


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SOZIALFORSCHUNG



Trade Union Development in Spain

Past Legacies and Current Trends

Marc van der Meer

Arbeitsbereich I / Nr. 18
Mannheim 1997

ISSN 0948-0072

Arbeitspapiere

Working papers

Marc van der Meer

Trade Union Development in Spain

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Marc van der Meer:
Trade Union Development in Spain : Past Legacies and Current
Trends.
Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES).
Mannheim, 1997 (revised version).
(Arbeitspapiere Arbeitsbereich I / 18)
ISSN 0948-0072

Deckblattlayout: Uwe Freund

Nicht im Buchhandel erhältlich

Schutzgebühr: DM 5,--

Bezug:

Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES), Postfach, 68131 Mannheim

Redaktionelle Notiz:

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Das Arbeitspapier ist ein Teilergebnis des internationalen Forschungsprojektes "The Development of Trade Unions in Western Europe", das vom Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES) koordiniert und unterstützt wurde.

Editorial Note:

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This working paper is part of the results from the international project on "The Development of Trade Unions in Western Europe (DUES)", which was coordinated and supported by the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES).

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Abstract

This paper provides an overview over the historical development of the Spanish labour movement from 1870 to 1995. The Appendix presents comprehensive data on union membership, density rates, works council elections, and mobilising capacities of Spanish unions. The rise of union organisation in Spain was hesitant and uneven. Under the long Franc-Dictatorship free trade unions were suppressed, though since the 1950s semi-clandestine trade unions emerged on a local or regional basis, partly in fusion with works councils. Since 1975 a new and complex pattern of trade union organisation emerged, fostered by the democratic legislation. The paper provides union membership data from 1981 until 1995 which recently became available from CC.OO, UGT, ELA.STV, USO and CSI-CSIF. The author also develops a hurdle model to enhance the theoretical debate on the current situation of the Spanish union movement. The model helps to understand the current low - though increasing - membership record of Spanish unions, given the structural dilemma they face in the labour market.

Zusammenfassung

Dieses Arbeitspapier gibt einen Überblick über die historische Entwicklung der Arbeiterbewegung in Spanien von 1870 bis 1995. Im Anhang werden umfassende Daten zur Mitglieder- und Organisationsgradentwicklung, den Betriebsratswahlen und den Mobilisierungskapazitäten der spanischen Gewerkschaften zugänglich gemacht. Der Weg der Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Spanien war zögerlich und ungleichmäßig. Unter der Diktatur Francos wurden freie Gewerkschaften unterdrückt, jedoch entstanden seit den 50er Jahren halb im Verborgenen Arbeiterorganisationen auf lokaler oder regionaler Ebene, die teilweise in den Betriebsräten aufgingen. Seit 1975 entstand eine neue, jedoch auch komplexere Gewerkschaftsstruktur, die durch die demokratische Gesetzgebung unterstützt wurde. Das Arbeitspapier dokumentiert im besonderen neue Mitgliedsdaten von 1981 bis 1995, die für CC.OO, UGT, ELA.STV, USO und CSI-CSIF zugänglich wurden. Der Autor entwickelt ein Stufenmodell zur theoretischen Auseinandersetzung mit der gegenwärtigen Lage der spanischen Gewerkschaftsbewegung. Das Modell trägt zum Verständnis der gegenwärtigen niedrigen, jedoch steigenden Mitgliedschaftsmobilisierung der spanischen Gewerkschaften bei, die vor einem strukturellen Dilemma auf dem Arbeitsmarkt stehen.

Abbreviations

ANPE:	Asociación Nacional de Profesionales de la Enseñanza, National Association of Professionals in Education.
BEL:	Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales, Bulletin of Labour Statistics
CC.OO:	Comisiones Obreras, Workers' Commissions
CEOE:	Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales, Spanish Confederation of Employers' Organizations
CEPYME:	Confederación Española de Pequeña y Mediana Empresa, Spanish Confederation of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises.
CES:	Consejo Económico y Social, Economic and Social Council
CIG:	Confederación Intersindical Gallega, Galician Interunion Confederation
CIS:	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas: Center for Social Reserach
CNT:	Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, National Confederation of Labour
CONC:	Comisiones Obreras Nacional de Cataluña, National Workers' Commissions of Catalonia.
COS:	Co-ordinadora de Organizaciones Sindicales, Co-ordination of Trade Union Organizations
CGT:	Confederación General del Trabajo, General Confederation of Labour
CGTU:	Confederación General de Trabajo Unitaria, General Unitarian Confederation of Labour
CSI-CSIF:	Confederación de Sindicatos Independientes; Confederación de Sindicatos Independientes de Funcionarios, Confederation of Independent Trade Unions; Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Public Servants.
CXTG:	Confederación General de Trabajadores Gallegos, General Confederation of Galician Workers
EBCC:	Estructura, Biografía y Conciencia de Clase; Structure, biography and class conciousness
EIRR:	European Industrial Relations Review
ELA.STV:	Euzko Languillen Alkartasuna. Sindicato de Trabajadores Vascos, Trade Union of Basque Workers
EPA:	Enquesta de Población Activa, Survey of Active Labour Force
ETUC:	European Trade Union Congress
FAI:	Federación Anarquista Ibérica, Iberian Anarchist Federation
FNTT:	Federación Nacional de los Trabajadores de la Tierra, National Federation of Agrarian Workers
FRE:	Federación Obrera Regional Española, Spanish Regional Workers' Federation
FTN:	Fomento de Trabajo Nacional, Promotion of National Labour
FTRE:	Federación de Trabajadores de la Región Española, Workers' Federation of the Spanish Region.
ICFTU:	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
INEM:	Instituto Nacional del Empleo, National Institute for Employment
INI:	Instituto Nacional de Industria, National Institute for Industry
Insalud:	Instituto Nacional de Salud, National Health Institute
INTG:	Intersindical Nacional de Trabajadores Gallegos, Nationalist Trade Union of Galician Workers
IU:	Izquierda Unida, United Left
JONS:	Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Socialista, Boards of the National Socialist Offensive
LAB:	Langille Abertzale Batzordeak, Basque Workers' Assembly
MTSS:	Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Ministry of Labour and Social Security, since 1996 Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
OECD:	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSE:	Organización Sindical Española, Spanish Syndical Organization
PCE:	Partido Comunista Española, Spanish Communist Party
PSOE:	Partido Socialista Obrero Español, Spanish Socialist Workers' Party.
PP:	Partido Popular, People's Party
SATSE:	Sindicato de Enfermería, Trade Union of Nurses
SEMAF:	Sindicato Español de Maquinistas y Ayudantes Ferroviarias, Spanish Trade Union of Rail Drivers and Helpers
SEMS:	Sindicato de Medicos, Trade Union of Doctors
SOC:	Solidaridad de Obreros Catalanes, Solidarity of Catalan Workers
SOC:	Sindicato de Obreros de Campo, Trade Union of Agrarian Labourers
SU:	Sindicato Unitario, Unitarian Trade Union
SUP:	Sindicato Unificado de Policía, United Trade Union of the Police
UCD:	Unión de Centro Democrático, Central Democratic Union
UGT:	Unión General de Trabajadores, General Workers' Confederation
USO:	Unión Sindical Obrera, Workers' Union

Introduction

This paper provides an overview of Spanish trade union development, giving special attention to questions of organization and membership evolution.¹ Deep regional, ideological and political cleavages have marked Spanish unionism, but also the economic structure has led to the weak level of organization. Spanish trade unionism until the civil war (1936-1939) was characterized by fragile organization, deep ideological divisions whether should be relied on moderate institutional participation or on revolutionary strategies of direct action. The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the following authoritarian Franco-dictatorship (1939-1975) made the development of Spanish trade unions unlike other European countries. During the state-corporatist period free trade unions were suppressed, though in the 1950s and 1960s semi-clandestine trade union organizations emerged on a local or regional basis, partly in combination with works councils.

In the transition to democracy in the immediate post-Franco period, union membership soared and a new legal statute of free worker representation through unions and councils was achieved. In the early 1980s the major trade unions were able to strengthen their position due to the practice of social concertation. According to survey research, union support declined after a membership peak in 1978. Spanish unions were divided by ideological and political alignments, and there were persistent regional variations and differences between large and small companies. However, in recent years a rapprochement of the main union movements occurred after the social concertation subsided at a time of massive and persistent unemployment and efforts to flexibilize labor law. As will be seen, trade union density is still low, but has changed in composition and has risen considerably since the early and especially the mid-1980s.

The paper has three aims. First an overview of the historical development of Spanish union strength will be given, with as far as possible, attention to union density developments, workplace coverage, cohesion of the labour movement, mobilizing capacities and institutional participation. Secondly, existing figures on dues paying membership will be provided. In contrast to other Western European countries, these data are only partly available, nevertheless a new, recently available time series will be provided for UGT and CC.OO for regions and federations for the period 1981-1994 (see Appendix). In addition, as far as possible new data will be given for the unions USO, CSI-CSIF and ELA.STV. Thirdly, an interpretation and explanation of the current trade union strength will be proposed.

I. A historical overview of labour relations in Spain

1. Early Labour Relations until 1936

Spanish trade unionism in its formative period is characterised by deep political and ideological divisions, fragile organization, sustained regional differences and a conflict between enduring ideology of revolutionary action and reformist practice. Until the Civil War (1936-39), Spanish worker organizations were divided along two major cleavages, regional variation existed between urban-industrial and rural-agricultural areas, and ideological variation between anarchist and

¹ This paper is part of a research project on the "Development of Trade Unions in Western Europe" (DUES) at the University of Mannheim, co-ordinated by Bernhard Ebbinghaus and Jelle Visser (forthcoming). The research on Spain is part of a study programme on interest formation, collective bargaining, and wage setting, with respect to job creation and skill formation in the Netherlands and Spain, which is currently conducted by the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research at the University of Amsterdam. Research for this study began in Amsterdam, whereas most of the fieldwork was conducted in Spring 1995 during a stay at the Fundación Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones in Madrid. The author is indebted to the Juan March Institute for its hospitality, to Joost Heys for help with data selection and to Javier Astudillo, Katrin Burgess, Justin Byrne, Bernhard Ebbinghaus, Joaquin Fernández Castro, Carlos Prieto, Andrew Richards and Jelle Visser for their comments on an earlier draft of this working paper. The paper, however, is under the sole responsibility of the author.

socialist orientations. The process of industrialization was spreading hesitantly and unevenly across the country. A labour proletariat emerged, mainly in the Catalan cities where textile manufacturing emerged since 1825, in the Basque steel and iron industries and in the Asturian mines in the second half of the 19th century. Around 1900 the extractive industries, textiles and railways accounted for just 25% of the industrial sector, which was dominated by arts, craft and building trades organized in small and medium-sized workshops (Castillo, 1990). In 1900, only 14% of the economically active population were employed in industry; almost 70% worked in agriculture, which was partly dominated by latifundia in the Andalusian and Castilian areas, where the agrarian question still dominated the public debate (Beligno, 1986). Illiteracy and poverty were widespread and hampered both the development of durable trade union organizations and a larger electoral turnout for the left. Moreover, economic development was slow due to the lack of an efficient transport infrastructure, the extreme climate and different soil characteristics on the Iberian Peninsula. In 1920 the employment share of industry had risen to 21%, in 1940 to 25%, albeit agriculture remained the largest sector (56% in 1920 and 51% in 1940) (Mitchell 1980: table C1, p. 169).

Apart from the belated industrialization, political instability and conflict hampered trade union development. The constitution of Cádiz (1812) after the successful Spanish resistance against Napoleon, and the penal code of 1822 prohibited trade union organization. Only in the more liberal Catalan area the first textile mutual association (Sociedad Mutua de Trabajadores de Tejedores de Algodón) was established in Barcelona in 1840. During the 'six-revolutionary years' (1868-1874) after the Gloriosa revolution of 1868, unions were permitted, but then the right of organization was withdrawn again until the enactment of the law on freedom of association (1887). This act included a period of relative tolerance of trade union organization and activity, although state repression returned at times when the conservative forces gained over the liberal party. There were various waves of social mobilization of both industrial and agricultural workers. Strikes occurred frequently and received massive support, especially in Barcelona (1909 and 1917-1920) and Andalucía (1919-1922); in the 1930s social conflict extended country-wide.²

Anarchism has a strong social basis ever since Bakunin's ideas were introduced in Spain in 1869. The Anarchists strongholds were mostly located in Barcelona and in the Andalusian rural areas. The most important anarchist organization, the National Confederation of Labour (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo-CNT) was established in 1910. As its main counterpart Marxist inspired socialists organized their ranks in the Spanish Socialist Labour Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español-PSOE) in 1879. PSOE set up the General Workers' Union (Unión General de Trabajadores- UGT) in Barcelona in 1888. Until the First World War the socialist movement followed a rather solitary path and grew only gradually, especially in Madrid, Asturias and Basque region.

Around the turn of the century the Spanish trade union movement was very weak due to the economic backwardness, the adverse political climate and severe living conditions. No less than 64% of the population of 18.5 million in 1900 were employed in agriculture and only 12% of the population lived in larger towns with fifty thousand and more inhabitants (Tuñón de Lara, 1985a: 275). In general, organized labour was too weak and too divided to effectively strive for universal social rights. Notwithstanding the achievement of collective wage contracts in some sectors, mostly following successful strikes, and some influence on the emerging debate on the social question, Spain was still

² From the literature follows that in the first third of the twentieth century, strike activity in Spain is relative low in comparison with other countries (Heywood, 1989; Martin, 1990). Soto Carmona (1989) observes that strikes returned in cyclical periods on such issues as salaries, piecework, children and women labour, the labour time, organization of work and representation rights. In the period up to 1936, strikes occurred predominantly in six major cities; Barcelona, Oviedo, Madrid, Vizcaya, Zaragoza and Valencia, and mostly in agriculture, construction, mining, transport and textiles. For data on variance in strike activity in Spain in the period 1905-1934, see Smith (1995: 177).

the only major European country without a working-class representative in parliament as late as 1909 (Carr, 1980: 439).

Around 1900 nevertheless, social provisions were introduced in Spain at about the same time as in many other European countries (Guillén, 1990). Important initial provisions were the child and women labour laws (1873 and 1900), universal male suffrage law (1890), the industrial accident law (1900) and the creation of the Commission for Social Reforms (Comisión de Reformas Sociales-1883), which aimed to inform about and to ameliorate the social situation. Especially after 1903 a new reform phase began when facing extensive unemployment, unfavourable labour conditions, long working days up to 12 hours and the wide-spread youth and female employment (Soto Carmona, 1989). The Institute for Social Reform (Instituto de Reformas Sociales-1903) fulfilled a key role in proposing and implementing labour legislation and mediating labour conflicts (Palacio Morena, 1988). Strikes were permitted by government order in 1903, and legalised in 1909. The Labour Inspectorate (1906) and the National Institute of Social Security (Instituto Nacional de Previsión, 1908) are further examples of the growing paternalist state intervention at the beginning of the century.

Public corporate institutions for such as the Chambers (Cámaras) for Commerce, Industry and Navigation and the Chambers for Agriculture were established (Martínez, 1993). The April 1886 legislation granted the Chambers an official recognition as "consultative bodies of public administration", and gave them a consultative role with respect to commercial treaties, tariffs, custom arrangements, commercial and social legislation. The chambers exist in all provinces with a peak-organization (Consejo Superior) in Madrid. Especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country the chambers were important lobbies (see Martínez, 1993: 25, 41).

Business associations were founded at the end of the nineteenth century more in order to defend their economic interests vis-à-vis the state than as a reaction to the labour conflict (cf. Soto Carmona, 1989). La Patronal's organizational and political influence on state intervention and protection varied among industrial regions, it had a different political roles in the political centre (Madrid) compared to such areas as the Basque and Catalan region, where stronger economic development, international trade and foreign capital but also separatist movements prevailed. In these regions, business associations have strong historical roots, dating sometimes back to guild-like organizations, as they existed in Tarrasa, Sabadell and Barcelona from the thirteenth century. Forerunners of the influential Catalan business association "Fomento de Trabajo Nacional" (1889) had been established in the early nineteenth century (Martínez, 1993: 50, 83; Cabrera and Del Rey, 1996). In the Basque region the first regional business association "La Liga Nacional de Productores" was established in 1893. Finally, in the large agrarian and less modernized areas, employers' organizations were less important than clientele and family linkages between landowners, politicians and industrialists (Linz, 1981). The first national employers' organizations were the Spanish Guild Federation (Federación Gremial Española-1912), which primarily organized smaller trades and crafts, and the Spanish Association of Farmers (Asociación de Agricultores de España), which organized mostly landowners. Since 1914 larger national business associations existed, such as the Spanish Business Confederation (Confederación Patronal Española) which, initiated by the employers of building and metallurgy of Madrid, Zaragossa, and Barcelona, organized representatives from different sectors of the economy in order to coordinate labour policy and to react against workers activity (Cabrera and Del Rey, 1996).

The First World War, during which the Spanish economy fostered thanks to its neutrality, and after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia (1917), an important social conflict arose on the thwarted social legislation. After a revolutionary general strike in 1917 collapsed, both the rising opposition by unions and the foundation of the International Labour Organization (1919), which was supported by Spain, led in 1919-1920 to some unemployment benefits, the 8-hour workday, and new apprentice contracts and pensions schemes (Martin, 1990). The Ministry of Labour and the first forms of Mixed Committees (in the Barcelonian Commerce) were created in 1920. In 1921 the Spanish Communist

Party (PCE) became established, yet the communist union, General Unitarian Confederation of Labour (*Confederación General del Trabajo Unitaria- CGTU*) was not founded before 1932. With the authoritarian Primo de Rivera-dictatorship (1923-1930) the constitutional parliamentary monarchy became destroyed and the first ideas of corporatist interest representation were realized in Spain (Linz, 1981). Public and advisory organs were established in the National Corporatist Organization (*Organización Corporativa Nacional-1926*), which substituted "the individualist State into the corporatist State". In the same year also the employment contract law became enacted, which until then had been regulated in the civil code. Furthermore collective bargaining became included in the 1926 Labour Code. In the new corporatist structure various existing and ad-hoc interest groups were invited to take part. The socialist union confederation UGT was tolerated and allowed to participate in the corporatist labour-management arbitration boards (*comités paritarios*); the right-wing merger National Confederation of Free Trade Unions (*Confederación Nacional de Sindicatos Libres de España- 1924*) and the Confederation of Catholic Trade Unions (*Confederación de Sindicatos Católicos- 1919*) prospered; however, CNT and other unions were forced underground. The Second Republic (1931-36) adopted a modern democratic constitution with explicit recognition of trade unions and collective bargaining. The PSOE participated for the first time in the left-republican government which initiated military, school and agrarian reforms, and working class rights, as well as the successful institutionalization of regional autonomy. Collective bargaining and negotiation was developing with the help of the so-called "Jurados Mixtos" (mixed juries), which were thought to stabilize capital- labour relations and which gave the state an arbitration and conciliation role. Unions gained in strength but remained divided over whether to press for reforms within or to mobilize for the revolutionary overthrow of the current system (Linz, 1981). With the 1934 election a conservative government came to power, which harshly crushed the anti-government protests in the Asturian mines. The continuous political instability, economic stagnation and uneven socio-economic development engendered sharp conflicts between liberals and conservatives, and between socialists and anarchists, thus impairing the labour unity and organization and cooperative labour relations. The labour movement radicalized propelled by strong ideological and symbolic issues, such as anti-clericalism, the national identity, and family and property structures. According to Linz, the mass mobilization of social groups, their activism and violence in order to achieve political purposes, and the organization of society along political lines outweighed the institutionalization of interest group politics and collective bargaining practices. While in the Twenties and at the eve of the Republic the Spanish trade unions were developing similar to other European labour organizations relying on collective bargaining and institutional participation, they became in the Thirties the instruments for power struggle and class conflict (Linz, 1981: 386).

