Is the South so different?
Italian and Spanish Families in Comparative Perspective

Teresa Jurado Guerrero and Manuela Naldini
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Teresa Jurado Guerrero schreibt als Doktorandin am Mannheimer Graduiertenkolleg eine Dissertation über 'Institutionalisation of Family Solidarity Patterns and the Development of the Welfare State. Spain, Italy and France in a Comparative Perspective'. Manuela Naldini ist Doktorandin am Europäischen Hochschulinstitut in Florenz, Italien. Sie schreibt eine Dissertation über 'Family Models and Welfare State. The Italian Case in Historical and Comparative Perspective'.

Editorial Note:
Teresa Jurado Guerrero is a doctoral student at the Mannheim Graduate College for Social Sciences (MAGKS). She is writing a doctoral thesis on 'Institutionalisation of Family Solidarity Patterns and the Development of the Welfare State. Spain, Italy and France in a Comparative Perspective'. Manuela Naldini is a doctoral student at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. She is writing a doctoral thesis on 'Family Models and Welfare State. The Italian Case in Historical and Comparative Perspective'. The paper is a result of the collaboration between the authors within the International Project on Family Changes and Family Policies.
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3
Abstract

Is the South so different?
Italian and Spanish Families in Comparative Perspective

This paper analyses family changes in Italy and Spain from 1960 to 1990 and contrasts them with different Western European countries. From a cross-national perspective it is often assumed that southern societies display a different division of labour between welfare state, market and family than other Western European societies. On the other hand, Italy and Spain are experiencing serious demographic changes which could affect the role of families in these societies. In the paper we describe changes in the family formation, expansion and shrinking phases as well as changes in the gender division of work in the labour market and the current differences in solidarity relations within kinship. Out of this context we develop a specific southern family model and demonstrate that, despite the extremely rapid family changes, this process does not in all aspects lead to similarities between southern and western families. The most important particularities of the southern family model compared to western societies are the higher degree of cross-generational cohabitation, higher frequency of social contacts and help within kinship, stronger institutionalisation of marriage, lower female employment rate in the formal labour market, lower fertility rates, and more widespread family- and child-oriented attitudes. In addition, relations between generations are seen more in terms of obligations than in terms of individual choice. We consider three factors responsible for the reproduction of the southern family model and for avoiding a further European convergence. We conclude that the specific economic situation, the particularities of social policies and the family culture in Italy and Spain are important barriers to a further individualisation of family relations in these societies.
1 Is Southern Europe different?

1.1 Introduction

The aim of this paper is to analyse Italy and Spain as representatives of a Mediterranean type of society.* The question whether such a type exists with respect to family changes will be explored here. For this purpose we use a comparative perspective. Our assumption is that the division of labour between state, family, labour market and church in Mediterranean countries is a specific one. The societal configuration in the South will be analysed from the perspective of the family. First, we will describe differences in demography and family among countries as well as cultural differences observed by opinion surveys. Second, we will develop some hypotheses in order to explain the southern family characteristics, their interrelations and their relation to other institutions. To this end, we will concentrate on the possible effects that southern modernization processes, employment and unemployment trends, family laws, social policies and some historical and cultural peculiarities in Italy and Spain have on family patterns. In this paper the hypotheses will be put forward only in a preliminary way, without testing them.

1.2 Theoretical perspectives on the family

The logical consequence of the new theoretical perspectives on the family is the emerging interest in the study of Southern European families. The new theoretical perspectives are from our point of view characterised by analysing the family in the context of the welfare state crisis and by revising the thesis of the progressive loss of functions of the family. As far as analysis of welfare state is concerned, the social-economic crisis that since the mid-seventies has affected all European countries has gradually produced a collective loss of faith in the possibility of uninterrupted economic growth and a disillusionment concerning the programmes and promises of the welfare society. As a result of the crisis the institutional framework began to change. In the new social and economic context the social division of responsibilities among the various institutional spheres, state, market and family, had to (and still has to) be re-negotiated. As Flora points out, the essential meaning of the changes produced by the crisis "may be found

* We thank Peter Flora for proposing the idea to write this paper and for the useful comments he gave us during the writing process.
much less in the threat of an historical regression of the European welfare state, and much more in the break of the past growth patterns which will require a readjustment of major institutions' (Flora 1985, p. 25). The role of the family has become more important since the crisis of the welfare state has deepened and new market-oriented ideologies have become stronger. In this complex set of intricate relations between the different social institutions, women play a crucial role. 'They are in fact the principal mediators between the private market, public services and the concrete needs of their families' (Sgritta 1989, p. 85). Thus, not only the division of labour between different institutions is being discussed, but also the gender division of labour and the forms of interdependence between men and women and between parents and children within the family (Saraceno 1994b; Sainsbury 1994). As a consequence, cross-national variations between welfare states and family patterns cannot be understood without looking at the ways in which the welfare state policies have conceptualised paid and unpaid work.

From a cross-national perspective it is often assumed that southern welfare states have a different division of labour between state, market and family than other Western European societies (Abrahamson 1991; Ferrera 1994). This makes an analysis of the family in these countries especially interesting in the current theoretical context. The role of the family and the 'serving work' (Balbo 1983, p.229) done by women in southern welfare societies point to the fact that the network of social relationships between extended family, kin and neighbourhood has continued (despite the development of the welfare state) to constitute an indispensable resource for the satisfaction of many basic needs.

Family networks in modern societies were long neglected theoretically. Parsonian ideas and functionalist theory in general, according to which there is a direct relation between the loss of functions of the family and the urban-industrial development of society, retained a leading position in social theory at least until the end of the 1960s. Concerning the Parsonian vision, the family was first a nuclear family with a symmetrical division of functions between the sexes. Kin networks were looked at as having only residual functions, and as being present only in 'backward' regions and social contexts. In the years immediately following this period, this interpretation experienced a process of critical review. Scholars first directed their attention towards the assumptions of this interpretation regarding the transformation of the extended family into a nuclear family. From the 1960s until the mid-1970s, numerous studies challenged these assumptions on the basis of much demographic and historical data. These studies demonstrated the considerable existence of nuclear families in the past, in some European regions.
and among some social classes (Laslett 1972; Hareven 1977; Saraceno 1988). At the same time there was a re-evaluation of the concept of kinship and its economic, social and emotional importance. Litwak’s thesis of 'extended family cohesion' became a new way of analysing the model of the nuclear family. According to Litwak, the new model of family is, as the functionalists argue, the nuclear family, but the family is not isolated. On the contrary, it is actively inserted in kinship networks (Litwak, E. 1960a, 1960b). This perspective seems especially important for the Southern countries, where the kinship relations and family-oriented values are said to be more important than in West European countries¹ (Tullio-Altan 1978; Giordano 1992).

This southern division of labour could be affected in an important way by the deep demographic changes taking place in Spain and Italy. The changing age structure of the population, the decreasing fertility rate and the emerging female employment patterns will create a new situation that should not be neglected. Now that analysts are emphasising the role of families for the welfare states in crisis, the more family-oriented countries could be moving towards more individualist societies. A contradiction? First of all it has to be determined to what extent the family is changing in the South.

1.3 European context and European divergences

First, a general West European overview of recent family changes will be given. Many social analysts (Roussel 1994; Barbagli 1990) maintain that the great changes in the West European pattern of family started in 1965, a consequence of both demographic changes and normative shifts. Since 1965, in most European countries—with varying intensity and timing—a reduction in the fertility rate and an increase in the divorce rate occurred. These new family behaviours were related to the gradual diffusion of cohabitation and to the increase in births out of wedlock. During the 1970s these family changes became more radical in Scandinavia, more

¹ We prefer to use the term "family-oriented society" and "family-oriented values" instead of the term "familism" because of the symbolic and often misleading meaning of the term familism. The term was introduced for the first time by Banfield in 1958. According to the author the inhabitants of the small village of the south of Italy, Montegranaro, act following exclusively their private advantage and assume that everyone will do the same. As a consequence, in the author's vision the Southern family, or better its familistic culture, should be considered a main factor responsible for the backwardness of this society. From the Banfield research onward, the term familism has been object of a widespread theoretical and political debate on the interpretation not only on the Italian family life but also on Italian political and cultural life. (For a classical interpretation, see Pizzorno; Marselli in Banfield 1961, 1976. For a recent debate, see Grubaudi 1995.)
widespread in Central Europe but remained weak in Southern Europe. What was really new were the relations between sexes and generations. Equal opportunities became an important issue in public life (Roussel 1992), and changes in family roles occurred as well. More women have entered the labour market, in a wider range of occupations and for a longer period than at any other time since the Industrial Revolution (Rapoport 1989). The proportion of women in the labour market has increased steadily everywhere since the late 1960s though the rate of increase differs from one country to another. Until the beginning of the 1980s the initial scrutiny of demographic data on EU member states seems to suggest that the major indicators were converging, as was the case for the fertility patterns, since birth rates have declined considerably since 1960s. During the same period the number of births out of wedlock increased rapidly in all EU countries, but again at differing rates. In all countries mentioned, divorce rates increased and marriage rates decreased.

In the field of family structures, Roussel (1992, 1994) has classified European countries, on the basis of demographic indicators, in three homogeneous geographical groups: the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Iceland) which pioneered family changes for the high diffusion of cohabitation and births out of wedlock; Central Europe (Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland) which soon followed the family model of Scandinavian countries; and finally, the Mediterranean countries (Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal [and Ireland]) which only recently adopted in a contradictory way the ‘new’ family pattern. So far, the main question is: how can we explain the persistence of differences in family structures and behaviours across countries? Are they due to timing differences or pattern differences? Do we have convergence or divergence? It is not easy to forecast the future of the family patterns in Europe. A overview of Italian and Spanish cases seems to suggest that the thesis of a final convergence of all countries, even with different timing, is inadequate to explain the pathway they have taken recently.

