The Institutionalization of Family Welfare

Division of Labour in the Field of Child Care in Austria and Germany

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The International Project on Family Changes and Family Policies, co-directed by Prof. Flora (University of Mannheim, Mannheim Centre for European Social Research) and Profs. Kamerman and Kahn (Columbia University School of Social Work, New York), analyses changes in family structures and family policies in a long-term and comparative perspective in 20 countries in Europe and overseas. Primary output will be publication of a 7-volume-series on family changes and family policies, including five volumes with country studies and two comparative volumes. Another major objective is the built-up of a family policy data base which will include regularly updated time series.

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The Institutionalization of Family Welfare: The Social Division of Labour in the Field of Child Care in Austria and Germany.


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Redaktionelle Notiz:

Birgit Fix ist wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Lehrstuhl für Soziologie I (Prof. Dr. Peter Flora) der Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften der Universität Mannheim. Das vorliegende Arbeitspapier ist während eines Forschungsaufenthaltes im Rahmen des Training and Mobility Programme for Young Researchers (TMR) "Family and Welfare State in Europe" am Institut für Demographie in Wien entstanden. Es ist eine Vorarbeit für ihre Dissertation "Die Institutionalisierung von Familienpolitik in historisch-vergleichender Perspektive."

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Editorial Note

Birgit Fix is a research assistant at the Chair of Sociology I (Prof. Dr. Peter Flora) at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Mannheim. This working paper has been produced during a research stay within the framework of the Training and Mobility Programme for Young Researchers (TMR) about "Family and the Welfare State in Europe" at the Institute for Demography in Vienna. The paper is part of her doctoral thesis on the "Institutionalization of family policies in an historical and comparative perspective."
Abstract

Comparative research on family policies has primarily focused on governmental activities for the family. Public expenditures and single governmental measures have been at the core of current discussion, with a specific focus on their impact on particular social situations of families as well as on particular family forms. Thus, most of the debate is state-centred, neglecting the role of collective actors in civil society, such as the Church, in providing family welfare. The aim of this paper is to study the division of labour between family, government and civil society on the one hand and its consequence for the division of labour within the family on the other hand in the field of child care. After presenting a short overview of the present state of comparative research, I will develop a theoretical framework for studying the social division of labour in the field of family welfare. Following this theoretical approach, I will describe the social division of labour in the field of child care. In order to develop an institutional map of child care in Europe, I will compare Austria and Germany as exemplary cases. There are huge variations in these patterns to be found all across Western European societies. Thus, in the part to follow, I try to explain these similarities and differences with reference to the origins and development of the division of labour in the field of child care. For this purpose, I choose an historical and interpretive approach following Stein Rokkan. Thus, I will study and compare the country-specific configurations of cleavages from their origins, the social actors organizing along these lines of conflicts, and their ideas for problem-solving in the field of child care.
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I. Family policies analysis as an analysis of societies

Comparative research on family policies has primarily focused on governmental activities for the family, neglecting the role of other social actors in civil society in policy-making and providing family welfare. Public expenditures and single governmental measures have been at the core of current comparative studies, with a specific focus on their impact on particular social situations of families as well as on particular family forms: thus, the studies of Kahn and Kamerman (1978, 1981, 1991, 1994) are most of all concerned with comparing selected measures in individual countries. The publications of the "Gesellschaft für Familienforschung" (Neubauer et al. 1993a, 1993b) focus on an inventory of actual packages of measures taking the existence of family organizations, family observatories, and the family departments, as well as of other governmental organizations in the national contexts into specific consideration. Bradshaw et al. (1995) investigate the impact and benefit of the packages of family policy measures on different family models by applying a matrix approach. For several years the project of a "European Observatory" has tried to evaluate changes in family structures and national family policies in the EU countries. This institution publishes country-specific reports on the actual situation of families in member-states (Dumon 1991, Ditch et al. 1995). Other studies, such as those by Sainsbury (1994) and Bock & Thane (1994), focus more strongly on the impact family policies have on the gender dimension in a comparative perspective, whereas Therborn (1993) is more interested in the study of children's rights in a comparative perspective. Kaufmann and his research team have carried out survey studies testing the impact of family policies on families in certain periods of the life cycle (Kujsten et al. 1994). In order to get a better understanding of family attitudes and values as well as of the benefit of certain measures for families, the Population Policy Acceptance project (PPA) made a comparative survey that was evaluated in country reports (Moors/ Koesoebjone 1991; Moors/ Palomba 1995) and comparative studies (Dorbritz/ Fux 1997). Another set of comparative studies concentrates on governmental population policy measures, as do the studies of Höhn & Schubnell et al. (1986) and of Hoffman-Nowotny et al. (1992). A strong historical perspective underlies the studies of Anne H. Gauthier (1996) on the background and origin of state activities for the family in a comparative perspective. Single measures such as child care were investigated in a comparative way by Olmsted & Weikart (1989), Woodill et al. (1992) and Cochran et al. (1993). Wennemo (1994) has linked the party composition of governments with family benefit systems. She attempts to locate family policies within the range of a welfare-state typology based on party ideology (Esping-Andersen 1990; Castles 1994; Kersbergen 1995), taking the importance of the women’s movement into consideration.

To summarize, most of the debate is state-centred, neglecting the role of social actors in civil society, such as the church and trade unions, in providing family welfare. The neglect of non-state actors becomes more fatal in studying family policies in societies such as Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Norway, where social partnership plays an important role in the policy-making-process and in providing family welfare. It is the goal of this paper to understand the country-specific path of

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1 This paper was presented at the Third European Conference for Sociology in Essex, Thematic Subtheme: Work, Welfare, and Citizenship/ Subgroup: Welfare State, Welfare, Society, 28st August, 1997. For useful comments to my work I like to thank the Mannheim team of the international project on "Family Change and Family Policies" under the direction of Peter Flora, the research assistant of the Research Unit I of the MZES, Gudny Bjork Eydal (Iceland) and my sister Elisabeth. The data on Austria could be collected during a stay in Vienna financed by a scholarship of the "Training and Mobility Programm for Young Researchers (TMR) Family and the Welfare State in Europe".
institutionalizing family welfare in a society from the country-specific constellation of actors in an interpretive way, thereby explaining them causally. Consequently, I largely follow Heinz Lampert who defined family policies in a wider sense as "the rationally-guided action of all the actors and instances responsible in the public sphere that are oriented toward the improvement of the judicial, economic and social situation of the family according to their political ideas and goals as defined by these actors and as pursued by all means that seem to be appropriate" (Lampert 1986: 10, transl. and emphasis B.F.). However, I would suggest referring to a social sphere instead of a public sphere to emphasize the importance of all actors in a society in the field of family welfare. By focussing the discussion on single measures and expenditures, one misses the opportunity to learn more about societies, since the family is one of the most important cornerstones of any society. A deeper insight into the division of labour within a society can be reached by an analysis of the socially fixed division of labour in the field of family welfare. I start from the assumption that societies - in contrast to state actors - try to build institutions in order to solve specific problems resulting from social conflicts. These institutional solutions constrain the space of action of the actors with respect to the regulation of problems coming up later on.