In 1936, the left Popular Front, an electoral alliance between republicans, socialists, communists and marxists, achieved a victory at the ballot box. Conservative groups, combining landowners, shopkeepers, employers and industrialists, part of the Church and the Army, led by General Franco, started a military coup against the Republican government and for the next three years Spain was engulfed in a deep-rooted civil war (1936-39). The defeat of the Republican government led to the dictatorship of an authoritarian-nationalist regime under Franco (1939-1975) and forced the union and left party leaders into exile or underground.

2. Labour relations during the Franco-dictatorship

During the Franco-dictatorship (1939-1975) trade unions were prohibited and the strike right was suspended. Following plans from 1938 a new vertical corporatist Spanish trade union organization based on the principles of "unity", "totality" and "hierarchy", was established (*Organización Sindical Española-1940*), it became directly subordinated to the Falange, the unitary government party and was headed by labour minister and staffed with militants from the Falange and JONS.³ The trade

³ The Board of the National Socialist Offensive (Jons) was established in the Second Republic in 1931, the Traditional Spanish Falange was created in 1933. These rightist organizations merged in 1933.

union organization was divided in 28 vertical sector organizations "sindicatos", in which employers and employees were compulsory members in order to "eliminate" class conflict.⁴

The economic structure mirrors the political rigidity of the Franco-dictatorship (cf. García Delgado, 1987). In the early 1940s the Spanish economic development slackened and living conditions in these "years of hunger" declined due to the political repression and Spain's isolated international position during and after the Second World War. The state through its "National Institute for Industry"-holding (INI, 1941), set-up to invest in all basic industries, such as steel, energy and automobiles, succeeded nevertheless in promoting the industrialization of the country (Braña et.al., 1979). After a decade of economic autarky and stagnation, the political climate of heavy-handed authoritarian suppression gradually changed in the 1950s and 1960s. Following the Spain's first international agreements with the United States and the Vatican in 1953, new ideas of openness were gradually brought into practice. Workers' protest was at first restricted to individual resistance at work shop level. In 1945 there was a transport strike in Barcelona, and in 1946 the first general strike against the regime was called in Manresa (Ruiz, 1993). In the 1950s, for the first time in more than a decade, massive demonstrations and strikes emerged spontaneously at a larger scale in Vizcaya and Barcelona (1951), followed by other major cities (1956). The turning point to the 1959-1974 period of economic growth and expansion was the 1959 Stabilization Plan, which allowed more international openness and foreign investment, while emerging mass tourism and money transfers from Spanish workers employed abroad, gradually brought improved living conditions.

Two institutional reforms within the "syndical" organization were permitted: firstly, the election of worker representatives in statutory work councils, the so-called "jurados de empresa" (legislation enacted in 1947, but operative only after 1953); secondly, collective bargaining was introduced between the formal representatives of capital and labour within the vertical system in order to overcome the rigid central wage formation (1958). These "entities of labour harmony" allowed the development of clandestine trade unions, such as the communist-led Workers' Committees (*Comisiones Obreras*- CC.OO) and the progressive catholic Workers' Union (*Unión Sindical Obrera*- USO) to take part in the official syndical organizations (see Amsden, 1972; Foweraker, 1989; Ruiz, 1993). USO was created by members of the apostolic youth workers' organization *Juventud Obrero Cristiana* (JOC) in Guizpuzcoa, who in 1959 started to reflect on the difficult employment conditions during the regime. In 1961 its Foundation Letter was written (USO, 1987). *Comisiones Obreras* emerged more spontaneously as an ad hoc organization of an unofficial strike movement in Asturias (1958), who insisted to negotiate on employment conditions. After the large scale 1962 strikes, government officials stated they were compelled to negotiate with the "so-called Workers' Commissions" (Mateo de Ros, 1967, in Ruiz, 1993: 146). In the 1960s, CC.OO, USO and other christian groups organised workers on a local basis in different industrial regions and were able to "infiltrate" the vertical "syndical" organizations. However, the expansion of the workers committees was repressed by the state and the committees were ruled illegal in 1967. After the visit of an ILO-mission in 1969, further liberalization was enacted in the new Trade Union Law of 1971, though strict state control and persecution of political opposition was maintained. Nevertheless, strike activity increased in the mid-1970s and the semi-clandestine organizations played an important role in the opposition to the regime and in the transition to democracy after 1975.

3. Current Spanish labour relations (1975-1995)

Following Franco's death, a new and complex pattern of labour relations and trade union organization emerged during and after the transition to democracy.⁵ The union movement was striving for civil, political and social rights, for economic compensation for their sacrifices under the foregoing regime

⁴ As a consequence the characteristics of the state corporatist structure under Franco differ from the structure under Primo de Rivera's dictatorship (see Amsden, 1972; Linz, 1981).

⁵ For recent interpretations see, among others, Martínez Lucio (1992), Pérez Díaz (1993), Prieto (1993a; 1993b), Rigby and Lawler (1994), Loos (1995), Kohler (1995), Miguélez (1995), Milner and Nombela (1995), Schmitter (1995), Führer (1996), Jordana (1996) and Van der Meer (1996).

and for building up their organizations (see Fishman, 1990). Apart from the CC.OO and USO, also the leaders of UGT and CNT returned from exile, and new organizations emerged. In response to the growing trade union activity and the insecure political climate also the national employer association CEOE (*Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales*) became established in 1977 after a merger of four preexisting associations.⁶ After the integration of the Confederation of Small and Medium Enterprises (*Confederación Española de Pequeña y Mediana Empresa-CEPYME*) in 1980, the CEOE claims to have a monopoly in the representation of trade and business, with 1.300.000 affiliated firms, about 90% of the total number of firms (data provided by CEOE in 1994).⁷

With the legalization of the labour movement and the consequent Workers' Statute (1980) and Organic Law on Trade Union Freedom (LOLS, 1985) it was established that membership strength is not the sole factor that determines legal representation rights. Instead, a criterion for "most representativeness" is set in the Organic Law on Trade Union Freedom (1985); the results of the work council elections determine the representation of unions in collective bargaining, both in and above the enterprise level, as well as the institutional participation of unions in tripartite organs such as both the National Institutes for Social Security and for Employment, and the recently installed Social Economic Council (enacted in 1991, operating since 1992). In the daily practice of Spanish labour relations the complex panorama of trade unionism is simplified into a two-union model because only UGT and Comisiones Obreras are getting enough votes to meet the 10% national threshold in the works council elections.⁸ The 15%-threshold for representativeness at the level of the autonomous communities is surpassed only by ELA.STV and LAB in the Basque country, ELA.STV in Navarra, and CIG in Galicia (data for 1994, see *infra*).

Following the association right and legal recognition of unions in April 1977, the largest trade union organizations (CC.OO, UGT) and the employers' association (CEOE) have gradually improved their positions (cf. Miguélez 1991; Palacio Morena, 1993). A turning point are the political "Moncloa Pacts" (October 1977) signed by all parliamentary parties which outlined a broad program for the new labour regulation and incomes policies to control inflation by wage moderation. After the break over the -centralized - wage policy negotiations for 1979, UGT and CEOE signed a first procedural agreement, the National Multi-Industry Basic Agreement (ABI-1979), in order to throw off the yoke of government regulation and to negotiate wage increases by themselves. This agreement has been followed by many others.⁹

Social concertation has been important in Spanish labour relations; representative organizations of employers and employees not only agreed on income policies but they also learned to cooperate and remodel labour relations. In addition to central concertation, "negotiated legislation" occurred too. The 1980 Workers' Statute and the 1985 Organic Law on Trade Union Freedom are such

⁶ The founding "Confederación Empresarial Española", the "Agrupación Empresarial Independiente" and the "Confederación General Española de Empresarios" were all nation-wide employers' associations, the influential "Fomento de Trabajo Nacional" was mainly active in Catalonia.

⁷ However, own research in the construction industry shows that probably 80% of the population working in 26% of about 100,000 firms were covered. Consequently, the CEOE-claim must be overstated, especially since construction and banking are the main pillars of CEOE, as Martínez (1993) has illustrated.

⁸ This holds for works council elections in 1978, 1980, 1982, 1986, 1990 and 1994. The elections are organized every four years by the unions themselves. In 1980 an additional election was kept.

⁹ The most important agreements were, the Interconfederal Basic Agreement (ABI, 1979); the Interconfederal Framework Agreement (AMI, applied in 1980 and 1981); the National Employment Agreements (ANE, applied in 1982); the Interconfederal Agreement (AI, applied in 1983), and the Economic and Social Agreement (applied in 1985 and 1986). These agreements have been signed in different bi-partite and tri-partite settings (CEOE and UGT signed all accords, USO signed only AMI-I+II, CC.OO signed only ANE and AI, the government the ANE and AES-I; for full texts see De la Villa (1985)).

compromises on the employee participation, work contract law and collective bargaining. The institutional legacy of previous state regulation still has an impact on today's labour relations. The 1980 Workers' Statute stipulated a dual structure of employee representation, which allows for both trade unions sections (following the UGT's position, which wanted to restore the ground lost due to its position in exile in the dictatorship) and for personnel delegates and works councils representing the whole enterprise (following the CC.OO's position which preferred the mobilization in the old "jurados" and "asamblea" of the vertical syndicates during the dictatorship).¹⁰ The works council selects its own president and consists of different colleges for (un)skilled, technical and staff personnel, it has the statutory task of monitoring the implementation of labour legislation and collective agreements in exchange for collaboration with management to attain productivity growth. The employer must keep the works council informed about employment, production and turn-over figures. Furthermore, the works council has a right of information on employment contracts and health and safety matters, and has a restricted right to advise on personnel policy and working hours. The trade union section within the enterprise may hold meetings, collect membership fees and distribute information. Both trade union sections and works councils have rights to negotiate collective agreements at firm level and to call out strikes. 90% of works councillors are estimated to be trade union members, of which 80% are affiliated to UGT and CC.OO (Miguélez, 1995). This percentage, however, should be lower for personnel delegates, since survey research among UGT-representatives shows that in 1989 23.8% of the UGT-delegates were not even affiliated to the trade union (Bouza et al., 1990:18).

Also in respect to labour law, CEOE, UGT and CC.OO have influenced the political process. Initially the Franco-type of job control and dismissal protection rules were kept intact in the 1976 Labour Relations Act. In the Labour Relations Decree (1977) and the Workers' Statute (1980), dismissal was allowed in exchange for indemnization pay in case of objective circumstances such as individual malfunctioning and economic or technological reasons (see Lessenich 1995). The restrictions on labour market exit were accompanied by a variety of employment contracts for entry into the labour market. Especially in the 1984 revision of the Workers' Statute various new flexible contracts were allowed, which has started a process of "normalization" of temporal employment (Valdés Dal-Ré, 1985).¹¹

The labour market problems especially hit men with lower qualification levels and the new entrants in the labour market such as younger people and women. In recent years, new initiatives have been taken to improve the labour market situation by flexibilization, in spite of considerable trade union protests. Although there have been attempts to restart social concertation from 1990 to 1993 in order to improve the competitiveness of the Spanish economy, mainly the labour legislation was reformed. In December 1993 a decree-law was enacted to promote apprenticeships, to remove legal impediments to part-time employment and to permit private job-placements offices. Moreover in May 1994 an amendment to the Workers' Statute was amended to allow for further liberalization of lay-offs (also causes related to organization and production are now brought into consideration) and to improve functional and geographical mobility of employees.

Finally, the process of wage-setting is an example of the historical impact on current labour regulation. Since the introduction of collective bargaining in 1958, its coverage has gradually widened to 7.9 million workers in 1992 (1959: 0.4 million; 1977: 2.9 million). Uncoordinated, decentralized collective bargaining is currently the most important mechanism for wage setting,

¹⁰ Personnel delegates are appointed in firms with 6-49 employees, works councils exist in firms with 50 employees and more. The number of delegates and works council representatives varies according to employment; there are up to three delegates in firms with less than 50 employees, and three to seventy five representatives in firms with works councils.

¹¹ In 1994 no less than 33% of all employment contracts were of temporary nature in contrast to 18% in 1987. Moreover, there were 3,738,100 unemployed (24.2% of the active labour force) according to the EPA-labour force survey; and the rate of long-term unemployment (more than 1 year) was over 56% (BEL, 1995).

especially since the absence of central agreements after 1986. Its extent has been widened and currently covers 64% of the occupied labour force, and 87% of the dependent labour force (1992).¹² In Spain, company-bargaining is relatively unimportant since it covers only 1.2 million employees (15%), notwithstanding those in the major state-owned (or now partly privatized) enterprises such as Iberia, Renfe, Seat and Telefónica and in most multi-nationals. About 6.7 million employees (85%) are covered by a collective agreement signed above the company level, mostly at the provincial level, and there is no indication of a further decentralization (data for 1992). At firm level, works councillors are supported by the union sections of UGT and CC.OO in their negotiations with management. At sectoral level the "most representative" organizations of capital and labour negotiate collective agreements, although limited merely to wages and working hours (including holidays). An agreement between CEOE, UGT and CC.OO in October 1994, initiated the substitution of the Franco-legacy of labour ordinances, though whether this may lead to an enrichment in scope of collective agreements has to be seen in the coming years.¹³ In January 1996, a bi-partite accord on compulsory mediation in case of industrial disputes and conflicts was reached by UGT, CC.OO, CEOE and CEPYME. On July 18th this agreement was signed also by the government (El País, 19 July 1996).¹⁴

Since the mid 1970s a new trade union panorama has thus emerged, dominated by UGT and Comisiones Obreras which have contributed to a substantial reorganization of Spanish labour relations. They have also strongly supported democracy, especially during the transition and after the 1981 attempted coup d'etat. They have reinforced a new set of rules, the moderation of inflation rates and the regulation of labour conflicts. In the period of social concertation (1978-1986), UGT and to a lesser extent Comisiones Obreras were moreover able to strengthen their own positions by regularly signing social agreements, by participating in national institutions, and by moderately improving the still modest scope and coverage of collective bargaining. After the socialist party's entry in government (1982) with the public support of UGT, the main representative union organizations have increasingly voiced opposition to the -in their view- too liberal economic policies of restructuring and flexibilization, which are unable to reduce the high and persistent unemployment.¹⁵ Today the main

¹² Data should be analyzed with care due to the extended informal markets, which might cover 15-20% of all economic activity (The Economist, Survey of Spain, 1992; CC.OO de Madrid, Economía Sumergida, 1994).

¹³ After the labour reforms of 1994, a lively debate on the structure of collective bargaining has emerged in Spain. Both labour lawyers and social-economic specialist are taking part in this polygonal polemic. For critical overviews and references to the juridical perspective see for example "Relaciones Laborales", 1995, nr.5. For an economic critique it is insightful to read Circulo de Empresarios, "Económica y las reformas estructurales de la economía española" (1994), and the 1994 annual review of Economistas (nr.64).

¹⁴ Strike activity in Spain is relatively high in comparison with other Western-European countries, although the most recent figures point at a lowering of strike activity in Spain (EIRR, nr. 273, p.9). Statistics indicate that the number of lost working hours varies in time. In the last years of the dictatorship, about 10-11 million were lost annually (1973-75). In the period of transition (1976-78) this was ten times higher, and varied between 110 million in 1976, 92 million in 1977, 124 million in 1978 to the highest rate 171 million in 1979. In the period of social concertation (1978-86) this number declined to 109 million in 1980, 75 million in 1981, 58 million in 1982, 78 million in 1983, 122 million in 1984, 64 million in 1985, 51 million in 1986 and rose again afterwards to 82 million in 1987, and 117 million in 1988 (source: Alonso in Miguélez and Prieto, 1991: 425). Using the number of working days lost, the development after 1986 clearly indicates the general strikes of 1988, 1992 and 1994: 2.3 million (1986), 5.0 million (1987), 11.6 million (1988), 3.7 million (1989), 2.4 million (1990), 4.4 million (1991), 6.2 million (1992), 2.0 million (1993), 6.3 million (1994) (Source: MTSS, Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales, May 1995).

¹⁵ In the literature, several authors have evaluated the fourteen years of socialist rule under González (1982-1996) from a historical and comparative perspective (see Maravall 1995; Boix 1995; Gunther 1996). The former PSOE-minister of education and professor in political science, José Maria Maravall, accounts that the impact of the socialist government contained a combination of an economic, industrial and tax reform, in function of reaching a stable macro-economic framework which allowed for an expansion of social policies, especially in the fields of the national health

unions are in a rather difficult position in spite of electoral support in trade union elections and massive -one day- general strikes against the socialist government in recent years (1988, 1992, 1994). Union density rates seemed only to grow very moderately due to the lack of organizational and financial resources, and thus have a poor implantation at the workfloor level, especially in the small and medium sized enterprises. Moreover the massive and persistent unemployment, the flexibilization of labour relations, the ongoing restructuration processes, the 'casualization' of a substantial part of the labour force and the severe public austerity measures given by the targets in the Treaty of Maastricht (1991), hindered the further advancement of social provisions¹⁶

II. Union Development and Union Movements

In Spain, anarchist worker organizations were active since Bakunin's ideas arrived on the Iberian peninsula in 1869, though different organizing principles were competing.¹⁷ The anti-clerical and anti-political Spanish Regional Workers' Federation (*Federación Obrera Regional Española*- FRE, 1870) of the First International was anchored in the trade union movement and was organized "bottom up" from craft unions (oficios). In 1874 the FRE was declared illegal. In 1881 the Federation of Workers of the Spanish Region (*Federación de Trabajadores de la Región Española*- FTRE) was set up, which after a short and fast growth dissolved in 1888. Afterwards anarchists started to organize small, loosely connected anarchist cells (grupos de afinidad). In the end of the nineteenth century, the anarchist movement was basically split between anarchist-collectivist orientations among urban workers in Barcelona and anarchist-communist orientations in the rural Andalucía (Juliá, 1983).

In the beginning of the century new efforts were made to establish a national network of anarchist labour organizations. In 1900 the "Federación de Sociedades Obreros de la Región Española" was created, followed by the Catalan Workers' Solidarity (Solidaridad Obrera) in 1907. After the violent suppression of the civil protest against the Moroccan war in 1909, resulting in the Tragic Week in Barcelona, the most important anarchist union, the National Confederation of Labour (*Confederación Nacional del Trabajo*-CNT), was established in 1910. This anarcho-syndicalist

service, pensions, and education. In addition, Boix (1995) has suggested that both the nature of the Spanish union movement, which he supposes to aim at wage growth, and the policy choice of the socialist government itself, which was restricted to the achievements of international macro-economic standards, gave González no choice than stipulating at balanced budgets and control of inflation. This position consequently placed the unions for the continuous dilemma whether wage claims in the collective bargaining should be moderate (in function of investment, employment and control of inflation) or should correspond to productivity growth to stimulate consumption by increasing purchasing power (for the union perspective confirming this dilemma, see for example Gutiérrez, 1993; Redondo, 1994; EIRR, nr.264, p.12).

¹⁶ It has to be seen whether the entrance of the conservative Partido Popular-government under Mr. Aznar in May 1996, will change this panorama. In its campaign the new prime-minister stated to initiate a "centrist and reformist" policy including the search for consensus and cooperation with the organizations of employers and employees. Several consultative bargaining platforms on a tri-partite basis have been established for dialogue between the government and the social partners on such issues as health and safety, conflict mediation, vocational training, rural and public sector employment, public holidays and pensions (El País, 30 May 1996, p.54). On October 9th. 1996, an agreement has been reached between the new government and the two representative trade unions on the future of the pension schemes. However, since the new cabinet has committed itself to join the European Monetary Union, a strong austerity and privitisation program has been initiated. On July 10th. 1996, UGT and CC.OO organised a first manifestation against the privitisation plans, which will be followed up by several joint public sector strikes in Fall 1996. The main question regarding union-government relations for the near future however will be whether or not a new labour reform will be initiated to make dismissal protection cheaper.