1.4 A Southern European model of family?

An overview of Italian and Spanish families shows that between the two countries there are several common demographic changes that have occurred especially in the last decades. First of all, it is well known that since the 1980s the dominant phenomenon in Italy and Spain has been the rapid decrease of the fertility rate and the low fertility rate in comparison to other
countries. Secondly, in these countries unmarried youth remain longer in their parents' households than in other European countries, and single-person households are not very common. Thirdly, in Italy and Spain the numbers of divorces, cohabiting couples and births out of wedlock are still low. At first glance, these changes and the present family patterns in these two southern countries could be interpreted as the result of late modernisation processes. Surely this interpretation is partly correct, but some aspects of it cannot be understood from this perspective. First, Italy and Spain show both indicators of modernity in family (e.g., rapid decline in fertility) and indicators of traditionality (marriage as institution is still very important). Second, the modernisation process does not lead to the same results in each country, because during industrialisation traditions and cultural contexts have been incorporated differently. For example, the importance of small enterprises for economic growth in Italy shows how a specific family tradition (the diffusion of extended family) can produce a special kind of modernisation. Modernisation as well does not affect all areas of society in the same degree. The individualisation process in private life that normally goes parallel with social and economic modernisation of a society can be obstructed by the specific historical institutionalisation of norms affecting private matters in a country.

These considerations suggest that we need a different theoretical perspective to understand the differences and to explain the specific way in which families function in society. Yet, in order to compare families across countries it is necessary to have a theoretical instrument by which to measure different national contexts with the same unity. On the contrary, often one's own country or experience is the implicit ground for comparison. A simple model will be sufficient for the purposes of this paper. The analysis of families can be done at two different theoretical levels. First, the relationships between different societal institutions can be studied, i.e., the relations of the family with the state, the church and the labour market. This division of labour among different societal institutions changes between countries and over time with the family playing a more or less important role (cf. 1.2). Second, the 'black box' of what is meant by family can be opened. At this lower level the family can be seen as a unit crossed by the dimensions of gender and generations or as a unit related to other family units in social networks. This static view has to be enlarged by looking at the dynamics of families through different phases of the family cycle. The vertical extension of the family unit across the family cycle, i.e., by different generations living together, is supposed to differ between countries, as well as the extension and the intensity of the kinship network (horizontal extension of the fami-
ily, cf. Laslett et al. 1993). In general, the duration of specific family forms is also an important differentiating aspect.

Flaquer has summarized the peculiarities of the family model for Spain in an interesting way. He describes the Spanish (southern) model as a traditional version of the nuclear family with a low individualist contour and important family-oriented values. That means that kinship ties are very intensive, that children and parents live together for a long time, that solidarity and help in crises, that economic collaboration between households is important, that families are created primarily by marriage and that the degree of individualisation of the family members is low (Flaquer 1994a). In other words, the degree of institutionalisation of the relationships within the family, between genders, generations, and relatives seems to be higher in Italy and Spain than in other West European countries. The assumption here is that a high institutionalisation of private life is a result of the prevalence of a normative-oriented behaviour in contrast to a more individual-choice-oriented behaviour in this field (cf. Tyrell 1993, p. 145).

Figure 1: Family Model

![Family Model Diagram](image-url)
Family changes in Italy and Spain in the European context

In this paper we will use demographic indicators, being conscious that these indicators cannot catch the content of relationships, (e.g., changes in the power relations between sexes). We will describe the changes of the family mainly on the national level\(^2\) and by looking at the different phases of the family cycle. The concept of family cycle is useful, because family patterns vary not only geographically, but in the same family unit over time. The relationships between the family and the labour market, the division of work within the family, the vertical extension of the family unit, as well as the relationships between households differ chronologically. However we have decided to analyse the employment and work behaviour in a separate section, because of difficulties relating existing data to the different phases of the family cycle. In order to discuss the specific societal division of labour in the South we will focus on the second theoretical level: the functioning of the family. We hope that this will help to explain the first theoretical level. Before examining family changes, we will briefly describe the socio-political context of the two countries in the last 30 years.

2.1 Italy and Spain: an overview on socio-political changes

In Italy and Spain, modernisation was very rapid. In Italy, it took place later than in other European countries, between the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. In Spain, it started later and was even more rapid than in Italy, as Figure 2 shows. The period of rapid modernisation in these countries was also characterised by a structural employment shortage and by deep geographical differentiations within the two countries, which prompted great internal and external migrations during the 1960s until the mid-1970s.

Indicators of discontinuity in family values and attitudes, first in behaviours and then in legislation, started to appear in Italy in the mid-1950s and accelerated in the second half of the 1960s. In Spain they appeared at the end of the 1960s. The process of family change in the Italian and Spanish societies were related to changes both in the social stratification and in the economic

\(^2\) Until today national indicators are the only way to make comparisons between countries. But it should be mentioned that while these represent the "average" of sub-populations, within every country there are many variations at territorial and social levels. Their use is justified only by the same legislative, social and material constraints that citizens meet in their own country (Roussel 1992).
development of the countries. Moreover, they were accelerated by an intensive and rapid development of the welfare state. A striking fact is that the great changes in family law occurred in both countries during the modernisation process, in 1970/75 in Italy and in 1981 in Spain (Figure 2). Thus changes in family law appear to be closely related to industrialisation and the development of the welfare state in these two countries.

Figure 2: Indicators of modernisation and wealth. Spain and Italy 1961-1993


The Italian welfare state developed mostly during the 1970s and early 1980s, and soon reached the European average levels. During the 1950s it was one of the lowest among Western European countries (Ascoli 1984, p. 19-20). During the 1970s there was also the maximum expansion of social and caring services (kindergartens, day care for children under three, home help for elderly, and so on). In Spain the welfare state expanded especially during the 1980s, about ten years later than in Italy. The different social security systems were enlarged in general. Health and old-age pension benefits were universalised and new assistance schemes were introduced (Guillén 1992; Rodríguez Cabrero 1992).
Not only the late modernisation process is important for understanding the differences in family patterns, but also the political and ideological changes of both southern societies have to be taken in account. Italy changed its institutional-political framework after fascism and World War II, but despite this, family relations were strongly influenced by traditional values and norms defined by the Catholic Church and codified during fascism (i.e., codice Rocco in 1942). For more than forty years, the Christian Democratic Party was the main governmental force. This configuration of a strong Christian Democratic Party and a strong Catholic Church favoured the permanence of traditional family patterns and the delay of family law reform. Spain’s case was similar: there a fascist dictatorship with the support of the Catholic Church prevented a change in family-related legislation until the end of the 1970s.

As a result of these political-ideological configurations the process of legal changes began only in the 1970s in Italy and in the 1980s in Spain. In Spain an important factor for the change in the family was the imitation of West European behaviour. Due to tourism, emigration and the mass media, new ideas penetrated Spain (Conde 1982, p. 158). In Italy, the 1970s started a real process of modernisation and secularisation: important legislation concerning gender roles and the family was approved; divorce was introduced in 1970; family law was reformed and modernised in 1975, the same year in which the age of majority was lowered to 18. Equal treatment between men and women with respect to work was introduced in 1977, and abortion was legally authorised in 1978 (Vincenzi Amato 1988; Ferrera 1983; Saraceno 1994b). In Spain, after the end of dictatorship, from 1975 to 1981 the society experienced a singular process of peaceful and gradual transition to a pluralistic, democratic political system culminating in the authorisation of political parties and trade unions and the first parliamentary elections in 1977, the socio-political agreements (Pactos de la Moncloa) between different social groups, and the constitution of 1978. With the reform of the ‘Código Civil’ in 1981, civil marriage became an option for citizens (cf. 2.2.1). Questions about separation and divorce passed from the responsibility of the church to that of the state. These reforms also led to equality between spouses: wives were no longer legally bound to obey their husbands; they could start a business, buy and sell and work without needing the authorisation of their husbands. Financial questions in marriage, questions of infidelity, paternity, children born out of wedlock and other family matters were changed as well (Alberdi/Alberdi 1982, p. 105). Since the mid-1980s abortion has been legal in some cases, cohabiting and homosexual couples can register their unions in municipalities, public child-care services and female employment increased and a slight diversification of family forms has begun.
In countries like Italy and Spain, where a rapid modernisation has taken place, one can note incongruencies in the process of social change. Among the economic, demographic and family changes on the one hand and the legislative and welfare-state transformations on the other, as well as among geographical areas, which have developed differently in economic terms. The velocity of the changes has made adaptation very difficult. In Spain, for example, families began to change at the end of the 1960s, but because of the comparatively high number of members in Spanish families, the few public possibilities for child care, and the low level of consumer goods to facilitate housework in Spanish households, traditional ideas about the division of labour within the family and the authoritarian political system made further changes difficult before democratisation. In the 1980s incongruencies were partly eliminated, but by the 1990s, due to the rapid and intensive changes, two processes overlapped in Spain: the end of the process of nuclearisation in rural regions (where extended families were the norm) is finishing and new family forms emerging in the cities like Madrid and Barcelona (Iglesias de Ussel/Flaquer 1993, 65; Flaquer/Soler 1990). In Italy, the duality in socio-economic development as well as what social analysts have defined as 'a particularist clientelistic welfare state' have prevented the southern regions and the islands from benefiting completely from the legislative and welfare state transformations (Paci 1984; Ferrera 1984, 1994). At the same time, in this part of the country social services were not as developed as in other regions. In these regions citizens experienced a de facto greater social exclusion, because of the difficulties of translating social rights into real resources. In Spain as in Italy, great regional cleavages in economic development influenced the family changes and the development of the welfare state, delaying or preventing them in the more backward regions (Conde 1982, p. 159).

