Forging Divergent and ‘Path Dependent’ Ways to Europe?: Political Communication over European Integration in the British and French Public Spheres

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Abstract: Our research question concerns ‘Europeanization’: how and to what extent does political communication now spread across the borders of two nation-states within Europe, and which actors drive such processes? A first aim is empirical and descriptive, whereas a second is explanatory: that by identifying cross-national and actor–level similarities and differences, and interpreting such findings, we may account for divergent or convergent experiences of transformation, either nationally, or by actor type. First, we look at the chain of communicative linkages between different levels of political institutions (EU, trans-European, foreign EU, national domestic) that are mobilised by collective actors and appear in the public spheres of the two countries. Here our contrast is between France, a founder member of the European project, and Britain, a latecomer, who has not joined integrative projects, such as monetary union. We refer to political theories of ‘path dependency’ (Pierson 2004) in order to account for cross-national differences and similarities. We examine whether the deeper institutional and discursive engagement of France within the project of European political integration compared to Britain has led to differences in the two national patterns of political communication. Second, we focus more closely on the dynamics of actor-relationships within the two countries. Here we examine the type of cleavages (elite versus civil society; left versus right political parties), and the relationships (competitive/consensual, opponents/allies), between national collective actors who mobilise demands, and their positions on European integration (pro-European versus Eurosceptic).

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Introduction

In 2005, the project of European integration appeared to have reached a crucial phase of development. The attempts to introduce a European Constitution foundered after popular rejections at referendums in two founder countries France and the Netherlands, where political elites broadly supported adoption of the Constitution. At the very least such an occurrence, and the political responses to it, constituted another decisive step in the erosion of a permissive consensus over European integration. These events also created shockwaves in the national domestic politics of two countries that have traditionally placed themselves as ‘pace-setters’ at the centre of the common European project, as well as generally putting the brakes on advancing European integration. In Britain, such a national permissive consensus over European integration has been historically lacking. Had a referendum on the Constitution been called in Britain, a major political party, the Conservatives, would have opposed it, the Labour government would have provided ‘ lukewarm’ support, or sat on the fence, and the public would have most likely have voted resoundingly ‘no’. Such an occurrence may have disappointed other member states, and the EU institutions, but it would not have surprised them, nor would it create a domestic political crisis on a similar scale, nor threaten the whole European project. This is largely because it would follow in the established tradition for Britain’s relationship to Europe. How did France and Britain arrive at such different political relationships to Europe, and how have such positions been maintained, and with what consequences for a common Europe? These are questions that we shall address here.

In the academy, much has been written on European integration and the processes which drive and constitute this political development, which links different political levels (national and supranational), and occurs across national borders. We discuss this literature on ‘Europeanization’ and put forward a position that emphasises the importance of the transformative impact of political communication in the national public spheres. So far there has been relatively little empirically informed research on political communication over European integration. In this article, we attempt to unpack evidence on the nature and extent of emergent Europeanization trends, and the specific constellations of actor relationships which are driving them, by undertaking a comparative analysis of political communication over European integration in British and French public spheres. Britain and France are selected as two nation-states that entered into the common European project at different times and which have participated in the integration process to different degrees. We discuss these different historical national relationships to Europe, and refer to political theories of ‘path dependency’ (Pierson 2004) in order to account for cross-national differences and similarities.

Our empirical evidence on political communication allows us to examine patterns of convergence and divergence, both nationally, and across different actor types (state v civil society cleavages; political party cleavages) within a country, which we relate back to the degree of political involvement of each country, and each actor type, within the project of European integration. Our aim is to reach an empirically grounded understanding of the drivers and processes of Europeanization.
The empirical analysis is in two parts. First, we look at the chain of communicative linkages between different levels of political institutions (EU, trans-European, foreign EU, national domestic) that are mobilised by collective actors and appear in the public spheres of the two countries. Here our contrast is between France, a founder member of the European project, and Britain, a latecomer, who has not joined integrative projects, such as the abolition of border controls by the EU’s Schengen group and monetary union. We examine whether the deeper institutional and discursive engagement of France within the project of European political integration compared to Britain has led to differences in the two national patterns of political communication. Second, we focus more closely on the dynamics of actor-relationships within the two countries. Here we examine the type of cleavages (elite versus civil society; left versus right political parties), and the relationships (competitive/consensual, opponents/allies), between national collective actors who mobilise demands, and their positions on European integration (pro-European versus Eurosceptic).

Our central research question is: how and to what extent does political communication now spread across the borders of these two nation-states within Europe, and which actors drive such processes? A first aim is empirical and descriptive, whereas a second is explanatory: that by identifying cross-national and actor–level similarities and differences, and interpreting such findings, we may account for divergent or convergent experiences of transformation, either nationally, or by actor type.

In the next section, we discuss ‘Europeanization’ processes, before outlining insights from policy studies of European integration and path dependency theories, which lead us to expect cross-national differences. We then give a brief outline of Britain’s and France’s historical relationships to the European project, before outlining our methodological approach for political claims-making analysis. The subsequent two sections are an empirical analysis, which looks at the extent and type of ‘Europeanized’ communication across political levels and borders, and then focuses on the political communication between different types of national collective actors, in the two public spheres. Finally, in the conclusion, we discuss the relevance of these findings with regard to European integration and the path dependency thesis.

**European Integration and Political Communication: ‘Europeanization’ processes**

Early pioneers of European integration, including Jean Monnet, saw their challenge as ‘building Europe in the absence of Europeans’. They considered that citizens would transfer their loyalties, and that the emergent European polity would be considered legitimate, as the beneficial impacts of integration on key economic and social sectors were felt and experienced by people in the European region. Key early academic theories of European integration shared this optimism. Ernst Haas (1961: 196) a ‘founding father’ of European integration studies foresaw a ‘process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new political centre’. This early functionalist vision of a European consensus over ideas, principles and interests, now appears outdated and idealistic. This holds to some extent for elite actors, but especially with regard to Europe’s citizens, when voters remain stubbornly uninterested in European elections, and European identities clearly remain secondary forms of allegiance, loyalty and political understanding to national ones.
In spite of, or perhaps because of, this relative ‘absence of Europeans’, the advancement of European integration has been substantial over the last 50 years, driven by political elites. From the vantage point of 2005, the ‘European Union (EU)’ presides over a new regional order of 25 countries, and represents the world’s most advanced example of regional cooperation and close interpenetration of societies, markets, and governments, both across borders, and between supranational and national institutions. Over time, the European institutions’ influence over the policy agenda has been continuously but unevenly (across time and policy fields) extended. This has brought a system of governance which has emerged at multiple levels to politically manage the changes, especially those brought about by the advancing transnationalisation of economies and markets across the region. However, the power of the EU’s supranational political base has been limited by the unwillingness of some member state’s governments to cede national sovereignty. Instead of a more federal type of political union, governance therefore occurs largely by intense policy co-operations through institutional arrangements which are largely ‘intergovernmental’ and conducted between member states (see, Tsoukalis 2003).

The term ‘Europeanization’ is broadly, and differently, used, but can be generally considered to describe a spectrum from simple co-operations to full integration by government and non-government organisations, with universal or limited memberships, and covering a wide range of activities and policy fields, both within and across borders and across different political levels. Since Haas’ early functionalist vision, interpretative models for Europeanization have become more realistic and sensitive with regard to the ways that political actors and publics have both responded to, and become constitutive of, the emergent European polity through their actions. Nonetheless, most approaches, including neo-institutionalism (Stone Sweet, Sandholtz and Fligstein 2001), multi-level governance (Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996), network governance (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999) and political opportunities and contentious politics (Imig and Tarrow 2001), continue to share the basic premise that as the locus of institutional political power shifts to the European level, political actors will adapt themselves and their actions to this new playing field. Differences of opinion remain on the processes of political transformation that constitute Europeanization, regarding: the nature, form and impact of such changes, both within and across borders, and across different political levels; on their extent, direction and possible outcomes; and on the nature of relationships between institutions, discourses, norms and rules, and actors, which produce and reproduce them. In general, however, the orthodox view is that political actors will shape their expectations and behaviour with regard to the institutional changes brought by advancing European integration.

In addition to viewing Europeanization as a form of institutional development involving primarily elite actors, it is important also to examine to what extent, and how, these emergent forms of politics are mobilised by other types of collective actors and mediated through public discourses to the broader citizenry. This has been recognised by recent studies of political conflict over European integration, focussing on political party cleavages (Hix and Lord 1997, Taggart 1998), the activities of

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2 This draws from Börzel’s (2002) definition which was designed for policy analysis. It is a suitable starting point for our discussion, but, as will become clear, we extend the focus on political elites and collective actors to include also the citizenry, who are linked to political processes through broader mass mediated communication. Our understanding of ‘Europeanization’ is thus more in the tradition of the literature on contentious politics and the European public sphere.
interest groups (Wessels 2004), and ‘contentious politics’ and citizens’ protest (McAdam and Marks 1996, Imig and Tarrow 2001, Statham and Gray 2005). In addition, several authors have emphasised that political communication and the construction of a public sphere is an essential prerequisite for a meaningful process of European integration. In this vein, Calhoun (2003: 243) states, ‘If Europe is not merely a place but a space in which distinctively European relations are forged and European visions of the future enacted, then it depends on communication in public, as much as on a distinctively European culture, or political institution, or economy, or social networks’.

Building on such insights, we consider that an understanding of the emergent processes of Europeanization, how they occur, the extent to which they have developed, and their likely outcome, requires study not only of political institutions, policy-making and elite actors, but also of the public sphere, and the transformation of political communication and action by collective actors. Our focus is on the public sphere, but it needs underlining that this basic idea is not functionalist, i.e. that an active participatory public sphere will occur automatically in response to the European integration of political institutions. To the extent that it emerges at all, a European public sphere will build itself, and be built, through the interactions of collective actors who politically engage over European issues, both between and within different levels of politics. For the idea of a ‘public’ sphere, it is also important to see to what extent such actions are mediated through the mass media and rendered visible to citizens in the public domain, which potentially opens politics up to processes of wider public scrutiny and deliberation, and thereby confers a degree of legitimacy on decision-making.

This approach views ‘the public’ as an mobilised actor (not just an aggregate of opinions measured through opinion polls) and political communication as a field of interaction for collective actors. Thus our research focuses on an examination of Europeanization in the public sphere, i.e., public acts of political communication over European integration that take place in, and thereby help to create, a space of relations among political actors, institutions and citizens.