The Industrial Revolution was the immediate cause of several problems that became central issues of family welfare and continue to the present day: the separation of household and work made it necessary for families to define the education and care of their children in a new way. By restricting and later even forbidding child labour and by introducing compulsory education, children were no longer available as a cheap workforce for their families but instead turned into an expense. After children disappeared from the labour market, the income situation of the family worsened and women were forced to work outside the home in order to secure the subsistence of their family. The protection of mothers during the period following childbirth became a public issue, one that is closely connected with the issue of child care. Thus, the differentiation between household and work brought about the necessity of an institutional differentiation of the reproductive and educational functions of the family. To summarize, two questions of institutional differentiation became important with respect to the social division of labour in the field of family welfare: 1. the protection of maternity, and 2. the care and education of children (fig.1). These questions have been under discussion up to the present time.

The more or less common problems arising with the process of industrialization in Western Europe were dealt with by the individual societies in different ways. The main reason, in my eyes, seems to be the big variation between the society-specific configurations of actors. These configurations are the product of the historical cleavages that determine the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity of a society. In 1967, Rokkan and Lipset applied the Parsonian AGIL-scheme and found four central cleavages that fragmented Western European societies. The National Revolution has produced an ethnic and linguistic cleavage as well as a cleavage between the State and Church, whereas the Industrial Revolution brought conflicts between urban and rural interests and the cleavage between employers and employees to the fore (Rokkan/ Lipset 1967: 14). From these country-specific configurations of cleavages that also determine the degree of heterogeneity in a society, organizations such as parties, trade unions and associations as well as patterns of values, attitudes and political processes developed in specific ways. Those country-specific differences in institutions, political processes and values, in my view, are the central structural conditions for the development of specific forms of family policies. Therefore, the development of parties, trade unions and associations within the state-church-conflict and the conflict between employers and employees as well as their respective ideologies and ideas should be taken into consideration in any comparative study on family policies. The single groups of actors within a society perceive problems in a specific way that also determines the solutions to the problems proposed. Thus, it is of vital importance to study ideas about the relationship between family, society, and the state as expressed by the different actors in family policies in a
historical perspective in order to understand the socially-fixed division of labour in the field of family policies within a society.

In particular, the contrasts between the Catholic and denominationally-mixed societies are interesting cases for comparison: since those societies are culturally highly fragmented, family policy issues such as the education of children have been subjects of deep social conflicts between different social groups, even producing social cleavages. Thus, I have chosen Catholic Austria and denominationally-mixed Germany for comparison in this paper.

Austria and Germany, in my eyes, are interesting cases for comparison since they have a common tradition in the development of the welfare state. Austria introduced an obligatory system of social insurance following the German example (Alber 1987: 47). In contrast to that development, no common model in the division of labour in the field of family welfare can be observed. The question now is how to explain these variations in the socially-fixed division of labour in the field of family. In the first part of this paper, I will develop a theoretical framework to study the social division of labour in family welfare. In a second part, I describe the institutional division of labour in Austria and Germany following this approach. In the last two parts, I try to explain this division of labour from the specific and historically-developed configuration of actors and their ideas in an interpretive way.
fig 1.
Institutional division of labour in the field of family welfare

issues/problems in the field of family welfare
1. protection of maternity
2. child care and education

country-specific configuration of actors

ideas/interests of actors

criteria of rationality
to specify the context of action
1. predominance of the public sphere
2. predominance of intermediary agencies
3. predominance of the family

country-specific solution
by configuration of institutions

socially-fixed division of labour
in the field of family welfare
1. state intervention model
2. corporative model
3. familialist model
II. Theoretical concept: The institutional analysis.

The theoretical concept of this paper is based on an historical-institutional approach. Thus, my work stands in the tradition of an interpretive sociology. I shall follow Max Weber's call to study social phenomena with an interpretive understanding of social action that can then be causally explained in its course and consequences (Weber 1968: 4). Up to the present, the institutional perspective has been widely neglected in the theoretical approaches on the origins and development of modern welfare states. An exception to that rule is the work of Peter Flora and Rainer M. Lepsius. These two authors have been much influenced by Max Weber's theory of social action. According to this theory, social action is determined by ideas on the one hand and interests on the other.

The socially-fixed division of labour in the field of family welfare, which is co-determined by family policy measures, in my opinion can be regarded as a configuration of institutions since they define social norms and values that build the space of action for actors in this policy field, offering families a range of alternative actions and, at the same time, constraining this set of alternatives. My goal is to investigate the process of the development of these institutions, or, in other words, their institutionalization.

Following Durkheim, one can define institutions as "all sets of belief systems and behavioral norms set by the society" (Durekheim 1991: 100, transl. and emphasis B.F.). Thus, a major step of research is to look for the ideas circulating in a society that are able to define the norms and standards of social behavior. Maurice Hauriou (1965) thus has given pride of place to the concept of an "idée directrice" that builds the key and guiding line of the social action of political élites. But Hauriou is not able to explain why élites implement a certain "idée directrice" in politics while others do not. Here, the introduction of Max Weber's concept of "interest" gains relevance and importance for theory-building. The concept of interests enables us to understand the process of implementing ideas in concrete political actions. In his "Economic Ethics of World Religions" edited in 1920, Weber sets a famous phrase that is often quoted: "Interests (material and ideal ones), but not: ideas directly determine the social action of man. Yet, very frequently the 'ideas of social reality' (Weltbilder) that have been created by 'ideas' have, like switchmen, defined the tracks along which the dynamics of interests pushed forward action" (Weber 1988: 252, transl. B.F.). But the important question is: how are interests formed and when and how are institutions built? Malinowski (1975) deducts the building of institutions from the fulfillment of specific needs. The idea that social action is only directed towards the satisfaction of needs evoked a sharp critique by Gehlen, who saw social action as a creative act (1955, 1975). A synthesis of both approaches was undertaken by Schelsky (1965: 38) who assumes that institutions serve several purposes. In all three approaches, institutions have the function of stabilizing human behavior, or, in other words, of building a social order. In all these approaches institutions are, at the same time, considered as actors that create an order (functionalist perspective). This means that institutions can be considered as rules in order to solve distributional or other types of conflicts. Nevertheless it is necessary, in my eyes, to talk concretely about the particular actors that build those institutions. Therefore, it seems necessary to me to extend the concept of institutionalization to introduce an action-centred perspective. In Parsons' theory of action, institutions define role expectations and the range of sanctions in case norms are violated. In the same way, the number of alternatives of action is specified and thus restricted (Parsons 1957: 177). Since institutions are built on the conformity of all actors with respect to norms and values, this perspective implies that we have to look at the "actors" supporting those values. But the analytical level of the actor perspective is missing in Parsons' theory. In this context, I would like to refer to Max Weber who deducts social action from interests and ideas.