2.2 Changes in the family formation phase

Family formation normally takes place when young people leave their parents' home and form a new family. First, the traditional and predominant way of creating a new family, marriage, will be described, followed by a discussion of cohabitation and singleness, minority phenomena among Spanish and Italian youth.
2.2.1 Marriage patterns and values

According to Golini, 'one of the most important characteristics of the recent Italian demographic developments is the reduction of the number of marriages' (Golini, 1988 p.10). The great reduction in the number of marriages started in the 1970s, later than in other European countries and has continued to decrease. This decline may not be imputed to a decline in the number of potential spouses. The phenomenon is common to all regions but it is more substantial in those of the Centre and of the North (Golini 1988, p. 350). In Spain the gross marriage rate has decreased in general since 1981 with a certain stabilisation from 1986 to 1990. For 1982 one can also detect regional differences in Spain, but they do not seem to be very important and not clearly structured (Delgado 1993a, p. 139; Instituto de la mujer 1990, p. 31).

Figure 3: Gross Marriage Rate 1960-1990

Note: For Italy the figure of 1990 is a provisional one. For Spain the data from 1985 and 1990 are from Delgado 1993, because they are more accurate. The European average for 1990 does not take in account the United Kingdom.

So far, the data seem to support the hypothesis of delayed marriages and not of a reduction of potential marriages. In fact, in Italy the total number of marriages has decreased, but overall among young women. At the same time the marriage rate of women over 25 has increased. A consequence of these changes is the increase of the average marriage age. In 1992, it was 29 for males and 26 for females (Golini/Menniti 1994). At the territorial level we have many dif-
ferences for this phenomenon as well, especially in female behaviour. The share of population that has changed most rapidly are the women living in big towns of the Centre and of the North (Golini 1988). Note that delayed marriages do not imply an increase in singleness among young people. As already mentioned, this phenomenon is very limited in Italy compared to other countries. In Spain, too, the data show that since 1980 the percentage of people marrying before the age of 25 is decreasing. The age of women married for the first time rose in 1990 to 25.3 years, and remains lower than in Denmark, France and Germany but higher than in the United Kingdom (Delgado 1993a, p. 129). Interregional differences of the mean age at first marriage range from 23.4 to 26, but are not clearly related to modernisation differences (Delgado 1993b, p. 221). Since data of the 1991 census are not available, it is difficult to know whether these tendencies point towards delayed marriages or fewer marriages. In Spain and Italy, a number of circumstances favour the delay of marriage: high unemployment rates and increasing precarious employment of young people, prolongation of education, expensive housing and cultural shifts after 1968 concerning sexual relations before marriage (Flaquer 1994b; Golini 1988, p. 352; Garrido Medina 1993, p. 166).

Another indicator of changing marriage patterns in Italy and Spain is the increase in the number of civil marriages. In Italy civil marriages have grown from 1.5% of all marriages in 1970 to 18% in 1992. The reason for the increase cannot be found in the rise of the number of second marriages since the introduction of divorce in 1970. In fact, in 1988 11% of all first marriages were civil marriages (Golini/Menniti 1994, p.13). In Spain civil marriages have also increased steadily since 1981, when the free choice between religious and civil marriage was institutionalised\(^3\), from 5.6% of all marriages to 19.3% in 1990 (Flaquer 1994b).

Are the delay of marriages and the increasing civil marriage rates indicators for negative attitudes toward the institution of marriage? For this purpose we will examine attitude surveys in a comparative perspective.\(^4\) In the World Values Survey 1990–1993, people were asked to give

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3 Until 1981 the civil marriage (i.e., marriage certified by the state) was subsidiary. Catholics had to reject their faith if they wanted to marry only in a civil way. After the reform of the "Código Civil" the civil marriage became optional, so that citizens could decide in which form to marry. Questions about separation and divorce passed from the first time from the responsibility of the church to the state.

4 The indicators chosen here can be analysed in a comparative way, because questions in this sense have been asked in the same way in international surveys. The interpretation of the results of comparative opinion surveys has to be made carefully, because the same question can produce different meanings across cultures and countries.
their opinion concerning the statement 'Marriage is an out-dated institution'. Their responses are shown in the table below.

**Table 1: Opinions about ‘marriage is an out-dated institution’. 1990-1993**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>ex-FRG</th>
<th>Group-average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In Italy, West Germany and Spain few respondents said that marriage is out-dated, but the differences between Spain, Denmark and the United Kingdom are not very relevant. Only France is clearly different with nearly 30% of persons expressing this opinion. These figures show that marriage as an institution is highly valued in most analysed countries with the exception of France. Other indicators should be added to these findings. In our opinion an approval of marriage should correlate with a disapproval of cohabitation or singleness.

### 2.2.2 Cohabitation, being single and living with parents

In a Eurobarometer survey people were asked, 'some people live together without getting married. Do you think that this is a good thing, a bad thing, or that it is not for others to judge?'

**Table 2: Opinions about cohabitation. 1993**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>FRG</th>
<th>EUR-12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>good thing</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bad thing</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not for others to judge</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>don't know</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer, 1993., 39, 68.

For the interpretation of these findings one has to take into account that the answers reflect two different dimensions: opinion about cohabitation of others and opinions about the privacy of family life. This table shows a surprising result: Spain and Italy are not as similar as the analysis of demographic indicators and Table 1 above suggested. Similar to the European average, around 20% of the Spanish say that cohabitation of others is a good thing, and the majority of them express that cohabitation is a private matter. In Italy, in contrast, only 10% of the people say that it is a good thing, whereas the advocates of family privacy reach 68%, more than in France and Germany and above the European level. Nineteen percent in Italy are clearly opposed to cohabitation, 13% in Spain and 14% of the Europeans. Spain is more like France
than Italy in this data set. Do Italians and Spaniards behave the way their opinions would suggest?

Comparative data dealing with the evolution of cohabitation are difficult to find, but existing data point to a low significance of cohabitation in southern countries like Italy and Spain. Among couple-based families the percentage of unmarried couples in Italy is very low in comparison with other countries. In 1990 this type of family was 1.3% of all couple-based families, although, as some analysts suggest, this number may be largely underestimated (Golini 1988; Sabbatini 1991). In any case this phenomenon is more common in the Northwest, in urban areas and among higher-educated people and employed women. Moreover, peculiar to Italy, most unmarried couples are separated or divorced, not mainly young people as is the case in other countries. In Spain the figures for 1990/91 range from 1.5% cohabitants of the total population to 6.4% cohabitants of all couples (Flaquer 1994b; Valero 1992, p. 186). In Spain most cohabitants are young people (18-34), in contrast to Italy: they are not practising Catholics and they live predominantly in urban areas, more frequently in the regions of Cataluña, Madrid and País Vasco (Valero 1992, 187).

Comparative data help to complete this picture. Cohabitation before marriage has been described as a new European trend. A Eurobarometer survey of 1990 shows this trend:

Table 3: Young people (15-24 years old) in cohabiation in 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% living with her boyfriend or his girlfriend</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>ex-FRG</th>
<th>EUR-12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


That Italy and Spain are below the European average means that most people form a family through marriage, without an experimental phase before. Thus marriage continues to be a dominant institution. Italians behave and think in more traditional ways than other Europeans. In contrast Spaniards behave in traditional ways in cohabitation, but express more tolerant, 'European' opinions about marriage and cohabitation. How can we explain this Spanish incongruity? One reason seems to be that a significant group of predominantly young people has new ideas about these subjects, but that they cannot resist social pressure and tradition

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5 The problem is that sometimes the current situation is asked, while sometimes it refers also to past experiences. Then prenuptial cohabitation is often not counted as cohabitation.
(Flaquer 1994b). Another possible explanation can be found in the rapid modernisation process of Spain that has resulted in rapid changes in attitudes, but only slow changes in behaviour.

If marriages are being delayed and cohabitation is still a minority phenomenon in Spain and Italy, what are the living arrangements of young people? Do they live as single persons? The composition of one-person households in the South is different from that in other European countries: even if the number of single-person households is increasing in the South, very few young people live alone. Therefore, the elderly dominate nearly completely this type of household from a comparative perspective6 (Roussel 1983; Council of Europe 1990; Eurobarometer, 1991, 34.2). From 1983 to 1990 single-person households in Italy grew from 13.1% to 20.3% of the total number of households (Istat 1985; Istat 1993). In 1990 only 2.7% of single-person households were constituted of young people under 25 (Istat 1993, p. 22). In Spain from 1970 to 1991 the number of single households rose from 7.46% of all households to 10.25% (1981) and 13.4% (1991)7. In 1991 only 3.6% of the single households in Spain were composed of young people from 18 to 29 (Flaquer 1990, p. 512; Flaquer/Soler 1990, p. 58; Flaquer 1994c, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 1991, Var. 1.21.).

If marriages are being delayed and cohabitation and singleness among youth is still a minority phenomenon in Spain and Italy, then young people must be staying longer in their parents' homes. An international comparison of young people from 20 to 24 and 25 to 29 shows that in Italy and Spain youth stay longer with their parents than in the other countries. Can this southern phenomenon be explained by the situation of young people? For this purpose we have correlated the national unemployment rate of young people with the rates indicating their living arrangements. As illustrated in Figure 4 there is a relation between both rates in the case of the youngest age group, especially for Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.

6 Also here attention has to be put on the different definitions of households when comparing the percentage of one-person households between countries.