3 For ‘state of the art’ on political conflict over European integration, see contributions to Marks and Steenbergen 2004.
4 On the European public sphere, see Gerhards (1992), Eder and Trenz (2002). Previously, Habermas (1989) demonstrated that the emergence of the nation-state as the predominant unit of political space, superseding the local and regional levels of political organisation, was not just a question of institution-building from above, or an outcome of pre-existing identifications among the citizenry, but depended crucially on the development of a civic public sphere, as an interactive field which increasingly involves citizens in national public debates. Most scholars agree that whatever form ‘Europeanisation’ of the public sphere takes, it will not simply replicate the experience of the nation-state at the supranational level, to form a supranational European public sphere. In the virtual absence of a transnational Europe-wide mass media and the predominance of national media, the most likely location for ‘Europeanisation’ trends is within national public spheres (Schlesinger 1999). Most scholars also emphasise that an intermediary public sphere of political communication for bridging the gap between European institutions and the European citizenry will be essential to any resolution of the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’.
5 This is the starting premise for the empirical research outlined in the Europub.com project, see Koopmans and Statham (2001).
6 For a more detailed exposition on four functions of the mass media in the European policy process: legitimation; responsiveness; accountability; and participation, see Koopmans (2005).
Our general approach follows in the ‘institutionalist’ tradition, and specifically the political opportunity\(^7\) and contentious politics approach, which made the important contribution of systematically including the ‘mobilised public’ as a collective actor within the analysis of Europeanization processes (Imig and Tarrow 2001). Whereas Imig and Tarrow’s research focuses only on extreme examples by studying protest acts, however, we look at public acts of political communication over European integration by a full range of collective actors, including elites, which allows for a more complete examination.

In order not to walk into our comparison of political communication over European integration theoretically naked, we discuss factors that may lead us to expect cross-national variations in the next section. To gain insight on possible cross-national differences between Britain and France, we draw inspiration first from policy research on member states’ motives for and responses to Europeanization (Börzel 2002), and second from ‘path dependency’ approaches associated with historical institutionalism (Pierson 2000, 2004). In addition, ‘path dependency’ theory also stresses the importance of timing within political processes, that is, we argue, especially relevant in explaining nation-states’ approaches to European integration.

Towards Explaining Cross-national Differences in ‘Europeanized’ Political Communication

As, we have outlined, the ‘institutionalist’ orthodoxy is to expect political actors to change their behaviour in response to the emergence of European-level institutional developments, however, it is still necessary to specify a basis for expectations of cross-national variation within such processes.\(^8\)

A first insight for expectations of cross-national differences comes from studies of policy-making within the context of advancing Europeanization. Here a salient argument is that countries have a general incentive to ‘upload’ their policy arrangements to the European level, because this reduces the costs of having to ‘download’ common policies, nationally, and institutionally adapt to them. Thus states, given their distinct social, political and economic institutions, will generally promote policies that conform to their own ‘national model’ and the preferences of their constituencies (see especially Héritier 1996). As Börzel (2002: 194) puts it, in her ‘two-way process’ model for Europeanization: ‘national executives strive to minimize the costs which the implementation of European norms and rules may impose on their home constituencies. Therefore they have a general incentive to upload their domestic policies to the European level. The better the fit between European and domestic policies, the lower the implementation costs at the national level. Since

\(^7\) Political opportunities are ‘consistent –but not necessarily formal or permanent- dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations of success or failure’ (Tarrow 1994:85). See Kriesi et al (1995) for a cross-national application.

\(^8\) Recent cross-national comparative research has emphasised the need to distinguish between general aspects of political opportunities, such as differences between political systems, and issue-specific ones, which are of particular importance for the substance of the specific field of contention, in this case European integration (Koopmans and Statham 2000a, Koopmans et al 2005). Here our discussion focuses primarily on factors that might account for issue-specific cross-national differences (i.e., with regard to European integration) and only secondarily to general differences in opportunities that are derived from the political systems.
Member states have distinct institutions, they compete at the European level for policies that conform to their own interest and approach.’

From this, national sectoral interests and established political institutions, norms and discourses for advancing them, which are strongly different between countries, are likely to lead to a high level of cross-national competition and negotiation between national elites over the substance and contents of common European policies. This competition over common European policies and practices transforms the context for political action both for national elites and interest groups. Elites representing their nations externally, and attempting to legitimate their stances internally, plus collective actors with defined sectoral interests, will have different perceived interests within this new ‘Europeanized’ context than they did in the ‘old’ established politics. In addition, these ‘new political opportunities’ offered by European collaboration will not be evenly distributed across countries, nor will collective actors who have established themselves within a specific policy domain nationally, necessarily be those who are best in a position to adapt and benefit from the new situation. Overall, considering the large number of countries required for reaching a working European consensus for an approach, and the high stakes involved due to potentially high adaptation and implementation costs, both for countries, and for specific collective actors within them, the potential for cross-national and internal political conflicts, over issues of European integration, is very high indeed.

In general, higher adaptation costs are likely to lead to conflictual approaches towards common EU policies, as actors perceive themselves losing relative advantages from the existing situation. Conversely, lower adaptation costs are likely to lead to consensual approaches, as actors perceive new potential benefits in European integration. Facing the perceived impacts of a ‘Europeanization’ that fits their national preference to a greater or lesser degree, elites acting on behalf of their national constituencies, and collective actors affected, are likely to adopt different strategies with regard to the new political context. Such strategies may be identified as: pace-setting, actively pushing a national policy preference to the European level to minimize adaptation costs; foot-dragging, blocking potentially costly EU policies to prevent them or receive compensation for implementation costs; and fence-sitting, neither systematically pushing, nor blocking policies, but building tactical coalitions with pace-setters and foot-draggers. These strategies were identified with regard to EU environmental policy-making (Börzel 2002), but are applicable, we argue, also with regard to European integration, in general, for countries, and for collective actors within a country.

Overall, the general logic for participating in a common European project is that extra benefits accrue through pooling activities (especially economic ones) with neighbouring countries, leading potentially to increased gains for all. Unlike markets and economic systems, however, political systems exhibit ‘stickiness’, that is features which appear to be especially resilient toward adaptation, even when such changes may be desirable or optimal. This feature of politics has been discussed in the literature on historical institutionalism as ‘path dependency’ (Pierson 2000, 2004). This provides a second insight for expectations of cross-national variation in Europeanization, with regard to timing.

In this view, existing political approaches, both ‘national models’ and those of established actors, will be especially resistant to change, since such approaches will have been built through processes of increasing returns and ‘positive feedbacks’ –for which politics has an especially high propensity- toward the chosen ‘path’, which was selected initially from a
multiple range of possible alternatives to become the enduring mode. As Pierson argues (2004:40), ‘There are, then, compelling reasons to believe that political processes will often be marked by dynamics of increasing returns. Tendencies toward positive feedback characterize four processes central to political environments: collective action, institutional development, the exercise of authority, and social interpretation. In each case, there are reasons to anticipate that steps in a particular direction can trigger a self-reinforcing dynamic. This conclusion should be underlined.’

Applying insights from ‘path dependency’ theory, the potential for cross-national differences in political conflicts over European integration becomes even more pronounced, especially when we consider the time dimension. Political approaches or ‘paths’ are defined by contingent key events, perhaps even small ones, which shape them initially at a crucial early formative time, but thereafter have large enduring and deep consequences. In this view, the timing of entry within a European collaboration will be an important factor in determining whether a country is in a position to shape the common European ‘path’ towards its own national approach, or not. Timing of entry in relation to the process of institutional development becomes crucial.

A country involved in the early and formative stages of collaborations will have importantly shaped the substance and direction of European political institutions and policies, and the norms and discourses around them. In addition, its national political path will have been integrated within the joint European ‘path’ at an early contingent stage. By contrast, a country joining at a later stage, faces much higher hurdles of political adaptation and implementation, because it has established its own national political approach independently, and then has to join a European ‘path’ that is already established, and moving along a defined and institutionalised course. The European path is unlikely to fit the latecomer’s national path well, unless the latecomer’s established path is by chance complementary to this collective collaboration, or alternatively it is weakly established or underdeveloped as an institutional ‘path’, and therefore relatively open to change. At the time of entry into a common Europe, latecomer countries which are highly economically developed and politically institutionalised such as Britain, are likely to have a national political path that is more ‘fixed’ and harder to adapt, than countries which are relatively less developed economically, such as Ireland, or ‘newer’ politically and institutionally, such as Spain and Portugal, which have emerged more recently as liberal democracies from dictatorships. In addition, the latecomer countries are joining at a time after the formative phase when events could have had large contingent impacts on the general European path, and so are unlikely ever to ‘catch up’ the full impact of this relative advantage and have the opportunity to definitively re-direct a European collaboration, compared to founder countries. Again, relative to highly economically developed and highly politically institutionalised ones, latecomers with less established paths will have more chances of making European collaboration central to their own national path as adaptation processes are likely to become dynamic and self-reinforcing. Thus the importance of timing of entry within the EU process along with the nature and level of national institutional development explains why countries are likely to start, and largely remain, in different positions with regard to their respective perceived incentives, advantages and interests in European integration. In addition, it gives insight into how such political positions become established and self-reinforcing over time.

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9 It should be noted that Pierson’s approach synthesises the research of many others, in taking the step from economic theories of ‘path dependency’ and specifying their relevance to politics.
Whereas the ‘two-way process’ model emphasises the importance of cross-national variation in the ‘institutional fit’ of national policy-making with the European-level for defining actors’ political strategies, path dependency theories emphasise the importance of timing of entry within a European collaboration as a factor which strongly influences the costs of political adaptation. Applying these insights to the topic of European integration, one can make some general hypotheses about cross-national variations in a country’s politics.