¹⁷ See Juliá (1983), Heywood (1989), Martin (1990), Esenwein (1992), Smith (1995).

movement attracted a large membership after the outbreak of the First World War. After 1918 until the end of the civil war in 1939, CNT consisted of so-called "sindicatos únicos", which grouped workers per industry into the larger movement. In 1927 the ultra-revolutionary Iberian Anarchist Federation (*Federación Anarquista Ibérica-FAI*) was formed in reaction to the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. FAI became influential especially after 1930. During the short Second Republic the anarcho-syndicalist movement increased its membership. In the subsequent civil war CNT and FAI, notwithstanding continuing differences, abandoned their anti-political attitude. Their loose organizations became dominant political powers, which attempted to establish workers' collectives and workers' control. In 1938, the anarcho-syndicalists supported the Republican government. The counterpart movement to the anarchists were the socialists. The first marxist-oriented organization was the *Nueva Federación Madrileña* (New Federation of Madrid, 1872), which survived only few years. In 1879 the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*), which recently constituted the Spanish government (1982-1996), was founded. After the reestablishment of freedom of association in 1887, PSOE formed the General Union of Workers, (*Unión General de Trabajadores- UGT*, 1888), from which it was formally independent. Like the PSOE, UGT mostly followed a solitary path and remained an urban based trade union until 1900. UGT was formed in Barcelona where it failed to attract major support, and in 1899 it moved to Madrid. As follows from Heywoods (1989) account, socialism in Spain was weak until the 1930s and especially within this movement reformist practice was dominant over revolutionary rhetorics. Its ideology was broader than just socialist defined and the union contained a moderate attitude with regard to union struggle. Its centralized structure was mainly oriented to the organization and defence of skilled artisans and craft workers in the building and printing trades in Madrid, iron and metal workers in the Basque region, and (after 1910) the coal miners in Asturias (Heywood, 1989). Apart from the two main political movements, some minor trade unions enjoyed periods of growth and importance. Although Catholic initiatives have always played a mayor role in Spanish society, a comprehensive Catholic union movement did not come off the ground.¹⁸ In the 1870s and 1880s, the social Catholic movement set up different mutual aid societies, religious and educational forums. After the encyclica *Rerum Novarum* (1891) catholic unions were also formed, especially in the conservative Castile, Valencia, Aragon, Asturian and Basque regions. In 1912, a first strike was called by catholic workers and in 1916 and in 1919 "free" catholic unions were established. In Barcelona, the free unions became a major union federation in the early 1920s. Apart, only in the periods 1919-1931 and 1935-1936 did catholic unionism achieve some organizational power, membership was found mainly in agriculture and among small proprietors. The catholics had been unable to build a position comparable to similar movements in other European countries, probably because of the Catholic Church's conservative role in Spanish society, the absence of a supportive Christian democratic party, and the ideological conflicts between leftist revolutionary unions and the yellow contra-revolutionary unions in their mutual strife for workers' support. Apart from the catholic unions there have been also other -sometimes regionally operating- trade unions. The reformist-minded and important "Tres Clases de Vapor"-textile union, established in Barcelona as early as 1840, remained non-political. Some unions, working under the leadership of the PCE, the Spanish communist party (1920), emerged after the end of the Rivera dictatorship. A

¹⁸ See Castillo (1977), Payne (1984), Martin (1990).

communist *Confederación General del Trabajo Unitaria* (CGTU) was founded in 1932. The division of Spanish society in different communities with own cultural traditions and languages (Castilian, Catalanian, Basque, Gallician) finds expression in the foundation of regional organizations. Most notably is the still existent *Euzko Langillen Alkartasuna - Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos* (ELA.STV), founded in the Basque country in 1911 on christian principles. The contemporary features of Spanish unionism emerged during the transition from the dictatorship to democracy (1975-1978). Three groups of union organizations appeared as influential forces. First, CC.OO and USO, which grew during the late Franco-period, claimed the right to represent all workers. Secondly, unionists of the old workers organizations UGT and CNT, which were active before the Franco dictatorship, returned from exile. Finally new national organizations and mostly independent sectoral and regional trade unions, which sometimes replaced the predecessors, came into existence. Examples are the *Confederación de Sindicatos Unitarios de Trabajadores* (CSUT) and *Sindicato Unitario* (SU), both splinter groupings that broke away from the Comisiones Obreras movement in 1976. Both were strong at the end of the 1970s but have lost support since then. Apart from these also independent sectoral organizations emerged, for instance, in the medical sector, in air, railway and urban transport, but also occupational unions in technical professions and in the public sector. The most important regional unions (in Spain called "nationalist" unions) are located in the Basque country, in Galicia and, to a far lesser extent, in Catalonia and Andalusia. Yet, also the main unions are organized by regions.

In the period of massive mobilization and strike activity immediately after the death of Franco, the Comisiones Obreras were the most important trade union organization, with a strong base in the large enterprises. However, their aspiration to monopolize the representation of workers was frustrated by other political movements and union organizations. In June 1976, CC.OO joined forces with USO and UGT in the then settled Coordination of Trade Union Organizations (*Coordinadores de Organizaciones Sindicales-COS*), which served as a platform for trade union cooperation in the formulation of political, economic and juridical demands for the new Spanish industrial order. However, this platform collapsed after the legalization of the unions in April 1977.

In the period 1978-1986, the main union confederations UGT and CC.OO (and at the end of the 1970s also USO) participated in centralised consultation with CEOE and the government. However, their commitment to joint action has always been ambiguous, given their need to build up their own organization and to become recognized in the new labour relations. On the one hand, unions were looking for political and mutual cooperation in the defense of a perceived general national interest, and on the other, they were aware of their fragile position and competed for hegemony, especially in trade union elections (see Fishman 1990 for an analysis of the role of union leaders). The disappointment of the economic decline and rising unemployment in the period 1975-1985, especially during the socialist government, have led to a more outspoken political opposition by the two main union movements. In 1984 no national agreement could be attained, especially when the main unions didn't want to give a blank cheque for industrial reconversion. Comisiones Obreras organized in June 1985 a one day strike against the Socialist government's pension proposals.

With the economic recovery in the late 1980s also UGT abstained from central negotiations after the break-down in national consultation in 1986. Since then there has been no national wage agreement setting norms to pay rise and inflation. Both trade unions have instead concentrated their bargaining

on particular matters. They have succeeded in negotiating wage increase above the price index in 1987-1993, especially in sectoral agreements at provincial level where any bargaining coordination was lacking. Moreover, they have promoted collective bargaining in the public sector, although they had to accept a public sector wage freeze in 1993 and 1994 (and probably in 1997). They were furthermore granted union participation in monitoring employment contracts, they successfully pressed for coverage expansion of social security funds and the purchasing power of pensioners and they moderated the government proposals on statutory minimal service during strikes and on the flexibilization of dismissal regulations.

Until the late-1980s, UGT has always adopted a more consensual concertation approach in order to restore its previously lost position, while Comisiones Obreras adopted a more contentious class strategy. After the collapse of the social concertation and continuing government opposition which culminated in the massive general strike of 14 December 1988, both unions opted for more interunion cooperation laid down in joint action programmes. The unions opted for a "shift" in the field of social policy (*giro social*) with attention to social welfare spending and the reduction of temporary contracts. Examples of the "policy of united action" of the main confederations are the Proposal of Trade Union Priorities (*Propuesta Sindical Prioritaria*, PSP-1989) and the Trade Union Initiative on Progress (*Iniciativa Sindical de Progreso*, ISP-1991), which both intended to broaden the political and collective bargaining agendas. In 1993 the trade unions collaborated in an alternative employment programme, which was however overruled by the labour reform enacted by the PSOE-government in December 1993 and May 1994.¹⁹

Notwithstanding continuing competition in trade union elections in 1990, and to a lesser extent in 1994, the two union confederations currently support each other in consultation with government and employers' organizations and in general manifestations such as First of May celebrations, and the one day general strikes of May 1992 and January 1994. Voices have been raised to examine the possibility of a UGT-CC.OO union merger, but this is not high on the unions' agenda.²⁰ The hegemony of the bi-partisan union model which is based on results of the trade union elections, is not publicly challenged by others, apart from the independent civil service union in the government sector, CIG in Galicia, and the Basque nationalist unions ELA.STV and LAB which aim at a particular labour regulation for the Basque region. Radical leftist unions have almost disappeared from the Spanish trade union map (except for some major cities) and the rise of independent, professional associations is still moderate at the aggregate level. In bargaining tables at enterprise level different coalitions may exist between sections of the national class unions and specific professional worker groupings.

III. Trade Union Structure

The two main union confederations, UGT and Comisiones Obreras are formally politically independent unions. Historically, UGT entertained links to the socialist PSOE, and the CC.OO to the Communist Party and other leftist parties, which are since 1986 grouped under the "United Left".²¹

¹⁹ Comisiones Obreras and UGT: "Base para un acuerdo por el empleo" and "Alternativas de los sindicatos sobre la reforma laboral", Madrid, winter 1993-1994. See also note 15.

²⁰ In a survey conducted in Spring 1994 among 3,706 wage earners, retired and unemployed with work experience, 42.6% seemed to be in favour of this opportunity, 31.3% were against it, 8.2% had doubts, 15.9% had no opinion, 1.9% didn't answer (CIS, forthcoming).

²¹ The origin of the Workers' Commissions in the late 1950s and early 1960s was initiated by different groups, among

Both communist and socialist labour movements have always maintained interlocking directorates between party and union, although since the mid-1980s union-party relations cooled off in both camps.²² UGT opposed the PSOE-government most clearly in the general strikes of 1988, 1992 and 1994, but this was after the central agreements ruptured and the charismatic UGT-leader Nicolas Redondo left parliament in 1987. After a leadership succession struggle UGT rejuvenated its board with the election of Candido Méndez as union leader in April 1994. At its annual conference in November 1990 the Socialist Party decided to break up its formal links with UGT and UGT-membership was no longer required for PSOE-party members. CC.OO distanced itself from the Communist Party, especially since the historical leader Marcelino Camacho was replaced by the younger Antonio Gutiérrez in 1987. There are still various internal factions, though the leading position of Gutiérrez was re-established in the Confederal Congress of January 1996.

Both UGT and CC.OO are part of the international trade union movement; though they were initially split by ideology as well. UGT (in exile) was a founding member of the "International Confederation of Free Trade Unions" (ICFTU) in 1949 and a founding member of the "European Trade Union Confederation" (ETUC) in 1973. After UGT's-opposition ceased, Comisiones Obreras was also allowed into ETUC in 1990. The different ideological orientations of the two main unions are mirrored in their statutes and programmes. The statutes of UGT declare the principles of class struggle and emancipation of the working class. However, its congress resolutions express more moderate policy objectives, with a focus upon participation, cooperation and negotiations with employers and the government.²³ Comisiones Obreras also aims at the abolishment of capitalism, but, like UGT, its practical policies are directed towards bargained relations with employers and governments, albeit with differences in style and culture.²⁴

UGT and CC.OO are organized along regional and functional lines. The basic unit of the UGT is the union branch at plant level. The branches are grouped together in local unions, which cover workers of the same industry in a certain district. These local unions are combined in provincial and regional industry federations. Like the German DGB, all units come together in national industry federations. In recent years UGT-federations were engaged in a process of reorganization and merger, which ended in 1993. Currently there are twelve major sector federations, and nineteen regional organizations, which in contrast to the German DGB have strong voting rights. The largest sector federations are by rank: public administration; metal; transport and telecommunications; chemical industries and financial services. The largest regional membership support (in absolute terms) is found in Andalucia, Valencia, Catalonia, Madrid and Castile-Leon, in Asturias the highest relative

with both communist oriented and catholic workers (Ruiz, 1993). In the mid-1970s the diversity was strongly verbalized by the Partido de Trabajadores Españoles (PTE), with a Leninist orientation and supported by members of the "Confederación de Sindicatos Unitarios de Trabajadores", and the "Organización Revolucionaria de Trabajadores" (ORT), of Maoist nature and related to the Sindicato Unitario. Both CSUT and SU broke way from Comisiones Obreras at the First Assembly in Barcelona (July 1976), when CC.OO decided to change to a "new type of trade union". Since then Comisiones Obreras has undergone influence from different bloodstreams.

²² For details and implications for Comisiones Obreras see Martínez Lucio (1990), for UGT see Gillespie (1992).

²³ The XXXVI Congress Confederation of UGT declares to be an autonomous, independent democratic union confederation which aims at the advancement and defence of the class interest of its members (UGT, 1994).

²⁴ The 1992 statutes of the Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras declare to be a union confederation which is a unitary, democratic and independent, participative and massive, international, socio-political movement which defends the employments conditions of the total working class.

implantation is found.²⁵ In its last Confederal Congress in April 1994, the power division between regional and sector federations was one of the main topics, also underlying the dispute about the new General Secretary-candidates Mendéz and Lito. At this congress, the construction and metal unions succeeded in rebalancing the resource distribution from 50%-50% to 60%-40% in favour of industry federations over regional ones, after failure to do so in 1990.

The internal structure of Comisiones Obreras resembles the Italian model. Based on the district union, a peak organization is built along both sectoral and regional lines. In comparison with UGT, the organizational structure of Comisiones Obreras gives more weight to the representation of union-organizations units at decentralized level. Also the regional autonomy of the federations is more important than in the case of UGT (a striking example is the Catalan *Comisiones Obreras Nacional de Cataluña* (CONC) (see Ceres, 1993). These characteristics may be explained by the historical development of the Comisiones Obreras movement which was active at the level of the shopfloor in certain industrial districts. As a consequence CC.OO has started the process of organization building and expansion belated. In the fifth Confederal Congress of 1991 there were still 21 sectoral federations, and 18 regional federations. In 1993 some mergers have been realised: the metal and mining unions joined forces, the chemical unions united with textiles and leather unions, and the entertainment union merged with paper and graphic industries. The number of federations was thus reduced to eighteen (including the federations for unemployed and pensioners). The largest sectoral membership support is found in metal and mining industries, transport, public administration, chemical-textile-leather, and construction. The largest regional membership support in absolute terms is found in Catalonia, Andalucia, Madrid, Valencia and Basque Country, yet in relative terms Asturias stand out with the highest regional union density rate.²⁶

The financial capacity of the main trade union confederations is rather limited, because membership dues income is low (about 1,000 pesetas per member and per month; which corresponds to about 6 ECU or 8 \$), and reduced fees exist for pensioners and the unemployed. On the other hand, trade unions receive certain state support given their "most representative" status and statutory political role, the compensation they received for their confiscated properties and the mandatory membership dues during the Franco-period (the so-called "patrimonio sindical", which favoured UGT in particular), and subsidies for unions involved in training programmes for the unemployed.²⁷ Elected works councillors have the right to paid working time which provides considerable support (Prieto, 1993: 381).²⁸

²⁵ The regional organizations include all seventeen autonomous communities, as well as Ceuta and Melilla. In the next paragraph a picture with geographical spread is provided.

²⁶ The regional federations relate to all Autonomous Communities excluding Navarra, which is included in Basque country, and to the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla in Northern Africa.

²⁷ It is interesting to indicate that the total income flow of UGT rises from 350 million pesetas in 1978-1979 to 2,430 million pesetas in 1983-1985. Besides, the relative importance of union dues declines from 82% in the first period, to 20% in the second. The main income sources in the 1983-1985 period are state subsidies (50%) and technical services (21%) (Source: Pardo and Fernández, 1994: 469).

²⁸ Prieto (1993: 380) states that according to union representativeness, UGT received 562 millions, CC.OO 496 millions, nationalist unions 64 millions and other unions 155 millions (data government budget 1992, in pesetas). The amount of time is up to an equivalent of 8,245 annual working years for UGT, and 7,389 annual working years for CC.OO (1990). The data are calculated by the amount of elected delegates of the main unions multiplied by the legally available time. In a survey conducted by Bouza (1989) it was however remarked that in practice 38.7% of the delegates

In 1994, UGT employed--after a reduction of its staff--only 1,171 people: 176 union leaders, 144 higher advisory staff, 64 lower advisory staff, 95 secretaries, 622 administratives, and 70 technical personnel, divided over its confederation (160), sectorial organizations (257), the provinces (647), and local union branches (107) (UGT, 1994b: 124). Membership dues are divided over the confederation (10%), the sectoral federations (55%) and the territorial organizations (35%). Some professionalization of dues-collection has been achieved. In 1993 61% of dues were paid by bank account, 39% were paid by check-off agreement (UGT, 1994b), whereas in 1989 only 18.7% were paid by bank account, 26.7% were deducted from salary, and 54.5% were individually collected (Taboadela, 1992).

Comisiones Obreras does not publish information on its staff, though in an interview it was stated that CC.OO employs from its income 2,029 persons and mostly full-time (data for April 1994). These are trade union leaders: 488; lawyers and economists: 271; lower staff advisers: 169; administratives: 952; services: 149. The division of membership dues since the fifth confederal congress in 1991 is 10% for the confederation, 15% for the sector federations, and 75% for the Autonomous Communities, of which 45% is spent on the sector organizations and 30% for the territorial ones. Currently the union confederation is engaged in a process of centralization and computerization of its dues-collection. In May 1995, 213.000 members paid directly their dues to the confederation in Madrid (55% by bank account and 45% by check-off), whereas the other two-third still paid their dues to the local union.²⁹

Apart from the main union confederations there are several class, professional, regional, local and enterprise unions. In the 1990 trade union elections, 216 different national, regional and local unions received enough votes to represent one or more candidates in the enterprise (MTSS, 1992). At the regional level, ELA.STV has always had a dominant and representative position over the *Comisiones Obreras Patrióticas* (LAB) in the Basque country (cf. Kaiero, 1991; Kohler, 1995). In 1994, ELA.STV has gained the most representative status in Navarra, and LAB in the Basque region. In Galicia, the 1980 founded *Intersindical Nacionalista de Trabajadores Gallegos* (INTG) and its 1986 breakaway *Confederación General de Trabajadores Gallegos* (CXTG) merged in 1990 to form the nationalist leftist union coalition *Convergencia Intersindical Gallega* (CIG), now known as "Confederación Intersindical Gallega", which contains representative status. In Catalonia, several independent union organization have been established throughout the 1980s such as the *Solidaridad de Obreros Catalanes* (SOC) and the *Confederación Sindical de Cataluña* (CSC), but these have not achieved representative status. Neither did the agricultural organization *Sindicato de Obreros del Campo* (SOC) in Andalucía, notwithstanding a relatively strong position in the early 1980s (cf. Miguélez Lucio, 1992; Kohler, 1995).

did not use the available time credit and 23.5% did not know how much time was legally guaranteed (Bouzo, 1989: 33).

²⁹ According to the financial secretariat of the CC.OO confederation, in 1995 at local level still 10-20 percent is individually paid to the local union officer, and it may be that these amounts are even higher in daily practice due to the need for local unions to have enough resources to pay costs (as a consequence membership rates are underestimated). The dues-division of, for example, the CC.OO metal-mining union in Murcia is the following: 10% to the confederation, 15% to the metal-mining federation in Madrid, 15% to general CC.OO-union at Murcian autonomous community, another 15% to general CC.OO-union Murcian-community, 20% goes to the metal-mining federation in the autonomous community of Murcia, and 25% to metal-mining union in local Murcia.

IV. Union Membership and Density

1. *The formative period until 1936*

Despite many brief periods of intense mobilization of worker protest, the Spanish labour movement remained fragmented and weak during its formative period. Membership was low and continuous organization extremely difficult in an environment where industrialization lagged behind and illiteracy was widespread. There are only some crude, probably inflated, estimates of union strength during the formative period of the Spanish union movement. The anarchist *Federación Obrera Regional Española*, (FRE) founded in 1870 counted about 30,000 members in 1872, organized in 149 local sections and 361 unions. After the Spanish section of the International was prohibited between 1874 and 1881, its successor, the *Federación de Trabajadores de la Región Española* (FTRE) counted at its 1882 congress in Seville 57,934 members, divided over 633 sections and 218 localities (Bernecker, 1983). The evolution of the membership of the anarchist movement is difficult to estimate due to the sequence of tides of public collective action, followed by ebbs of persecution and clandestinity. Nevertheless, Führer (1996: 54) gives 50,000 members for anarchist groupings in 1900. After CNT's establishment there were 123 sections with 23,758 members in 1911, of which 59% were Catalan and 24% were Andalusian. CNT Membership dropped in 1915 to about 15,000, but rose again to 73,860 in 1918 (Martin, 1990). In 1919, there were maximally 714,028 workers represented, although the national committee calculated only about 550,000. Here, the dominance of the Catalans seemed to have increased to 420,000 (60%) in comparison with the Levante/ Valencia 132,000 (18%) and Andalusia 93,000 (13%), with some outposts in Asturias and Galicia (Tuñón de Lara, 1985b:132).

