7	6,4
	Strengthen citizen	3,5		8,6		4,2		1,5		6,9		6,1		5,0		4,7	
Citizens themselves	National identities																
	Plural identities	1,2						1,5								0,5	
Widening – Deepening	Focus: deepening	20,9	53,8	17,1	20,8	18,3	31,2	20,0	25,9	25,9	18,8	4,1		5,0		16,5	19,7
	Focus: widening	15,1	30,8	11,4	16,7	4,2	7,8	12,3	3,7	20,7	9,4	26,5	8,5	8,3		13,7	9,2
Foreign policy	Traditional	1,2		2,9				3,1		1,7	3,1	4,1	16,9			1,7	4,4
	Common	8,1	7,7	17,1	12,5	12,7	1,3	10,8	22,2	3,4		12,2		6,7		9,7	4,4
Monetary policy	Traditional											16,3	44,1			1,9	10,4
	Common	1,2		5,7	4,2	8,5			3,7	1,7	3,1	4,1				2,8	1,2
Social policy	Liberal			8,6	8,3	1,4						6,3	2,0	3,4		1,2	2,4
	Welfare					1,4	2,6									0,2	0,8
N		86	13	35	24	71	77	65	27	58	32	49	59	60	17	424	249

Note: case numbers are lower than in table 21. Reason: here only explicit positions have been analysed.

Table 8: Openness towards European actors by country

%	Ger	Sp	F	It	Nl	UK	CH	total
Fully Europeanised**	60,1	56,1	66,1	49,3	54,5	24,6	30,8	49,2
Partly Europeanised***	22,9	12,7	22,3	39,4	22,5	21,7	7,3	21,5
Fully national	7,1	19,7	9,8	8,1	18,8	45,1	54,7	22,8
Other non Europeanised*	9,9	11,5	1,8	3,2	4,2	8,6	7,3	6,5
N	253	157	224	221	191	175	234	1455

* no EU actors involved + not only national actors involved
** all actors (addressee / object actors) within a claim from Europe
*** half of the actors (addressees / object actors) within a claim from Europe

Table 9: Degree of Europeanisation by media types (Means)

Mean	Ger	Sp	F	It	Nl	UK	CH	Total
Quality	.71	.54	.75	.67	.70	.46	.40	.61
Reg./Boulevard	.73	.74	.80	.73	.60	.25	.11	.58
All media	.72	.62	.77	.69	.66	.35	.34	.60
N	253	157	224	221	191	175	234	1455

Range: "0" (not Europeanised at all) to "1" (fully Europeanised)

Table 10: Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA): Degree of Europeanisation

Dependent variable	Independent variable		Strength of model
	Country	Newspaper	
	Beta	Beta	R-square
Degree of Europeanisation	.38**	.04	.15
Degree of Europeanisation (only Ger, Ch, UK = tabloid countries)	.36**	.17**	.19

Table 11: Addressee scope

%	Ger	Sp	F	It	NI	UK	CH	total
National	16,2	29,9	24,5	33,5	36,3	59,9	57,8	35,9
Transnational	83,8	70,1	75,5	66,5	63,7	40,1	42,2	64,1
EU horizontal	30,8	29,6	16,8	30,8	24,7	11,0	24,6	24,4
EU vertical	37,9	30,6	55,9	29,9	36,8	22,1	10,4	32,5
Global	13,0	7,5	1,8	5,4	1,6	7,0	0,9	5,4
Other/Rest	2,0	2,1	0,9	0,4	0,5	0,0	6,2	1,7
N	253	147	221	221	190	172	211	1415

χ 276, df=24, p<0,001

Table 12: EU institutions as addressees (vertical)

%	Ger	Sp	F	It	Nl	UK	CH	Total
EU Commission	36,5	28,9	7,3	18,2	20,0	21,0	13,6	20,5
EU Parliament	3,1	2,2	0,8	12,1	5,7	0,0	0,0	3,7
EU Council	18,8	22,2	34,1	4,5	27,1	5,3	40,9	22,4
EU Convents	4,2	11,1	13,0	15,2	5,7	2,6	4,5	8,9
EU general	32,3	22,2	33,3	47,0	34,3	63,2	40,9	36,8
EU other	5,2	13,3	11,4	3,0	7,1	7,9	0,0	7,6
N	96	45	123	66	70	38	22	459

Table 13: Average Evaluation of Addressees (Means) according to newspaper type

Mean	Ger	Sp	F	It	Nl	UK	CH	Total
Quality	-.21	.10	.16	-.19	-.23	-.18	-.16	-.12
Reg./Boulevard	-.27	.10	.09	-.03	-.23	-.30	-.38	-.12
All media	-.21	.10	.12	-.14	-.22	-.24	-.20	-.12
N	253	147	220	221	189	172	211	1415

Range: "-1" (only negative) to "+1" (only positive)

Table 14: Average Evaluation of Addressees (Means) according to actor scope

	Ger		Sp		F		It		Nl		UK		CH	
	Mean	n	Mean	n	Mean	n	Mean	N	Mean	n	Mean	n	Mean	n
National		41	.14	44	-.13	54	-.16	74	-.16	69	-.24	103	-.25	122
Transnational	-.25	212	.09	103	.12	166	-.12	147	-.26	120	-.23	69	-.13	89
EU horizontal	-.40	78	-.11	44	.00	37	-.44	68	-.34	47	.21	19	-.15	52
EU vertical	-.21	96	.31	45	.25	123	.29	66	-.22	69	-.53	38	-.23	22
Global	-.15	33	-.09	11	.50	4	-.50	12	-.33	3	.00	12	-.50	2
Other / Rest	.40	5	.33	3		2	-1.00	1	1.00	1			.15	13
Total	-.21	253	.10	147	.12	220	-.14	221	-.22	189	-0.24	172	-.20	211

Table 15: Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA): evaluation of addressees

	Independent variable			Strength of model
	Country	Newspaper	Scope of addressee	
Dependent variable	Beta	Beta		R-square
Evaluation of adressees	,16**	,02	,11**	,04
Evaluation of adressees (only tabloid countries)	,01	,11*	,11*	,02

Table 16: EU institutions addressee evaluation (vertical)

	Ger		Sp		F		It		Nl		UK		CH	
	Mean	n	Mean	n	Mean	n	Mean	N	Mean	n	Mean	n	Mean	n
EU Commission	.03	35	.62	13	-.33	9	.17	12	-.21	14	-.63	8	-.33	3
EU Parliament	-.33	3	1.00	1	.00	1	-.63	8	-.75	4				
EU Council	-.33	18	.20	10	.12	42	.67	3	-.47	19	.50	2	-.44	9
EU Convents	.50	4	.20	5	1.00	16	1.00	10	.50	4	1.00	1	1.00	1
EU general	-.55	31	.00	10	.20	41	.32	31	-.22	23	-.58	24	-.11	9
EU other	.20	5	.33	6	.36	14	.00	2	.60	5	-1.00	3	--	
Total	-.21	96	.31	45	.25	123	.29	66	-.22	69	-0.53	38	-.23	22