In Weber's approach, ideas function as "gate-keepers" defining the interests of actors that are directly orienting social action. The interests and ideas of actors in the actual processes of decision-making about family policies thus can be inferred from the historically built institutions or their configurations (fig.
1.). Actors with similar or common interests deriving from historical constellations of conflicts have joined as members of specific social groups. The oppositional interests of groups concerning a specific object have resulted in the building of specific cleavages that run through a society. It was Stein Rokkan who elaborated the perspective that most of the cleavages that show their relevance for the decision-making-processes even today were already built in the historical phases of state formation and nation-building. In order to solve these basic conflicts along the cleavage lines, societies have built a system of institutions. They formulate basic ideas (Leitideen) and develop criteria of rationality (Rationalitätskriterien) in order to specify the context of action (Handlungskontext). Basic ideas and criteria of rationality can be controversial within a society. In such controversy lies the potential for institutional change (Lepsius 1997: 65). The basic ideas and the subsequently developed criteria of rationality contain the solution to distributional conflicts. Rainer Lepsius distinguishes between four problems of allocation in this context: 1. the allocation of competences that determines and regulates the rights to decide, 2. the allocation of resources which determines the availability and the power over the means to attain goals, 3. the allocation of legitimation that regulates the distribution of legitimation within society, and 4. the allocation of control that regulates the distribution of sanctions (cf. Lepsius 1990: 61). These allocations are specific for the social order and can change by system transformation. This is important for any historical analysis.

With respect to the social division of labour in the field of family welfare, industrialization brought the institutional differentiation of household and work to the fore, thereby making the norm that the family should be responsible for the reproduction and education of children a subject of social discussion. Rational criteria such as the prevalence of the public sphere and the predominance of intermediary agencies and the family were discussed in European societies. The impact of these ideas in the decision-making processes differs from society to society according to the actors’ interests. Thus, the institutional division of labour in the two fields 1. maternity protection and 2. education of children became institutionalized according to the predominance of one of these three concepts or of a mixture of them. One can distinguish three models of an institutional division of labour within the field of family welfare: 1. the state intervention model, for which the predominance of the public sphere is typical, 2. the corporative model, in which the predominance of intermediary agencies is dominant, and 3. the familialist model, in which the responsibility of the family is dominant.

In reality, one could expect to find a mixture of these types since different ideas and interests of actors make compromises necessary. Nonetheless, these ideal types can be helpful in developing an institutional map of child care and maternity protection in Europe. In the next paragraph, I will analyze how Austria and Germany can be categorized with respect to these three ideal-types.

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2 Also Beat Fux tried to replace typologies such as Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare regimes by distinguishes an individualistic, etatistic and familistic regime. According to Fux, individualistic regimes are characterized by the absence of an effective family policy. Thus, "individuals or couples are forced to organise their interest themselves" (Fux: 8). Etatistic regime are dominated by state intervention. In familistic regimes, welfare policy is oriented towards the family. In general, I think that this kind of typology makes more sense than typologies using political labels as does Esping-Andersen (1990). Nonetheless, a problem of the Fux typology is the change of analytical level: Individualistic and etatistic terms are concentrated on the question of who is responsible for the family. In contrast, the question behind the familistic type is: Who profits from a policy?
III. The social division of labour in the field of child care in Austria and Germany

Development up to 1945

In order to study the social division of labour in the field of child care it is necessary to shed some light on the situation of the parents - especially mothers - since mothers’ employment is an important issue on political agendas all over Europe. The call for protecting children and women in the 19th century was not motivated by family welfare but by better working and living conditions for these groups in the labour market. Thus, the first law for the protection of children was launched in 1786 by Joseph II in Austria - sixteen years before the famous British Moral and Health Act in 1802 (Ebert 1975: 49). Its aim was to produce a better hygienic situation for children. Although the Prussian Law in 1839 (Regulativ über die Beschäftigung jugendlicher Arbeiter in Fabriken), the Bavarian Law of 1940, the Austrian Industrial Code (Gewerbeordnung) of 1859 and the German Industrial Code 1891 tried to improve children’s working conditions by regulating working hours, the problem was enforcing the legislation. The same was true of the maternity protection in Germany (1878 unpaid/ 1883 paid) and in Austria (1888 paid). Thus, socially-insured women in childbirth were entitled to payment after confinement by their health insurance. In reality, many women had to circumvent the period of work prohibition of six weeks (Germany) or four weeks (Austria) after confinement in order to earn money for their subsistence. They brought their newborn children to the factory or and calmed it with specific methods (for details see Sieder 1987: 40) because they were not able to live on the reduced benefit they received from health insurance. Alternatives like public child care institutions were not were widespread in Austria and Germany. Thus, such protective measures did not change the division of labour in the field of family welfare in Austria and Germany in general. However, the introduction of paid maternity protection can be interpreted as a first step by the state in regulating the division of labour in the field of family welfare. The responsibility was given to intermediary agencies, when maternity protection was financed by employers’ and employees’ health insurance contributions. Thus, the burden of childbirth and care for babies was shifted from the socially insured mother or the family to the community of insured people. Maternity protection as a part of social insurance was used as an authoritarian defense against (full) political citizenship by the constitutional monarchies of Austria and Germany (Flora/ Alber 1995: 46). Or, in other words: the German and Austrian states tried to produce political legitimacy via social policy, in our case via family policies. According to this political aim, the allocation of control was low since for both groups - the mother needing the income and the employer needing the working force - it would have been worse to regulate the distribution of sanction strongly.