For UGT more complete time-series figures are available for the early years. At its onset, UGT's membership rose only gradually and with fluctuations (see table 5 for complete figures). In 1888, there were 4,994 members in 47 sections, which increased to 26,088 members in 126 sections in 1900, and to 40,981 members in 305 sections in 1910. In 1910, 65% of UGT membership was located in Madrid, where in 1899 the head quarter was established. In the following years membership continued to rise to 121,553 in 384 sections in 1915. Membership declined to 89,601 in 457 sections (1918), but rose again to 211,342 members in 1,087 sections in 1920 and slightly declined to 208,170 members in 1,198 sections in 1922 (Tuñón de Lara, 1985b: 205). The division of membership per sector of economic activity shows an important change in distribution of membership over the years: In May 1918 mining was the most important sector for recruitment (23,358 members or 40%), followed by agriculture (9,049-11%), metallurgy (8,032 or 9%), alimentation (7,141- or 8%) and transport (7,031 or 8%). In May 1920 UGT's composition was completely changed, then agriculture was the most important sector (61,327 or 29%), followed by mining (53,846 or 25%), construction (16,666 or 8%), metallurgy (16,548 or 8%) and transport (11,647 or 6%) (Tuñón de Lara, 1985b: 147).

During the Primo de Rivera-dictatorship UGT grew, while CNT was forced underground. After the proclamation of the Second Republic (1931-36), UGT and CNT underwent a large expansion. In December 1930, UGT organized 287,333 affiliates in 1,881 sections, one year later there were already 958,451 members in 4,401 sections, and 1,054,599 members in 5,107 sections in June 1932

(Tuñón de Lara, 1985b: 307).³⁰ Moreover, UGT mostly expanded due to the affiliated National Federation of Agrarian Workers (FNNT), which grew from 50,332 (1928) to 400,677 members in 1932, and was then responsible for 42% of UGT-membership (Soto Carmona, 1989: 306). The sectoral picture showed that in 1932 agriculture was the largest membership sector (445,414 or 42%), followed by construction (83,861 or 8%), railways (49,117 or 5%), mining (40,635 or 4%), urban transport (34,435- or 3%) and metallurgy (33,287 or 3%) (Tuñón de Lara (1985b: 310). Also notable is the regional membership distribution because UGT was dominant in Castile, and strong in the Basque country, Asturias, Extremadura, and Andalusia but was almost absent in Catalonia.³¹ Under the extreme conditions of the civil war, UGT probably doubled to 1,904,569 members (1938), one third in agriculture, followed by transport, textiles, construction and metallurgy (Guinea, 1978: 95). Maravall (1978) reports, however, only 1,444,474 members for 1938 (cited in Prieto, 1993b: 364).

CNT claimed to have 535,565 members organized in 511 sections in its June 1931 Congress in Madrid, a number which is believed to have risen to between 800,000 members (Redero San Roman, 1992) and 1,200,000 members in 1932, while in 1934 the membership must have been about 800,000 (Tuñón de Lara, 1985: 324). The regional implantation is mainly in Catalonia (apart from its country-side), Andalusia (the whole area), the cities Gijon and La Felguera in Asturias, Zaragoza, a part of la Rioja and there were different spots of activity in Vizcaya, the Basque country, Santander, Sevilla and in the construction sector of Madrid (ibid).³² In the 1936 Congress 519,229 adherents were represented, mostly in Catalonia, and the agricultural zone of Andalusia-Extremadura, followed by the Levant (Tuñón de Lara, 1985b: 325). According to Maravall, CNT counted 1,577,547 members in the civil war (cited in Prieto, 1993b: 364).

The communist CGTU represented about 64,000 members at the moment it joined UGT in 1935 (Martin, 1990: 364). The catholic "Confederación Española de Sindicatos Obreros" organized about 60,000 in 1932 (Guinea, 1978: 72) and 276,389 members in 1935 (Soto Carmona, 1989: 313). ELA.STV in the Basque country declared to represent 10,832 in 1928 (Guinea, 1978: 43) and 64,800 members in 1935 (Taboadela, 1992: 294).

In conclusion, we may calculate the density rates for the pre-1936 period, keeping in mind the poor quality of data (incomplete data, without proof of actual dues payment, and only scarce information on regional differences, not taking into account other unions). Thus we can only estimate density by dividing UGT and CNT membership figures by available labour force data (Mitchell, 1990), though we lack consistent and complete data distinguishing between self-employed and wage-earners. Union

³⁰ The data are taken from Tuñón de Lara (1985), however Redero San Roman (1992) gives different figures: 654,403 members for December 1931, 778,599 in March 1932 and also 1,041,539 for June 1932.

³¹ This might be illustrated by the division of socialist votes in the 1933 elections: Madrid (142,000); Badajoz (137,000); Jaen (112,000); Granada (92,700); Asturias (83,000); Caceres (62,000); Cordova (61,000); and Guipuzcoa (60,000), as a consequence no Catalan city was mentioned (Tuñón de Lara, 1985b: 309).

³² The regional spread of anarchist membership is difficult to estimate, but abstention from the 1931 elections gives at least some indication: the city of Barcelona (62%), Cadiz (60%), Sevilla (58%), the province of Granada (53%), and the city of Malaga (47%). In 1933 a similar panorama follows after CNT started a campaign for abstention in the elections, although abstention is by and large lower than in 1931 (Tuñón de Lara, 1985: 324).

density for UGT and CNT only was at 1.0% in 1900, 1.3% for 1911, 8.6% for 1920, 11.9% for 1930 (including agricultural workers).³³

The current situation

Until very recently Spanish trade unions have not published reliable membership figures. Neither the division between employed, unemployed and retired workers, nor the breakdown by sub-sector or gender was published.³⁴ Apart from the lack of data, union density developments are also difficult to analyze because during the transition to democracy union membership became an important source of propaganda and interest politics. The unions saw the need to recover from the previous underground position, to return from exile, and to establish and institutionalise their position in the new Spanish labour relations arena. Monthly dues stamps on membership cards were not regularly paid and union membership as reported by locals were often overstated. Therefore it is extremely difficult to estimate the exact development or composition of union membership in the late 1970s. After the restoration of trade union freedom, several surveys on union membership have been initiated in the period from 1977 until today (see table 7). However, the present surveys on are mostly too small and lack conceptual homogeneity which makes comparisons extremely difficult (Jordana 1995a; Führer 1996).

The estimates of membership figures for the mid-1970s suggest soaring membership levels. Although no exact membership data nor precise sectoral breakdown are known, estimates indicate that, if we concentrate on trade union "supporters" (here broadly defined as "members and active sympathizers"), Comisiones Obreras was by far the largest union at that time. Soto Carmona (1993) has recently provided an overview of the rise of CC.OO "membership" or "supporters". The figure shows that Comisiones Obreras underwent a large expansion from about 30,000 "supporters" in December 1976 to 1,840,907 "supporters" in its first Congress in 1978, mostly in metal, construction, transport, textiles and agriculture.³⁵ The highest growth rates are found especially in the period between April and October 1977, when free trade union organization was allowed, the mandatory membership in the corporatist structure was ended and the first parliamentary elections were held. The growth rates declined after October when the political Moncloa Pacts left no doubt

³³ If we take into account only UGT and CNT, without mentioning other organizations, we arrive at the following picture. We may take the 26,000 figure of September 1900 for UGT and 50,000 for anarchist groups than union density is 1.0% (given the active labour force of 7,541 thousand; source Mitchell, 1990: 153). For 1911 we have more reliable figures if we join UGT and CNT; together they organize 100,000 members, which gives 1.3% trade union density (active labour force 7,497 thousand; census data 1910). In 1920 we have 700,000 members of CNT and UGT, resulting in 8.6% union density (active labour force 8,093 thousand; 1920). These data will of course be slightly higher if we should also take regional and catholic organizations into account. For the early 1930s we find 1,100,000 members for UGT and CNT, which related to an active labour force of 9,220 thousand, results in 11.9% union density (Mitchell does only provide active labour force for 1940, density would however be 13.6% using the 1920 figure). During the extreme conditions of the Civil War union density of course fluctuate and doubled at some moments.

³⁴ The existence of particular federations for the unemployed or retired persons do not exclude that also regional or industry federation have unemployed or retired people among their dues paying rank and file.

³⁵ The division among the ten main federations was: 1). metal (451,627-24.8%); 2). construction (312,240-17.1%); 3). transport (121,927-6.7%); 4). textiles (118,581: 6.5%); 5). agriculture (108,232-5.9%); 6). chemical (106,486: 5.8%); 7). diverse industries (68,287-3.8%); 8). wood (67,224-3.7%); 9). trade (59,684-3.3%), 10). paper-graphics (54,166-3.0%). The regional division was Catalonia (493,408-27.1%); Madrid (350,950-19.2%), Andalusia (237,066-13.1%); Valencia (209,400-11.5%); Basque Country (102,710-5.6%).

about the severeness of the economic situation. The membership peak was probably reached at the first congress in June 1978. At its second, 1980 congress CC.OO organized 702,277 "supporters". UGT's development is similar, but with a slower start and, according to some figures, a higher peak in the late 1970s. After returning from exile UGT organized in between 6,000 and 10,000 "supporters" at its 30th-congress in April 1976 (Alonso Soto, 1982). Then a quick rise to 982,000 "supporters" at its extraordinary congress in July 1977, when it became larger than CC.OO (Jordana, 1995a). Consequently UGT increases its membership to 1,459,473 in January 1978. At UGT's 31st-congress in May 1978 it organized some 2,020,000 "supporters" (Guinea, 1978; Taboadela, 1992).³⁶ After this peak, UGT declines to 1,375,000 "supporters" at its extraordinary congress of October 1979.

The rising membership figures in the 1976-78 period and its turn around afterwards is supported by survey research. In a 1978 survey conducted by Pérez Díaz (1979), 57.4% of industrial workers of six industrial sectors were "affiliated" to a union, and 20.6% showed "sympathy" to one or another union. However, replicate surveys showed that union "affiliation" already declined to 33.8% of industrial workers in 1980 (Pérez Díaz, 1981) and 23% amongst industrial workers in 1984 (Pérez Díaz, 1993: 267). Similar patterns of trade union developments are also reported by other surveys. The CIS-survey of 1977 among 3.000 workers marked an "affiliation" of 31.6% (CIS, 1977: 349-380). The FIES-studies of 1979 and 1980 among about 800 wage earners suggests a membership decline from 36.9% in 1979 to 22.5% in 1980 (published in Alvira Martín and García-López, 1981). The EAF (1979) survey marked the lowest rate of 11% among 3,990 workers of the occupied labour force (published in Gunther, Sani, Shabad, 1986: 242).

The studies on wage earners of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (1980; 1982) show a decline from 36.8% (1980) to 27.2% (1982). In 1984 a CIS-survey counted 23.5% membership among the population older than 16 years (Führer 1996: 137). The 1988-edition of CIS among wage earners arrived at 1,018,000 union members (16.5%).

Apart from the CIS-survey over the dependent labour force, there are three other recent surveys which give indications over the development of current union membership. First there is the "Sigma 2"-survey displayed by Comisiones Obreras which interviewed 1000 employees in firms with at least 6 employees. According to this survey membership for this population was 13.8% in 1986.

Furthermore, there is the (unpublished) EBCC-survey under the direction of Carabaña (1991), which interviewed 2,281 salaried employees about their class-position (or 14.1%). If we exclude unemployed and pensioners, the net union density rate is 12.1%, whereas another 25.0% showed sympathy for a trade union, without having joined (Escobar, 1991; Taboadela, 1992; 1993). Finally, there is the forthcoming CIS-survey which interviewed 3,706 employed, retired and unemployed with

³⁶ This figure might be overestimated given the fact that according to García-Nieto Paris (1979: 40) UGT counted only 1,350,000 members (supporters) at its congress of May 1978. As a consequence this is again an indication of the political use of membership figures in striving for hegemony in the initial period of institutionalization of its position. Nevertheless, the following breakdown is possible for the ten largest UGT-sectors in 1978: 1). metal (500,000-24.8%); 2). construction (160,000-7.9%); 3). chemical sector (150,000-7.4%); 4). transport (130,000-6.4%); 5). hotel (110,000-5.5%); 6). commerce (80,000-4.0%); 7). food processing (70,000-3.5%); 8). energy (60,000-3.0%); 9). public administration (40,000-2.0%); 10). wood (30,000-1.5%). The regional breakdown for UGT is the following: Catalonia (380,500-18.8%), Andalusia (308,300-15.3%), Valencia (270,500-13.4%), Castile Leon (200,500-9.9%), New-Castile (197,000-9.8%).

work experience, from which 12.5% were actually union members, whereas 16.5% had been members before (CIS, forthcoming).

After the initial upsurge of membership followed on the 1977 legalization of the trade unions and caused by the widespread enthusiasm and high expectations about the emerging democracy, union membership started to fall after 1978 and declined to levels which are among the lowest in European terms. In table 7 an overview of the different surveys is presented. Although the surveys do not permit comparisons due to the use of different population bases and the lack of homogeneous questions, one can detect nevertheless a strong decline of union membership after the late 1970s to membership levels which are just over 10%.

However, apart from the survey-data we may also calculate density from figures provided by the union confederations for the period 1981-1994.³⁷ The union confederations distinguish "affiliation" or support rates from "subscription" or dues-rates. The subscription rate refers to workers who are paying their membership-dues and include those who are unemployed, retired and in atypical employment relations (on sources see below). The affiliation rates of CC.OO is according to their own information probably 20% above the subscription rate. UGT reports that there is not anymore a difference between dues payment and affiliation figures. In the case of ELA.STV the 1993 subscription rate is 98,29% of the affiliation rate.

In tables 8a and 8b we have summarized some main union density trends. Table 8a provides union density from a historical perspective (1981-1993). We have calculated density developments for UGT, CC.OO and ELA.STV, using data for both the dependent labour force and the gainfully employed as denominator. It follows from the series that density developments are on the rise especially since the mid-1980s. However, one should realise that the membership figures include unemployed and retired members, whereas the density levels also vary corresponding using a different denominator in the fraction. The unemployed labour force is not taken into account in the denominator of the fraction.

In table 8b. we have calculated the variation in union density for 1993 according to the ISIC-major division used by the OECD. Here we use membership data provided by six confederations (UGT, CC.OO, CSI-CSIF, USO, ELA.STV, CIG). In the nominator unemployed and pensioners will be included, in case these categories are affiliated to the sectoral federations, the specific federations for unemployed and pensioners are of course excluded from the analysis. It seems that union density is mainly concentrated in the traditional sectors of the Spanish economy, such as mining (55.4%), transport (34.7%) and manufacturing (27.0%). As we will see below, substantial increase in the public sector and service organizations may be noted.

Thus, from the membership data provided by the unions it follows that throughout the 1980s union membership has grown, especially after 1986. This is in contrast to the conventional belief based on survey research that the union density was declining throughout the decade. Comisiones Obreras

³⁷ Data for UGT are published in "Consideraciones sobre la afiliación sindical" (UGT, 1993) and are completed with recent data provided by Mr.Paco Borges of the UGT-confederation (data for June, 1996). Data for CC.OO are provided by Mr.José Antonio Picas of the financial secretariat of the CC.OO confederation (Balance de la evolución de cotizantes - periodo VI Congreso Confederal, with data for 1991-1994). Data for ELA.STV are provided by the Manu Robles-Arangiz Institutoa (1993), updated by private correspondence. Some of these figures were already published in McElrath (1989) and cited by Pardo and Fernández (1994). Consequently, the data presented in this text include a revised update (especially in the case of UGT) in comparison with the figures published in Van der Meer (1996).

indicates 69% net growth from 1981 until 1994; the CC.OO membership declined from 1981 to 1986, but grew continuously to 1994. The current level is 656,266 paying members (see table 8, 9, 11, 12).

The available UGT-data from 1981 to 1994 indicate a similar development. The high growth rate (241%) in this period is due to the lower starting point and a higher peak; there is small increase in membership from 1981 to 1983, then a small decrease for two years, but since 1986 UGT has grown substantially to 750,745 members in 1993. In 1994 and 1995 the socialist unions suffer from a substantial backdrop in membership (only 649,316 paying members is the provisional figure for 1995), which may be related to the mismanagement of the UGT-housing corporation PSV and ongoing leadership struggles during this period. It still has to be seen whether the decline is of longterm structural nature (see table 8, 9, 12, 13).

The Basque ELA.STV data show rising dues-paying membership figures. From 1978 to 1981 the organization grows, but from 1982 to 1985 the membership remains more or less stagnant, yet after 1986 it rises again to 88,714 in December 1995 (see table 8). ELA.STV, which probably is the best organized union in Spain having its own strike funds, recruits its membership mostly in metal and public services (see table 20).

In addition, we may further inquire in which economic sectors trade union organizations are concentrated? Here we can use two sets of data. Primarily, we have collected a complete time series by sectors and regions for CC.OO and UGT unions for the period 1981-1994 (see table 10-14).³⁸ Furthermore, we can publish the first sectoral and regional overview of membership developments for both USO and CSI-CSIF for several years (see table 15-18).³⁹ Finally we will present some data for ELA.STV and CIG (tables 20-21).

For UGT and CC.OO, the regional divisions illustrate similar growth patterns throughout the decade, while regional variations in union density are insignificant. This may indicate that there are substantial differences between union organization in smaller and larger firms within regions (see *infra*). Only in the northern Autonomous Communities Asturias (26.4%) and Cantabria (15.7%) with traditional industries and the small enclaves in Northern Africa, with probably specific norms about union participation, density rates are substantially higher (table 10). The Basque and Galician regions, union figures would have indicated higher density levels if the regional unions could have been included.

We may also compare union membership for the two main union confederations at a more disaggregated level for agriculture, industry, construction and services for the period 1981-1994 (table 19). It follows that union density rank on top in industry, followed by services, construction and agriculture. However, important intrasectoral developments are notable throughout the period. Union density is relative low in agriculture, but has risen up to 13.0% in recent years (disregarding agricultural organizations and cooperatives, which are still important, especially in Southern Spain). The data indicate that union density in agriculture differs between UGT and CC.OO. Comisiones Obreras reached a higher level than UGT, but has lost relatively more support since the early 1980s.

³⁸ According to the union the published data are reliable, but it is still possible that some of the affiliated federations will have to revise their historical membership figures in future.

³⁹ The data for USO were offered by Mr. Ernesto Sarabia from the confederation, Mr. Juan Cimarra provided the figures for CSI-CSIF.