7 Data for 1991 used here are from the Sociodemographic Survey (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 1991). Their comparison with census data from 1970 and 1991 is problematic. Different statistical sources from the National Statistical Institute (INE) have shown different numbers of single households (cf. Flaquer 1994)
For France and West Germany this correlation does not appear to be particularly strong, because despite relatively high unemployment in France, young people seldom live with parents and because West Germans live relatively often with parents despite low unemployment. In addition, it is also evident that the great differences in living arrangements among countries cannot be explained by variations in unemployment rates, because the last variations are much smaller than the first. In the case of young people from 25 to 29, variations in unemployment rates among countries are not so important, but variations in the living arrangements are. Unemployment does not explain all. Recent Italian research shows that a substantial percentage of young women live in their parents' home even when they have a job (Menniti et al. 1992). Cavalli's surveys on this issue argue that young people prefer to remain in their parents' home with economic support and social security being supplied, together with personal freedom.
(Cavalli et al. 1993). Also young people still in school can be relevant for understanding the living behaviour of youth. Being in school can be a barrier to leave the parental home, but perhaps to a wider extent in some countries than in others. In Italy and Spain most students stay at home until they finish their education, whereas in other countries the tradition seems different. This aspect cannot be analysed in depth here, because we would have to know the living arrangements of students in different countries as well as their economic situation. Another relevant aspect that needs to be studied is the institutional arrangements of education among countries: for example, the differences in vocational training systems, the different university fees and so on.

Is it a cultural peculiarity of Italy and Spain which makes it acceptable and even desirable for young people to stay with their parents for a long time? In 1990-91, people were asked to choose five among ten given statements on values they consider especially important for children to be provided at home. One value was ‘independence’, which should be here interpreted as an indicator for cultural ideas about the relation of parents and children.

Table 4: Most important qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home: ‘independence’. 1990-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column % of How many people mentioned</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>BRD</th>
<th>Group-average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Italians, Spaniards and the French seldom expressed that independence should be a quality to be transmitted to children, while three-quarters of the Danes and West Germans said that independence should be learned at home. The remaining three most important values were: responsibility, good manners and tolerance/respect. In West Germany, Italy and Denmark, responsibility was most often chosen (about 85%), in Spain and the United Kingdom, good manners were considered most important (approx. 85%); and for the French, tolerance/respect was the most desirable value (78%) (World Values Survey 1990-93, var. 226-236).

Based on this indicator, one can suppose that young people in Spain and Italy may find a more favourable cultural climate to stay for a longer period at home than in other countries. This does not necessarily mean that such a climate determines such behaviour. West Germany and

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8 These data are easier to interpret than those in the former table, because the neutral category as a possible answer was not offered and the question here is more neutral than the other.
France pose problems to this cultural hypothesis. This can be solved by looking for more adequate indicators of cultural background or by adding a supplementary hypothesis. For example ‘independence’ seems not to be a value worth being encouraged at home in the perception of three-quarters of the French. There youth unemployment is high, but the percentage of young people staying at home with their parents is rather low internationally. The economic situation and the ‘cultural’ values would suggest higher rates of young people living with their parents, while reality is different. For this reason it is also important to look at social policies in the different countries. Does the French state financially support young people in order to have their own income or at least depend less on the income of their parents? On the contrary, in the case of Germany ‘independence’ is highly valued, unemployment is very low but young people still live very often with their parents. This suggests that the housing situation should be included in a deeper analysis.

To conclude, we have found some elements that prove the hypothesis of a special southern family formation pattern and others that dispute it. Spaniards and Italians marry later and more often only in the civil way following the West European path; their opinions about marriage as an institution are not so different from their West European neighbours; and Spaniards even seem to be as tolerant towards cohabitation as other West Europeans. But Italians and Spaniards also differ from their neighbours. The range of individual choices in family formation is narrower in the South; Italians and Spaniards normally neither cohabit nor live as a single person when they are young but instead stay very long in their parents’ household. We have tried to relate this to unemployment and to the value of ‘independence’ in children’s education at home, remarking that factors such as social policies, education and housing may be relevant.

2.3 Changes in the family expansion phase

The family expansion phase analysed with national data shows similar changes and features in Spain and Italy. These changes are similar to these in Western Europe but delayed by a few years. Since the 1980s the decline in fertility rates has stopped in most Western European countries, and since the 1990s the fertility rates have increased in countries such as Sweden or among older women in other countries. In Italy the decline of fertility began rapidly, in the middle of the 1960s and before that in Spain. Spain rapidly caught up and reached similar levels in the fertility rate (cf. Figure 5). For other aspects one can interpret the Spanish and Ital-
ian evolution of the family formation phase as delayed West European fertility patterns. Similarities with Europe can be found in the increase of the mean age at first birth, in the reduction of childbearing among very young women and in the stabilisation of fertility rates after age 30.

**Figure 5: Total Fertility Rates at European, national and regional level 1960-1990**

![Graph showing fertility rates](image)


What makes Italy and Spain similar to and different from West European countries? First, Spain and Italy have a great heterogeneous fertility patterns within the regions, while other West European countries are more homogenous (Delgado Pérez/Livi-Bacci 1992, p. 164). In Figure 5, fertility rates of the two most disparate regions in Italy and Spain are illustrated. It is curious to see how in both countries the two extreme regions with the highest fertility rates in 1975 have over time converged to the same fertility level as well as the regions with the lowest fertility rates. This was possible because of the rapidity of the fertility changes in Spain. In 1990, regional disparities among the extreme regions are still wide, as they are in Italy.

Differences at the territorial level should not be underestimated because they are indicators of different family cultures within a country. A paradoxical fact for Italy and Spain is that the "optimal" demographic behaviour, in terms of substitution rate, should be considered that of the couples specially in the southern regions. It is in these regions that, together with higher fertility rates, we can find higher unemployment rates in all age groups than in other parts of the country (Saraceno 1994b).
traceptive revolution took place, as Delgado and Livi-Bacci have pointed out; 4) strong influence by the Catholic Church on political, cultural and daily life, although to a different degree in Italy and Spain (Saraceno 1994a). In Spain during the democratisation process the power of the Church was restricted.

So, do Italians and Spaniards not like children? To answer this question it could be interesting to examine which is the value attributed to children by analysing the opinions of people on this issue. In a Eurobarometer opinion survey (Eurobarometer, 1993, 39.0) Europeans were asked how important it was for them to have a child. The findings confirm the central and fundamental role of children among all countries but with important differences. People that consider having a child essential and very important are 72.9% in Spain, 71% in Italy, 67.3% in France, 63.3% in Denmark, 57% in the United Kingdom and 56.2% in West-Germany. In addition, Spain, Italy and France are the three countries where people consider it more important to have children for a successful marriage (World Values Survey 1990-1993, var. 209). One possible conclusion is that Italians, Spaniards and French are more child-oriented than Germans, English and Danes. One could also say that Italian and Spanish people attribute to children an important role for increasing solidarity within the couple, as shown by the higher percentage of Italians and Spaniards who consider having a young child a good reason for not getting divorced (cf. Chapter 2.4).

If people in Spain and Italy are comparatively highly child-oriented, why then has the fertility rate decreased? Some Spanish and Italian analysts suggest that the major explaining factor in the drop in fertility would be late and massive entry of Italian and Spanish women into the labour force since the 1970s (cf. 2.5) These changes occurred so fast that the societies may not have adapted to them rapidly enough. Social services (especially child care and the level of family allowances), labour legislation, housework, etc. and social norms inside the family have not changed at the same velocity. If this analysis is right, childbearing presents greater opportunity costs to Italian and Spanish women than to women in other West European countries, where women’s participation in the non-agricultural sector of the labour force has a longer tradition (Delgado Pérez/Livi-Bacci 1992, 167; Conde 1982; Ambrosini/Rossi, 1994, p. 39). The decline of fertility should be related to the type and size of public support for children (cash benefits, support for working parents, child-care facilities, and so on), but some studies have shown that the fertility rate is not affected by family benefits in the same way across all countries (Gauthier 1991, p.23). It seems significant that Italy and Spain are two countries with one
The second way Italy and Spain differ from their European environment is that the decline of fertility is a shrinking marital fertility, because birth outside marriage is in both countries a minority phenomenon (cf. Figure 6). In other words, the birth of children is more strongly related to marriage than in West European countries and has to be seen in relation to the delay of marriages as described earlier.

Figure 6: Live births outside marriage 1960-1990

![Graph showing live births outside marriage 1960-1990 for Italy, Spain, and EUR-12.]


However, the number of births out of wedlock in Italy has more than doubled from 1960 to 1990. The evolution of births outside marriage in Spain is similar to that of Italy, but in 1985 Spain overtook Italy and came nearer to the European level. Nevertheless, Southern changes were lower than European ones.

How to explain low fertility rates in Spain and Italy? It is difficult to explain them as the result of modernisation or by using the explanations given for other West European countries (higher rates of female employment, higher rates of female participation in education, the sexual revolution and secularisation). The reduction of fertility rates in the South occurred and accelerated in the presence of the following factors: 1) a lower rate of women in the labour market in comparison with other European countries; 2) a gender divergence in education that remained stable until the 1970s (later than in other countries); 3) legislation that up to 1975 in Italy and 1978 in Spain prohibited abortion as well as the dissemination of both knowledge and use of contraception; even after abortion and contraception were legalised, only an incomplete con-
of the least generous child benefit packages of all European countries (Bradshaw/Ditch, 1993). Yet the delay of marriage surely has consequences for fertility rates, delaying and reducing births. So the causes for the delay of marriage (high unemployment rates among the youth, long education phase, housing shortage, etc.) may influence the fertility level in an indirect way. We have to note as well that the Catholic religion could not impede this decline of fertility in the Southern European countries differently from the case of Ireland.