The reduction of the birth rate at the end of the 19th century stimulated the social debate on public child care. Until the First World War, the public education of infants as part of child and family welfare was accepted in German society (Reyer 1987) and subsidized by financial support of kindergarten. Thus, the state took responsibility for children who could not receive sufficient education within their families. In Austria, the 1872 decree on kindergarten provision was valid for nearly 100 years. In this decree, kindergarten was seen as a useful supplement to family education. Kindergarten could be offered by the Länder, communities, voluntary associations and private persons (Faßmann/ Aufhauser/ Münz 1988:9-10). After the First World War, pre-school education was a key issue in the debate at the conference about the educational system in the Reich (Reichsschulkonferenz) in which an Austrian delegation also participated (Lechner 1995: 506). The result of this conference was the Law for the Welfare of the Youth in the Reich (Reichsjugendwohlfahrtsgesetz) in 1924, which emphasized the priority competence of the family for the education of the child and was consequently directed against any kind of compulsory pre-school education. The Law granted the priority of voluntary associations in child welfare. The state was to intervene on the
national or communal level only if there were not enough voluntary associations available for implementing this task (Hermanutz 1977: 176), but the state got the right to control. With respect to the allocation of resources, families and voluntary associations had to care for their own. Financial support by the provinces followed the Law of 1924 as optional but was not granted as a right because of the bad financial situation of the federal state and the provinces during this period. The regulations in Germany corresponded to the principle of legitimacy to be found in the German Constitution of 1919: the responsibility for childrearing was granted to the families (Art. 120 WRV) and the state was charged with the obligation to protect youth if parents were not able to do so (Art. 122 WRV). But shortly after the Law was passed, this right was withdrawn, with declared financial support to be distributed on a voluntary basis. Thus, there was no longer any possibility of sanctions since this right was no longer a social citizenship right.

A further step was taken during the pre-war period, when in the field of maternity protection the claim to payment was extended: in Austria pregnant female workers and employees were prohibited from working for a period of six weeks before and eight weeks after confinement. It had been paid by health insurance since 1921. There were special laws passed in the Bundesländer for female workers in the agrarian sector (with the exception of the Bundesland Vorarlberg, Münz/Neyer 1990: 28). Germany granted four weeks before and six weeks after confinement for insured pregnant women (with the exception of women working in agrarian sector). In 1927, this period was extended to six weeks before birth. In reality, increasing costs of living in the pre-war period compelled women to work, since the sickness benefit was lower than the real wage. Thus, claims for maternity protection decreased in Austria between 1923 and 1928 from 99% to 86% (Münz/ Neyer 1990: 33).

Even if the division of labour in the field of family welfare in the pre-war period did not change the real situation of families/ mothers very much, it is remarkable that the state assumed powers that determined and regulated a new division of labour within the society: thus, intermediary agencies got the responsibility for the family. In the field of German child care, the priority of voluntary associations was granted. In both young parliamentary democracies, in Austria and in Germany, family welfare was used to produce political legitimacy. Thus, in Germany the protection of the family, conceived as a responsibility of the Länder and the federal state by the Constitution of Weimar (Art.7 WRV; Ar. 119 WRV), came into being. A similar formulation can be found in the Austrian Constitution of 1920 (Art.16 BVG).

The situation changed completely when Hitler came to power in Germany. It was the aim of the Nazi Regime to suspend the institutional variety of social organizations and services and to replace them by a centralized system. Thus, the violent destruction of intermediary agencies as the trade unions and the old party system was a first step to destroy the Weimar Constitution. But it was more difficult to attack the Churches. The Lutheran principle of subordination to state authority was helpful to suppress protest against Hitler politics. The same principle did not work with respect to the Catholic Church. Therefore, Hitler caught them by concluding a concordate. With respect to the institutionalized system of family policy, he granted the existence of Catholic organizations and associations as well as the possibility of the church to participate in the educational system. Since a concrete list of organizations and associations to be protected was missing in the moment of signing the contract, Hitler could attack them soon. With the "National Socialist Peoples’ Welfare" (Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt= NSV), a mass organization for coordinating welfare was founded. It functioned as a transmission belt of the Führer and had the task to intervene also into the welfare sphere of the Church. The Catholic Caritas and the Protestant Inner Mission had to enter with their child care institutions in the NSV dominated "Reich Working Community of Free Welfare" (Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft der freien Wohlfahrtspflege). Thus, it was under the direct control of
the NSDAP. The main aim of the NSV was the total control of all welfare activities, kindergarten and child care organizations. The same happened in Austria after the Anschluss (Faßmann/ Aufhauser/ Münz 1988: 10).

In the first year of the Nazi era it was the aim of the state to stop the employment of women with the exception of agrarian work and to bring them back to hearth. Family life was dominated by lots of mass organizations, which replaced the old intermediary organizations in order to control for the education of children and the leisure time of adults. The Austrian Ständestaat followed the German prototype with respect to women employment. The situation changed, when it became necessary for the German industry to integrate women again into the labour market for reasons of war economy. Thus, the number of crèches (day care facilities for children under 3) and public kindergarten increased and private enterprises were advised to build up child care institution (Münz/ Neyer 1990: 37). The same holds true for Austria after the Anschluss to the Third German Reich. In 1941, family allowances were introduced in Germany and in Austria.

In general, National Socialism must be seen as a total break with the old institutionalized distributional pattern of duties between state, society and the family. The state took over the allocation of competences determining and regulating the rights to decide, and also the allocation of resources, which determines the availability and the power over the means of goal-attainment and, last, the allocation of control that regulates the distribution of sanctions. Like the constitutional monarchies, the National Socialist Regime used family policies in order to legitimize its authoritarian system and to compensate for the absence of democratic mass participation. In the pre-war period the family, and within the family, the mother, were responsible for the care of babies and toddlers. Older children were taken from the family by mass organizations such as the ‘Hitlerjugend’ and the ‘Bund Deutscher Mädchen’. During the Second World War, the family increasingly lost control of their children’s upbringing as mothers were integrated into the labour force.