In 1987, CC.OO arrived at its minimum level, there after its attraction rose again, yet it declined in 1993 and 1994. UGT arrived at its lowest point in 1989, but has noted a strong growth since then. In contrast, membership in industry increased continuously up to 21.0% in 1994. This pattern must be explained by fluctuating membership records and partly declining employment figures. CC.OO is the more important union confederation here; although the distance from UGT becomes smaller. As indicated earlier, the best organized sector still is mining, followed by transport, manufacturing and chemical industries. The construction sector shows unstable patterns, especially due to changing employment; today's density level is 11.2%. In this sector the membership of Comisiones Obreras declined, while UGT shows high growth rates but CC.OO remains to attract the largest support. Finally, the service sector shows the largest fluctuations, while membership rises continuously up to 12.6% in 1994. UGT leads over CC.OO for all years since 1982. UGT surpassed CC.OO in the first years during the first socialist government, and recent data suggest a small leading position for UGT (table 19). The summarised totals for UGT and CC.OO are published in table 18.e

Regarding other unions, we can make several observations. USO showed large attraction during the period of transition. According to Jordana, USO membership rises from about 5,000 in January 1977 to about 75,000 members at the moment of legalization in April 1977, and a maximum of 131,000 for April 1978 and 137,000 for October 1979 (Jordana, 1995).⁴⁰ In 1984, USO affiliation seemed to have declined to 40,609 (Führer, 1996: 135). Recently, USO has offered an overview of its membership development for the period 1988-1995. It seems that membership has continuously risen from 57,678 in 1988 to 78,718 in 1995. Currently major support is counted in Catalonia and in the metal, education, and chemical sectors. The number of unemployed members is substantial (see table 15 and 16).

Also the independent union organization CSI-CSIF provided an overview of membership trends for the period after its establishment in 1991. It seems that membership rose continuously from 109,850 in 1991 to 150,935 in 1994. Consequently, the membership of this organization is at the third spot after UGT and CC.OO on a national scale. In absolute numbers the main support is counted in Andalucia, Madrid, Castile-Leon and Valencia. The sectoral distribution shows the importance of CSI-CSIF especially in the public administration, health and education.

We should complete the picture by looking at other national, nationalist and professional organizations. Here, we can only note some general trends on membership ("supporters") in the other national and nationalist unions, even though no comprehensive series are available. In the transition to democracy, the anarchist CNT claimed to be the third union in Spain in 1978 with over 300,900 members ("supporters") organized mostly in banking, metal, post, education, public administration, telephone, health care, rails and textiles (Taboadela, 1992); especially in Catalonia (65%), and to a far lesser extent in Valencia, Andalusia and Madrid (Guinea, 1978). Jordana gives only a maximum of 130,000 members for October 1977, which seems to be a more accurate estimate. Moreover CNT's membership declined throughout 1978, and arrived at 60,000 in October 1979 (Jordana, 1996). After several re-organizations with the old anarchist party *Confederación General del Trabajo* (CGT), the latter claims to organize about 51,900 in 1989 (Taboadela, 1992). Jordana

⁴⁰ In order to illustrate how widespread misconceptions with respect to trade union support it is illustrative to refer to Taboadela (1992) who stated that USO organized maximally 556,060 members in 1978. Alonso Soto gives a maximum of 694,476 for 1979 (Alonso Soto, 1982: 374). These figures are strongly overstated however.

(1996) was told in an interview that the estimated current level is 60,000 (1993). CNT membership probably organizes not even half of CGT's membership, as it does not participate in trade union elections. Guinea (1978) provided also data for *Sindicato Unitario* (512,850 "supporters") in the first trimester of 1978 and *Confederación de Sindicatos Unitarios de Trabajadores* (CSUT) with 485,000 "supporters" in February 1978. Again, these figures are strongly overstated and only indicate union "support" as dues are not paid regularly, if at all. The 1980 estimates for SU (17,000) and CSUT (12,000) may be more accurate (Sagardoy and León 1982: 131, cited in Jordana, 1995b: 15).

In addition, there are also some "nationalist" unions in the autonomous regions. For ELA.STV we have published the membership development since 1981 in table 8.a and provide the distribution over federations for 1993-1995 in table 19a. In Catalonia, *Solidaritat d'Obrers Catalans* organized 25,000 "supporters" in the first trimester of 1978 (Guinea, 1978). In Galicia, the *Sindicato Obrero Gallego* organized 17,000 "supporters" in 1978 (Guinea, 1978: 255). Today, the *Confederación Intersindical Gallega* (CIG) stated (in private correspondence) to organize 39,318 members in 1994, mostly in metal and services (see table 21).

Finally, we should include also other professional organizations, for which only incomplete data are available and are subject to sectoral changes.⁴¹ According to the survey of Taboadela (1992), the other unions (apart from UGT and CC.OO) organize an equivalent of about 400,000 members, while Jordana (1995b) estimated 518,600 members (calculated and extrapolated from shares in trade union elections).

Given the available data we may try to estimate the total union membership. For the late 1970s all indicators point at a massive union mobilization; strike figures rise, manifestations are massive. Based on internal dues payment figures, we have given in table 18 disaggregated data for economic sectors, and density rates for the period 1981-1994. The data indicate rising union density for UGT and CC.OO especially in the late 1980s, with some fluctuations in the mid-1980s. In 1994, the two main union confederations organize about 15.8% of the dependent labour force. If we include other unions in estimating union density for the early 1990s, we run the risk of incomplete and not comparable data for all years. Furthermore there are fluctuating labour market data, and we cannot control for inactive members (unemployed, pensioners). Nevertheless, when we sum up the following membership figures: UGT 711,000 (1994); CC.OO 656,000 (1994); CSI-CSIF 151,000 (1994); ELA.STV 88,000 (1994); USO 79,000 (1994); CIG 39,000 (1994); CGT-CNT 60,000 (1993), CNT (20,000) the minimal combined membership is 1,804,000. Consequently, gross union density for 1994 is 20.9% given the dependent labour force of 8,626,300.⁴²

⁴¹ Taboadela provides data for several professional organizations for 1991, however it does not follow from the literature whether these organizations are still operative or will be merged, for example, in a larger confederation. Nevertheless, the *Sindicato de Enfermería* (Satse) organized 3,000 nurses in 1986, and 28,700 members in 1991. The *Sindicato Unificado de Policía* (Sup) organized 23,000 policemen. The *Sindicato Español de Maquinistas y Ayudantes Ferroviarios* (SEMAF) organized 5,200 railway engine drivers. The *Sindicato de Medicos* (SEMS) grouped 25,000 medical doctors. The *Asociación Nacional de Profesionales de la Enseñanza* (ANPE) organized 25,000 teachers (Taboadela, 1992).

⁴² Note again that in the fraction members which are unemployed or pensioners have been included, whereas in the denominator only the salaried employees have been counted. Moreover, this rate is still an underestimate given incomplete figures, but may also be an overestimate due to the inclusion of an unknown percentage of non-paying members, who meanwhile may have resigned.

We should also look at the occupation composition of membership, i.e. which group of workers are more prone to join a union? For UGT-affiliates, survey research gives some indications (Bourza, 1989): UGT-members seem to be mostly male, predominantly in the age group of 31 to 40 years old, with low education, and earning an average monthly wage of 100,000 pesetas per household (800 \$). For 56% of the UGT-members had began their job before 1975, 90% had a fixed labour contract, and 57% were working in smaller firms with less than 50 employees. The most important reason for union membership was "employment protection", followed by "ideological" considerations. In larger firms the importance of ideological reasons outweigh the protection arguments (Bouza et al., 1990). Escobar (1991) and Taboadela (1992, 1993) have both reinterpreted the survey data on class structure (Carabaña, 1991). Escobar, applying a factor analysis to a survey with 2,417 salaried workers, arrives at the conclusion that union "sympathy" is a more important predictor for participation in union activities than union "membership", while for union membership it is "seniority". Especially those workers with more than ten years employment at the same enterprise seem to be more socialized in the firm, and feel a stronger preoccupation with union activities than those with five or only one years of work experience (Escobar, 1991).⁴³

Taboadela (1992, 1993), reinterpreting the same data for occupational structure, found that union membership differs among different occupational categories. 16.1% of staff personnel (cuadros) are organized, more than non-staff workers (13.6%). Furthermore, among staff functions, supervisors (18.4%) had higher membership rates than managers/ directors (10.1%). Moreover specialized staff had lower rates (13.1%) than non-specialized staff (19.2%). Among workers, 18.2% of specialized workers, 16.0% of skilled workers, and 7.6% of unskilled workers were union members. After control of sector, the public sector (which contains some of the large state firms) accounted for 67.7% of union membership, while the private sector only for 32.3% (Taboadela, 1992).

Furthermore, Comisiones Obreras mostly organized qualified workers and non-specialized staff. Like CC.OO, UGT organized also non-specialized staff, but also specialized staff and unskilled workers. As a consequence, UGT membership seemed to be more heterogeneous than the more traditional CC.OO rank-and-file, which may be due to the more moderated behaviour of UGT and its better presence in the service sector. Apart from the two main union confederations, the other unions, organized foremost (semi)-specialized workers, for instance, in the case of public administration, health care, education and in public enterprises.

Finally, there are almost no official and reliable data available regarding female membership, but according to the confederations, the share of female members is 22% in the CC.OO, and also in USO (ETUI, 1993: 26). UGT provides a 25% membership for women (UGT, 1994a). In ELA.STV the division over men and women is 74% versus 26% (data Manu Robles-Arangiz Institutoa, 1993). In

⁴³ According to Escobar (1991) the following variables foster union membership: a) seniority; b) legal framework is more favorable in public than in private enterprises; c) firm size ; d) fixed compared to flexible contracts); e) income distribution (membership is lower with salaries under 50.000 pesetas per month, and higher between 100,000 and 200,000 pesetas); f) economic sector (transport, health care, education have higher, agriculture and domestic services have lower rates); g) age (younger people are less likely members); h) civil status (unmarried people join less); i) ideology (centre/right joins less); gender (salaried occupied women join less) and j) labour time (those with 40 hours and more join less) (Source, Escobar: 1991).

Galicia, CIG-affiliation consists of 60% men and 40% women. In general, about one in four to one in five of Spanish union members are female.⁴⁴

V. Works council elections

The picture on membership development can be complemented by taking into account the outcomes of the "elecciones sindicales" (literally: trade union elections), which determine not only the composition of works council seats, but are also significant for a union's representativeness at regional and national administrative levels. Escobar (1993) estimates that about 75% of the workers in firms with more than 50 employees have the opportunity to vote in these elections and that roughly 70% of all workplaces of this size have at least one works councillor. According to a survey, 39.3% of the interviewed workers (N=2,887) worked at a firm where personnel delegates or work councils existed (CIS, forthcoming). However, the 1990 election had only a turnout rate of 74,0%. In 109,133 workplaces, 5,443,283 workers elected 237,261 representatives (of which 79.7% were male) (see table 22). The median age of the elected candidates was between 30 and 39 years of age, and the median work experience was 10 to 19 years (MTSS, 1992).

The election results for 1990 show the dominant position of the two major confederations (MTSS, 1992). The majority vote for UGT and CC.OO has risen from about 56% in 1978 to about 80% of all votes in 1990. As we will see, in 1994 their support declined to 73%. UGT has been the most voted union organization in the elections of 1982, 1986, and 1990. In 1990 CC.OO attracted most votes, like it did in 1978 and 1980. USO, the third national union center has lost influence after several internal splits around 1980, and it is not representative at a national scale. At the regional level, ELA.STV is the most important trade union in the Basque country, while CIG occupies a third, but still representative, position behind UGT and CC.OO in Galicia. In 1990 there were, apart from the main unions (UGT, CC.OO, USO, ELA.STV, and CIG), 211 other local, regional, sectoral or enterprise unions, which have received enough votes to claim one or more seats in bargaining tables. The largest of these are CSI-CSIF (102,810 votes for 6,729 candidates); the Basque LAB which counted 51,450 votes for 3,058 candidates and the anarchist CGT which received almost 43,000 (42,610) votes for 2,695 elected candidates, the smallest is the Basque enterprise union "Federación de Trabajadores Independientes Iberduero Guizpuzco", which elected one representative with only four votes.

Unfortunately, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs has planned not to publish the results of the 1994-1995 trade unions elections. Nevertheless, the provisional election outcomes have been provided in private correspondence (data: November 19, 1996). It seems that CC.OO has gained the elections with 84,167 elected representatives (37.5% of the votes). UGT won 78,726 representatives (35.1%). USO gained 8,358 representatives (3.7%), CSI-CSIF 7,334 (3.3%), ELA.STV 7,247 (3.2%), LAB 2,964 (1.3%) and CGT 2,161 (1.0%). As a consequence it seems that, firstly, the total number of elected representatives is 5% lower than in 1990. Secondly, CC.OO and UGT (together 72.6%) have lost support to other unions in comparison with 1990. The explanation for the decline in UGT's votes may probably be related to the continuing dispute on the UGT's leadership and the suspension of payments of UGT's PSV-housing corporation. Thirdly, the data indicate that CC.OO

⁴⁴ The low union density figures for women may also be due to their lower labour market participation less than 50%, whereas 31.4% of women were unemployed (BEL, May 1995).

has not only received relatively most support, it is also the strongest representative union in the economically most important regions Madrid and Catalonia, as well as in Andalucía, Castile la Mancha, the Canary Isles and Ceuta. In the Basque country, ELA.STV (39.7%) has gained the elections over CC.OO (16.6%), UGT (16.2%) and LAB (15.3%). The latter union has consequently gained the most representative status in this region. Apart from UGT and CC.OO, also ELA.STV has gained most representative status in Navarra and CIG in Galicia. Finally, newspaper reports have indicated that Comisiones Obreras has the strongest support in public administration, banking, construction, hotels, textiles and transport and in enterprises with more than 250 employees. UGT is strongest in food, agriculture, commerce, energy and education, and in smaller firms with 6-30 employees (source: Cinco Días, 15 January 1996; EIRR, nr. 267, p.26). Works council elections have been organized in the public sector only since 1987. In 1987, the *Confederación de Sindicatos Independientes de Funcionarios* (CSIF) surprised to gain most votes, but lost this position to CC.OO and UGT in 1990 and 1994. It may be noted that also one quarter of the votes have been gained by "other unions" (table 24). It remains open whether occupational organizations such as the recently merged union confederation CSI-CSIF will threaten the dominance of the main confederations.

VI. Interpretation and explanation of union strength.

In 1985, the union leader José María Zufiaur when looking back on the years of transition and economic crisis, acknowledged the role of unions in the democratic consolidation, but he criticized the shortcoming in organization and institution building. According to Zufiaur, Spanish unionism is "a unionism with low membership (...), although with a broad representation in trade union elections (...); organized in traditional sectors and with only small presence in small and medium enterprises; a unionism with dividing political priorities; with a less developed structure, especially its professional or sectoral organizations; with its focal point of action in collective bargaining; without an articulated connection to the working class; without a structure of education, elaboration and debate; without a provision for services; with a position at dialogue more than at revolutionary action" (Zufiaur, 1985: 229, translation by the author).

Ten years later one may conclude that *prima facie* there are no major changes. Spanish unions confederations, by assuming a more constructive role in national concertation over socio-economic policies until 1986, have helped to overcome the economic and political difficulties of the 1970s and 1980s. This led to a better financial position for the most representative unions. Furthermore, the major union confederations were able to institutionalize their position in the works council elections, they have increased the coverage of collective bargaining, and, since their reapproachment after the general strike of 14 December 1988, they have gained some success in the political bargaining on national policies (especially safeguarding the future of the pension schemes and extending the coverage of unemployment benefits, although there is no individualized social security system in Spain).

However, two important developments which have been mentioned in this text should be reconsidered. The first main development is the increased cooperation between the two main union organizations, Comisiones Obreras and UGT. Secondly, it should be remembered that the structural labour market situation is even worse than in 1985. Yet, this has become far more urgent than was foreseen ten years ago, given the enormous growth of temporary employment contracts and the

persistent high unemployment rate, notwithstanding a considerable modernization of the economy in some urban regions. During the economic decline of 1992-94 the trade unions searched in vain for an appropriate response to the government's flexibilization of the labour market. These proposals were introduced in parliament in December 1993 and May 1994, after the lengthy tri-partite discussions had failed during the summer of 1993. In addition, a political solution still needs to be found for extended dismissal protection and debates on more active structural and labour market policies have just recently started. The joint formulation of policy proposals by the unions has without doubt increased their capacities for debate and collective action in the political arena, which contrasts with the situation in the mid-1980s. However, one may still question the unions' capacity to adapt their organization at the firm level to the structural economic changes and the current economic depression. Here, new in-depth research is needed to evaluate the union contribution to labour market performance at firm level.

In this paper, we have attempted to better understand union strength in Spain. We have started our discussion with the trade union development in its formative period. For the pre-1936 period we have indicated the slow growth of the trade union movement and the ideological schisms, in spite of mass support for some union action and massive strikes at some points in time. In the 1930s, Spanish trade unionism diverged from developments towards a peaceful integration of labour relations like elsewhere in Europe, since it became an instrument in a nation-wide power struggle culminating in the Civil War, which ended the Republican achievements. During the Franco-dictatorship, free unionism has become totally suppressed. Given this long period of repression, Spanish trade unionism had to be rebuilt with democratization after 1975, though there are legacies and historical roots.

We have shown that according to survey research and participation in union congress, trade union "support" (membership and active sympathy) seemed to have been strong in the late 1970s. Yet the available data indicate that union support fell sharply in 1979-80. In the literature, the trade union decline of the late 1970s is related to several factors; many workers became "disenchanted" with the unions given continuing unemployment, inflation and declining real wages; the labour movement lacked unity; direct union participation was less needed due to the institutionalized union representation and "erga omnes" extension of collective bargaining; the unions faced organization problems in an economy dominated by small and medium enterprises; and employer opposition to union activities was widespread. Moreover, declining membership produced a vicious circle of modest financial resources which inhibited recruitment drives and attractive membership services, thereby mobilizing even less potential members. This trend of ongoing union decline is confirmed in recent survey research.

However, in this paper time series on dues paying membership since 1981 has been presented for UGT, CC.OO and ELA.STV. Moreover we have provided recent membership figures for CSI-CSIF and USO. The data show that union membership is in a slow, but almost continuous upward process, especially after 1986, with some minor fluctuations in the mid-1980s. This contradicts the results from the available survey research, asking for further explanation. First, the labour market situation is deplorable, continuing industrial restructuration processes threaten employment. Union membership may be instrumental for job protection, but perhaps not for all groups in the labour market. Second, after years of organizational learning, trade unions have become more

professionalized and better implanted at workplaces and have more experiences in membership recruitment. Third, in recent years, the trade unions have introduced special membership services (tax advice, holidays, although a UGT-housing project went bankrupt). Fourth, after the end of social concertation, unions have bargained wage increases above the price index in 1987-1993. Fifth, inter-union cooperation improved since 1988 and the union leadership has been rejuvenated. Probably also the growing weakness and disagreement in the "socialist family" and the implication of the political strikes against the Socialist party (1988, 1992 and 1994) have contributed to the rising membership. Sixth, also the declining gainful employment has increased density rates.

However, these arguments give only a partial explanation of current trade union development. A more theoretical, twofold argument can only be sketched here. On the one hand, we have to account for the low union membership, and on the other hand, we should also understand why union membership is as high, given that trade unions do not provide important selective incentives (Prieto, 1993a). Stated differently, business cycle theories and institutional accounts are not adequate to explain both aspects. In short, business cycle theory implies that employment growth and real wage increases support membership growth (Bain and Elsheikh, 1976). However, for Spain we do not find a correlation between employment and union membership for the whole period.⁴⁵ Hence, we can conclude that Spanish union membership development is not only affected by employment decline (or unemployment rise), but also by other factors as well. In addition, rising union wage demands (in the early 1990s) cannot be seen as selective goods, as institutional theories often argue, given the existence of trade union elections and "erga omnes" bargaining which extends agreements to non-union members.

Thus, if we want to understand Spanish union density we need another explanatory model. We should pay more attention to labour market segmentation and union recruitment processes. According to the literature (see Green, 1988; Disney 1990; Visser 1992; Van Rij 1994), we distinguish two stages in the recruitment process; in the first stage the main question is whether trade union organizations are embedded at the workplace level (workplace coverage). In the second stage we question whether union delegates at the workplace are able to persuade workers to join unions, and to keep them as paying members (individual membership). We will argue that such a theoretical perspective helps understanding the division between well organized large enterprises in the private and public sectors that recognize unions in contrast to small firms with very weak or without any union activity.