First, the time of entry within the common European project, and the conditions and basis of agreement forming that decision, will have crucial contingent effects on the future path of a country with regard to European integration. This holds both in its relationship to other countries (EU and non-EU) and the supranational EU, and internally in the way that its politics, constituted by its relationships between political parties, and elites and civil society actors, deals with the potential adaptation changes brought by Europeanization. In general, latecomers with a high level of political institutionalisation and economic development, such as Britain, will face higher adaptation and implementation costs, and are more likely to respond to projects of advancing European integration as ‘fence-sitters’ or ‘foot-draggers’, when compared to founder countries, such as France. This strategy is likely to become self-reinforcing, leading to differences also with other latecomer countries which are less politically institutionally and economically developed at the time of entry, and so more able to dynamically adapt to European collaborations than Britain. In contrast to the latecomers, France’s national political institutionalisation has proceeded in tandem with shaping the common European political collaboration from its earliest formative stage, and so is likely to face low costs of adaptation that will have become mutually re-enforcing as Europe has continued along its path of development. Thus, compared to Britain, France is much more likely to be a ‘pace-setter’ for European integration.\(^\text{10}\)

Facing fewer potential hurdles of political adaptation, French political elites are more likely to take a consensual and favourable stance toward European integration and European institutions and policies. Within France this is likely to be reflected in less conflict between political parties, and between state and civil society actors over Europe, since political understandings will have been constructed within an environment where national interests have been formative in shaping and defining European ones. Perceptions of the relative advantages and benefits of European collaboration will have been mutually self-reinforcing among French political actors.\(^\text{11}\) In addition, this longer standing involvement within European political collaboration, will not only have shaped national institutions, rules, norms, and discourses, but will also lead to a deeper and more consensual level of political engagement by French political actors with supranational European institutions. One would

\(^{\text{10}}\) It should be noted that here we are talking about general European integration. There will, of course, be variation across policy fields, as the involvement of the EU in some policy fields, e.g., immigration, has occurred much later and has less institutional power and development than in others, e.g. agriculture. Thus in some cases Britain will have been involved in the formative stages and have had the potential to be a potential European ‘pace-setter’ for policies. To the extent that they have any power at all, European common policies on asylum have been shaped very much along restrictive norms that are compatible with the British national policy approach. By contrast, Britain has been the biggest ‘foot-dragger’ with regard to the long established and powerful European Common Agricultural Policy, to the extent that Britain receives a pay-off in the form of a substantial annual rebate from the others to allow the common European ‘path’ to continue its way.\(^{\text{11}}\) Following path dependency theory, such pro-European stances could be expected to remain even beyond the time when initial advantages in European collaboration had diminished.
therefore expect to find more forms of political communication that directly address EU institutions in France.

By contrast, British elites will have historically faced high hurdles of political adaptation in trying to upload their political models to Europe. This will have led to cross-national conflicts with elites from other member states, as well as EU institutions, since there will have been considerable difficulties in ‘fitting’ the perceived established British policy interests and approaches within a pre-existing European model. In addition, British elites will have faced the difficult task of legitimating European integration to their own domestic collective actors, who will in many cases have been facing higher adaptation costs than their French counterparts. Such political dynamics are likely to have increased elite uncertainties and cleavages over the European project, and be expressed through domestic politics, leading to higher levels of political party competition over Europe, as well as legitimating political understandings questioning the national value of European integration and which are less favourable to European integration in the wider public domain. Thus, for example, British Prime Minister Wilson required the public legitimacy of a referendum vote to remain within Europe, then known as the Common Market, soon after joining, at a time when the French public was unheard and permissive over Europe. Overall, compared to France, for Britain one would expect a form of political communication where Europe is a contested issue within national politics, with relatively less consensual and direct engagement with European institutions.

A further point to make concerns the emergence of European institutions themselves as potentially powerful actors shaping domestic national politics. In general, the deeper the power and influence of supranational European institutions, rules, norms and discourses, the more one would expect similarities to be produced cross-nationally across countries. However, following our previous discussion, the longer and deeper institutional involvement of France compared to Britain, and closer institutional ‘fit’ with and within Europe, would make it likely that the EU has a greater presence and legitimacy as an actor in French politics than in British. Such an impact is likely to have been self-reinforcing.

Here we have outlined some general basic hypotheses regarding cross-national variations in the contents and direction of political communication over Europe in Britain and France. Before our empirical analysis, we shall first add some contextual detail by giving a brief historical account of their divergent political views of European collaboration.

**Britain and France: Diverging Visions for Europe**

If we are to compare their different national trajectories, and the political communication of their elites and citizens with regard to European integration, it is worth briefly recounting historically Britain’s and France’s different starting points for engagement in the European project.

The idea of European co-operation initially bore fruit in 1950, a few years after the experience of a devastating war, with the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community, between France, Germany, Italy and the three Benelux countries. In many ways it was an economic means to a political end, and in particular, an attempt

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12 This brief account of Britain’s and France’s relationships to Europe is a limited caricature which is intended to add historical contextual flavour to the outlined framework. For a detailed and comprehensive coverage, see Tsoukalis (2003).
by France and Germany to resolve their bellicose history, by establishing interdependence for, and integrating, their key strategic productive sectors. It is not surprising that national elites chose to establish this regional co-operation and transnational bridge-building away from the gaze of their citizens, given the still bitter experiences of a war waged through ideologies of nationalism. In addition, the surviving liberal democracies of continental Europe were still in a precarious condition, institutionally weak, and culturally recovering from the combined traumas of occupation and guilt of Nazi collaboration, and attempting to reconstitute their legitimacy around national political myths of resistance. Thus elite-driven technocratic solutions designed to ensure regional peace and economic stability were accepted relatively unquestioningly by Europe’s war-weary publics. This permissive consensus toward elite-led European co-operation was underwritten, and subsequently politically legitimated, by the remarkable period of economic growth which the six founder countries experienced until the oil shock of the early 1970s.

Across the Channel, flush with the victors’ enthusiasm and psychologically unburdened by the stigma of Nazi occupation, the post-war British electorate voted to power a Labour government with a landslide majority to manage a national social transformation away from the class inequalities of the pre-war era. Internationally, however, Britain’s delusions of world political influence through empire and commonwealth were abruptly ended by the emergence of two competing superpowers the USA and the USSR.

In contrast to their French counterparts, who adopted a stance of national pride in becoming a leading architect of Europe, British elites initially remained uninterested and failed to see the potential significance of the first substantive inter-state co-operations in continental Europe. However, after the political and economic realities of a changed post-colonial world set in, the United Kingdom finally joined the European Economic Community in the first enlargement in 1973, along with Denmark and Ireland. A couple of years later this measure was given the legitimacy of support by a popular referendum following Prime Minister Wilson’s advice and voting against withdrawal. Britain was in large part attracted by the ‘economic miracle’ of continental Europe which had been far less evident on the island. Delayed for some years from joining the economic club by French President de Gaulle’s veto, however, British elites felt aggrieved with an overall package deal which required them to accept Community legislation as a complete package. Even sections of the political elite who promoted entry joined were unsatisfied by terms which appeared skewed towards the interests of founder members, a factor which has subsequently shaped political views on Britain’s relationship to Europe.

Over the last few decades characterised by rapidly advancing ‘Europeanization’, initially of markets followed by an emergent multi-levelled political institutional system of governance, France and Britain have supported strikingly different visions and commitments to the project of European integration, and of what Europe and the European Union should be. Although, like France, a major player in the European Union, British elites have adopted a more pragmatic, cost-benefit and ‘ad hoc’ approach to co-operation and participation, when compared to the expressed political idealism of their French counterparts. British elites, similar to their fellow late-comers, the Danes, have consistently been resistant and have applied logics of national self-interest to the new proposals for advancing integration that have evolved
over the subsequent years. For the British elites, the advancing European Union has been perceived more as a neo-liberal market project than as a political entity. British Governments have advocated a single European market but have generally opposed any measures that would limit national sovereignty over deciding welfare issues, defence and foreign policy, and immigration. Even when incremental change and increased cooperation has advanced in such policy fields, the British have always pushed for ‘intergovernmentalist’ not ‘federalist’ solutions, retained as much national autonomy as possible, and when projects nonetheless advanced, gone for national opt-out clauses, as in the cases of the common borders of the Schengen Accord, the Social Chapter (belatedly joined by Blair’s Labour government), and European Monetary Union. In part, this has been because German-Franco led policies, for example, with regard to social welfare and employment, have been perceived as not suitable or fitting for the more liberalised structure of the British economy. British elites have had difficulty visualising themselves at the core of the European integration processes. This has also been reflected in Britain’s relationship to Europe which over time has been an issue contested within and between the main political parties of left and right, both in government and opposition. Lastly, regarding the public, Britons regularly appear at the end of the Eurobarometer opinion poll scale which sees least value in European collaboration and is most opposed to it.

For France, the idea of being central to Europe is a core element of post war national political identity in the postcolonial era. French leaders have seen themselves as important architects of European integration. At a time when British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was using a veto to enforce a ‘rebate’ for British contributions to Europe, a Frenchman was at the Head of the European Commission ‘relaunching Europe’ backed by a French President and German Chancellor. It is not hard to envisage that French ideas became more central to shaping this period of European institutional development just as they had laid out the initial blueprint for European collaboration. This has allowed a mainstream political party consensus over European collaboration, which has shunted opposition to marginal political parties and organisations at the political fringes. It has also occurred within a context where opinion polls have depicted the French public as perceiving the benefits of European collaboration, and although this has declined over time, the French have remained distinctly more in favour of Europe than the British.

The case of European Monetary Union is illustrative. European Monetary Union (EMU) was an elite decision taken on the basis of a political rather than economic rationale, described by German Chancellor Kohl as a matter of ‘war and peace in the 21st century’. It was a German response to French pressure, with Germany underlining its continued deep commitment to Franco-German steering of the European project, after German unification, an event that non-German European states had greeted with less enthusiasm (Tsoukalis 2003: 146-7). However, EMU was not without costs and substantive changes. It has required important substantive transfers of national sovereignty to the European Union, and its Central Bank, not least the ability to use monetary policy and the exchange rate as instruments of economic policies. For France, it also meant replacing the Franc, a much-loved symbol of the republic. That French political elites were prepared to relinquish such national symbols and powers underlines the depth of their commitment to advancing European integration. The French political elite continue to be the central driving force of integration, and their vision remains of Europe as a political union, not simply a single market. It is within
This European political union that they see French national interests as being best served. This contrasts with the British government, who despite having her most politically Pro-European Prime Minister of modern times, could still not envisage setting a date for a national referendum on joining EMU in 2005. Thus, whilst Britain opted out of EMU as a ‘foot-dragger’ and ‘fence-sitter’, France, along with Germany, were ‘pace-setters’ leading the twelve EU states which replaced their national currencies with a single currency, the Euro, one of the most substantial and dramatic steps toward integration.

The influence of French ideas within the political ideas of the European Union’s institutions is demonstrated by a French former leader Giscard D’Estaing heading the Convention on the Future of Europe. This attempt to draw up a European Constitution in the wake of an expansion of European Union membership to twenty five countries was once more a Franco-German initiative, the potential merits of which British elites were significantly more sceptical of. This time, and in contrast to the narrow referendum victory supporting the adoption of the Euro, the French citizens significantly voted against the Constitution in 2005, an action which, along with a similar rejection in the Netherlands, has thrown both the national identity over the French relationship to Europe, as well as the European Union’s own political identity, into question. A similar referendum rejection in Britain, would have been expected, but would also have been in line with the established British approach to Europe, and so less threatening to the heart of the European project as a whole.

Overall, France has been a ‘pace-setter’ for advancing European integration, whereas Britain has been a ‘foot-dragger’ and ‘fence-sitter’. In the empirical section, we examine such cross-national differences in political communication over Europe in more detail. First, however, we present our method.