The development since 1945

The racist bias of family policies during the NS government was the reason why the Allies abolished some of these measures in 1945, when all racist laws were forbidden. In contrast to family allowances, in Austria, maternity protection was not abolished by the Allies and became part of the Austrian legal order. As in Germany, the old law was valid until 1957 when a new maternity protection law was created. In 1957, unpaid maternity leave up to a maximum of six months after the maternity protection of six weeks before and twelve weeks after confinement was introduced in Austria. In 1961, maternity leave was extended to a maximum of one year and, in addition, a means-tested cash benefit (Karenzgeld) paid by the unemployment insurance and the family allowances fund was introduced. With respect to the division of labour in the field of child care, maternity leave clearly favoured a model in which mothers had the responsibility for the care of their preschool-aged children. In 1974, the period of prohibition of employment was extended to eight weeks before and twelve weeks after confinement and the means-tested cash benefit (Karenzgeld) was abolished in favour of a universal benefit. Since 1990, maternity leave can also be taken by the father if the mother of a child has the right to paid leave (before birth of a child, the mother must have been socially insured for 52 weeks) or if she is employed. Thus, parental leave compels people to give up work and assume unemployed status (Neyer/ Wiederschwinger 1990: 192). With this concept, the federal state introduced laws that had been released in some Länder in the 1980s (Neyer 1993). By this regulation the responsibility for young children was given in part to both parents instead of just the mother. Since the claim of parental leave is connected with the right of the mother, her responsibility nonetheless has higher weight.

3 For details see Faßmann/ Aufhauser/ Münz 1988 (91-108) and Denk/ Schatrovits 1995 (107-112).
In contrast to Austria, maternity leave was introduced only much later in Germany: up to 1979. West German policies in this field were more or less limited to the older form of protecting working mothers from dangerous activities and employment before and after confinement. The laws of maternity protection (Mutterschutzgesetz) of 1952 and 1965, which were a part of the industrial law, set the period of prohibition of employment at six weeks before and after confinement (1952), and six weeks before and eight weeks after confinement (1965). From 1965 onwards, mothers received payment after confinement. For a period of 14 weeks (six weeks before and eight after confinement) maternity protection was paid as a sickness benefit up to the amount of 25 German marks per day. The difference between this amount and the net income had to be paid by the employer. Dismissal was made impossible until the second month after the end of maternity protection. Family tasks were regarded as a private matter. Therefore, the idea prevailed that many working mothers should not take up employment again until the period of maternity protection that was paid when sickness benefits had come to an end. The possibility of a maternity leave after the time of maternity protection was introduced in 1979, when mothers could claim paid maternity leave connected with a job security during the first six months of the child’s life. After the period of maternity protection, they received an income-related benefit at a maximum of 750 DM financed by federal revenues up to the end of the child’s sixth month. In 1984, the benefit was reduced to 510 DM, but without any income restriction.

Paid maternity leave was based on an experimental model that was tested from 1978 to 1981 in three regions of Lower Saxony. This model was intended to test how a system that combined parental leave and cash benefits related to this measure and health insurance as well as pension insurance contributions paid by the Land Lower Saxony worked. Not included in this model was the possibility of part-time work and the payment of the unemployment insurance by the Land. The results of this experiment were fundamental for the introduction of a parental leave programme in West Germany in 1986, as were the concepts of the so-called ‘Landeserziehungsgeld’ (child-care benefit from the Länder) in Baden-Württemberg, Berlin and in Rhineland-Palatinate that existed since 1983 and 1984 respectively.

The parental leave programme of December 6, 1985 intended to provide children with permanent care by a related person. The idea behind this programme was that it was better for children if one person closely related to the child provided care for the child’s first year. Thus, society did not have to pay for out-of-home care. It was of utmost importance for the government to underline that family work should receive the same social appreciation as employment. Therefore, benefits for the care of children were paid not only for employed persons but also for persons without any former employment. This is a very important point because care of children now received the status of ‘employment for society’. Biological parents as well as adoptive parents, step-parents, grandparents or other related persons with a right to provide care were entitled to this benefit, as were lone mothers or fathers. Parental leave as such was only paid to employed persons, but the federal child-care benefit (Bundeserziehungsgeld) since then has been a general scheme: housewives, self-employed persons and family members helping in the family business are also entitled to it. Parental leave starts after maternity protection from eight weeks after confinement. The length of time in which a related person has a claim to paid parental leave changed in the Federal Republic of Germany in the years 1986, 1988, 1990 and 1993. Either parent can claim paid parental leave in exchange. The main condition for claiming parental leave is the continuous care for the child by the person that has taken the parental leave during this period. The ‘Bundeserziehungsgeld’ (child-care benefit on federal level) is paid as a state-financed benefit.

As mentioned above, one key argument in favour of the law on parental leave was that society did not have to pay for out-of-home care. Corresponding to that argument day care for young children under 3 in Austria and Germany expanded only at a low pace. As can be seen in fig.2, the public care of infants is less developed in both countries, since only a small number of places is available. Alternatives, such as
childminders ("Tagesmütter"), are not to be found in the official statistics of both countries. Both countries give preference to family care for children under three years. This can be seen from the maternity leave measures as well as from special assistance payments to mothers with children under three years in Austria (Sondernotstandshilfe) when the mother can prove that she is not able to work because of lack of child-care facilities. In Austria, fathers’ rights to parental leave depend upon the rights and decisions of the mothers, which clearly shows that the division of labour within the family is fixed by family policies. The German parental leave is more neutral in this respect since both parents may claim leave. In reality, the small amount of the child-care benefit (Erziehungsgeld) causes a break in the employment career of the mother. The replacement of maternity leave by parental leave indicates a change in the socially-fixed division of labour in the field of child care. Since in reality parental leave in Germany and Austria is taken by the mother, one may now observe change in the division of labour within the family.

![fig.2](image)

**Places in crèches in Austria and Germany, 1970/1-1990**


To summarize, in both countries, the government has legislative authority with regard to the division of labour in the field of child care. The responsibility is given to the family and within the family to the mother. There is a difference with respect to the allocation of resources: Whereas in Austria intermediary agencies are predominant - maternity leave receives half of its financing from the unemployment insurance fund, two-thirds of which is paid by employers' and employees' contributions, and the other half from the family allowance fund, of which 75% is financed by employers - in Germany the state, which finances the maternity/parental leave, is predominant. In Germany, this division of labour is legitimized by Article 6 of the Basic Law which grants parents the right to raise children without state interference except in cases of abuse or neglect. Maternity is put under the special protection of the community (Art. 6.4 GG). The Austrian Constitution has no comparable guarantee of parents’ rights, but the federal state has the legislative competences in the field of mothers’ and infants’ welfare (Art.12 B-VG), whereas the Länder have to implement this legislation. Neither country guarantees a right to a day-care place. Thus, families now have the potential of using sanctions to change this situation. In order to solve the problem of child care, they have to use the potential of the market.
The situation is not comparable with respect to children in the age group 3-6. Fig. 3 shows the participation rate of children aged 3-6 in kindergarten in Austria and Germany. These results have been calculated from population census data.\textsuperscript{4} Data are available for the years 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991 for Austria; for Germany, calculable data are only available for the years 1950, 1961 and 1970. The data for 1991 have been taken from the official statistics of the Federal Office of Statistics in Wiesbaden. Therefore, the graph concerning the German data between 1970 and 1991 is displayed in dots. In both countries the participation rate was very low in the 1950s with Austria lagging behind Germany. Since the 1970s places in kindergartens have expanded in both countries: 52\% of Austrian children in the age group 3-6 have a place in a kindergarten, as compared to 80\% of German children. This relation clearly shows that public child care is more widespread in Germany than in Austria.