With regard to the decline of fertility it could be interesting to examine the main factors that in the opinion of the people of the European Community influence the decision over the number of children. The first survey on this issue was carried out by Eurobarometer in 1990. During this survey it was asked what three main factors influence the decision over the number of children.

Table 5: Factors influencing the decision over the number of children\(^9\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>ex-FRG</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>uncertain economic</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prospects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suitable housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women working outside</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer, 1990, 32.

As the table shows, most Europeans consider uncertain economic prospects to be most important when deciding on the number of children they wish to have. This is especially true in Italy, Denmark and Spain. Suitable housing is an important factor to the West Germans, the English and the Spanish. The number of people who think that women’s employment influences the number of children families have is particularly high in Italy, France and Germany. Some Italian surveys during the same period confirm that in the opinion of Italians hardships for a women to combine employment and motherhood, together with economic costs, make it difficult for a couple to have more than one child (Palomba 1991, p. 304; 1994, p. 32).

More recently, in the new survey carried out by Eurobarometer, a similar question was asked, “but because the items were not formulated in the same way it is not possible to make a systematic comparison between the two surveys. The emphasis in the present survey on the sta-

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\(^9\) The question was: “Many things can influence the number of children parents decide to have. Here is a list of such factors. Could you please select the three you consider to be the most important nowadays in deciding the number of children parents are likely to have?” (Eurobarometer 1990, 32, p. 27)
bility of the couple's relationship can no doubt be explained as contamination by the questionnaire as a whole, focusing as it does on the family and on the couple' (Eurobarometer 1993, 39.0, p.115). According to the results of the survey, 50% of all Europeans give priority to the stability of the couples' relationship. For this item the percentage is particularly high in Denmark, the United Kingdom, France and Italy. This is followed by the availability of suitable accommodation (42.3%), in Spain and in West Germany. The third most important factor is the economic crisis and unemployment (37.1%), which is still very important in Spain (49%) and Italy (44.6%) in comparison with Denmark (20.4%), Germany (30.2%), and the United Kingdom (32.7%). Less important in the decision over the number of children is child care (22.3%), parental leave (14.9%) and the level of family allowances (13.7%) (Eurobarometer, 39.0, 1993).

In this chapter we have shown that fertility in Spain and Italy has followed the West European pattern with some delay and with a steeper decline showing important regional variations. To have children in these countries is to have them within marriage, and children are highly valued. The inadequate adaptation of Italian and Spanish societies to the rapid increase of women's employment, the uncertain economic prospects, the housing shortage, the low level of public support for children and the delay of marriage have been described as the main elements that help to explain low fertility rates in these child-oriented societies. So far, we have seen that marriage continues to be an important institution and that children are born mainly to married couples, but do married parents often get divorced? How strong is the institutionalisation of lifelong marriage?

2.4 Changes in the family shrinking phase

In Italy and Spain, as in other Catholic countries of Western Europe, divorce laws were introduced later than in other European countries. In fact, divorce was introduced only in 1970 in Italy and in 1981 in Spain. When such laws are introduced so late in the socio-economic development of a country the demography of the people who get divorced is very different from that of other countries at the beginning of liberalisation. Couples who were married and perhaps de facto separated for a long time could then get divorced, thus divorcing partners and the children affected by the divorce are older (Goode 1993, p. 54). In Barbagli's analysis Italy is distinct from the other industrialised Western countries in a number of ways, even though the
same general tendencies are observable, because the various changes that have occurred elsewhere over a long period of time have been concentrated in Italy within a period of only twenty years. This is even more true for Spain. The most distinctive feature of divorce in Italy and Spain is that it is still not a substitute for a separation but is simply added to separation as a legal step. This makes divorce in these countries more costly than in other European countries.

In Italy spouses must demonstrate that they have been legally separated for at least three years (before 1987, at least five years). In Spain a divorce requires a certain time period until the final dissolution of the marriage can be achieved. The couple must first get a separation and then wait 1 to 5 years. The time period is longer if one of the spouses does not consent to divorce. So, mutual agreement is not a legal formula for divorce, but if both partners consent, the divorce is faster and easier (Alberdi/Alberdi 1982, p. 110)

Table 6: Divorces and legal separations 1971-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Italy separations</th>
<th>divorces</th>
<th>Spain civil separations</th>
<th>divorces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>18,126</td>
<td>17,134</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>20,445</td>
<td>31,717</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>23,513</td>
<td>11,302</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>32,003</td>
<td>13,731</td>
<td>17,436</td>
<td>21,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>35,205</td>
<td>27,072</td>
<td>31,153</td>
<td>21,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>25,361</td>
<td>36,272</td>
<td>23,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>44,520</td>
<td>27,350</td>
<td>39,758</td>
<td>27,224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data since 1982, because it is the first complete year in which divorce was possible.

Table 6 shows clearly the high demand for divorce in the first years in Italy after the liberalisation and then the respective importance of legal separation and divorce. The numbers reveal that in both countries more people sought legal separation than divorce, at least until 1991. In Spain separations have increased by 128% and divorces by only 27% from 1982 to 1991. If one observes the increasing acceptance of divorce among youth one can imagine that in the future this will change and more separations will end in divorce (Alberdi/Flaquer/Iglesias de Ussel 1994). In Italy the divorce rate has increased since 1982: from 33.7 in every 1000 marriages in 1981 to 77.9 in every 1000 marriages in 1991 (Golini/Menniti 1994). Nevertheless the levels of divorces in the South are still very far from those other Western countries. In 1989 the number of divorces per 1000 population was 0.6 for Spain, 0.5 for Italy and 1.6 in Europe of the Twelve ¹⁰(Eurostat 1992b, p. 123). A correct comparison between Italy, Spain and

¹⁰ This indicator is a very rough one, but it is the only available one for Spain. The better indicator for international comparisons, i.e. divorces per 1000 existing marriages is not available in Spain for non-census years and not yet for 1990 (cf. EUROSTAT, 1992b).
other countries in conjugal instability has to be made taking in account not only the number of divorces but the number of legal separations as well, first of all, because the number of legal separations in these countries has not differed in the past from the number of divorces in other countries. Second, many couples remain at the stage of separation; in Spain a survey on marital dissolution has shown that of all couples in 1990 0.9% broke down because of a divorce, 2% because of legal separation and 3.3% because of de facto separation. This means that until 1990 a significant number of Spanish people preferred extralegal solutions to their marital problems (Alberdi/Flaquer/Iglesias de Ussel 1994, p. 78). In Italy the number of legal separations increased, particularly after the introduction of divorce. In 1991 there were 44,926 legal separations and only 27,350 divorces (Goïni/Menniti 1994). The evolution of the phenomenon has, and always had, differential values between North and South, in any case the tendency is wherever the increase of phenomenon. As Barbagli notes, in more northern towns the legal separation rate is not different from the Swedish divorce rate.

A second important difference between Italy and Spain and the Western European countries, in part a consequence of the complexity of Spanish and Italian divorce law, can be found in the higher ages of Italian and Spanish divorces: in Spain in 1991, for example, more than 60% of the divorced or legally separated were 35 years and older and 26.9% were between 45-54 years old (Valero 1992, p. 196).

Third, in Italy the divorce rate is still higher among the upper social classes, although Barbagli asserts that this difference will decline over time (Barbagli 1990, p. 62). Also in Spain Borrajo has found a positive correlation between frequency of divorce and social class for the city of Madrid (Iglesias de Ussel 1994, 7.2.).

A fourth difference Barbagli reports is a definite correlation between the number of children and a reluctance to divorce: fewer couples with more children get divorced than do couples with fewer children. This seems not more a relevant characteristic in other western countries (cf. Barbagli 1990, p. 64-65). The findings for Spain are not so clear: a study of divorced and separated women in the city of Madrid for 1981–84 shows that this correlation does not exist, when controlling for the duration of marriage (Borrajo 1987; 129). In a national survey from 1981 to 1986 Borrajo found again that controlling for the actual duration of marriage, legally-separated or divorced couples did not generally have fewer children than married couples, with
the exception of the couples married between two and eight years. In this case separated or divorced people had fewer children (Borrajo 1990, 124).

Fifth, with regard to the relation between children and reluctance to divorce, the Eurobarometer survey (1993, 39.0) shows that among all Europeans the presence of children is for every country the first good reason for not getting divorced, but the percentage of Italians and Spaniards that support such an idea is higher than that of other Europeans11.

To conclude, divorce was introduced later and differently in the southern Catholic countries. This has consequences on the behaviour of people: the majority ask only for legal separation, since divorce requires more time and money, divorce is still more widespread among the upper classes in northern urban areas and in Italy among older people. Children still seem to be a barrier to divorce. One explanation for the low divorce rate in the South can be the higher institutionalisation of lifelong marriage. However, in order to prove such a hypothesis one would have to wait for the future development of divorce in Italy and Spain, because its legal introduction is still too recent.