**Methodological Approach: Political Claims-making Analysis**

Political claims-making analysis is an established approach for examining the public dimension of politics (Koopmans and Statham 1999b, Koopmans et al 2005). By making claims, collective actors strategically attempt to make their political demands appear more publicly rational and legitimate than those of their opponents, thereby potentially opening up policy decisions to wider deliberation processes. An instance of political claims-making is a unit of strategic action in the public sphere. It consists of intentional and public acts which articulate political demands, decisions, implementations, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors in a policy field. Not all collective actors mobilize political demands, some lack the material and symbolic resources to do so, whereas others perceive their interests to be sufficiently represented thus making mobilization seem unnecessary. In addition, not all claims-making acts reach the public domain, since the mass media selects and reports on those events, claimants and opinions which by definition have crossed a threshold of public significance as politically important issues. Claims-making analysis is an appropriate method for our purposes, because it provides empirical information on the actor-relationships which are visibly seen within the

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While content analyses study how the media frames events, claims-making analysis examines the news coverage of claims-making by non-media actors. Following ‘protest event’ analysis (Rucht et al 1998), the unit of analysis is not an article, but an individual instance of claims-making.
public sphere to be engaged in driving, resisting, or simply being part of the politics of European integration. It provides information on the actors carrying the project of European integration, the nature of their relationships which do so, as well as an overall birds-eye ‘view’ of the politics over European integration that is made open and visible to citizens in a national public domain.

We draw our original samples of political claims-making over European integration in Britain and France, from newspaper sources. Although there are other forms of intermediary public sphere, and arenas where politics is opened to the citizenry, we consider the national mass media (in this case the press) to be the most appropriate for our purposes, since it is the broadest and most general forum for political debates, the most publicly accessible for citizens, and where significant political events of the day will be selected and reported by journalists.

Our data is taken from three years 1990, 1995, 2000 and drawn from editions of *The Guardian* and *The Times*, for Britain, and *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*, for France.\(^\text{14}\) We decided to retrieve our cases of claims-making over European integration from a sample determined by specific days that were selected in advance at regular time intervals within each year. This retrieval strategy was considered to be preferable to sampling around key events of European debate – e.g. the controversy around Haider in Austria, or the launch of European Monetary Union. Our findings will therefore have more chance of representing general trends (cross-nationally, nationally, and across time) regarding the Europeanisation of claims-making in the public sphere, instead of telling us about specific event-driven occurrences whose importance, though significant, may be limited within a specific policy field or event, or within a contingent time period.\(^\text{15}\)

Acts were included in the data if they involved demands, criticisms, or proposals related to the regulation or evaluation of events in relation to European integration, irrespective of which actor made the claim.\(^\text{16}\) Regarding territorial criteria, we included acts in the United Kingdom and France, respectively, and those in the European Union/EEC, even if they were made by foreign or supranational actors or addressed to foreign or supranational authorities. Coded actors include civil society groups, such as employers and trade unions,

\(^{14}\) These papers were chosen because they are newspapers of public record with an encompassing coverage of the specific issues of interest. We used two newspapers per country with different (left/right) political affiliations as sources in the attempt to control for possible selection bias of the type of reported events. Data were coded from Lexisnexis versions of the newspapers by trained coding assistants on the basis of a standardized codebook. All articles in the home news section of the newspapers were checked for relevant acts, i.e. the search was not limited to articles containing certain key words, for selected days. For some of the main variables in the analysis (actors, addressees, aims, etc.) open category lists were used. This allowed us to retain the detail of the original reports in the analysis. Conventional inter-coder reliability tests were undertaken both for the selection of articles and coding, and in addition, coders participated in regular discussions about difficult cases. In total we selected a sample from 52 days for 1990 and 1995, and 104 days for 2000. Thus the opportunities for claims were overrepresented for the most recent year of our data-set 2000, compared to 1990 and 1995, by a ratio of 2:1. As our main approach for this paper is comparative, we have not adjusted the tables to account for this bias toward 2000, but this should nonetheless be borne in mind.\(^\text{15}\)

\(^{15}\) For an example of an alternative strategy see van der Steeg and Risse (2003), whose case study of the Haider affair attempts to make general statements about Europeanisation on the basis of a contingent and policy specific event.

\(^{16}\) We coded all acts in the field of European integration, and all acts with a European issue scope in six strategically selected policy fields: two where EU competences have extended furthest (monetary, agriculture), two intermediary (immigration, troop deployment) and two where nation-states retain most autonomous control (retirement/pensions, education).
NGOs, and European campaign organisations, and also political parties and state actors, such as the courts, legislatures, governments and supranational institutions. To give an idea of the type of information coded, claims-making acts are broken down into seven elements, for each of which a number of variables are coded (See Koopmans 2002 for codebook):

1. Location of claim in time and space (WHEN and WHERE is the claim made?)
2. Actor making claim (WHO makes the claim?)
3. Form of claim (HOW is the claim inserted in the public sphere?)
4. Addressee of claim (AT WHOM is the claim directed?)
5. Substantive issue of claim (WHAT is the claim about?)
6. Object actor: who would be affected by the claim if it were realised (FOR/AGAINST WHOM?)
7. Justification for claim (WHY should this action be undertaken?)

In the next section, we compare claims-making over European integration at the general level, by examining the structure of claims-making in the British and French public spheres, before focussing more directly on cleavages between national actors over European integration, by examining state/civil society relationships, and political party relationships.

Political Communication over European integration in British and French Public Spheres

The first step of our analysis is to determine whether the overall patterns of political communication that appear in the British public sphere are similar to or different from those in France, a country with a deeper and longer institutional involvement in European integration. To make the step toward analysis, it is necessary to see claims-making acts as communicative links. Claims-making acts communicatively link different political levels (EU supranational, EU foreign, national domestic) and different types of actors (e.g. elites/civil society; left/right political parties) and express different purposeful views on European integration (pro-/anti-) which may be framed in different ways (political, economic, cultural). Here we compare to what extent, and how, the political claims mobilised by collective actors communicatively link across the different levels of polities (supranational, foreign national, domestic national). A prime concern is the extent to which claims link actors beyond the geopolitical boundaries of a nation-state, or not.

Claims-making acts which link different levels of polities are important carriers of Europeanisation processes in national public spheres. With regard to links across different levels of polity, hypothetically a claims-making act may construct a vertical relationship between the domestic nation-state and the supranational European institutions, for example, when a Prime Minister, President or pressure group makes a ‘bottom-up’ demand on EU institutions with respect to a concern about policy, or alternatively, when a European institution demands ‘top-down’ that a national government changes its policy with respect to a European issue. Second, a claims-

17 Our analysis is drawn from the years 1990, 1995 and 2000, a period of advancing European integration and over which Europe has transformed from the European Community to the European Union. Here we use the terminology EU and European Union, for our analysis, to avoid the clumsiness of writing EU/EC and European Community/European Union throughout, although we are of course aware of the institutional developments over time.
making act may constitute a horizontal relationship between actors within different EU member states, for example, when the French government criticises the British for their lack of commitment to the European Constitution. Another form of claims-making remains national, comprising those demands about Europe which are between national actors and remain within the boundaries of the nation-state. Here for example, the British Conservative Party may criticise the Labour Party over its pro-European stance, or alternatively, French farmers may demand that their national government protects their subsidies from the Common Agricultural Policy in European negotiations. By aggregating the different types of claims-making, it becomes possible to see the similarities and differences between the British and French public spheres, in their respective political communications over European integration. We now map and compare the communicative links, both within and between different polities, which are produced by claims-making in the two national public spheres.

Figure 1 shows nine possible types of claims-making relationships that may occur between collective actors across three different levels of polity. It does this by relating claims-makers from three political levels (national domestic, foreign, supranational) to their addressees, the institutional actors on whom demands are made, from three political levels (national domestic, foreign, supranational). Each of the nine cells is a possible communicative relationship between political actors that carries a specific form of Europeanisation.
Another important distinction to make is between those types of claims-making which involve a national domestic actor as either a claims-maker or an addressee, and those which are ‘external’ to the receiving public sphere and which are communicative interactions between collective actors who are outside the domestic nation-state. We propose here to focus principally on the five claims-making relationships in which national domestic actors are actively engaged as claims-makers or addressees ((a), (b), (c), (d), (e)). Such types of claims-making can be expected to have a more active transformative impact as carriers of Europeanisation trends on the domestic national public sphere, because they purposefully engage national domestic actors into communicative political relationships over Europe. Conversely, the four ‘external’ types of claims-making represent the reporting in British
and French public spheres of the supranational and transnational interactions of ‘outsiders’, i.e., foreign and supranational actors (cells in italics). Such cases are more passive in that they do not engage national actors, but simply report on and render visible the communication of these ‘outsiders’ over European integration to national publics. They will be discussed secondarily.

Thus the five possible types of more ‘active’ claims-making in which national actors are engaged are:

(a) National claims-making over Europe – Here national actors mobilise demands over European issues on other national actors. This is evidence for ‘internalised’ national political debates over European issues, including contestation, as a form of Europeanisation.

(b) Horizontal claims-making by foreign actors from European member states on domestic actors – Here actors from other EU member states enter national domestic politics demanding responses over European issues from national domestic actors. This contributes to Europeanisation by linking the national politics of two or more EU states.

(c) Horizontal claims-making by national actors on other EU member states – This is the reverse of (b). Demands are mobilised by national actors on actors from other EU member states over European issues. These horizontal types of claims-making (b) and (c) depict a Europe of nation-states whose politics are being more closely communicatively interwoven with one another by conflict over, or collaboration in, European integration.

(d) Top-down vertical claims-making by EU institutions on national actors – Supranational European political institutions are the driving force behind Europeanisation by calling for a political response from national domestic actors over issues of European integration. This creates a top-down vertical Europeanising relationship from the supranational to the national domestic polity.

(e) Bottom-up vertical claims-making by national domestic actors on EU institutions – This is the reverse of (d), where political claims-making by national actors calls on EU supranational institutions to respond to demands over Europe.

Each of the possible types of claims-making represents a relationship between actors that constitutes a specific form of Europeanised political communication. This means that by aggregating the cases of claims-making across the different types, we are able to draw up an overall picture of the patterns of communicative relationships in a national public sphere.

Of the five possible communicative relationships, horizontal and vertical claims-making carries forms of Europeanised communication which creates links between the domestic nation-state, and states beyond national borders transnationally (b) and (c), and the EU supranational institutions (d) and (e), respectively. Such forms of communication across borders and levels of polities can be considered a more purely open variant of Europeanised communication. In such cases, the national public sphere visibly carries direct supranational and transnational interactions between actors across
EU, foreign member-state, and national domestic politics. By comparison, national claims-making over Europe (a) is a more closed variant, where Europe becomes a topic for politics between actors only within the national domestic framework, and without carrying any direct transnational or supranational communicative links.