![Figure 3: Participation rate of children aged 3-6 in kindergarten in Austria and Germany, 1951-1991](image)


It is difficult to draw an exact picture of the share of costs, since kindergartens in Germany are in the responsibility of the Bundesländer. The same holds true for Austria (Art. 14 B-VG). In both countries, parents, the state, the provinces and the kindergarten operators share the costs. It is much easier to get an overview of the division of labour among the operators. As can be seen from the first graph, kindergarten operators in Germany are above all the welfare organizations with a prevalence of confessional associations. With the increase of places in kindergarten between 1970 and 1990 other religious associations, private

\textsuperscript{4} I wish to thank Franz Rothenbacher from the data archive EURODATA of the Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung for giving me access to this database.
enterprises and other associations came to provide places. In Austria, most of the kindergartens are publicly operated. The second graph shows that these trends increased between 1970 and 1990. The same proportion can be seen in the distribution of the day-care providers: in Austria, three-quarters of day care is provided by the state (graph 3) whereas in Germany less than 50% is (graph 4).  

The availability of full-time kindergarten places is not very well developed in either country. The right to a kindergarten place as fixed by German law has not greatly changed since many communities cut full-time kindergarten into half-time places in order to be able to fulfil the requirements of this law. Thus, the responsibility for child care, in reality, continues to be left to the family and within the family to the mother.

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5 The data used for the graphs are taken from the official statistics. Thus, lots of private initiatives could not be accounted for.

graph 2. Kindergarten operators in Austria, 1970 and 1990

graph 3.
Operators of crèches in Austria, 1990


graph 4.
Operators of crèches in FRG (only the old Länder), 1990

The result of this division of labour can also be observed in fig. 4. The labour force activity rate by age groups and gender in 1995 shows a typical ‘M-curve’ for Germany. That means that mothers follow a three-phase-model: labour force participation is followed by care for the family at home and, in a third phase, by a return to the labour force. In Austria this break cannot be observed in the same manner, since mothers have the status of unemployed persons during maternity leave. Since 1974, Austrian mothers lost their right to unemployment insurance after the maternity leave. This means that they have to decide whether to go back to employment or to disappear from the labour market. The stronger decrease of female labour force activity rate in Austria in the age group 35-44 could be explained by the lack of child care places.

![Fig. 4: Labour force activity rate by age group and gender in Austria and Germany, 1995](image)


**Explanation**

To summarize, in both Germany and Austria family policies have fixed a kind of division of labour in child care which gives the general responsibility for children to the family. In Germany, this division of labour is legitimised by Article 6 of the Basic Law which grants parents the right to raise children without state interference except in cases of abuse or neglect. Maternity is put under the special protection of the community (Art. 6.4 GG). A comparable guarantee of parents’ rights is missing from the Austrian Constitution, but the federal state has the legislative competences in the field of mothers’ and infants’ welfare (Art.12 B-VG) whereas the Länder have to implement this legislation. The main difference between Austria and Germany in the division of labour in family welfare is in the field of financing: whereas in Germany maternity and parental leave are financed by the state budget, in Austria they are paid by the unemployment insurance. The unemployment insurance is mainly financed by contributions of employers and employees and some additional state supplements. Thus, it can be argued that the corporative element in
Austria is more dominant than the state element, whereas in Germany the corporative structure is missing. One the other hand, in the field of child care, voluntary associations are given a more prominent role in Germany than in Austria, where child care is more often publicly operated. But the fact that child-care operators in Germany are subsidized by the state reduces the weight of this statement. The question is how to explain these differences in the division of labour in family welfare in Austria and Germany.

The first idea that comes to mind is that the corporative model of Austria is the result of a politics dominated by Catholic ideas; the Pope has several times made his position clear through papal encyclicals. In the encyclical ‘De conditione opificum’ he advocated guaranteed wages for workers because nobody should be dependent on the clemency of his employer. He also proclaimed the worker’s duty to support his family but avoided connecting these two arguments. In general, he was against state intervention and favoured a subsidiary model of cooperation between employers and employees. Thus, one could argue that the dominance of Christian democracy in Austria is the main reason for using this model. This kind of argument is in the tradition of welfare state research, and welfare-state typologies based on party ideology have a long tradition. Whereas Walter Korpi (1983) elaborates on the social democratic model of welfare state development, e.g. Flora and Alber can show that the social security and insurance programmes in European welfare states have been pushed and implemented not only by socialist trade unions and parties but, on the contrary, have partially been introduced by political élites of a conservative or liberal provenance (Flora/Alber 1985, Alber 1987). Wilensky (1981) has pointed to the importance of the Catholic party power for the welfare state development in Europe. Castles (1994) also emphasizes the role of religion and Christian parties for the development of the modern welfare state. The benefit of this kind of typology-building can really be doubted if one looks at the empirical country clusters that different authors working in this tradition have formed: whereas Esping-Andersen puts France, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Austria in the category of conservative welfare regimes, Castles and Mitchell (1993) classify France together with Canada, Ireland, Japan, Switzerland and the Netherlands as conservative welfare states, but Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden as ‘non-right hegemony’ states. With reference to that context, I completely agree with Franz-Xaver Kaufmann who wonders ‘whether a typology working with political labels such as the actually most discussed typology by Esping-Andersen (1990) is really able to represent the complexity and institutional variety of the different forms of social policies and welfare states existing in reality’ (Kaufmann 1996: 710). Especially the comparison of Germany and Austria can show that this kind of argumentation does not fit. Both Germany and Austria have strong Christian Democrat parties but have arrived at different results as to the division of labour in family welfare. Thus, I suggest examining the country-specific constellation of actors to gain an understanding of the country-specific paths of institutionalizing family welfare in Austria and Germany. Without analysing the institutional context and the configuration of actors, in my view it is not possible to understand the basic patterns of the division of labour within the field of family welfare.