2.5 Changes in the gender division of work in the labour market

The employment pattern of women in the labour market is very important for understanding family life. First, it is important to know how many women do not enter the labour market or enter it only for a short period, and second, which problems employed women must face. If women want to be employed and want to have a family with children they will have coordination problems, which depend on social transfers and services for helping families, as well as on the labour division between husband and wife inside the home and on the help coming from relatives and domestic employees. Also the number of children and the flexibility of the employment arrangements influence the difficulty of coordination. In this chapter we will try to offer hypotheses on women’s employment in Italy and Spain, both the low female employment rate and the peculiar career patterns of employed women. Female employment patterns reflect national differences in the gendered division of labour in the home and the workplace. First, we will give an historical overview of women’s participation in the labour market, then

11 The question was: "If you were married and no longer getting on with your spouse, what are the three main reasons which, despite everything, might encourage you not to get divorced?".
we will look at the quantitative importance of women's employment and unemployment in the South.\textsuperscript{12}

2.5.1 Women’s participation in the labour market after World War II

After the Spanish Civil War, the industrialisation process was reversed and the economy became more rural again. The total active population in industry was about 32% in 1930, a figure achieved again only in 1960. The participation of women in the labour force increased especially from 1940–1965, when 18% of women were in the labour market, with low wage levels until 1975 acting as incentive for women's employment. After 1965 the Spanish economy experienced high growth rates of the GDP, but few employment increases. It was a period of increases in mechanisation and productivity with a parallel emigration of labour to Western Europe. From 1970 to 1974 female labour force participation rose to 22%, but with the subsequent economic crisis female activity stagnated until 1981, when the rate grew for some years, then stagnated again because of high unemployment. From 1984 to 1987 women's activity expanded rapidly again and then more slowly. The number of women employed in agriculture expanded until 1965 and then decreased; the number of women in industry grew until 1974, and the number of women in the service sector continues to grow. Until 1980 the female labour force rate depended predominantly on the employment demand generated by the economy (Espina 1990, p. 111-119). Later, the demand for women, especially for services and for the public sector, was important, but then the supply also increased independently from the demand. Nowadays in Spain a clear segmentation of the labour market exists. In 1986 five economic sectors accounted for 80% of female employment: trade, agriculture, other services, education and health, textile, clothing and leather production. Women have more often contracts of limited time period, work more in part-time and irregular jobs and have higher unemployment rates (Moltó 1993). Employment rates of women differ by region, with a general south-north distinction as in Italy (with the exception of Galicia). High employment rates are found in regions with a highly-developed service sector or where agriculture is dominant.

In order to understand the process and the timing of entrance of Italian women into the labour market, one should keep in mind some factors concerning the specific historical process of the country's industrialisation: 1) the process took place later than in other European countries,

\textsuperscript{12} This chapter can only in part be comparative, because of the extent and complexity of the problems touched here.
between the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s; 2) the Italian labour market had been characterised since the 1930s by a structural employment shortage; 3) the process was and still is characterised by deep geographical differentiations and therefore was marked by a wide migration within the country, from the south towards the north. As a consequence, the employment within the country as well as unemployment by the sexes was widely differentiated. Women’s participation rate in the labour market decreased constantly from the 1930s until the mid-1960s, although with different velocities in different sectors as well as in different social classes. During the years of the great industrialisation, the total number of women in the labour market declined. In fact, in 1951 only 25.5% of women were in the labour market and in 1961 only 24.7%. During the 1960s, the only two sectors in which female employment increased was in agriculture and commerce. In agriculture especially there were many unskilled jobs vacated by the male labour force oriented towards more qualified jobs offered by the industries of the north. As a consequence of the structural crisis of the agricultural sector and of some industries traditionally based on the female employment (e.g., textiles), the first phase of industrialisation in Italy was characterised by the expulsion of women from the labour market for a longer period than in other countries. Another important factor that helps explain the expulsion of women from the formal labour market was, as some analysis point out, the wide reserve of the Italian male labour force coming from the south as well as the Italian structural employment shortage (Federici 1984; Paci 1982). Since the second half of the 1960s a common phenomenon of the Italian labour market has been the growth of ‘black’ or ‘grey’ jobs (cf. 2.5.2). These kind of occupations in Italy were mainly covered by women because of their lower qualifications and because of the division of labour within the family (Balbo 1976). Since the beginning of the 1970s there has been a new trend, and the number of women in the official labour market has risen significantly.

To sum up, Italy and Spain had very low female labour participation after the Second World War, with Spanish women, over time, less likely to be employed than Italian. During the 1950s and until the mid-1960s, the female activity rate increased in Spain, while in Italy, as a consequence of the first phase of industrialisation, it decreased. As illustrated in Figure 7, since the beginning of the 1970s, female labour force participation increased in both countries, with greater velocity in Italy than in Spain. What has been really new for both countries, however, is that the female labour supply is no longer strictly dependent on market demand but is more and more influenced by women’s willingness to go into the labour market.
Figure 7: Female Activity Rates 1970-1990

![Graph showing female activity rates from 1970 to 1990 for various countries.]

Note: The number for 1970/75 refer to total active population as a proportion of total population. Afterwards the total active population as a proportion of the population aged 15 or over is shown. In Denmark in 1980 a serious break of homogeneity in the statistical series has to be considered for interpretations.

Figure 7 shows clearly that despite the rapid augmentation of southern female activity rates are still the lowest among the analysed European countries, reaching only 2/3 of the West European activity rates. Thus in the south, the exclusion of women from the labour market is more accentuated than in other countries. Aside from these differences, women in the Spanish and Italian labour markets are integrated in different ways than West Europeans.
2.5.2 Peculiarities of the southern labour markets and employment careers

One of the main factors in analysing comparative data on employment in Italy and Spain and especially data on female employment is that the labour markets in these two countries have been characterised, as already mentioned, by the high presence of 'black' or 'grey' jobs. These jobs, mainly held by women, are distinguished by precarious social security, time (seasonal jobs, domestic work, part-time work), and pay. As data collected at the national level and data used to make comparisons are only connected to the formal labour market, information on female employment concerns only women in the official labour market. As we will try to demonstrate in the following pages, there are two main peculiarities of the recent entrance of women into the labour market in Italy and Spain: 1) the growth of female activity rates meant and still means an increase in women's unemployment rates, 2) women's part-time employment is very low.

Figure 8: Female and general Unemployment Rates 1983, 1985, 1991

Source: Eurostat, 1992a, p.41.
Note: The international comparison of unemployment is difficult, therefore we have restricted ourselves to comparable data from the Community Labour Force Survey.

Female unemployment rates in Italy and Spain increased in the 1980s and seemed to decrease somewhat in 1991 (Figure 8). The gender division of unemployment is much more clear-cut in Italy and Spain than in other countries. The difference between the general unemployment rate and the female unemployment rate in 1991 was 0.7 percentage points in Germany, 1.3 in Den-
mark, 2.6 in France, 5.6 in Italy, and 7.3 in Spain. The United Kingdom presents a completely different picture, because there women have lower unemployment rates than the overall rate. Spain is the only country where the differences between women and men have increased since 1983, i.e., where the risk of being unemployed has increased for women in comparison to men.

The second peculiarity of the south is the low rate of part-time activity in relation to total female activity. In 1989 10.9% of the Italian women in the formal labour market were employed part-time vs. 11.9% in Spain. In France the part-time rate was 23.8%; in West Germany, 30.7%, in Denmark, 40.1%, and in the United Kingdom 43.6% (Eurostat 1991; Eurobarometer, 1991, 34).

Figure 9: Female employment by economic sector and female activity 1989

![Graph showing female employment by economic sector and female activity rate](image)


Activity and employment patterns in Italy and Spain cannot be explained here. We want only to summarise the most important characteristics: 1) both countries have always been characterised by a structural shortage of employment, which surely has affected women's labour force participation in the south in contrast to Western Europe; 2) in Italy and Spain, as shown in Figure 9, there is a general lower development of the service sector, traditionally occupied by women in other countries, and a higher proportion of employed people in the agricultural sector; 3) in both countries the number of women working has been and still is underestimated,
due to the large number working in the informal or black sector and at family help in agriculture (Muro et al. 1988; Solsoa 1991; Balbo 1976; Paci 1980).

What characterises the family cycle and female employment careers in the southern countries? A longitudinal study on employment and family in the EU carried out for Eurobarometer in 1991 shows clear differences in the labour markets which affect women in different ways. Six differences could be identified with a factorial analysis producing the following groupings of countries: 1) France and Belgium, 2) Denmark, 3) East Germany, 4) Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, 5) West Germany and Great Britain, and 6) The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Ireland. The differences between countries were due to variances in the rate of initial entry into the labour force, the proportion of women employed part-time and the continuity of employment. Variances were also found in the linkage between activity rates, number of children and interruption of activity with the birth of the first child. For Spain and Italy the study confirms and enlarges the previous picture. In fact, women in Spain and Italy go late into the labour market, have a low entry rate, a very high continuity rate, and seldom work part-time. After the birth of their first child a majority of married women continue to work full time in Italy, whereas in Spain they either stop employment completely or continue full-time, and the employment interruptions are mainly motivated by professional reasons in both countries. By contrast, in West Germany and Great Britain, women have a high initial entry rate, but low continuity, punctuated by long interruptions and high reliance on part-time work. A very high number of women leave the labour force after the birth of the first child (Eurobarometer 1991, 34, p. 62-77; p. 91). Both France and Denmark constitute an intermediate group, although several differences should be underlined. For one thing, employment is more continuous than in West Germany and Great Britain, 'due to the types of child care available and attitudes favouring economic independence for women' (Eurobarometer 1991, 34, p. 76). Also other national and cross-national studies have shown the permanence of women on the labour market in Italy (and Spain) during their adult years (Ambrosini/Rossi, 1994; Commission 1992, p.7).

The uninterrupted participation of women on the labour market in the south can mean that 1) a high proportion of employed women come from upper social classes and have more financial resources for solving child-care problems; 2) the higher proportion of women working in agriculture can more easily combine employment and family; 3) strong family relationships make it

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13 On the issue of women working in the "informal" or black sector, the literature in Italy is wide. For a bibliography, see Paci, M. (1980), Chapter 5.
easier for working mothers to find somebody in the family to help take care of the children, 4) the high female unemployment rate pushes women into an uninterrupted employment career, and 5) many women have fewer children and thus fewer co-ordination problems. The point about the importance of family solidarity will be discussed in the next section.

