EUROGOV
No. C-08-01
Paul Magnette and Yannis Papadopoulos
On the politicization of the European consociation:
A middle way between Hix and Bartolini
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Published: January 31,
2008
Abstract
A debate has emerged between S. Hix and S. Bartolini on the
plausibility and desirability of the politicization of the
EU. By this it is usually meant a more important role for
mass, competitive, and partisan politics both on the input-
(expression of preferences) and on the output- (collectively
binding measures and resource allocation) side of the European
decision-making system. In this article, we argue that this
debate does not sufficiently take into consideration the consociational
nature of the EU. Comparing the EU to other consociational
polities such as Belgium and Switzerland, we show that the
politicization of the EU is not plausible along a bipolar
logic, but that other forms of politicization are both plausible
and desirable.
We argue that S. Hix’s recipe for politicization is
based on some incorrect assumptions and predictions. It is
not obvious that the EU is evolving towards more Left-Right
polarization. Even if this were the case, the nature of the
EU implies that cooperation and compromises are indispensable,
therefore Hix’s suggestions will not suffice to clarify
political choice and enhance accountability. Hix is not correct
in believing that politicization along the Left-Right cleavage
will alleviate euroskepticism. He tends to associate the latter
with this dimension, which is partly wrong. Moreover, euroskepticism
also has a social base (“losers of modernization”)
and does not only derive from the deficit of accountability
in the EU.
At the same time, we think that the consociational nature
of the EU also reduces the risks feared by S. Bartolini with
regard to the consequences of politicization on governability.
The politicization of constitutive issues can even be regarded
as necessary, in order to integrate anti-system political
entrepreneurs and euroskeptic segments of public opinion.
Also Bartolini is only partially right in stressing the destabilizing
potential of the politicization of opposition on these issues:
it is true that consociational mechanisms are less effective
– at least in the short term – in dealing with
this kind of conflict, but it seems to us less risky to rely
on them than on non-politicization.
As a remedy to the accountability deficit of the EU, consociational-type
politicization is nevertheless not a panacea. Therefore we
suggest the coupling of a system of politicized “negotiation
democracy” with mechanisms of direct participation.
With a number of institutional safeguards, such a coupling
would help to cope with the limits of consociational systems,
would remain compatible with the compound nature of the EU,
and would provide value-added in terms of public legitimization
of the European integration.
Keywords:
accountability, democratization, legitimacy, participation,
political parties, political representation, political science,
polity building, public opinion, referendum
Paul Magnette
– Université Libre de Bruxelles
e-mail: pmagnet@ulb.ac.be
Yannis Papadopoulos –
Université de Lausanne
e-mail: Ioannis.Papadopoulos@unil.ch
© 2008 Paul Magnette
and Yannis Papadopoulos
Citing this EUROGOV
paper:
Magnette, Paul, and Yannis Papadopoulos. 2008. On the politicization
of the European consociation: A middle way between Hix and
Bartolini. European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) No.
C-08-01,
http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-08-01.pdf
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