Hence, at the first stage, the extent by which workplaces are covered is important. Spanish unions are strongly implanted at the workplace of the larger industrial firms. This dates back to the time when unions infiltrated the vertical syndical structure of the Franco-period from bottom up and given that since 1975 they have legal support to establish themselves in newly emerged firms and government agencies. Yet this does not hold for the small and medium sized firms which are relatively widespread

⁴⁵ To test this hypothesis for Spain, we have correlated the union density with employment and wage patterns. Regression analysis for 1981-94 shows a significant relation between the evolution of membership for UGT and CC.OO and the growth of wage earners (Pearsson correlation coefficient $r=0.82$; and for 1981-1991 $r=0.93$). For several years also a significant relation between union growth and decline in unemployment is found ($r=-0.92$, for 1985-1991). However, this business cycle analysis, cannot understand the continuing rise of union membership in the early 1990s, when employment strongly declined and unemployment strongly rose. Although we have only 4 cases, the correlation coefficient has the wrong signature: $r=-0.77$ for membership growth and wage earners decline, and $r=+0.65$ for membership growth and unemployment rise, both figures 1991-1994.

in Spain compared to other European countries (see Sisson et al. 1992). Union implantation will be far more difficult in these firms due to organization and financial problems of the unions.⁴⁶

At the second stage, it is important whether union delegates recruit potential members. Here at least two aspects are crucial: first, the incentive and possibility to recruit new members, and second, the continuity of dues payment over time (i.e. that members keep paying and do not leave unions; that is, do not vote with their feet).⁴⁷ The incentive and possibility to recruit workers depends on the union delegates capacity to persuade non-members to join. Here a certain cost-benefit consideration by potential members may play a role. Union recruitment will be easier where union officials can show workers the benefits of membership, i.e. when they can provide selective and collective goods. The subsequent question is what kind of selective goods do Spanish trade unions offer, given the existing system of trade union elections and "erga omnes" bargaining (Prieto, 1993a). One may argue that unions are too weak and lack the resources to provide any selective goods, or at least started belated in providing these. Apart from these instrumental motives, workers may perceive unions more ideologically as a "good thing" given their institutional and political roles, or as an instrument for career development or for protection against dismissal. As a consequence, it seems that the employer strategy (pro or contra unionism) and the social norms about joining unions among workers in the firm. Therefore one could expect that larger firms with a more homogeneous occupational labour force composition (i.e. in the traditional, large scale private and public sectors without many temporary workers and with an institutionalised positions for unions), the collaboration and the comradeship between workers fosters social norms which encourage union participation (or even reject non-membership). In the more modern, more heterogeneous sectors (i.e. the small scale industry and services sectors) these norms may be less developed or more difficult to apply.

An empirical indication for the relation between union membership, normative considerations and labour market segmentation can be found in the Carabaña-survey. The division of union membership by occupational groups has changed and differs according to labour market position. Union density is lower for unskilled workers and for those with precarious labour contracts compared to those with stable employment contracts (Escobar, 1993; Taboadela, 1993). As Miguélez argues, temporary workers have to deal with the anti-union culture in some firms, the lack of voting rights in union elections, the lack of identification and socialization within firms and the trade unions, and the duality of union strategies, which sometimes favour permanent employees over temporary workers, these are all reasons for the low recruitment of the latter group (see Miguélez, 1995).

Second, recent CIS survey-research showed that (ex-) wage earners held the opinion that trade unions play a role in both the political arena and in firms, but that unions need to adapt their strategies.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Regrettably there is no indicator for union coverage in firms, but it must be feared that the Spanish economy is largely divided between a union sector and a non-union sector. Union elections thus indicate that the turnout rate is 74% and roughly 70% of all firms with more than 50 employees have at least one works council (Escobar, 1993). Moreover, the forthcoming CIS-survey indicates that 57.1% of the (ex-) wage earners worked in workplaces without personnel delegates or works councils (39.3% worked in such places, whereas 3.5% gave no answer).

⁴⁷ The unions have no computer control on intra-annual variation in the entry flow into and exit flow out of the membership index. In interviews it has been recommended that the circulation of members into and out of the unions may be substantial in quantitative terms.

⁴⁸ Survey among 5,965 members of the Spanish population of 16 years and more; conducted from May to July 1994 (CIS, forthcoming).

The survey indicated that the (ex-) wage earners have also other than only wage related interests. To the question what unions should do at central level, the respondents thought that unions should focus more on working conditions (49.7%) and contract types (39.8%) than on salary increases (33.7%) and unemployment protection (27.5%) (multiple answers were possible). Concerning the question which aspects of the labour process are very important, the Spanish population ranked employment security (74.6%), the feeling of being productive (65.8%), training opportunities (64.0%), self-realization (63.6%), responsibility (59.7%) and colleagues (57.0%) above salary payment (56.8%) (multiple answers were possible).

Third, analyses of individual workers' identification with trade unions (by studying groups sessions of workers in different sectors throughout Spain) showed that there is no consensus on what actually constitutes worker and union interests (Vargas Sampredo, 1993). Pay increases, working conditions, and contract types were all mentioned as well as collective bargaining and strike activity, but it was also remarked that without job control, union support is without significance, e.g. for temporary workers in the services like cleaning (Vargas Sampredo, 1993).

Fourth, and perhaps most interesting, research on the union support among technicians in the metal sector, that is in a climate of ongoing economic restructuring and flexibilization of labour relations, management and union strategies at enterprise level resulted in divergent evaluations and pay systems, with consequently different possibilities for job control and career patterns. Even though the causation is difficult to establish, divergent membership rates were found across different firms, varying from almost nil (3%) in one private firm to 51% dues paying members in a public enterprise (Iriso Napal; 1994: 15).

Given labour market segmentation, especially the division into internal and external labour markets, union density cannot be explained from employment figures alone. One will need to study normative considerations concerning selective incentives at firm level in order to be able to understand union membership developments. As has been argued a threshold model may help to understand the current density development. The slight rise in union membership can be due to the fact that unions have learned to recruit more new members than old members have left. Unions may have convinced their paying members that they prevented a flexibilization of dismissal rules, that they bargained successfully, that they now provide tax and holiday services, that they won general strikes and that they have a rejuvenated leadership. In addition, we conclude that Spanish union strength cannot only be understood by focusing at density developments alone, one should also look at union coverage of firms, union voting, strike and assembly participation, and union sympathy.

Finally we should evaluate the current level of membership. It seems that even though membership has risen in recent years, membership levels and resources have remained relatively low in comparison to Northern Europe. This raises the issue of the "crisis of union representation"; Spanish union organizations not only lack in representativity vis-à-vis their traditional rank and file, they also meet large difficulties in the interest mediation in the service sectors, between the new entrants in the labour market and the unemployed (Miguélez, 1991; Pérez Díaz 1993). Recent surveys show that union membership division by occupational groups has changed and varies according to labour market position (Taboadela, 1993). It follows that the strength of Spanish trade unions is still found in the traditional sectors, but there is an improvement in the unions implantation in the service sector and among staff and technical personnel. In contrast, the unskilled workers and those with precarious

labour market contracts are less likely to join, leading to what Crouch (1982) described as the paradoxical logic of trade union collective action: those who probably need it most, join least. Therefore we should consider the unions' role and capacity in recruiting new members (Taboadela 1993). Union recruitment is easier in the public sector with its large enterprises than in the private sector which is dominated by small and medium sized firms and by an extended informal economy. Here, trade unions have to deal with serious insider-outsider dilemmas in the perspective of the extension of worker representation, co-determination, collective bargaining agreements and social benefit clauses. To conclude, there seems to be a pattern of representation in which workers support trade unions on decisive political and economic issues inside and outside the firm. However, apart from this support, they join unions only to a relative extent and they keep remote from their delegates in works councils and union sections, which represent them indirectly (Miguélez, 1991). There seems to be more a culture of voting and participation in assemblies and trade union elections than a culture of continued and formalized membership. The major union confederations have a strong voice in the political arena. Unions have also some influence in the larger companies which is supported by institutional recognition, but their position is weaker in small and medium sized enterprises due to its low membership.

Sources

Several primary and secondary sources have been used to measure Spanish union strength including dues paying membership, the organization and cooperation of unions, the coverage rate of workplaces, their financial resources, their mobilizing capacities and the results of the trade union elections. The sources are to be found in the trade union archives Largo Caballero (UGT) and Primero de Mayo (CC.OO) and in the labour statistics provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. The early history of Spanish trade unionism in its formative period has been relatively well documented, especially the 1930s. Membership data, however, are imprecise and incomplete, though UGT is the exception, probably because it was organised only on a small particular scale. The Franco-dictatorship established a corporatist vertical structure, therefore the whole spectrum of free and democratic trade unions was restructured from the mid-1970s onwards.

The current internal organization of labour is best understood from documents and literature in which the focus is on developments in both intra-union coordination and inter-union cooperation. An indicator for workplace coverage needs further elaboration, but the Ministry's labour statistics on participation in union elections are first indications. Information on financial and staff resources are partly to be found in congress reports and in government budgets, and additional information have been collected based on interviews. Strike statistics are given in the labour statistics of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. In addition, general strikes are widely documented in the literature, in union journals and congress documentation. The results of the trade union elections are to be found in special, voluminous reports published by the Labour Ministry.

Membership data, however, are difficult to collect and have to be estimated due to several data problems. There is no legal obligation for the unions to publish membership figures, nor is there an independent or government research centre which studies membership developments. The surveys on union membership suffer from their small scale and their lack of comparability, which resulted in serious misconceptions on membership growth throughout the 1980s. Furthermore, in the period of

transition to democracy (1975-1978), union "membership" and "active sympathy" (here together defined as "support") became totally mixed up in the struggle of unions for political and institutional recognition. Moreover, for this period there are probably no financial data available since there were only monthly dues "stamps" distributed by the unions. These do not reflect the actual membership payment, because if dues were paid, it was by hand and on irregular basis, mostly during periods of congresses. As a consequence, unions were confronted with large differences between union support and actual payment, and consequently unstable dues incomes. It is therefore still an open question for future research to what extent union density actually declined after its probable peak in 1977-1978. In recent years unions have been modernizing their organization and reorganizing their income flows. A centralization of membership payment control exists at the level of UGT, CC.OO, CSI-CSIF, USO and ELA.STV confederation. Increasingly, check-off agreements and bank discounts are substituting payment by stamps given to dues collectors. This process prevents local union branches in some cases to exaggerate membership (which allows them more influence in intra-union decision making) and in other cases to diminish membership (to improve their financial position). This process of bureaucratization permits the union headoffices also to reproduce and to classify an increasing percentage of their membership data by computers. Currently, dues-paying density figures are available for both UGT, CC.OO and the regional union ELA.STV since 1981, which makes a reconstruction of dues membership developments possible. Nevertheless, in the future slight revisions of these figures will be possible, in case figures of local branches will seem to be less accurate. Moreover, the data still include pensioners, retired and unemployed due to the fact that "inactives" stay members of their federations despite the existence of particular federations for these categories. Furthermore, the union confederations have no accurate guess at all of the probably considerable membership flows (entry and exit) within the years. Besides, a breakdown by the division between private and public sector (i.e. public administration and state enterprises), and by gender differences are difficult to estimate. While lacking accurate data, an alternative approach is to follow the initiative of Jordana, who in recent papers extrapolated and readjusted available membership and union election figures, in order to reconstruct an estimated membership series for the period since 1977. However, per definition the extrapolated series are less accurate than the correct figures the unions may provide themselves.

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Table 1. Political development and labour relations.

Political development

1812	Constitution of Cádiz
1822	Penal code
1869	Constitution with provision for freedom of association
1873-74	First Republic
1875-1923	Constitutional Monarchy
1883	Commission for Social Reforms
1887	Law on freedom of association
1891	Rerum Novarum Encyclica
1903	Institute for Social Reforms
1908	National Institute for Insurance
1914-18	World War I, Spain remains neutral
1920	Ministry of Labour
1923-30	Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera
1931-36	Second Republic
1931	Democratic Constitution
1936-39	Civil War
1939-75	Franco-Dictatorship
1939-45	World War II, Spain remains neutral and isolated
1953	Agreements with United States and Vatican
1955	Spain joins United Nations
1959	Stabilization Plan
1961	Spain joins OECD
1967	New Organic State Laws
1975	Death of Franco (Nov 20.)
1975-78	Transition to democracy
1977	Legalization of political parties and interest associations (Spring)
1977	First parliamentary elections since 1936 (June 15.)
1978	Democratic constitution (Dec 27.)
1978-82	UCD in government
1978-	Decentralization of public administration into autonomous communities
1981	Failed Coup d'état (Feb 23.)
1982	Spain joins NATO (definitively after referendum in 1986)
1982-96	PSOE in government
1986	Entry into European Community
1989	Spain joins European Monetary Union
1996-	Partido Popular in government

Labour relations

1825	Industrial take-off in Catalonia
1850-	Begin of industrialization in some other parts of Spain
1855	First general strike
1890	'First of May' in Barcelona, Bilbao, and Madrid.
1907	First governmental regulation of

1909	collective bargaining
1919	"Tragic Week" in Barcelona
1919	Massive strike activity
1923	Establishment of collective bargaining in enterprises with more than 300 employees
1924	Establishment of state controlled arbitration boards
1926	Introduction of Corporatist Organization
1931	New regulation of individual and collective labour relations.
	Establishment of Mixed Juries
1934	Violent labour conflicts in Asturian region
1938	Franco Labour Charter
1940-77	Spanish corporatist Trade Union Organization
1941	Settlement of National Institute for Industry (INI)
1941	Spain leaves International Labour Organization (ILO)
1947/53	Works councils legislation
1958	Collective Bargaining Act
1962	Start with proposals for new strike legislation
1971	New Trade Union Law
1973	Collective Bargaining Act (replaces 1958 Act)
1976	Labour Relations Act
1977	Freedom of association (April 1.)
1977	Abolishment of vertical syndicates (June 2.)
1977	Pactos de la Moncloa (political pacts, Oct.21)
1978	Democratic constitution (Dec 27.) Role of trade unions and employers' associations established in article 7
1978-86	Social concertation
1979	Interconfederal Basic Agreement (CEOE, UGT; July 10)
1980	Interconfederal Framework Agreement (CEOE, UGT, USO; Jan 5, applied 1980 and 1981)
1980	Workers' Statute (March 10.)
1981	National Employment Agreement (Government, CEOE, CC.OO, UGT; June 9., applied 1982)
1983	Interconfederal Agreement (CEOE, CEPYME, CC.OO, UGT; Feb 15., applied 1983)
1984	Amendment of Workers' Statute
1984	Economic and Social Agreement (Government, CEOE, CEPYME, UGT, Oct 9., applied 1985 and 1986)
1985	Organic Law of Trade Union Freedom (August 2.)

1985	General Strike (June.20)
1987	Co-determination in public administration
1988	Largest general strike after transition (Dec.14)
1991	Economic and social Council (June 17. operative from 1992)
1992	General Strike (half day, May 28.)
1993	General Strike (Jan 27.)
1993	National Agreement on Continuous Vocational Training (CEOE, CEPYME, CC.OO, UGT, CIG; Feb 25.)
1993-94	Amendments of Workers' Statute
1994	Central Agreement on Substitution of Labour Ordenances (CEOE, CC.OO, UGT; Oct.)

1888	Socialist union (UGT)
1899	UGT-seat transferred from Barcelona to Madrid
1900	Federation of workers' societies of the Spanish region
1907	Catalan Workers' Solidarity (SO)
1910	Anarchist union (CNT)
1911	Basque union (ELA.STV)
1927	Iberian Anarchist Federation
1931-38	Legal recognition of unions
1939-77	Period of trade union prohibition (CNT, UGT in exile)
1958	Appearance of Workers' Commissions (CC.OO)
1961	Appearance of USO
1976	First congresses of union confederations after dictatorship
1976-77	Coordination of Trade Union Organizations
1977	Legalization of unions
1977-	Period of trade union juridical recognition
1978	First trade union elections
1980	Second trade union elections
1982	Third trade union elections
1986	Fourth trade union elections
1989	Proposal for Trade Union Priorities (PSP)
1990	Fifth trade union elections
1991	Trade Union Initiative on Progress (IPS)
1991	Independent union (CSI-CSIF)
1994-95	Sixth trade union elections

Table 2. Party, employers and union organizations.

Party formation

1879	Socialist party (PSOE)
1921	Communist Party (PCE)
1977	Legalization of political parties
1977	Partido Popular , PP (originally Alianza Popular , AP)
1977	Democratic Centre Union (UCD)
1978	Catalan Convergence and Union (CiU)
1986	Merger of PCE and other leftist parties in United Left.

Employers organization

1886	Chambers of Commerce established by law
1889	Fomento de Trabajo Nacional
1893	La Liga Nacional de Productores
1912	Spanish Guild Federation
1914	Spanish Employer Confederation
1977	Spanish Confederation of Employers' Organizations (CEOE)
1980	Integration of Spanish Confederation for small and medium sized firms (CEPYME) in CEOE

Union movements

1822-69	Period of trade union prohibition (reaffirmed in 1848 and 1870)
1840	First mutual aid society, la Sociedad de Tejedores, in Catalonia
1869-'36	Period of relative trade union tolerance
1869	Introduction of Bakunin doctrine
1870	Spanish Regional Federation (First International)
1872	New Madrid Federation (First International)
1881	Federation of workers of the Spanish Region

Table 3. List of major confederations.

a) National confederations

UGT: Unión General de Trabajadores (General Workers' Union) History: founded in 1888. General union. Both manual workers and non-manual employees in both private and public sector. Socialist orientation. Affiliates: 12 unions (1994). Members: 710,868 (1994), International affiliation to ICFTU, ETUC and TUAC.

CC.OO: Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras (Union Confederation of Workers Commissions). History: founded in 1958, legalized 1977. General union. Both manual and non-manual employees in both private and public sector. Communist orientation. Affiliates: 18 unions (1994). Members: 656,167 (1994). International affiliation to ETUC.

CSI-CSIF: Confederación de Sindicatos Independientes-Confederación de Sindicatos Independientes de Funcionarios. Confederation of Independent Trade Unions- Confederation of

Independent Trade Unions of Public Servants. History: founded in 1991 after cooperation of several independent union organisations in trade union elections of 1990. Independent. Affiliates 21 unions (1994). Members: 150,935 (1994).

USO: Unión Sindical Obrera: (Workers Unions). History: founded in 1961, legalized 1977. Socialist orientation. Affiliates: 17 unions (1994). Members: 78,533 (1994). International affiliation to WCL.

CNT: Confederación Nacional de Trabajo (National confederation of labour). History founded in 1910. Anarchist orientation. Split in CNT-CGT and CNT after 1978. Members: 60,000 (1993 for CGT-CNT) and 20,000 (1991 for CNT). CGT is affiliated to International Labour Alliance.

b) Regional confederations

ELA.STV: Eusko Languillen Alkartasuna.

Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos (Basque Workers' Solidarity). History: founded 1911. Affiliates 7 unions. Members: 87,866 (1994). International affiliation to ETUC.

CIG: Confederación Intersindical Gallega (Galician Interunion Confederation). History: founded in 1990 after a merger between Intersindical Nacional de Trabajadores Gallegos (1981), and its breakaway Confederación General de Trabajadores Gallegos (1985). Affiliates: 11 unions. Members: 39,000 (1994).

Table 4. List of sectoral federations affiliated to CC.OO and UGT.