As has been shown before, the situation of the labour market in these two countries is crucial for understanding the family changes: decrease in marriage and fertility rates and low level of marital dissolution. For Italy a relationship between the level of female employment and the level of fertility as well as of divorce can be found by doing a regional variance analysis (Barbagli 1990). It would be interesting to test these connections for Spain to see if higher employment rates correlate with lower fertility rates and higher divorce rates. On the other hand, family behaviour (or better, the gender division of work within the family) influences the division of employment in the labour market and vice versa. The low rate of female employment and the high presence of women in the informal sector and among precarious jobs favour an asymmetric relation between genders in the family. Comparative analysis of these relationships has still to be developed.

2.6 Solidarity relationships and family values

The demographic behaviour and the opinion survey data analysed in the previous chapters confirm the hypothesis of our theoretical introduction: Spaniards and Italians seem to be less oriented to individualist and independent behaviour, and their family cultures seem to be unique. An analysis of family networks and of attitudes toward religion and the family should be able to show to some extent the importance of the family in the division of labour between state and family. Using the existing data we will show the specificity of the southern family culture.

2.6.1 Family networks and solidarity

How people are in contact and help each other in situations of need can be divided into two dimensions: 1) duration of living together in one household, and 2) extension and intensity of networks between different households. Concerning the first, in Spain and Italy, family members of different generations live together longer than anywhere else in Europe. In 1993, when
asked if old people of 65 years or more lived permanently in their household, 13% of the Europeans answered positively. Within Europe great variations were found: in France only 8% said old people lived with them, 9% in Denmark, 11% in West-Germany, and 13% in Great Britain. However, in Italy 19% and in Spain 21% had older people living with them. A similar picture emerges for young people, but with even greater international variations (cf. 2.2.2). What do Europeans think about living together with elderly relatives? In 1993 Eurobarometer asked the following question: ‘In the future, working adults may have to look after their parents more than they do nowadays. In your opinion is this quite a good thing or quite a bad thing?’ (Eurobarometer 1993, 39, p. 105). Over 60% of Italians said that this was quite a good thing, whereas about 50% of the Europeans answered in the same way. Nearly 20% of the Italians said that it was neither good nor bad, the same as the average European. Around 45% of the Spaniards said it was quite a good thing, but nearly 30% of them said that it was neither good nor bad. As in other Eurobarometer questions, Spaniards give no clear answer. Available information about living arrangements is too scarce to be able to determine whether people live as they do by choice, out of necessity, or both. The question cannot be answered here. In any case, people living together have necessarily high contact with each other; they can help each other and pool income more easily if they want.

But not only is the potential help network inside the family important in the south, the networks between households are also important. As the only comparative study on social networks (ISSP; 1986) does not include Spain, we will analyse the Italian and the German cases as representatives of both clusters of countries. Kin and friendship networks in Italy are both wider than in Germany, which means that the individualisation degree is in this sense lower in Italy than in Germany. Relatives in Italy live closer and visit each other more often than in Germany. Italian social networks, both kin and friendship, are characterised by a strong ‘intensity’ and ‘localism’. What seems different as well is that the intensity of relationships in Italy is often extended beyond the relationships with mother and father (Table 7).
Table 7: People visiting their relatives: West Germany and Italy in 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of relatives not living in the same household</th>
<th>West-Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mother</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>father</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>daughter</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>son</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sister</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brother</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other relative(^\text{14})</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISSP 1986, 32-48, 61, 63.

The hypothesis that frequent visits of relatives reduce contacts with friends has been falsified by studies based on ISSP data of 1986 (Bruckner/Knaep/Müller 1993; Höllinger/Haller 1990). On the contrary, countries with wider and stronger kinship networks seem to have wider and stronger friendship networks. Germans have weaker kin networks than Italians, and they also have weaker friendship networks in both extension and intensity.

Is Spain similar to Italy? A Eurobarometer survey of older people in 1992 gives some ideas. People over 60 were asked ‘how often do you see your family?’ The results support our previous analysis on social networks in Italy and Germany (Figure 10).

\(^\text{14}\) The respondent had to say with which other relative (grandmother, grandfather, granddaughter, grandson, aunt, uncle, mother-in-law, father-in-law, sister-in-law, brother-in-law, other adult relative) he has most contact and how often he/she visits this relative.
The more intense relations of Italians to their relatives result also in the importance of the relatives for social and economic support. Even if the potential of relatives is held constant, the kinship orientation in help networks is higher in Italy. As a result the partner is less important in Italy than in Germany. For help Italians mostly ask relatives (mother, father, but also sisters and brothers), and the help of the partner is relatively less important than for Germans (Bruckner/Knaup/Müller 1992, p. 120). The importance of helping networks within kinship is also reflected in how young people look for jobs. In the Eurobarometer study, ‘Young Europeans’, the importance of different ways of looking for work varies considerably from country to country. ‘Help from kinship and social networks (relatives and friends) is of primary importance throughout the Mediterranean (Spain, Greece, Portugal, Italy, and even France) [...]’. By contrast, throughout the countries of northern Europe, particularly in Denmark, Germany and Ireland, direct approaches to potential employers are most successful. Finally, advertisements play an important role in helping young Danes, Luxembourgers, Dutch, and Germans to find work’ (Commission of the European Communities 1988, p. 175). Family members in the South interact more closely with each other, and kin networks are more important than in other countries. The fact that different generations live longer together, as well as the high institu-

15 In the ISSP (1986) persons were asked who helps them in apartment and garden, in case of influenza, in case of depression, in case of marital crisis, financial help and advice about important changes in life.
tionalisation of marriage, can help explain the higher density of contacts within and between families. But how can we explain the high level of support and solidarity within networks in these countries? Are they due to the high density of contacts or to other socio-economic characteristics? The level of economic development of a country (measured by the classic indicators of industrialisation, urbanisation and mobility) can only partly explain the lasting importance of family and kinship relationships in some countries. For example, Hollinger and Haller (1990) have proved that, although Italy has a higher degree of urbanisation than Austria, in Italy kin relationships are much more important. In addition, different economic levels of development can produce a similar intensity in kinship networks within the same country. Within Italy family kinship behaviour does not vary between the very economically-differentiated regions of the country (Hollinger/Haller 1990). Thus other socio-cultural factors must explain the strength of family and kin relationships in southern countries.

How to explain especially the frequent cohabitation of the elderly with their children? To what extent can the tradition of extended family in the past in some areas and regions explain why different generations live together longer? The literature on this issue, although extensive for some countries (Laslett 1972), gives no homogeneous and complete picture of family types in the past. Especially among Mediterranean countries, family structures and marriage patterns are not easily reduced to one model among and within countries (Barbagli/Kertzer 1992; Rowland 1987). Another indicator of the cultural tradition of a country concerning family solidarity is surely the religious denomination and the strength of the Church. However, national differences in public services housing markets can contribute some answers to our questions. This issue will be touched on in the conclusion. In the next section we will show how religión is related to family values.

2.6.2 Religion and family duties

The Catholic Church in Spain and Italy has traditionally had a great influence on family matters. Despite an important secularisation process in the last decades, religion is still very important in both countries from a comparative perspective. As Greeley has shown in a cross-national study, despite modernisation, differences persist between the Catholic and the Protestant ethic, greatly influencing family values. According to Greeley, the Catholic ethic is 'communitarian' while the Protestant is 'individualistic', because of different preconscious
world views. 'Catholics are more likely to visit parents, children, siblings, and other relatives than are other Christians. [...] Net of national differences then Catholics do form more intense family networks than do other Christians [...]’ (Greeley 1989, p. 497). This means that despite the existing differences between, for example, Spanish and French Catholics, Catholics differ always from Protestants.

The results of the World Values Survey (WVS) (1990-1993, var. 146) confirm the well-known fact that families in Italy and Spain are more often than in other countries the first vehicle to transmit religious beliefs. Virtually all Italians (93.5%) and Spaniards (91.9) have been brought up religiously at home, compared to 71.2% of the French, 62.2% of the West Germans, 61.2% of the British and 43.2% of the Danish. In addition, religious faith is considered important to be encouraged in children by parents more frequently in Italy (17.1%) and Spain (9.7%) than in the other European countries: the United Kingdom (8.9%), West Germany (7.5%), France (5.7%), and Denmark (2.5%) (Eurobarometer 1993, 39.0, 85). The importance of the Church in the life of Italians and Spaniards is also supported by the high number of people who attend religious services at least once a week: 37.9% of Italians, 29.2% of Spaniards, 17.9% of Germans, 14.2% of the British and only 10.2% of the French and 2.5% of the Danish. People in Spain and Italy are in general more religious than in other West European countries, and they also give more attention to the Church on family matters. In 1991 in the WVS (var. 153) it was asked, "Generally speaking, do you think that your Church is giving, in your country, adequate answers to the family life?" Around 45% of Italians and 43% of Spaniards answered yes, as compared to 38% of the British, 34% of the Germans, 28% of the French and only 13% of the Danish. The importance of the Church and religion for family values is also reflected in the ideas people express when asked about family duties.