This closed and indirect form of claims-making over Europe is still Europeanised communication, and following those historians who have emphasised conflict in the formation of the nation-state (e.g., Tilly 1978), one could even argue that contestation within a country, and the increasing references to Europe it brings, might contribute to future European integration processes. From our point of view, however, the crucial difference is that ‘nationalised’ communication over Europe—as it presently is, not what it may arguably bring in the future- constitutes, and makes visible in the public sphere, a less direct communicative engagement with the supranational EU institutions (vertical), and with other foreign polities (horizontal). This means, for example, that if the EU is not visibly seen to make political demands, or have demands directed on it, then European institutions are not being directly ‘opened up’ in a public sphere to national collective actors and the wider citizenry for processes of political engagement and deliberation. Instead European politics becomes indirect and ‘nationalised’, becoming apparent and mediated only through competition between domestic national actors. Clearly, this difference between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ communicative relationships is important, because ‘open’ links constitutes ‘Europeanisation’ as a multi-levelling of collective actors and political institutions, a new form of political communication, whereas ‘closed’ links is simply a case of ‘new wine in old bottles’. Europe as an issue within the existing relationships of national collective actors and political institutions.

Turning to our analysis, Tables 1a and 1b show distributions across the types of claims-making for Britain and France, respectively. In addition to the share of each claims-making type, we show a score for ‘position’ over European integration which ranges from -1 to +1. A -1 score is attributed to a claim against a deepening of the European integration process, or which implies restrictions in the rights and position of European institutions and regulations (or a rejection of extensions). Conversely, +1 is for a claim in favour of deepening European integration, or for the extension of the rights and positions of European institutions and regulations (or a rejection of restrictions). Thirdly, a 0 score indicates neutral or ambivalent claims. The position score is reached by aggregating the position scores of all claims of that type and then calculating a mean. By comparing the mean positions of different claims-making types, we are able to show a first qualitative indicator for whether specific types of claims-making are generally in favour of, or against, European integration.

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18 In Tables 1a and 1b we include only cases where there was both a claims-maker and an addressee, as this constitutes an actor relationship. Cases without an addressee were excluded.
Table 1a: Britain: Share and Position of Types of Political Communication over European Integration, from Claim-making Acts in National Public Sphere, 1990, 1995, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Addressee</th>
<th>Foreign Addressee</th>
<th>EU Supranational Addressee</th>
<th>All Addressees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>share (%) position (+1/-1)</td>
<td>share (%) position (+1/-1)</td>
<td>share (%) position (+1/-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Claims-maker</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>+0.12</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign EU Claims-maker</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>+0.38</td>
<td>+0.40</td>
<td>+0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU/EEC Supranational Claims-maker</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>+0.62</td>
<td>+0.13</td>
<td>+0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Claim-makers</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>+0.16</td>
<td>+0.30</td>
<td>+0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1b: France: Share and Position of Types of Political Communication over European Integration, from Claim-making Acts in National Public Sphere, 1990, 1995, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Addressee</th>
<th>Foreign Addressee</th>
<th>EU/EEC Supranational Addressee</th>
<th>All Addressees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>share (%) position (+1/-1)</td>
<td>share (%) position (+1/-1)</td>
<td>share (%) position (+1/-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Claims-maker</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>+0.39</td>
<td>+0.40</td>
<td>+0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign EU Claims-maker</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>+0.27</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>+0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU/EEC Supranational Claims-maker</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>+0.58</td>
<td>+0.41</td>
<td>+0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Claim-makers</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>+0.40</td>
<td>+0.24</td>
<td>+0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A first general observation to make is that the positions over European integration expressed in the French public sphere are significantly more pro-European than those in the British, both for claims-making by, and on, national domestic actors (All British claims-makers +0.03, all French claims-makers +0.32; All British addressees +0.16, all French addressees +0.40). This indicates that political debate over Europe in France occurs on an axis that is more favourable to integration than that in Britain, which is an important general difference. Overall, in France the country with the longer and deeper institutional involvement and commitment in European integration, ‘active’ political debates over Europe, occur on a cleavage line that is already less sceptical than in Britain.

Turning to the types of claims-making over Europe, if we start with top-down ‘vertical’ claims-making, where EU supranational actors make demands on British and French actors (d), we find relatively modest amounts in both countries (Britain 5.5%, France 2.5%). This indicates a limited penetration of European institutions as a visible and ‘active’ political actor addressing national domestic politics, even in the field of claims about European integration. The EU appears to be a poor communicator, though it could also be the case that the national media are poor in picking up EU demands. Overall however, the effect is the same, there are relatively few opportunities for citizens in both countries to see the EU as an initiator of political demands on national actors, although it is clearly a powerful institutional actor in this field. These findings support the idea of the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ in political communication. Not surprisingly, when it does reach national public spheres it is a strong advocate of European integration (Britain +0.62, France +0.58).

Conversely, when we look at the claims made by national actors on EU institutions with regard to European integration (e), we find this bottom-up way of linking the EU into public debate three times more prevalent in Britain (15.5%), and ten times more so in France (26.6%), than the top-down type (d). This shows that the EU is brought into debate as an addressee much more than it puts itself forward by making claims. Another important observation is the striking cross-national difference. This type of bottom-up, vertical claims-making accounts for significantly less claims-making in Britain and puts forward a strong Eurosceptic position (-0.24). By contrast, this claims-making directed towards EU institutions is the most prominent form in France and evaluates European integration much more positively than the British (F +0.29; UK - 0.24). This shows that French actors have produced a channel of communication that directly addresses European institutions, more so than their British counterparts. Such direct links upwards to the EU polity are also made significantly visible and open to scrutiny by the French public. This development indicates the emergence of a public sphere where French national actors open up the EU for deliberation over issues of European integration, and where the public have more of an opportunity to actually see the EU as a powerful institutional actor. It is evidence that political relationships in France produce communication that is more multi-levelled and engaged with EU institutions than Britain. Such communication will not only result from France’s deeper institutional entrenchment in the European project, but will also contribute to, re-constitute and re-enforce such processes, as political actors invest in the idea of a multi-levelled polity. In contrast, the British actors work politically to a lesser extent at the supranational level, and when they do so are highly sceptical and critical of the European project in comparison to their French counterparts. So once more we see
important cross-national differences that can be related to each country’s approach to the institutional advance of European integration as a political project.

Regarding the possible development of political communication ‘horizontally’ across borders between EU member states over European integration (b) and (c), we find relatively small amounts in both countries (taken together: Britain 5.8%, France 5.4%). So far it appears that there is relatively little transnational political communication over European integration that would be indicative of horizontally interacting Member states. This indicates that the institutional emergence of the EU has stimulated some political communication between actors across Member states, but that this is secondary to the vertical links and political channels that have been produced between national domestic politics and the EU institutions, which as we have seen are driven primarily bottom up by national actors making demands on the EU.¹⁹

Lastly, we turn to the more ‘closed’ type of claims-making that communicates neither upwards supra-nationally, nor trans-nationally across EU national borders, but remains internalised within the nation-state (a). This type of claims-making accounts for almost three times as much claims-making in Britain (35.2%), where it is the most prominent form, compared to France (12.6%). Such nationally internalised claims-making over Europe is also significantly more Eurosceptic in Britain (+0.12) than in France (+0.39). This provides clear evidence that internal debate and competition between national actors is the defining characteristic of Britain’s political communication over Europe, which is in stark contrast to France’s. British actors are twice as likely to address demands at other British political actors and institutions, over issues of European integration, than they are EU actors and institutions ((a) 35.2%, (e) 15.5%). The reverse is true in France, where national actors are twice as likely to address demands at EU actors and institutions, over issues of European integration, than they are French actors and institutions ((a) 12.6%, (e) 26.6%). This is a striking difference in the way that political actors in the two countries have responded to the institutional emergence of multi-levelled European politics. British actors view the European project primarily as an issue within national politics, and the sceptical position of such debates, ((a) +0.12 compared to the overall mean +0.20, and the French (a) +0.39), indicates there is a high level of criticism for the European project within national politics. Whereas as French internal debates appear to be more consensual and exist around a pro-European axis, in Britain, the higher degree of ‘internalised’ politics over Europe over a more Eurosceptic axis, indicates that Europe is a more conflictual issue in Britain. From this we would expect to see different dynamics of political competition over Europe between actors in the two countries, leading to these two divergent political paths that actors have constructed over the increasing emergence of the European Union. We shall examine these shortly by comparing in detail state versus civil society, and political party cleavages over Europe.

Here the overall comparison with France, a country which has been a driver of European institutional integration, has served to demonstrate that British debates about European integration have emerged as being more nationally ‘closed’ and engaging less directly with the EU as a political actor. A further consequence is that compared to

¹⁹ Cross-nationally, it is worth noting that British actors are less likely to address actors in other EU countries (c) (1.6%), than be addressed by them (b) (4.2%), which is not the case for France ((c) 2.3%, (b) 3.1%). In this relatively limited type of communication French actors seem to have acted more ‘openly’ to external Europeans than their British counterparts.
their French counterparts, the British public has fewer opportunities to see the EU institutions directly addressed by problems and issues relating to European integration. Instead European politics is made visible to them in the public domain as a national issue, mobilised primarily by British actors addressing British actors. To a certain extent this precludes opportunities for citizens to see themselves having a direct relationship to EU institutions, and for seeing the EU as an influential actor in its own right, rather than as an epiphenomenon of national politics.

Regarding the ‘passive’ claims-making which is ‘external’ to the domestic public sphere and does not engage national actors (f), (g), (h), (i), of particular interest is the strong presence that we find for claims-making by supranational European actors which is also directed at the EU/EEC institutions and actors (i) (France 26.4%, Britain 13.6%). Here we see that claims made by EU/EEC supranational actors tend to remain enclosed within the domain of supranational EU affairs by being made on other EU actors. Thus national publics get to see EU political affairs to a significant extent as externalised and self-enclosed, rather than engaging national actors. Thus the EU appears in national public spheres as a distinct and separate supranational political entity. Such a view of EU politics is especially prominent in France (26.4%) compared to Britain (13.6%), which again points to the greater salience of EU institutions within French public affairs.