The 18 federations affiliated to CC.OO are (in sequence of membership; in brackets % of total membership; data 1994):

1. *Federación de Minero-Metal;* (metalworking and mining); Members: 124,020 (18.9%);
2. *Federación Estatal de Transporte, Comunicación y Mar;* (transport, communications and sea); Members: 74,361 (11.3%);
3. *Federación Sindical de Administración;* (public administration); Members: 63,519 (9.7%);
4. *Federación Estatal de Industria Textil-Piel, Química y Afines;* (Textiles, Leather, Chemical and related industries); Members: 51,053 (7.8%);
5. *Federación de la Industria, de la Construcción y de la Madera;* (Construction and wood); Members: 44,581 (7.0%);
6. *Federación de Enseñanza;* (education); Members: 39,071 (6.0%);
7. *Federación de Trabajadores de la Salud;* (health care); Members: 36,239 (5.5%);
8. *Federación de Banca y Ahora;* (banking and savings); Members: 31,863 (4.9%);

9. *Federación de Actividades Diversas;* (Different activities); Members: 31,681 (4.8%);

10. *Federación Estatal de Alimentación;* (food processing); Members: 31,625 (4.8%);

11. *Federación Estatal de Pensionistas y Jubilados;* (Pensioners); Members: 31,265 (4.8%).

12. *Federación Hostelería;* (hotel and tourism); Members: 23,196 (3.5%);

13. *Federación Estatal del Comercio;* (trade and commerce); Members: 19,769 (3.0%);

14. *Federación Estatal del Campo;* (agriculture); Members: 17,899 (2.7%);

15. *Federación de Papel, Artes gráficas, Medios de Comunicación y Espectáculo, Cultura y Deportes;* (Paper, graphics and communication, entertainment, culture and sports); Membership 13,903 (2.1%);

16. *Federación Estatal de Parados;* (Unemployed); Members: 10,574 (1.6%);

17. *Federación de Energía;* (Energy); Members: 8,754 (1.3%);

18. *Federación Estatal de Seguros;* (Insurance); Members: 2,913 (0.4%).

The 12 federations affiliated to UGT are (in sequence of membership, in between brackets % of total membership; data for 1994):

1. *Federación Estatal de Servicios Públicos;* (public administration); members: 140,000 (19.7%);
2. *Federación Estatal de Siderometalúrgica;* (metal); members: 107,338 (15.1%);
3. *Federación Estatal de Transporte y Telecomunicaciones;* (transport and telecommunications); members: 77,356 (10.9%);
4. *Federación Estatal de Industrias Afines;* (chemical, mines, textiles); members: 75,616 (10.6%);
5. *Federación Estatal de Servicios;* (banking, communication); members: 66,744 (9.4%);
6. *Federación Estatal de Trabajadores y Empleados de Servicios;* (Hotels, Trade); members: 56,081 (7.9%);
7. *Federación Estatal de Enseñanza;* (education); members: 44,469 (6.3%);
8. *Federación Estatal de Construcción Y Madera;* (construction and wood); members: 43,202 (6.1%);
9. *Federación Estatal de Alimentación y Tabacos;* (food processing and tobacco); members: 30,095 (4.2%);
10. *Federación Estatal de Trabajadores de Tierra;* (agriculture); members: 29,287 (4.1%);
11. *Federación Estatal de Jubilados y Pensionistas;* (pensioners); members: 17,426 (2.5%);
12. *Federación Estatal de Varias Pequeñas Agriculturas;* (different small agriculture); members: 23,254 (3.3%).

Table 5. Trade union membership, 1869 - 1938.

Year	Anarchists	Socialists			
1869	30,000				
1882	57,934				
1888		4,994	(Aug.)		
1889		3,355	(Nov.)		
1890		3,896	(Sep.)	5,169	(Nov.)
1891		5,457	(April)	5,304	(Aug.)
1892		7,170	(Feb.)	8,014	(Aug.)
1893		8,848	(Feb.)	8,553	(Aug.)
1895		6,276	(May)		
1896		6,154	(Feb.)		
1899		15,264	(Sep.)		
1900	50,000	14,737	(March)	26,088	(Sep.)
1901		29,383	(Feb.)	31,558	(Sep.)
1902		32,778	(Feb.)	40,087	(Oct.)
1903		46,896	(Jan.)	46,574	(Sep.)
1900		56,900	(March)	55,817	(Oct.)
1905		56,905	(Feb.)	46,485	(Oct.)
1906		36,557	(March)	34,537	(Oct.)
1907		32,405	(April)	30,066	(Sep.)
1908		32,612	(March)	39,668	(Oct.)
1909		43,478	(March)	43,562	(Nov.)
1910		40,981	(June)		
1911	23,758	77,749	(May)		
1912		127,09	(Aug.)		
1913		147,729	(Jan.)		
1914		127,804	(Jan.)	119,114	(Feb.)
1915		121,553	(Feb.)	112,553	(Aug.)
1916		76,304	(Feb.)		
1917		99,520	(March)		
1918	73,860	89,601	(June)		
1919	550,000	160,480	(Nov.)		
1920		211,342	(May)		
1921		240,113	(-)		
1922		208,170	(Nov.)		
1923		210,617	(Dec.)		
1924		210,741	(Dec.)		
1925		217,386	(Dec.)		
1926		219,369	(Dec.)		
1927		223,349	(Dec.)		
1928		210,567	(July)		
1929		228,503	(Dec.)		
1930		277,011 - 287,333	(Dec.)		
1931	535,565	654,403	(Oct.)	958,451	(Dec.)
1932	800,000 - 1,200,000	778,599 - 957,451	(March)	1,041,539 - 1,054,559	(June)
1934	800,000	650,000			
1936	519,229				
1938	1,577,547	1,444,474			

Sources: see text. Anarchist membership rates date from Bernecker (1983), Tuñón de Lara (1985), Maravall (1978) and Martin (1990). Socialist membership rates for period up to 1915 date from Castillo (1990), afterwards from Tuñón de Lara (1985), completed with Redero San Roman (1992).

Table 6. Trade union support, 1976 - 1980.

		CC.OO	UGT
1976	Dec.	30,000	6,000
			10,000
1977	Jan.	78,459	15,000
	Jan.	94,325	--
	March	139,760	--
	April	180,000	--
	May	268,496	--
	July	760,000	982,000
	July	1,110,210	--
	Sept.	1,272,300	--
	Oct.	1,604,550	--
1978	Jan.	--	1,459,473
	May	--	2,020,000
	June	1,840,907	--
1979	Oct.	--	1,375,000
1980		702,277	

Source CC.OO data are taken from Soto Carmona (1993), UGT data are taken from García-Nieto Paris (1978), Alonso Soto (1982), Jordana (1995). See text for discussion.

Table 7. Recent surveys estimates on union membership, 1977 - 1994.

Year	Gainfully employed	Dependent employed	Industrial workers	Families of wage earners	Families of employed	Adult population
1977	31.6% N=3,000 (CIS)					
1978		57.4% N=4,179 (Pérez Díaz)				
1979				36.9% N=803 (FIES)	11% N=3,990 (Gunther)	
1980		36.8% N=1,997 (Ebert)	33.8% N=2,400 (Pérez Díaz)	22.5% N=796 (FIES)		
1982		27.2% N=2,000 (Ebert)				
1984						23.5% N=2,491 (CIS)
1986		13.8% N=1000* (CC.OO)				
1988		16.5% N=2,014 (CIS)				
1991		12.1% N=2,281 (EBCC)				
1994	12.5% N=3,706 (CIS)					

Sources in between brackets, see also text. Data are not comparable due to different survey bases and question.

(*) Firms with > 5 employees.

Table 8. Dues paying union members and density, 1978-1993.

Year	CC.OO	UGT	ELA.STV	TOTAL	Dep.empl.	Gainf.emp	Density I	Density II
1978	1,840,907	2,020,000	38,374	--	8,418,000	12,096,000		
1979	--	1,375,000	43,231	--	8,255,000	11,902,000		
1980	702,277	--	45,340	--	7,986,000	11,551,000		
1981	389,237	208,170	45,340	642,747	7,730,000	11,216,000	8,3%	5,7%
1982	377,576	316,774	44,773	739,123	7,676,000	11,098,000	9,6%	6,7%
1983	377,905	344,265	44,693	766,863	7,598,000	11,047,000	10,1%	6,9%
1984	357,959	317,731	44,634	720,324	7,275,000	10,748,000	9,9%	6,7%
1985	356,082	345,592	45,103	746,777	7,265,000	10,637,000	10,3%	7,0%
1986	332,019	369,690	45,723	747,702	7,608,000	10,875,000	9,8%	6,9%
1987	360,802	409,406	49,148	819,356	7,946,000	11,383,000	10,3%	7,2%
1988	405,032	443,798	51,805	900,635	8,320,000	11,780,000	10,8%	7,6%
1989	439,354	495,569	55,413	990,336	8,843,000	12,260,000	11,2%	8,1%
1990	508,428	545,234	65,745	1,119,407	9,234,000	12,578,000	12,1%	8,9%
1991	580,415	669,551	72,685	1,322,651	9,332,000	12,608,000	14,1%	10,5%
1992	638,729	728,545	79,571	1,446,845	9,030,000	12,359,000	16,0%	11,7%
1993*	653,824	750,745	81,773	1,486,342	8,634,000	11,826,000	17,2%	12,6%

Source: For period 1978-1980 see table 6. Data refer to "supporters", apart from ELA.STV. Data for 1981-1994 for UGT and CC.OO are provided by the confederations, and indicate a clear break in the series after 1980. The data for UGT are totals for all federations, which slightly vary from the regional totals. Data for ELA.STV are provided by the Manu Robles Arangiz Institute (1993). Labour force data are taken from OECD-historical labour force statistics for 1973-1993, pp. 358-59 and pp.364-65. Dependent employment refers to wage earners and salaried employees. Gainfully employed refers to wage earners including workers working on own account and unpaid family workers. End of year figures, except for ELA.STV, May 1993.

Note: * provisional figures, I: dependent labour force; II: gainfully employed.

Table 9. Trade union density by sector, 1993.

ISIC-classification	Dep. labour force	Membership	Union density
1. Agriculture	372,000	61,200	16.5%
2. Mining	57,000	31,600	55.4%
3/4. Manufacturing, electricity, gas and water	2,142,000	579,300	27.0%
5. Construction	810,000	111,400	13.8%
6. Wholesale Trade, Hotels, Restaurants	1,425,000	111,600	7.8%
7. Transport, storage and communication.	509,000	176,600	34.7%
8. Financing, insurance, real estate services	618,000	115,500	18.7%
9. Community, social and private services	2,702,000	475,200	17.6%
0. Other			

Source: Dependent labour force statistics: OECD Historical Statistics (1993-1994), pp. 364-365. Aggregated union membership figures, include federations affiliated to UGT, CC.OO, CSI-CSIF, USO, ELA.STV, and CIG. Federations for unemployed and pensioners are not taken into account. The unemployed and pensioners may be included in case of membership of federations. Data refer to 1993, except for the mining federation UGT (1992) and CIG (1994).

Table 10. Union membership by regions in 1994.

	CC.OOrs	in %	UGT	in %	Labour force	Density
Andalucia	100,570	15.3%	117,699	16.8%	1,688,200	12.9%
Aragon	19,731	3.0%	29,871	4.3%	389,200	12.7%
Asturias	33,290	5.1%	47,908	6.8%	307,600	26.4%
Baleares Islands	13,435	2.0%	14,827	2.1%	243,300	13.6%
Basque Country	39,155	6.0%	38,982	5.6%	664,900	11.8%
Canary Islands	19,577	3.0%	20,081	2.9%	447,600	8.9%
Cantabria	9,423	1.5%	14,672	2.1%	153,900	15.7%
Castilla-Leon	30,868	4.7%	57,908	8.3%	759,800	11.7%
Castilla-La Mancha	34,503	5.7%	28,456	4.1%	483,300	13.0%
Catalonia	108,790	16.6%	75,859	10.8%	2,052,700	9.0%
Extremadura	10,141	1.5%	23,363	3.3%	270,900	12.4%
Galicia	31,638	4.6%	38,105	5.4%	916,200	7.6%
Madrid	98,249	15.0%	70,074	10.0%	1,547,300	10.9%
Murcia	14,837	2.3%	15,925	2.2%	308,200	10.0%
Navarra			12,206	1.7%		
Valencia	85,864	13.1%	80,766	11.5%	1,208,700	13.9%
La Rioja	3,662	0.6%	9,136	1.3%	82,200	16.0%
Ceuta & Melilla	2,436	0.4%	4,188	0.6%	31,400	22.7%
Total	656,268	100%	700,026	100%		

Source: Respective confederations. In case of CC.OO, Navarra is included in Basque country, density rates for Basque country and Navarra are summarised. Due to the fact that Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales doesnot provide data for wage earners at the level of the autonomous communities, here the occupied labour data employed including self employed are used (BEL, March, 1995, p.73-74).

Table 11. Comisiones Obreras: Trade union membership by region, 1981 - 1994.

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Andalucia	49,169	51,628	41,226	51,023	48,949	43,672	49,576	55,865	63,277	70,738	92,162	100,358	98,712	100,570
Aragon	9,545	9,439	8,957	7,153	7,048	7,559	11,765	9,120	10,442	13,729	16,024	19,832	19,982	19,731
Asturias	30,276	31,544	29,653	28,824	28,415	28,624	30,220	30,866	32,304	34,578	35,492	35,009	34,993	33,290
Cantabria	7,154	7,520	7,667	6,600	6,733	6,765	6,044	6,686	6,917	7,535	9,396	9,695	9,701	9,423
Castilla-Leon	14,868	13,971	16,505	11,387	14,501	17,261	11,793	15,766	22,058	23,892	31,808	30,027	31,948	30,868
Castilla-la Mancha	17,732	15,909	13,685	12,201	12,418	12,658	13,006	16,733	16,944	24,869	30,882	33,897	35,053	34,503
Catalonia	56,333	56,333	56,333	60,389	59,206	42,285	61,408	62,136	72,716	84,596	99,445	110,537	111,555	108,790
Basque Country	24,723	25,815	32,181	24,121	24,531	25,260	24,764	25,627	27,363	29,917	35,040	37,478	39,146	39,155
Extremadura	3,783	4,384	5,188	1,239	2,051	2,735	3,167	3,937	4,646	5,696	9,099	9,992	9,874	10,141
Galicia	25,291	19,931	20,944	19,717	17,930	19,150	14,576	20,666	20,580	19,430	21,089	26,214	29,560	31,638
Balears islands	6,242	6,199	7,368	7,339	8,110	8,065	9,587	9,462	10,040	10,921	12,633	13,705	12,550	13,435
Canaries islands	7,570	6,703	7,337	6,347	6,323	7,415	8,731	9,958	12,490	14,852	9,570	18,462	19,018	19,577
Madrid	62,807	61,421	63,468	53,405	52,170	50,979	54,417	71,623	67,579	81,056	82,222	86,553	93,673	98,249
Murcia	7,731	7,358	7,914	7,067	8,208	8,777	7,717	8,476	9,598	13,975	13,238	16,620	14,748	14,837
Valencia	63,928	57,431	57,402	59,608	58,229	49,642	52,705	56,452	60,800	67,428	78,832	85,279	87,631	85,963
Rioja	1,362	1,264	1,321	1,412	966	947	1,279	1,351	1,556	1,914	2,352	3,076	3,521	3,662
Ceuta	285	288	318	127	157	150	--	308	0	0	723	1,073	1,183	1,377
Melilla	438	438	438	--	137	75	47	--	44	257	408	877	976	1,059
Total	389,237	377,576	377,905	357,959	356,082	332,019	360,802	405,032	439,354	508,428	580,415	638,729	653,824	656,268

Source: CC.OO confederation

Table 12. Comisiones Obreras: Trade union membership by federations, 1981 - 1994.

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Diverse activities	12,773	12,709	13,391	12,035	11,945	11,465	13,874	15,595	17,190	22,337	25,651	29,252	32,083	31,681
Food processing	21,511	21,057	21,293	20,619	18,666	17,361	18,456	21,756	23,715	27,659	31,593	33,302	32,645	31,625
Public administration	5,444	5,123	6,561	7,038	8,781	9,364	14,255	21,216	26,554	36,849	44,784	53,858	59,686	63,519
Banking	7,868	7,206	8,299	6,738	7,641	7,136	8,654	11,365	13,437	18,382	24,070	27,422	29,789	31,863
Agriculture	15,689	15,497	13,687	12,304	11,159	9,251	8,017	11,844	13,385	15,913	20,328	21,629	18,642	17,899
Trade	8,655	8,467	8,050	8,027	8,206	7,500	9,665	10,160	11,119	13,957	17,682	19,014	20,089	19,769
Construction and wood	58,196	52,565	48,350	38,627	34,420	29,599	27,945	27,795	28,964	32,507	40,645	44,322	46,890	44,581
--construction	43,745	40,072	37,053	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
--wood	14,451	12,493	11,297	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Energy	6,057	5,513	5,283	4,862	4,768	4,291	4,067	4,476	5,425	6,393	7,246	7,338	7,817	8,754
Education	2,680	2,750	2,440	3,414	3,710	4,525	6,835	9,081	13,401	19,177	26,288	32,730	36,527	39,071
Graphical industry	10,274	9,285	9,541	9,608	8,349	7,314	7,755	10,483	9,010	10,551	11,905	13,346	13,784	13,903
--graphical industry	9,357	8,591	8,682	8,578	7,392	6,424	7,001	9,657	8,158	9,761	11,060	12,220	12,940	--
--entertainment	917	694	859	1,030	957	890	754	826	852	790	845	1,126	773	--
Hotel	9,320	9,027	9,006	8,571	8,366	8,205	10,508	11,944	13,207	15,444	19,041	22,042	21,916	23,196
Mining-metal	118,279	115,474	120,512	108,925	108,592	102,967	102,562	114,051	114,755	120,986	126,112	129,846	127,287	124,020
--metal	103,161	100,833	105,035	94,359	93,111	87,495	86,162	98,901	98,596	104,776	110,975	116,008	113,871	--
--mining	15,118	14,641	15,477	14,566	15,481	15,472	16,400	15,150	16,159	16,210	15,105	13,838	11,604	--
Pensioners	22,122	24,396	22,750	28,142	32,423	28,820	28,428	29,864	29,521	29,284	31,502	30,870	32,130	31,265
Health care	4,700	4,386	5,110	5,611	7,327	7,656	8,997	12,061	16,939	22,855	28,695	32,571	35,313	36,239
Insurance	1,129	1,172	1,188	1,192	1,088	994	1,150	1,191	1,586	1,928	2,623	2,945	3,043	2,913
Chemical+text+leather	46,670	44,469	45,287	43,211	40,263	35,079	39,144	40,558	43,148	47,157	51,700	54,764	53,472	51,033
--chemical	19,913	19,073	19,832	19,163	17,747	16,479	17,928	19,580	22,070	24,951	27,575	30,260	30,254	--
--textile	17,646	17,083	16,534	24,048	22,516	18,600	21,216	20,978	21,078	22,206	23,854	24,492	22,657	--
--leather	9,111	8,313	8,921	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Transport	36,092	36,771	36,289	39,035	40,378	40,492	47,423	46,719	53,545	59,524	59,963	71,929	71,557	74,361
Unemployed+Unclassif.	1,778	1,709	868	--	--	--	3,067	4,873	4,453	7,525	10,585	11,530	11,154	10,574
Total	389,237	377,576	377,905	357,959	356,082	332,019	360,802	405,032	439,354	508,428	580,413	638,727	653,824	656,266

Note: Due to revision of data for the period 1991-1994 by the union, the total figures for chemical-leather-textiles industries, for mining-metal and for graphical industries and entertainment are not exactly correspondent with their constituting parts.

Source: CC.OO confederation

Table 13. UGT: Trade union membership by regions, 1981 - 1995.