Ideas about duties between generations can be deduced from two questions of the WVS in 1991. Following statements were presented: 'Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them' (a) or 'One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes' (b). To these statements Europeans tended to agree as follows:
Table 8: Love and respect parents. 1990-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column %, How many people mentioned</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>BRD</th>
<th>Group-average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statement a</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement b</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Over three-fourths of Spaniards and Italians feel more attached to their parents, independent of their behaviour and attitudes, whereas only around the half of the Danes and West Germans do. Forty to 50% of the latter tend to support a more differentiated vision. Similar are the values related to children. ‘Parents’ duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being’ (Statement a) or ‘Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children’ (Statement b). These statements (a, b) were supported by respondents in the following way:

Table 9: Parents duties related to children. 1990-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column %, How many people mentioned</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>BRD</th>
<th>Group-average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statement a</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement b</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With respect to the duties of parents in relation to children, three-fourths of the Spaniards and Italians express a family-oriented opinion, a somewhat lower percentage than the findings in Table 8\[17\]. Also the British seem to be very family-oriented. The answers of the French are difficult to interpret, because the category of ‘neither’ is lacking. The Danish and West Germans again express more often an ‘individualistic’ view. These indicators of 1990–91 point to some cultural qualities that are found not only in Italy and Spain, but that help to explain great differences in behaviour. These opinions seem also to relate to the religiosity and role of the Church in each country as the rank order for the questions shows.

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\[16\] The category "neither" was included in this question but not in the question about parents.

\[17\] This could be attributed to the technical difference between the two questions: in the question here the possibility of answering "neither" was offered.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Raised religiously</th>
<th>Children encouraged to religious faith</th>
<th>Religious service once a week</th>
<th>Church answer to family life is adequate</th>
<th>Love and respect parents always</th>
<th>Parents' duty is to do best for children 18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRD</td>
<td>BRD</td>
<td>BRD</td>
<td>BRD</td>
<td>BRD</td>
<td>BRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>BRD</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Religious heritage seems to be important for family duties, independent of other socioeconomic factors. The core of religious heritage in Spain and Italy seems to be the high legitimacy of the Catholic doctrine about solidarity and reciprocal duties. As a consequence, relations among generations, genders and households are to a great extent regulated by religious norms. The problem with such an explanation emerges when comparing the southern countries with other Catholic countries like Austria, France, Belgium and Ireland. In these countries the family and the Church are not all institutionalised in the same way. Therefore the role played by the Church has to be seen together with other national characteristics. Perhaps the history of the State-Church relation and the strength of the state could give significant insights. In the next chapter we will try to connect the southern family model with some general socioeconomic features of the Italian and Spanish societies.

3 Conclusion: The southern family model

In this paper we have proposed a theoretical model for analysing the family in Spain and Italy. Following Flaquer and our findings this model can be summarised in Figure 11.

18 France cannot be included because the question was asked differently and so is not comparable.
Figure 11: The southern family model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Opinions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Generations living long together in one household (young and aged people)</td>
<td>* Family-oriented attitudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* High institutionalisation of marriage: low cohabitation and divorce rates, few births outside wedlock and few single-person households among young</td>
<td>* Children are highly valued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* High intensity and wide extent of family and kinship networks</td>
<td>* Relations between generations are seen more in terms of obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Low female employment in formal labour market and high continuity in employment patterns</td>
<td>* Importance of church-oriented values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Low fertility rate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the model shows, changes in this part of Europe point to incongruity and no clear shifts. Italian and Spanish families present indicators both of deep changes and of continuity. We have developed hypotheses regarding relations between the different characteristics of the southern family model: the increase of women’s employment together with the rapid modernisation seem responsible for the rapid decline in fertility and the increase in conjugal instability. These are surely indicators of changes in, as well as delay of, marriage. However, we have found some indicators of permanence of ‘traditional’ patterns, too. Marriage as an institution is still very important and, as a consequence, birth outside marriage is still rare and divorce is not (yet) so widespread as in Western Europe. To some extent cohabitation and living as a single young person (still very unusual phenomena) can be related to the strong institutionalisation of marriage. On the other hand, the longer vertical extension of the family unit together with the relevance of church-oriented values can be associated with the high intensity of family and kinship ties as well as to the way in which the obligations between generations are perceived. The long dependence of young people on their parents is likely rooted in the high value attributed to children and in the low significance of “independence” as an education value. The reverse of the coin is the propensity of people in the South to offer support to the parents during their old age.
Will this southern family model persist in the future or will it change? Are we only facing the problem of a cultural time lag? Here we want to unify our previous explanations and provide some ideas about the future development of the southern family model. Three factors seem to explain and favour the reproduction of the southern family model:

1. The socio-economic situation
2. The characteristics of social policies in Southern Europe
3. The family culture

1. It seems to us that the social structure in the South will continue to be different from that in West European countries as long as the economies of Italy and Spain continue to be characterised by: a) the subordinate role of these economies in the international division of work; b) the more intensive economic crisis, that is, higher and structural unemployment (characterised by a higher percentage of women, young people and long term unemployed people); c) a labour market with many precarious jobs that affect especially young people and women, high employment in agriculture, high rate of self-employed people as well as a higher rate of workers working in small enterprises (i.e., a high propensity to informal jobs); 4) few opportunities of part-time employment in the formal sector; and 5) the concentration of economic and social disadvantages in some areas and regions (cf. OECD, 1994).

2. In Italy and Spain the entitlement and the level of public social benefits and social services are often related to the family unit and to family income. Social assistance, support for agricultural workers, family allowances, help for handicapped persons, scholarships, services for the aged, etc., are not institutionalised as individual social rights, but as social rights related to family income and family situation. Yet unemployment benefits for young persons seeking first employment are non-existent, as they are supposed to be supported by their family (Jurado Guerrero 1995). This is also often the case in Western European welfare states, but in Italy and Spain it seems to be more frequent. Similarly, family policies in both countries are not so developed, mainly targeted to families in need and dependent on family income (Neubauer 1993). In particular, support for children is 'poor' in comparison with other Western European countries (Bradshaw/Ditch 1993, p. 74). The particular institutionalisation of some social security laws concerning families must seen partly as a result of the historical period in which the social security was founded and partly as the result of specific socio-political contexts. The current
cruis of welfare states will make it difficult to develop more generous family benefits as well as base entitlements of benefits on individual rights.

3. The family and kin culture in the south as described in 2.6 is dominated by the relevance of children and family-oriented values, by the importance of obligations, by the solidarity between generations and by religious norms. Despite secularisation processes, southern family culture maintains many of the past elements because it adapts well to a context of lasting employment shortage and a scarce development of social services for families.

Figure 12: Factors pushing towards the reproduction of the southern family model

From our point of view, the specific socio-economic development and current situation, the characteristics of social policies, and the scarce and regionally-differentiated diffusion of social services favour the persistence of the southern family model in Italy and Spain, as shown in Figure 12. The specific family and kin culture pushes in the same direction. These factors encourage solidarity between generations and within kin relationships and make the individualisation of living arrangements more difficult. The family-oriented culture is surely a result of this economic and social situation as well as a legitimate factor for the present division of labour between the state and the family, between genders and generations in the labour market and within the family. In turn, the importance of the family and kinship networks is likely to

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favour social reproduction and inhibit social change, because of the greater probability of social control within the networks. All this forecasts the persistence of the southern family model.

Nevertheless, some factors could transform the existing model. The ongoing processes of secularisation, the increasing educational level and the entrance of women into the labour market together with their wishes to be economically independent will accelerate the re-negotiation of relations between genders in favour of a more symmetrical relationship. The changing population structure, due mainly to fertility declines, will impact the potential number of women available to care for the older generation and the horizontal extension of the kinship networks as well (cf. Laslett et al. 1993, p. 127).

Two different perspectives will guide our future work on Italian and Spanish families: one will focus on the relationships between social policies and the family model in the south, and the other will investigate the phenomenon of the longer vertical extension of southern families, especially the relatively late leaving-home process of the youth.

The southern family model described in this paper has dealt mainly with family structures. Only a few explanations have been preliminarily proposed. Does a southern family model exist with respect to law and social policies? What influence has the specific development of the welfare state and cultural ideology had on the family model? To answer this we will analyse the way in which paid and unpaid work have been divided between different societal actors and within the family between genders. We have shown how law reforms concerning the family were late in Italy and Spain, but we have not explained why. It remains to be analysed how the family with its lines of division between genders and generations as well as relationships between kin have been codified by law and social policies. To some extent, social security and social policies analysis should help answer the question of whether strong solidarity within family and kin and long dependency of family members is related to lack of state support. As a first step, one might look at indicators of social expenditures for the different family members among the countries included in the paper. However, as a second step one would have to analyse the more general characteristics of welfare states in different countries. Then some social security laws would have to be selected in order to find out how relationships between genders and generations and obligations within family and kin have been defined and codified by social law.
For the second perspective the guiding questions are: 1. Why do young people live so long with their parents? 2. Why is their transition to adulthood mainly characterised by leaving the parental home only for marriage? In this paper we have indicated that the delay of marriage cannot explain the longer vertical extension of the southern family. We have then attempted to find possible explanations in unemployment, culture, education, social policies and housing. It is clear that this list could be enlarged by variables such as social class, urbanisation, region, employment characteristics and so on. Living arrangements of different groups of young people and their relation to other societal characteristics can be analysed by comparing regions and/or countries. Education, culture and welfare state systems require mainly a cross-national comparison. Meanwhile, other relationships can be studied by both cross-national and cross-regional comparisons. The idea is to formulate hypotheses about relationships at a macrosociological level. In addition some relationships should be analysed more in detail, while others take a secondary place. In our opinion, the relations between the living arrangements of young people and their labour market and income situation, their position in the education system and the state support for these groups and their families should be the most relevant variables. If the research process shows great deficits for this perspective, supplementary variables will be included. So far, the idea is to compare Italy, Spain, France and Germany. One problem is the difficulty of accounting for family culture by making only secondary analysis of survey data. This problem could perhaps be solved by using some qualitative or anthropological studies, if they exist.

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