In sum, this comparison of the structures of claims-making over European integration in the two public spheres has served to demonstrate basic cross-national similarities and differences. The major difference is that in France processes of Europeanisation are most likely to occur through vertical claims-making by national domestic actors on the supranational level, whereas in Britain the ‘closed’ form of Europeanisation through internalised national communications was most prominent. This significant cross-national difference supports the view that the political communication which constructs and reproduces the relationship to European institutions is substantively different in the two countries. It supports a ‘path dependency’ argument, whereby the deeper and longer institutional involvement of France, an initiator of the European project who had an important influence in shaping it in its own image and interests at the early stages, has led to political communication that is more favourable to European integration, and collective actors who view the political world in a way that they engage more directly with EU institutions. By contrast, political communication in Britain, a relative latecomer who joined the European project after it had already been significantly defined and institutionally shaped by others, is carried by actors who engage less and are more critical of EU institutions, and who are still debating internally over the value of European integration for the country. Such debates would be much harder to make in France, where politics, and the discourses around it, has institutionalised the idea of national centrality to the European project, which gives French actors a different baseline to operate from than their British counterparts.

In addition, we found a very limited role of the EU as a communicating actor in national public spheres, which suggests that it is national actors who carry the respective and apparently different ‘European projects’ forward in Britain and France. In the next section, we examine cross-national differences further, by focussing on two types of possible

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20 It is also worth noting that foreign EU political actors are at their most visible (as either claim-makers or addressees) with demands that are made on the EU institutions (h) (Britain 14.4%, France 16.7%). Thus Foreign EU political actors appear most often in both countries as claim-makers making ‘bottom-up’ demands on EU institutions.
cleavages between national actors over European integration, those between state and civil society actors, and those between political parties, since these are two important forms of political mediation linking institutions to citizens in the nation state.

National Actors’ Political Communication over European Integration

i. State and Civil Society Cleavages

Given the different overall structures of political communication in Britain and France, and the importance of national political actors in driving and reproducing those specific relationships to European Union institutions, we now examine the nature of cleavages between national state and civil society actors over the project of European integration. An important consideration here will be the share and position of state actors in claims-making over European integration since this will be a decisive factor in shaping the opportunities for civil society actors to purposefully enter political debates.

Tables 2a and 2b show the shares and positions among different types of national domestic actors in Britain and France, respectively. In addition to showing the overall categories of aggregated state and civil society actors, we have ordered the different sub-categories of actors according to their positions over European integration, with more pro-European positions at the top and more Eurosceptic ones at the bottom. This gives a visual presentation of the discursive distance between collective actors over European integration, given through their expressed stances, and identifies who are likely allies and opponents, as well as the public stances of the different institutions, relative to one another.

The samples in Tables 2a and 2b, and 3a and 3b, include cases of claims-making acts where no addressee was specified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRITAIN</th>
<th>Share in Claims-making (%)</th>
<th>Position over European Integration (-1 to +1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Domestic State and Political Party Actors</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Domestic Civil Society Actors</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>+0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers and private companies</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>+0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National central bank</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>+0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other National state actors</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>+0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions and employees</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>+0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific and research experts</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>+0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic experts</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>+0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other national civil society organisations and groups</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>+0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National government and executive actors</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>+0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro/anti European campaign organisations</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National legislative actors, political parties and politicians</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Domestic National Actors</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>+0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases (N)</td>
<td>367</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRANCE</th>
<th>Share in Claims-making (%)</th>
<th>Position over European Integration (-1 to +1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Domestic State and Political Party Actors</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>+0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Domestic Civil Society Actors</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>+0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National government and executive actors</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>+0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National legislative actors, political parties and politicians</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>+0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific and research experts</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>+0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers and private companies</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>+0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National central bank</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>+0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other national civil society organisations and groups</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>+0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic experts</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>+0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions and employees</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Domestic National Actors</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>+0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases (N)</td>
<td>270</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Excludes Pro/Anti European campaign organisations (0.4%) and Other National State actors (1.5%) from subcategories, which have too few cases (n<5) to calculate a position.
First, we again see that French political debates over European integration are constructed by national actors around an axis that is significantly more pro-European (+0.38) than in Britain (+0.01). Turning to the type of collective actor, overall we find similarity in the share of demands, with state actors making three times more than civil society actors in both countries (Britain: state 72.2%, civil society 27.8%; France: state 74.8%, civil society 25.2%). This high proportion of claims-making by state actors is indicative of a highly institutionalised field of politics and an especially elite-dominated debate. Previous research on Britain using the same method reveals that by comparison state actors account for a smaller share of claims-making in racism and discrimination (46.0%), and unemployment (39.8%) (Koopmans and Statham 2000b; Statham 2003). However, there is also a striking cross-national difference, namely that British state and civil society actors hold similar and sceptical positions on European integration (state and political party -0.02, civil society +0.06), whereas in France, civil society actors (+0.13) challenge the state’s strongly favourable stance to European integration (+0.47) with demands that are more sceptical. Thus, the British cleavage over European integration cross-cuts different actor types, both among elites and institutions and within civil society. In France by contrast, there is a cleavage over European integration between pro-European political elites and institutions versus a more Eurosceptic civil society.

Looking at the shares and positions of specific collective actors, the picture becomes clearer regarding the nature of these striking differences. First, we consider the political institutional actors who dominate the debates in both countries, and whose position defines the opportunities and starting reference point for other collective actors to mobilize demands over Europe. In Britain, the legislative and political party actors (26.2%, -0.16) are the most opposed actors to European integration, and the government and executive actors (42.5%, +0.06) are also strongly present at the Eurosceptic end of the scale. This is in complete contrast to France, where the government and executive (42.2%, +0.54) are the most pro-European actor, followed by the legislative and political party actors (29.3, +0.37). Here we see that the stances over European integration which are advanced by the national political institutions, and which are constitutive of the discourses which reproduce embedded institutional positions, are diametrically different in Britain and France. In line with ‘path dependency’ arguments, British institutions remain strongly sceptical of the European project, even between two and three decades after joining it. Government and Parliament remain questioning and critical of the value of European integration.

There are many examples which support this. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, 20/03/90, states that responsibility for fixing budget deficits in Brussels would represent an 'unacceptable loss of national authority'. As Defence Secretary, Michael Portillo, 10/10/95, declares that the Conservative government will not allow Brussels to control our defence policy and that ‘British troops will never die for Brussels' accusing the Labour opposition of endorsing surrender to 'European federalism'. Peter Lilley as a Conservative Social Security Secretary, 3/02/95, claims that 'There can be no question of extending the community's competence into the area of financing our diverse social security systems', stating that the government would not tolerate the EC extending its remit to taxes and benefits. Lord Denning, 13/07/90, says that European law is 'like a tidal wave bringing down our sea walls' and that the European Court of Justice 'has made many decisions impinging on our statute law'. In 2000, 22/11, the Labour government’s Foreign Secretary Robin Cook tells the Foreign Affairs Select Committee that Britain will if necessary use its veto on social security harmonisation at next month's Nice EU summit since it could mean
'quite significant potential sums of additional spending'. Likewise the Labour British Government, 14/03/00, supported by the Opposition, reject the European Commission’s proposals to extend qualified majority voting to areas of tax and social security, saying that 'the Commission could propose what it liked, but it was up to member states to decide.'

By comparison, the French state, largely supported by its legislature, is a committed advocate and national proponent of the European project, over which there is a clear consensus within the political institutional arena. Political debate exists within French institutional politics, but is premised on the benefits of European integration, not questioning its value. We find many examples supporting this. Thus, Elisabeth Guigou, Socialist Minister for Justice, 26/04/00, claims during a parliamentary debate on the Future Charter of European Rights that the project is a sign that EU is a matter of common values and identity. President Chirac, 29/05/00, calls on the Eurozone States to have a more coordinated policy to support the currency, and the European member states to reform their pension schemes and elaborate a good education system which can benefit all citizens. Socialist Finance Minister Laurent Fabius, 29/05/00, supports the propositions of Joschka Fischer for a Federal European Union and calls for close concertation between Berlin and Paris, and then on a different occasion, 07/11/00, declares that the Euro is a long term bet and a pillar of the European construction process.

Such examples of British state scepticism and French state Europeanism are not atypical and serve to demonstrate further that debates over Europe occur on different terrains within the two countries. Overall, national differences in elite and institutional positions over European integration appear to have been enduring and, according to our evidence, continue to be re-enforced through contemporary political communication. Unlike France, a political elite consensus has never been achieved over the perceived benefits of advancing European integration within Britain, who has had to adapt and define her political interests, within a template institutional framework that had already been shaped, and was more compatible with the interests of France.

The way that civil society actors perceive the benefits and losses of advancing European integration will be strongly shaped by, and refer to, the expressed positions of national political elites and their institutions. Civil society actors in Britain exist in a situation of elite uncertainty and scepticism over the potential benefits European integration, which opens up this issue to the broader public arena for political competition. In contrast, the French elite’s consensus over the benefits of advancing European integration, leaves civil society actors in the position of making demands by referring to this established pro-European institutional stance. In Britain, the project of European integration is put up for discussion by the elites, and it is striking that we find no actors expressing more than a cautious pro-European stance, with employers and private companies being the most pro-European (+0.27), with a position that in France would rank as a sceptical challenge the elite’s consensus. In fact, employers and private companies (Britain +0.27, France +0.29) and central banks (Britain +0.25, France +0.20) in both countries hold similar positions. In addition, it is worth stating that to the cautious and limited extent that it is advanced at all in Britain, the pro-European cause is carried by market concerns and actors, whereas in France it is promoted as a political concern by elites. This indicates that commitment to advancing European integration is part of mainstream institutionally backed French political identity, whereas in Britain it is viewed more as a limited sectoral interest.
and economic concern, which is changeable, negotiable and ‘ad hoc’. In Britain pro-Europeanist values are not an established element of the elite’s political identity.

Looking at the composition of civil society groups making claims, for the most part these are economists, private firms, bankers, and academics in both countries, who are hardly the type of actors who would be indicative of a participatory active ‘demos’ over European integration. This gives support to the notion of a ‘democratic deficit’ of the European Union project, since citizens seem to have mobilized relatively little through social movements over this undoubtedly important political issue, even at the national level.\(^{22}\) The major exception to this overall rule is a dedicated European protest movement sector in Britain, which accounts for a tenth of national domestic claims-making and has an overall impact which is Eurosceptic (9%, -0.15). In the British situation of the elite’s divisions and overall unwillingness to endorse European integration as beneficial to the national good, competition spills from the institutional arena over into the public domain. We found thirteen organisations which existed specifically to campaign over issues of European integration, with ‘Britain in Europe’ the most prominent pro-European, and ‘Business for Sterling’ the most visible of the Eurosceptics.