IV. Configuration of actors

In analysing the German and Austrian cases it makes sense to distinguish between specific actors in family politics, on the one hand, and general political actors, on the other: for actors such as family organizations, welfare associations, and women’s organizations, family policy is their major field of activity both as interest groups and as providers of social services. General political actors such as the political parties and labour organizations have broader interests than family policies.

Many of these actors developed in an early stage of state formation and nation-building. Fig. 5. shows the development in Germany: during the constitutional stage, they set up different forms of
configurations. Thus, political parties came into being after the revolution of 1848, as a consequence of the conflicts between the bourgeoisie and working class. Next to them, related voluntary associations, women’s organizations, and labour movements came to the fore. In comparison to these associations, denominational intermediary organizations developed comparatively late.

They developed out of the conflict between state and Church in the German Kaiserreich. The religious cleavage between the dominant Protestant majority and the Catholic minority shaped the development from the Kaiserreich to the Federal Republic of Germany. The constitution of the Kaiserreich (1871–1918) constrained the activities of political parties: the Bundesrat as an organ of the advocates of the Länder was more important than the Bundestag. Thus, parties were only able to support or hinder the political activities of the Kaiser and his bureaucracy. The Kulturkampf and the laws against socialist activities (Sozialistengesetze) drove denominational and socialist groups out of the public sphere.

This situation changed completely during the Weimar Republic (1919–1932). The variety of different political parties made it difficult to build parliamentary coalitions, and in the field of family policy, intermediary associations and organizations achieved a major influence. In contrast to consociational democracies such as Austria, Belgium, The Netherlands and Switzerland, pillarization between parties and related organizations in the sphere of welfare, women, family, and labour failed. A major reason may have been that there was no strong liberal movement as counterpart to the mass movements in Germany. Territorial fragmentation was another obstacle to the building of strong political subcultures. Thus, the configuration of actors during the Weimar Republic is characterized by major fragmentation. The situation changed again when Hitler seized power and largely suspended the institutional variety of social organizations and services, replacing them with a centralized system.
After 1945, the change in social structure made the social relationships of actors more clear-cut since the number of actors decreased. Thus, the party system today is composed of four dominant parties: Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, the Liberal Party and, since the late 1970s, the Greens. The churches built up their own family organizations: in 1953, the Catholic Church decided to increase its influence on family policy by creating its own family association, the Family Federation of German Catholics (Familienbund der Deutschen Katholiken, FDK), made up of individual church members and other Catholic associations. By contrast, the Protestant Community of Action for Family Issues (Evangelische Aktionsgemeinschaft für Familienfragen, EAF) is a coalition of Protestant organizations and regional action committees. Both Catholic and Protestant family organizations are a very important pressure group, comprising more than two million members each. They work together with the denominational women’s and voluntary associations. Family, voluntary associations and women’s organizations have their institutionalized channels in the decision-making process. The labour organizations can rule in their autonomous field while the principle of free collective bargaining (Tarifautonomie) is granted. The German Trade Union (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) is the largest labour organization with more than eleven million members among blue- and white-collar workers and civil servants. The DGB was organized after the Second World War no longer as politically fragmented trade unions (Richtungsgewerkschaften) but as a unitary trade union (Einheitsgewerkschaft). All these groups work within an institutional context of the Federal Republic of Germany defined by elements such as the federalist structure of the political system, the specific role of the constitutional court, the institutionalized influence of political parties, the guaranteed autonomy of collective bargaining, and the important function of intermediary organizations legitimized by the principle of subsidiarity.

Fig.6. The structure of family organizations, voluntary welfare associations, and women’s movements in Austria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>bourgeoisie</th>
<th>socialist</th>
<th>non-denominational</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austrian Red Cross 1867</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Austrian Women’s Association 1893</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Caritas (19th century)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(League of Austrian Women’s Organizations 1902)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Catholic Action (19th century)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vienna Christian Women’s League 1897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middle class society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Catholic Family Federation 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austrian Families Associations 1951</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>working classes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Workers Educational Association 1890</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children’s Friends 1908</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
In contrast to Germany, Austria is characterized by a more centralized political structure. The constitutional court has no comparable function to its German counterpart since the Austrian Constitution has no catalogue specifying citizens’ rights as in Germany and consequently cannot provide the basis for lawsuits. The bureaucracy is comparable to Belgium - closely interconnected with the political parties, mainly to the Christian democrat and socialist camp, and plays a dominant role (Neisser 1992: 146). This dominance of bureaucracy goes back to the Habsburg monarchy. The political parties developing in Austria at the end of 19th century had in fact no chance to influence the decision-making process which was dominated by the Kaiser, his Kanzler and the bureaucracy. The same holds true for organizations such as the women’s movement that developed after the revolution of 1848 (see Fig. 6): they only got a chance to fight successfully for their demands after the end of the monarchy (Hauch 1995: 277). In the field of family organizations, the socialist Children’s Friends - organized as a self-help group for children in misery - came into being in 1908. On the Catholic side, the Catholic Action integrated family interests into a family organization within its organizational framework. The loss of democratic structure during the Habsburg era was the reason that Austria fell into a deep crisis of legitimation after the end of the monarchy in 1918. The old cleavage structures concealed the long tradition of authoritarianism that now came to the fore: Thus, the conflict between labour and capital, state and church, centre and periphery dominated the political process while the integrative force of the monarchy was disappearing. In order to maintain governability, Austrian politicians developed specific strategies for solving conflicts in the First Republic. This point is very important in order to understand policy-making in the field of family policies in later decades. The following strategies were the most important ones in this respect: first, they avoided putting controversial issues on the agenda. Secondly, they constituted extra-parliamentary boards in order to discuss issues and to find compromises before the issue was put on the parliamentary agenda. This principle of cooperation rendered the activities of political parties suspect to the population. All political parties were said to be corrupt, which became an integral part of Austrian political culture. Nonetheless, both strategies were used again in the Second Republic after the period of the Austrian Ständestaat and the Austrian Anschluss with Germany.

During the fascist era, in Austria as in Germany, the politically fragmented trade unions (Richtungsgewerkschaften) were replaced by unitary trade unions (Einheitsgewerkschaften). The experience of Fascism, in Austria as in Germany, made the leaders of the labour movement create a strong union movement without any political fragmentation. Thus, the Austrian ÖGB as the German DGB are organized as unitary labour union movements. After the Second World War, Austrian employers and employees decided to build institutions of social partnership. The main reason was the bad state of the economy in the postwar period and the insecurity with respect to the political development of an occupied country. Thus, the ÖGB, the Workers’ Chamber (‘Arbeiterkammer’), the Commercial Chamber (‘Handelskammer’), and Agricultural Chamber (‘Landwirtschaftskammer’) became the key social partners in Austria.