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995*
Andalucia	25,615	40,456	46,725	43,106	46,263	49,970	56,337	63,979	75,229	83,277	104,601	114,112	114,043	117,699	100,559
Aragon	5,122	7,671	7,468	7,658	9,673	10,906	12,789	14,173	15,352	19,292	24,651	27,628	32,013	29,871	29,023
Asturias	20,630	28,783	30,617	30,015	35,754	35,066	34,754	37,315	39,284	40,968	45,835	44,803	48,672	47,908	41,380
Cantabria	5,734	8,918	9,903	8,673	8,576	9,643	10,096	10,671	10,960	12,035	14,182	14,525	15,967	14,672	13,310
Castilla-leon	13,160	18,418	21,301	19,251	21,519	23,711	25,704	28,917	30,990	36,466	46,489	50,052	50,537	57,908	51,659
Castilla-la Mancha	10,405	12,956	14,416	11,176	12,938	12,766	13,769	16,880	18,193	19,924	26,959	28,395	30,665	28,456	26,274
Catalonia	27,357	47,896	47,773	44,891	45,941	47,827	53,714	56,962	62,113	65,899	78,205	78,918	84,103	75,859	69,523
Basque country	22,140	31,188	30,871	26,491	27,981	27,459	29,041	29,319	30,945	31,495	36,669	39,691	40,133	38,982	36,374
Extremadura	3,724	6,772	8,581	7,122	8,461	8,494	10,071	11,121	13,148	10,645	18,000	19,859	27,681	23,363	21,728
Galicia	3,514	9,583	10,686	10,641	12,329	15,075	17,834	19,871	25,856	27,177	35,111	38,055	42,325	38,105	36,780
Baleares islands	5,237	6,792	6,499	8,112	7,717	8,810	10,262	11,910	12,523	15,582	15,549	19,214	14,609	14,827	13,329
Canaries islands	4,883	7,599	11,395	9,389	11,444	11,493	14,628	15,139	15,427	16,300	21,928	24,590	21,950	20,081	17,171
Madrid	24,322	35,633	38,742	36,248	37,914	43,514	46,391	47,831	58,413	66,847	76,530	79,762	84,683	70,074	65,281
Murcia	7,376	7,675	9,302	7,736	7,895	8,218	8,847	9,740	10,398	11,068	15,087	16,314	17,103	15,925	15,446
Navarra	565	1,638	1,669	1,861	2,567	3,668	4,898	5,195	6,752	10,791	11,724	17,605	14,126	12,206	13,163
Valencia	26,863	42,332	44,200	42,204	45,703	46,766	53,285	57,163	61,037	67,708	84,170	91,664	86,642	80,766	74,544
Rioja	1,334	1,940	2,821	2,219	2,571	2,901	3,419	3,936	4,510	6,035	7,732	7,945	9,488	9,136	8,632
Ceuta	189	264	837	570	741	1,037	913	1,208	1,539	1,367	1,607	1,729	1,672	1,525	1,776
Melilla	0	260	459	368	438	549	905	1,014	1,332	1,447	1,859	2,571	3,014	2,663	2,278
Total	208,170	316,774	344,265	317,731	345,425	367,873	407,657	442,344	494,001	544,323	666,951	717,432	739,426	700,026	638,230

* provisional figure.

Source: UGT-confederation

Table 14. UGT: Trade union membership by federations, 1981 - 1995.

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995*
Metal	49,348	70,992	76,037	71,854	74,316	78,834	86,003	87,444	95,492	100,281	115,252	118,675	116,734	107,338	99,996
Construction-wood	22,701	30,266	28,633	22,658	24,216	21,245	22,348	23,367	25,958	28,055	37,705	43,649	45,962	43,202	36,408
Chemical/textile	35,613	53,146	57,484	50,448	53,509	56,068	60,203	62,404	67,080	72,316	79,821	81,080	79,798	75,616	69,163
--textiles leather:	11,401	17,179	17,247	14,216	14,433	15,470	16,156	17,289	18,085	18,753	20,747	20,291	--	--	--
--mineria	9,652	13,656	14,720	13,631	15,600	16,017	17,299	16,450	17,826	18,182	18,322	17,355	--	--	--
--chemical sector	14,560	22,311	25,517	22,601	23,476	24,581	26,748	28,665	31,169	35,381	40,752	43,434	--	--	--
Food processing	10,452	16,159	18,034	15,038	15,759	15,939	18,041	19,583	21,070	24,094	30,208	33,418	33,609	30,095	27,556
Trade hotel	14,731	20,759	22,152	18,260	20,576	20,106	25,041	29,200	38,438	34,489	48,593	62,204	60,727	56,081	50,728
-- trade	6,552	10,315	11,177	8,796	10,992	8,792	11,862	14,024	20,520	16,241	26,174	36,275	38,814	--	--
-- hotel	8,179	10,444	10,975	9,464	9,584	11,314	13,179	15,176	17,918	18,248	22,419	25,929	21,913	--	--
Education	1,350	3,463	7,363	7,159	8,968	10,853	14,600	17,177	22,065	29,596	38,861	43,247	44,965	44,469	38,991
Transport (+sea)	21,942	32,298	38,971	40,890	45,339	51,912	54,174	56,636	63,236	70,130	79,121	84,025	86,957	77,356	70,796
Public adm.	6,888	14,505	21,660	24,784	33,757	40,273	55,432	68,276	80,675	98,026	126,633	140,069	148,123	140,000	132,467
Services+banking	15,668	24,965	26,280	21,020	23,162	24,311	28,919	32,895	40,370	47,134	59,817	67,594	69,737	66,744	58,256
--different services	11,145	15,998	16,023	12,274	12,260	13,470	14,752	16,644	19,043	22,570	29,031	33,433	36,512	--	--
--banking	4,523	8,967	10,257	8,746	10,902	10,841	14,167	16,251	21,327	24,564	30,786	34,161	33,225	--	--
Agriculture	11,979	18,273	18,839	11,918	13,619	11,507	11,424	10,731	9,371	11,668	20,831	26,426	25,919	29,287	23,066
Pensioners	17,498	30,266	28,812	33,702	32,204	37,475	32,095	31,085	26,956	26,210	25,448	20,973	20,975	17,426	18,101
Small agriculture	-	-	-	-	-	-	417	3,846	4,240	2,785	6,857	6,646	16,868	23,254	23,788
Exterior											--	539	371	--	--
Total	208,170	316,774	344,265	317,731	345,592	369,690	409,406	443,798	495,569	545,234	669,551	728,545	750,745	710,868	649,316

* provisional figure

Source: UGT-confederation

Table 15. USO: Trade union membership by regions, 1988 - 1995.

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Andalucia	3,702	3,982	4,421	4,282	3,428	4,003	4,066	4,277
Aragon	3,045	3,149	3,307	3,238	3,319	3,275	3,372	3,520
Asturias	5,611	7,417	8,574	8,589	8,693	8,746	8,278	8,204
Cantabria	1,641	1,719	1,884	1,842	1,914	1,920	1,986	1,975
Castilla-leon	6,219	6,440	7,173	7,753	7,739	7,636	7,855	7,918
Castilla-la Mancha	1,209	1,253	1,291	1,264	1,219	1,232	1,765	1,708
Catalonia	8,727	10,565	12,376	12,740	13,371	14,212	14,790	14,308
Euskadi	6,833	7,021	7,753	7,905	7,821	76,595	7,515	7,093
Extremadura	29	358	394	410	424	450	450	476
Galicia	2,643	2,813	2,946	3,168	3,262	3,396	3,719	3,929
Baleares islands	2,140	2,232	2,746	2,903	2,843	2,830	2,729	3,039
Canaries islands	2,907	2,954	3,197	3,124	3,134	3,012	3,058	3,002
Madrid	5,262	6,165	6,856	6,980	6,876	6,882	6,941	7,401
Murcia	2,490	2,733	2,887	3,037	3,263	3,216	3,189	3,154
Navarra	879	958	1,062	1,021	939	944	914	857
Valencia	3,147	3,879	4,637	4,736	4,778	4,949	5,590	5,463
Rioja	1,196	1,365	1,531	1,691	1,782	1,915	1,872	1,968
Ceuta	0	0	0	0	503	451	445	387
Total	57,678	65,001	73,035	74,682	75,306	76,729	78,533	78,718

Source: USO confederation

Table 16. USO: Trade union membership by federations, 1991 - 1995.

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Printing	1,413	1,236	1,219	1,165	1,118
Food	3,920	3,910	3,961	4,048	3,896
Hotels	1,713	1,793	2,103	3,185	2,590
Finance	520	653	637	636	598
Education	8,310	8,035	8,128	8,155	8,264
Transport	5,057	5,194	5,203	5,110	5,291
Construction	3,585	3,504	3,325	3,247	3,232
Metal	14,141	13,971	13,217	12,552	12,714
Textile	1,746	1,659	1,491	1,457	1,446
Mining	3,320	2,831	2,664	2,396	2,284
Chemical	6,452	6,353	6,360	6,408	6,118
Health	3,357	3,002	3,182	3,358	3,020
Public administration	4,988	5,043	5,040	5,785	5,719
Commerce	3,218	2,906	4,204	4,217	4,505
Security firms	3,405	3,450	3,563	3,458	3,608
Unemployed	0	6,561	8,083	8,813	9,528
Pensioners	9,537	3,907	4,336	4,387	4,787
Total	74,682	75,306	76,729	78,533	78,718

Source: USO confederation

Table 17. CSI-CSIF: Trade union membership by regions, 1991 - 1994.

	1991	1992	1993	1994
Andalucia	23,461	24,696	28,376	33,483
Aragon	4,573	5,003	5,653	5,766
Asturias	1,577	1,618	1,990	2,070
Cantabria	4,061	4,280	5,364	5,418
Castilla-leon	10,617	10,965	13,686	13,823
Castilla-la Mancha	7,142	7,407	8,610	8,782
Catalonia	3,403	3,382	5,259	5,785
Pais Vasco	1,798	1,854	2,266	2,311
Estremadura	8,246	8,879	10,877	11,203
Galicia	4,167	4,291	6,103	6,225
Baleares islands	2,982	3,368	4,342	4,559
Canaries islands	1,034	1,088	1,398	3,596
Madrid	20,357	21,102	24,414	24,658
Murcia	2,308	2,432	3,137	3,262
Navarra	1,163	1,134	3,533	3,568
Valencia	10,850	11,210	13,152	13,415
Rioja	1,248	1,299	1,987	2,047
Melilla				
Ceuta	265	277	345	348
Total	109,850	114,703	141,084	150,935

Source: CSI-CSIF confederation

Table 18. CSI-CSIF: Trade union membership by federations, 1991 - 1994.

	1991	1992	1993	1994
Craft	7,692	8,054	9,469	9,542
Diverse	1,789	1,900	3,526	4,143
Administration				
- autonomous	11,658	12,103	14,413	14,873
- central	14,323	15,208	17,442	17,652
- justice	6,493	6,904	8,584	9,531
- local	9,461	9,697	12,126	12,841
Finance	7,274	7,722	11,109	11,414
Commerce & textile	888	930	1,328	1,541
Construction	3,380	3,644	4,175	4,927
Post	5,170	5,100	6,232	6,701
Energy & chemicals	7,841	8,106	10,114	9,284
Education	12,790	13,445	14,488	15,735
Hotel & food	852	892	1,235	1,420
Research	143	150	162	179
Metal	608	637	1,021	1,160
Office	399	418	506	987
Health	14,065	14,623	18,403	19,707
Air transport	96	100	153	172
Transport & communic.	2,261	2,420	2,331	3,813
University	1,971	2,064	2,662	3,376
Pensioners	510	586	1,605	1,946
Total	109,664	114,703	141,084	150,935

Source: CSI-CSIF confederation

Table 19. Union membership of CC.OO and UGT by sector, 1981-1994.

Year	a) Agriculture				b) Industry				c) Construction			
	CC.OO	UGT	Dependent lab.force	Union density	CC.OO	UGT	Dependent lab.force	Union density	CC.OO	UGT	Dependent lab.force	Union density
1981	15,689	11,979	584,400	4.7%	202,791	95,413	2,665,600	11.2%	58,196	22,701	770,800	10.5%
1982	15,497	18,273	584,500	5.8%	195,798	140,297	2,526,600	13.3%	52,565	30,266	761,000	10.9%
1983	13,687	18,839	583,400	5.6%	201,916	151,555	2,443,600	14.5%	48,350	28,633	725,400	10.6%
1984	12,304	11,918	534,000	4.5%	187,225	137,340	2,360,000	13.8%	38,627	22,658	600,100	10.2%
1985	11,159	13,619	575,200	4.3%	180,638	143,584	2,287,200	14.2%	34,420	24,216	551,600	10.6%
1986	9,251	11,507	546,200	3.8%	167,012	150,841	2,330,300	13.6%	29,599	21,245	609,900	8.3%
1987	8,017	11,424	538,700	3.6%	171,984	164,247	2,404,400	14.0%	27,945	22,348	693,500	7.3%
1988	11,844	10,731	541,400	4.2%	191,324	169,431	2,458,000	14.7%	27,795	23,367	774,200	6.6%
1989	13,385	9,371	487,800	4.7%	196,053	183,642	2,553,400	14.9%	28,964	25,958	889,700	6.2%
1990	15,913	11,668	472,100	5.8%	212,746	196,691	2,628,300	15.6%	32,507	28,055	963,100	6.3%
1991	20,328	20,831	465,500	8.8%	228,556	225,281	2,542,100	17.9%	40,645	37,705	994,500	7.9%
1992	21,629	26,426	400,500	12.0%	238,596	233,173	2,421,300	19.5%	44,322	43,649	906,500	9.7%
1993	18,629	25,919	371,500	12.0%	235,005	230,141	2,196,800	21.2%	46,890	45,692	809,500	11.4%
1994	17,899	29,287	364,300	13.0%	229,335	213,049	2,110,200	21.0%	44,581	43,202	787,100	11.2%

Year	d) Services				e) Totals			
	CC.OO	UGT	Dependent lab.force	Union density	CC.OO	UGT	Dependent lab.force	Union density
1981	75,888	60,579	3,762,800	3.6%	389,237	208,170	7,783,500	7.7%
1982	74,902	95,990	3,862,400	4.4%	377,576	316,772	7,733,600	9.0%
1983	76,943	116,426	3,882,400	5.0%	377,905	344,265	7,634,900	9.5%
1984	79,626	112,113	3,815,700	5.0%	357,959	317,731	7,309,700	9.2%
1985	85,497	131,802	3,895,000	5.6%	356,082	345,592	7,309,200	9.6%
1986	85,872	147,455	4,167,100	5.6%	332,019	369,690	7,653,900	9.2%
1987	107,487	178,166	4,336,400	6.6%	360,802	409,406	7,973,000	9.7%
1988	123,737	204,184	4,577,800	7.2%	405,032	443,798	8,351,500	10.1%
1989	149,788	244,789	4,948,500	8.0%	439,354	495,569	8,879,500	10.5%
1990	188,116	279,375	5,209,900	9.0%	508,428	545,234	9,273,400	11.4%
1991	223,146	353,025	5,371,700	10.7%	580,413	669,551	9,372,800	13.3%
1992	262,511	397,139	5,347,900	12.3%	638,727	728,545	9,076,300	15.1%
1993	277,920	410,509	5,307,800	13.0%	653,824	750,745	8,685,600	16.2%
1994	290,931	384,650	5,364,600	12.6%	656,266	710,868	8,626,300	15.8%

Note: Sectorial aggregates are calculated from data provided by the confederations. In the calculations for both CC.OO and UGT, the respective federations for various industries, small agriculture and for pensioners are not taken into account. Density data refer to dues paying members, and include the non-actives, unemployed and pensioners. The totals of the UGT are the sum of the affiliated federations not the regions. The wage earners statistics are taken from Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales, of September 1991, p.64, and March 1995, p.64. Density rates refer to the sum of UGT and CC.OO membership divided by the wage earners.

Table 20. ELA.STV: Membership by federations, 1993-1995.

	May 1993	(in %)	Dec. 1994	(in %)	Dec. 1995	(in %)
Public services	16,743	20.1		20.98		21.31
Technical employees and food processing	13,572	16.3		16.29		16.38
Education	3,857	4.6		5.45		5.69
Metal	27,727	33.3		32.71		32.36
Information, chemical sector, energy and graphical sector	8,908	10.7		10.39		10.19
Transport	6,055	7.3		6.75		6.34
Construction and wood	6,334	7.6		7.43		7.63
Total	81,773	100	87,866	100	88,714	100

Source: Manu Robles-Arangiz Institute.

Table 21. CIG: Membership by federations in 1994.

Federation	Membership	(in %)	Federation	in (%)	Membership
1. Metal	6,451	16.6	7. health	6.8	2,652
2. Services	5,890	15.2	8. sea industry	6.2	2,400
3. Construction	4,895	12.6	9. chemical + energy sector	5.3	2,061
4. Food processing	3,861	10.0	10. transport	5.3	2,061
5. Education	3,739	9.6	11. banking	3.3	1,278
6. Public administration	3,481	9.0	TOTAL	100	39,318

Source: CIG-confederation.

Table 22. Works council elections, 1978-1994.

	1978	1980	1982	1986	1990	1994
Number of workplaces	61,850	61,049	53,601	70,812	109,133	-
Voters	3,821,839	3,419,914	2,987,933	3,159,778	5,443,283	-
Representatives	193,112	164,617	140,770	162,298	237,361	224,543

Sources: for 1978-1990: MTSS *Elecciones sindicales 1990*, Madrid 1992. For 1994: unpublished data provided by Ministry, November 1996.

Table 23. Results of works council elections in (%), 1978-1994.

	1978	1980	1982	1986	1990	1994
Participation-rate	-	-	79.2	79.8	74.0	-
CC.OO	34.5	30.9	33.4	34.5	37.6	37.5
UGT	21.7	29.3	36.7	40.9	43.1	35.1
USO	3.9	8.7	4.6	3.8	3.0	3.7
ELA.STV	0.9	2.4	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.2
CIG	-	1	1.2	0.7	1.5	-
CSIF	-	-	-	-	1.4	3.3
Other unions	20.9	11.9	8.7	10.0	7.1	13.3
Non-unions	18.1	15.8	12.1	7.6	3.9	3.9

Source; see table 20.

Table 24. Works council elections in public administration, 1987-1994.

	1987	1990	1994
CC.OO	24.2 %	28.4 %	28.2 %
UGT	23.1 %	26.9 %	21.3 %
USO	-	0.9 %	1.1 %
ELA.STV	-	2.0 %	2.3 %
CIG	-	1.8 %	-
CSIF	24.9 %	19.4 %	20.2 %
Other unions	27.8 %	18.2 %	25.5 %
Non-unions	-	2.4 %	1.3 %
Workplaces	1,432	2,123	-
Voters	997,552	1,181,533	-
Elected representatives	13,065	15,375	16,268

Source; see table 20.

Table 25. An overview of trade union strength.

	Pre-1936	Dictatorship 1939-1975	Transition 1975-1978	Democratic period 1978-1995
<i>Density</i>	slightly rising, growth especially after 1917 and in 1930s.	-	massive union support members and sympathy	gradually rising especially since 1986, current level about 20
<i>Work place coverage</i>	unknown, but variance among industrial and rural areas	obligatory organization in vertical syndical structure	unknown but probably clear segmentation between union and non-union sector	unknown but probably clear segmentation between union and non union sector
<i>Works council elections</i>	-	legally introduced in 1947 (effective 1953). 1962 important for CC.OO	first elections in 1978	legal support for personnel delegates; works councils; and union sections
<i>Cohesion</i>	main disputes: anarchist versus socialist, and rural versus industrial interests		complex pattern; pluralist orientation	mainly bi-partisan model: UGT vs. CC.OO; 1988-increasing co-operation;; emerging strife: regions vs. sectors.
<i>Resources/ staff</i>	-	-	probably weak but international support	low membership income, but state support
<i>Mobilizing capacities</i>	large in several years	political protests from early 1950s on, in spite of continuous political repression	massive strike activity	relatively large industrial strike activity, general strikes in 1985, 1988, 1992, 1994

*Institutional
participation of
unions*

1923-1930: first
state corporatist
structure;
1931-1934, 1936:
relatively
progressive
governments

obligatory
participation in
vertical syndical
organization

cooperation of
CC.OO, UGT, and
USO in joint
platform (1976-77)

union rights in
constitution,
participation in
national institutes;
social concertation
(1978-86) and
social-economic
council 1992-