A considerable number of the claims by campaign groups in Britain focussed on the main project of European integration within our time period, the prospect of European Monetary Union. In Britain, the decisions of successive governments (both Conservative and Labour) not to decide on a timetable for joining monetary union, and to take a sceptic and ambivalent stance, created political uncertainty and has opened up a space for extra-parliamentary campaigning on this issue. Here the campaign groups appear, with ‘Britain for Europe’ stating typically: ‘Britain cannot stand like a latter-day King Canute, holding back the tide. Whether we like it or not, the euro exists and British companies are being forced to deal with it.’ Against such demands Britain for Sterling, point out that the year 2000 ‘is the 10th anniversary of Britain joining the ERM, which cost 100,000 business bankruptcies, 1.75m homes in negative equity and a doubling of unemployment.’ By contrast, in France with a pro-Euro governmental stance, we find only one equivalent case, and even in that the ‘Alliance pour la souveraineté de la France’ is acting in co-operation with a British group. Together they organise a ‘Sovereignty European Charter’ and protest against the euro at an ‘alternative’ to the official Nice Summit.

In France, the institutionalisation of European integration as a political project provides few material or symbolic resources for campaign organisations who question the value of Europe. A campaign sector over Europe was virtually absent in France accounting for a miniscule 0.4% of claims. Instead the only real opponent of European integration in France, were the trade unions and employees, who were barely visible (2.6%, -0.43), and were mostly critical of the neo-liberal direction of the European Union rather than the principle of European integration. Thus, the general secretary Marc Blondel of Force Ouvrière, 07/12/00, declares that it is not because bosses are more Europeanist that they are less bosses, and goes on to criticise

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\(^{22}\) The national level is also where civil society actors are most present over European integration too. From our full samples of claims-making acts, national domestic civil society actors (Britain 14.0%, France 9.2%), were far more prominent than EU supra- and trans-national civil society actors (Britain 1.0%, France 2.3%), and foreign EU civil society actors (Britain 3.8%, France 3.5%) – (Britain n is 729, France n is 740). Thus civil society participation and engagement in political debates over European integration in national public spheres, is largely a project of national civil society actors, not EU supra- and transnational ones, who are hardly visible.
the President of the European Confederation of Unions, Emilio Gabablio, for being not very involved in defending employees. In other cases, the Unions, and especially the CGT, 05/12/00, demonstrate against the absence of the social question within Europe and supports the Fundamental Rights Charter in Nice, whereas radical unions, 7/12/00, demonstrate against the Charter and the neo-liberal EU, and the public sector, 29/11/95, strike in protest against the deregulation programme of the European Commission and reforms of social security brought by EU laws. Here we see a sectoral opposition to the EU which is seen as an economic model that is more neo-liberal than the French one. There are no such examples in Britain, where, as the examples of elite’s claims show, ‘social’ Europe is perceived as a potential threat to Britain’s national autonomy over its existing market-based economic model.

In sum, an important factor in explaining the differences between Britain’s and France’s politics over Europe is the different stances of their political elites. ‘Fence-sitting’ and ‘foot-dragging’ by national elites has created uncertainty over Britain’s future role in the EU. These elite divisions and ambivalence over advancing European integration within the institutional arena has provided opportunities for single issue campaigns over Europe to emerge in the public domain. By contrast, French elites and their institutions appear as unequivocal ‘pace-setters’ for European integration. This has led to a limited cleavage between state and civil society, but one where civil society actors generally accept the value of European integration, and defend their perceived sectoral interests within that project.

ii. Political Party Cleavages

There has been considerable academic debate over party political positions on European integration, and the extent to which pro-European and Eurosceptic positions cross-cut left and right cleavages. Here a salient thesis is that political party positions cross-cut left/right divisions, so that parties of the centre of left and right tend to be pro-European and Euroscepticism is confined to the marginal poles of ‘extreme left’ and ‘extreme right’ parties, thus forming an inverted ‘U’ pattern (Hix and Lord 1997, Taggart 1998, Aspinwall 2002). So far, this thesis has been grounded in analyses of experts’ assessments (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2004), party programmes (Gabel and Hix 2004), and party positions imputed by voters (Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004), but not in the political communications that party actors mobilise into the public domain. Such political communication is arguably a more relevant form of data to address such issues because it relates to party’s actions in relation to ongoing political events that are real and continuous over time, and is drawn from the medium where parties communicate with citizens as an ongoing process, and not just their one-off attempts to woo citizens with strategic propaganda and promises about the future at election time, or expert or public perceptions measured at a specific moment in time. In addition, given that for nation states, political parties are the classic form of intermediation between institutional politics and citizens, we considered it important to examine the evidence for party political cleavages over European integration. Tables 3a and 3b show the shares and positions of all collective actors with a party political identity, and across the three selected years, 1990, 1995, 2000.  

23 Note this includes all actors of all types with a recognisable political party identity and so cross-cuts the state/civil society distinction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Share</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Share</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>53.3</td>
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<td>Labour</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
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*Position score only given if n>5, otherwise N/A. ** also includes those not subcategorised in table.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>All</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Share</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR)</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>+0.56</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>+0.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parti socialiste (PS)</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>+0.48</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>+0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union pour la Democratie Francaise (UDF)</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>+0.68</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>+1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Communiste Francais (PC)</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouvement des Citoyens</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Political Party Actors**</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>+0.40</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>+0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Position score only given if n>5, otherwise N/A. ** also includes those not subcategorised in table.

Note: Parties of Government are included in bold italics for the three years. Our retrieval of the sample allowed twice as many opportunities for inclusion for 2000, compared to 1990 and 1995 (see above). The figures for the All column are not weighted by year, but the total claims made by a party in our samples. Retrieval strategies are equivalent for both countries, allowing for cross-national comparison, as well as cross-party comparison within a country.

A first important difference is from the overall positions of the largest and mainstream centrist political parties, where in France we find a pro-European consensus and in Britain we find political competition over Europe.

In France, the overall centrist consensus between the main political parties of centre-left Parti Socialiste (PS) and centre-right Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR)
and Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF), is pitched in the pro-European camp (RPR +0.56, PS +0.48, UDF +0.68) compared to the other political parties (overall mean +0.40). Here we find numerous examples where politicians of the French centre are ‘pace-setters’ for European integration. Thus, François Hollande, French socialist leader declares, 12/05/00, that the Franco-German motor is essential to the development of Europe. Likewise, MP Pervenche Berès (PS) claims that the debate over the Charter of European Rights is a good occasion to show that franco-german relationship is not as loose as some claim. In another, 30/05/00, Senators including Jean-François Poncet (UDF) back German Minister Joschke Fischer’s proposals for an ambitious institutional reform during French presidency. And in another from the many examples, President Chirac declares, 26/06/00, on German television his will to deepen the "great european adventure" thanks to franco-german cooperation.

Against this consensual pro-European centre which accounts for four-fifths of party political claims-making (79.9%), there is party political opposition to Europe from small parties, among which the left wing Parti Communiste Français (PC) (3.9%, -0.14), and Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s Mouvement des Citoyens (socialist nationalist) (2.4%, -0.60) were most prominent, and there were also a lesser number from others including the trotskyist left, Lutte Ouvrière (workers’ struggle) and the Ligue Communiste revolutionnaire (LCR), and from the nationalist right, the Mouvement pour la France (national catholic party) and Rassemblement pour la France (RPF), and the extreme-right Front national. Thus, Jean-Pierre Chevènement leader of Mouvement des Citoyens declares, 21/05/00, that German Minister Joschke Fischer’s propositions for institutional reform towards a federal EU were a sign that Germany wasn't cured from its Nazi past. In another, 21/05/00, he adds that Germany, with its ethnic conception of the nation, dreams always of a Holy German Roman Empire. Also from the left, Communist candidate, Robert Hue (PC), demands a new referendum on EU before the new IGC in 1996, 26/03/95. And from the trotskyist left, Arlette Laguiller (LO), 26/03/95, claims the EU is anachronistic and prefers to promote the "Socialist United States of Europe" and the general secretary of the LCR, Alain Krivine, 07/12/00, calls for ‘a Europe of workers and people’. From the right, Charles Pasqua (RPF), 02/05/00, states that soon he will launch a campaign to abrogate the Maastricht Treaty, whereas the Front National protest peacefully against the EU, 07/12/00, led by Marie-France Stirbois.

Thus it is important to note that although overall an elite centrist party pro-European consensus predominates, that this is neither uniform nor unchallenged within French politics. We find evidence for dissent from the radical poles of left and right of the party system, and these appear to have become more vociferous over time, especially from the left PC and MdC, who were challenging the pro-European centre-left Socialists, in 2000, at a time when the Communists were also a minor party in the governing socialist coalition. In general and at the aggregated level, however, for France, the party political cleavage over European integration largely cross-cuts the left/right distinction, and follows an inverted ‘U’ pattern between a pro-European political centre and the Eurosceptic periphery. However, it should be noted that in our time period this inverted ‘U’ was not a pure one, in that Euroscepticism came more from the left than the right pole. In France, Euroscepticism comes mostly from a perceived defence of the French social welfare system against a neo-liberal Europe by the left-wing parties, and to a lesser extent from the ideological nationalism of the right and extreme right.
By contrast, we see that in Britain, Europe is an issue for party political competition between the two major parties of centre left and centre right. Labour (+0.33) has taken an overall more pro-European position compared to the Conservatives who have been strongly Eurosceptic (-0.29). The Conservatives, both as the party of government (1990, 1995) and the party of opposition (2000) have taken up Eurosceptic positions. Thus, in the Commons, 11/12/00, opposition leader William Hague accused Prime Minister Blair and Foreign Minister Cook of a 'sell out' claiming that the Nice agreement represents major steps towards a European superstate? It is worth noting, however, that this Euroscepticism was relatively unchallenged by the Labour opposition in 1990 and 1995. At those times it appears that an elite consensus existed among the main centrist political parties that was either against, or ambivalent, towards European integration. Thus Nicholas Ridley, whilst Trade and Industry Secretary in the Conservative Government claimed in an interview with the Spectator magazine, 14/07/90, that handing over sovereignty to the EC was 'tantamount to giving it to Adolf Hitler' and that the moves towards European monetary union was a German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe. In France, such extreme views would have been inconceivable from a main centrist party of government. However, in the same period, Labour were also unenthusiastic and ambivalent about Europe, for example, with Peter Shore, Labour MP, 11/06/90, stating in the Commons debate on the EC that European monetary union will deliver Britain, bound hand and foot, to the European decision makers.

Since entering office Labour has taken up a pro-European position (+0.38), whilst in opposition the Conservatives became strongly Eurosceptic (-0.50). Thus Britain does not conform to the inverted ‘U’ model for party positions on Europe. Also the most pro-European party have been the Liberal Democrats, Britain’s third political party with a much smaller number of seats than Labour and the Conservatives, who are barely publicly visible on the issue (2.5%, +0.75). Here, for example Paddy Ashdown, former Lib Dem leader, 16/06/00, claimed that Tony Blair needed to take the lead on the issue of joining the Euro and that the country was being left leaderless, and that this was the biggest decision the country had to take.

In general, competition over Europe is partly facilitated by the British party system which produces single party governments with significant majorities and strong executive power, which do not need to moderate their stance in order to gain the support of other parties. The British electoral system is also much less favourable to smaller parties than the French where parties are often required to form coalition governments. However, although they contribute to them, these general differences between political systems are not sufficient to fully explain the issue specific differences over Europe between Britain and France. Instead we consider in line with the logic of path dependency that there is an embedded and institutionalised difference between the ideological stances of political elites in the two countries over Europe that has endured and reproduced itself over time. Thus, Labour’s relatively recent conversion to a pro-European stance will lack the institutional embedding and depth compared to that of the French centre parties of left and right, and so will more easily shift back to ambivalence or opposition in the future. This is partly because the axis of the British ideological cleavage for political competition over Europe is substantially more Eurosceptic than in France, since it is based on ‘ad hoc’ national benefits arguments, rather than being an ideological commitment to ‘pace-setting’ and advancing the European project.
As a consequence, Labour’s new pro-Europeanism is perhaps most accurately depicted as Anti-Euroscepticism rather than a substantive ideological pro-Europeanism, especially when compared to that of the French centre parties. Thus, Britain’s Minister for Europe Keith Vaz claims, 1/09/00, that the right wing press are turning voters against the EU with a stream of scare stories report that the EU’s proposed charter of rights would be a disaster for UK business. Then, after the signing of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, he states, 07/12/00, ‘Get this clear. It is not a constitution. It is not legally binding. Nobody has talked about it being legally binding’. In another, Robin Cook, 10/02/00, UK Foreign Secretary presses the Prime Minister to be more positive towards the single currency because failure to join would damage relations with the rest of the EU and not divulging the results of Labour’s 5 economic tests for joining Monetary Union may damage Labour election chances. In another typical case, during visit to Moscow, Prime Minister Tony Blair, 21/11/00, uses a BBC interview and press conference with President Putin to launch an attack on UK’s Eurosceptic press, saying its coverage of EU defence force plans was fundamentally dishonest and in the grip of anti-European hysteria. On our evidence, the New Labour elite should rightly be considered Anti-Eurosceptics rather than pro-Europeans.

In contrast to the French, British political elites view European integration as an issue that is still open to question and competition, and use it as a possibility for mobilising support from the public. In France, competition between the main political parties appears not to address or question the national commitment to European integration to any substantial degree, and dissent over this issue is by parties of the far left and right, who mobilise against the centrist political establishment on different formulations of a perceived defence of national autonomy and/or the French social welfare system. In short, Britain’s past elite scepticism over Europe has contributed to reproducing the current malaise of institutionalised elite divisions within British politics over Europe. In France, elite consensus over the general goals of European integration appears to have largely pre-empted conflict over Europe within mainstream politics, though that may now be eroding and facing a new challenge. Indeed in France it is the small and marginal parties at the poles of the political spectrum who are Eurosceptic, but while their momentum may be rising, their overall impact on the political centre will also remain limited, not least because such parties often have other institutional barriers to their success, that are not related to the issue of Europe.

Conclusion and Discussion

In this article we set out to examine the extent and type of political communication by collective actors in Britain and France, that is both constitutive of, and a response to, the advancing Europeanization of political institutions and discourses of member states. We advocate a stance that sees ‘Europeanization’ as a process that is not confined to elites, institutions, and policy communities, but which extends through publicly visible acts of political communication mobilised by collective actors and carried by the mass media to the wider citizenry. Such an approach towards European integration follows in the related ‘contentious politics’ and European public spheres traditions. To our knowledge, this analysis is one of the first attempts to study acts of ‘Europeanized’ political communication in national public spheres by recourse to a systematically cross-national comparative data-set. By retrieving claims-making acts from the same regular pre-selected dates for both countries, we allowed the claims-making data to ‘speak for themselves’ and provide
information about countries’ and actors’ positions on European integration that is relevant for depicting the general trends of Europeanized political communication, and not limited by being tied to specific events that would be unrepresentative at the general level. Such a methodological approach is necessary since we required evidence on general differences between countries, and between actors, to address the central question of the extent and form of political communication over European integration, and for examining what processes might account for evident similarities and differences.

Overall, our empirical findings established that there are striking differences in the forms and contents of political communication through which collective actors in Britain and France politically mobilise issues of European integration.

First, our comparison demonstrated that the two countries have distinct patterns of political communication over Europe. French political debates are more ‘supranationalised’ than British ones. They exhibit stronger linkages to the European supranational political institutions and actors, a relationship that is largely produced by the ‘bottom-up’ claims-making by French actors on the EU. By contrast, British political debate is characterised by national ‘internalisation’, a type of communication that is indicative of inward-looking competitive relationships over Europe. British political debates occurred along an axis that was more critical of, and opposed to, European integration than the French. British debates also tend to make the EU a topic for national politics, more than they open up spaces for political exchanges with the EU as a powerful institutional actor. Thus EU politics is made publicly visible to British citizens primarily as a national affair. In comparison, French actors have transformed their communicative relationships to a greater extent and engage purposefully with the supra-national political level above the nation-state. Overall, this constitutes a more substantive type of ‘Europeanization’ of political communication, based on, and formative of, multi-levelled interaction and relationships, compared to Britain.

We sought to explain such differences by drawing on ‘path dependency’ theory. The deeper and longer institutional involvement of founder member France relative to latecomer Britain, as well as its self-location at the centre of the advancing European project, has importantly shaped the way that French political actors perceive and invest in the supranational level of European politics, compared to their British counterparts. Given that we found relatively little evidence for the EU intervening as a political actor in national public spheres (though more in France than in Britain), we turned to national cleavages, between state and civil society actors, and between political parties, to examine the relationships which have most likely produced and reproduced these two different national trajectories for relationships to European integration. This also allowed us to look more closely as the qualitative contents of political communication.

In both countries, the politics of European integration is an elite dominated affair. However, here the similarities end. In Britain, elites remain sceptical over the benefits of European integration, there has been strong competition over Europe in the institutional political arena, and this has spilled over into civil society, where issue-specific pro- and anti-European campaign groups add their own voices to the debate over the value of national involvement in Europe. Party political competition between Labour and Conservative Parties is also evident in the time period of our sample. Though it needs qualifying that Labour as an opposition party was sceptical towards Europe (1990), and remained silent in response to the Euroscepticism of the Conservatives (1995), and even when in power (2000), Labour has tended to be more anti-Eurosceptic than pro-European,
primarily over the issue of monetary union. In France, political elites are the most pro-European actor, and have strongly promoted European integration. This elite consensus over European integration has received limited opposition from civil society actors, but this is weak and mostly a defence of sectoral interests, mostly from trade unions in opposition to the perceived threat of a neo-liberal Europe to the French social system. The general pro-European elite consensus means that there is relatively little competition among the main political parties of government over European issues. Opposition to Europe is confined to parties which are usually excluded from governing coalitions or the minority junior partners at the national level, which were again mainly from the left against the perceived neo-liberalism of Europe, but also to a lesser extent from the right on an ideology of defending national autonomy.

Overall, our findings emphasise the key importance of national elites’ positions on Europe, which shape the institutional and discursive political environment in which other collective actors mobilise demands. A quarter of a century after joining the common European project, British elites have still not been, using Haas’ words (1961:196), ‘persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new political centre.’ In other words, their initial diffidence and ambivalence towards European integration which precipitated a referendum only a couple of years after joining, has continued to the present day. Other latecomers, such as Spain and Ireland, have exhibited less political ‘stickiness’ on this issue, and have grown and transformed themselves within the image of a developing and advancing Europe. We suggested earlier that relatively underdeveloped national economies and weak national political institutions (of Spain and Ireland compared to Britain) would be factors that would make countries more adaptable to the pressures of the European ‘path’ even for latecomers. Such a hypothesis can be tested by examining more cases of European countries, and their starting points of entry into, and contemporary forms of political communication about, the common European project. The data of Europub.com will allow such research. In this study, we can only contrast the British political elite’s reticence with the French elite’s advocacy of European integration, and are most likely dealing with cases at opposite poles of the scale.

Britain, the perennial ‘footdragger’ and ‘fence-sitter’ over European integration, stands diametrically opposed to ‘pace-setter’ France, which is also why the political leaders of the two countries so often visibly and publicly clash at European summits over such issues. At the same time, we argue in line with path dependency theories that their distinct trajectories over European integration are dynamic and self-re-enforcing, and that they have been both institutionalised and internalised as cognitive models by political actors, so that potential reversals are less likely than ongoing steps along existing ‘paths’. This sounds tautological but it is not. Our examination of political communication shows that political actors, in France and Britain, have invested in and built different institutional and discursive political worlds or ‘paths’ through which they engage with European integration. It is through these, and any shoots and branches that may grow from them, that they will have to start to address any future developments or changes that could potentially lead to a shift in perspectives. Such transformations will be a difficult and conflictual process, as many actors have invested strongly in their existing political worldviews, which are also underpinned by a deep institutional embedding.

Here an example from France is instructive. The French public’s ‘no’ vote in a referendum on the European Constitution in 2005, constituted a national political crisis, because it potentially threatened the established elite consensus on France’s advocacy of advancing
European integration. A ‘new’ branch may emerge from the existing ‘path’ allowing a transformation here, for example, if politicians from the mainstream French political parties start to become more like their British counterparts, and politically compete over the value of the European project and attempt to build public or electoral support by doing so. This would erode and diminish the elite consensus over Europe in France. However, France is not going to turn overnight into Britain over Europe, just as Britain – where a public ‘no’ vote would simply have followed to a large extent the existing political tradition – will not change into France. The point here is that because of the distinct types of political communication that have built up in the two countries, and have constructed their relationships to European integration, any changes that do occur are likely to be slow, and incremental, and take place within the parameters of existing national cognitive models, rather than be wholesale and sweeping.

A final point to make is that from the perspective of the European Union itself. An French elite without a clear and consensual stance for advancing European integration is potentially more threatening than a British one, since this will cut off the flow of ideas and one of the main impetuses for advancing European integration that has been present since the beginning. However, the institutional establishment and relative autonomy of the European Union as a supranational entity is sufficient to endure such events. If the ‘no vote’ turns out to be a turning point and the end of a permissive consensus toward Europe in France, and transformative of French elite positions, then the European Union risks becoming an institutional development without a coherent and legitimating political idea of where it is going. To a certain extent, this is nothing new, as countries have always competed over political projects for a common Europe. However, if the ‘pace-setters’ of European integration get cold feet, then the European Union is likely to be marked by a period of prolonged ‘stasis’ until those national elites who have built and shaped it, with themselves at the centre, decide to pick up the mantle once more.
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