To summarize: in Germany, the federalist structure of the political system, the specific role of the constitutional court, the institutionalized influence of political parties, the guaranteed autonomy of collective bargaining as well as the important function of intermediary organizations are the main variables for the institutional context for the institutionalization of a division of labour for family welfare. In Austria, the more centralized structure of the political system as well as social partnership as bargaining instrument represent the institutional framework in family policies. From the background of this institutional context, I

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6 Catholic Action is an organization of laymen within the Catholic Church building up a network of Catholic associations. The aim of this organization is the ‘protection of Catholic axioms in the life of single people, the family and the society according to the directive of the church and the regulations of the Holy See’ (Keller 1935, p. 36, translation B.F.).
will now analyse the concrete division of labour in family welfare in Austria and Germany taking actors’ interests and ideas into account.

V. Actors’ interests and ideas for the division of labour in the field of child care

In order to understand the specific division of labour in the field of child care it make sense to study the basic ideas of family life of the different important actors in Austria and Germany in a comparative way. As mentioned above, in both societies the responsibility for child care is given to the family, and within the family to the mother. This division of labour is coincident with the main ideas of the important actors in Austria and Germany: in historical perspective, the labour market participation of mothers with children did not find many advocates in either society. The debate on the institutionalization of maternity leave in Austria was as controversial as in Germany; in particular, disagreement between the social partners prevented a new law on maternity protection. After the Second World War female labour force participation was needed since lot of men lost their lives during the war or became prisoners of the victors. The same was true for Germany. Thus, women were just seen as a kind of ‘reserve army’ in Germany (Jurczky 1978) and in Austria (Münz/Neyer 1990). The situation changed in the 1950s in Austria when the economic boom ended, unemployment rose and the birth rate declined. During this period a new maternity law was introduced in Austria. Christian Democrats (ÖVP), SPÖ, and social partners agreed that the introduction of a maternity leave was necessary (Münz/Neyer 1990: 44). The ÖVP as well as the SPÖ saw the woman’s role as that of a mother working for the family. They supported that corporatist model which was institutionalized in 1957. Thus, the SPÖ demanded the ‘social recognition of housework and maternity by granting social security in a special social insurance for housewives and mothers. Mothers of infants shall not be compelled to seek employment. Household assistance and family vacations are to facilitate the double burden of a housewife and mother’ (Wahlprogramm der SPÖ 1959). This shows that the SPÖ had been as conservative as the ÖVP in the 1960s. This ideological stance of the SPÖ, interestingly, is totally comparable to respective statements of the German SPD. Thus the SPD party programme for the 1957 Bundestag elections states: ‘Being a housewife and mother is not only a woman’s natural duty but also of great importance to society. We are striving for an economic system in which no mothers of preschool- or school-aged children are forced by financial need to work outside the home’ (Bundestagswahlen, 1957: 349). With this position the SPD continued the tradition of social democrats such as Ferdinand Lassalle, who, along with a majority of workers, opposed married women’s labour force participation at the time of industrialization. This position can be found in historical platforms of Austrian and German Social Democrats.

In contrast to Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany did not develop a programme for maternity leave, but discussed other models. An important impulse to this debate came from Vatican II, in which Pope Johannes XXIII called for the full participation of women in intellectual, political, and economic activities in accordance with the ‘plan of creation’. The publications of the Catholic Women’s Association followed up with demands for more part-time job opportunities as well as for institutional support for working mothers in the form of day care, kindergarten, and full-day schools. Christian Democrats emphasized the monopoly of the Church and its voluntary welfare organizations in providing these services (Hausmann, 1973: 187 ff.).

7 German party electoral platforms, the Austrian and German platforms of the trade unions and the family associations are my own collections, whereas I have to thank Professor Klingemann and Dr. Andrea Volkens (WZB Berlin) for providing the sources of the Austrian electoral platforms and the right to use the party programmes collected in the Manifesto Project (WZB-Berlin).
In order to make it easier for women to return to paid work, the CDU in 1969 demanded the creation of job opportunities for female part-time work (Sicher in die 70er Jahre, 1969). This signalled a shift in the political discourse from a two-phase model for women - labour force participation to be followed by caring for the family at home - to a three-phase model - labour force participation to be followed by caring for the family at home and, third, by a return to labour force. The SPD, who had up to then considered public child care as part of its education policy, first made the relationship between public child care and women’s labour force participation an issue in the party programme of its 1975 Mannheim Convention. In that platform, they demanded organizing child care to be compatible with parents’ labour force participation. This effort to make working conditions more humane was supported by the SPD, the DGB, and the DAG.

Since the 1980s, all parties, trade unions, voluntary associations, and family associations have agreed on the need for more flexible work schedules and more public provision of day-care facilities for children aged 3 years and over (while giving preference to at-home care by parents). Thus, since the late 1970s the discussion of public child care for children at kindergarten age is linked with the labour force participation of the parents, mainly with that of the mother. Differences remain, however, in proposals regarding children under 3 years: the SPD calls for an extended unpaid maternity/parental leave connected with job security, while the Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Greens favour a generally state-financed parental benefit, for which either parent could opt, whether he or she is employed or not (SPD-Wahlprogramm, 1983: 406; Für Frieden und Freiheit, 1980: 20; Wahlprogramm der Freien Demokratischen Partei für die Bundestagswahlen am 5. Oktober 1980, 1980: 66; Wahlplattform zur Bundestagswahl am 5.10.1980, 1980: 12). With this proposal, these parties want to redefine the concept of ‘employment’ (Erwerbsarbeit) to include house and family work as well as labour market activity. The proposed parental benefit also satisfies the expectations of the Family Association of German Catholics, the German Family Association, the DGB, and the DAG, who all have come out in support of creating opportunities that extend men’s and women’s freedom to choose between home and family work on the one hand, and labour market activity on the other (Familie garantiert Zukunft, 1987: 25; Politik für Familien, 1994: 8; Geschäftsbericht des Bundesvorstandes des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes 1986 bis 1989: 388; Familienpolitisches Programm der DAG, 1988: 14). Thus, in the 1990s, all agents of family policy have rejected a rigid and narrow conception of the family in favour of creating conditions that will allow for the greatest freedom possible of family forms and family life, culminating in the introduction of this state-financed model.

Also in Austria the creation of conditions that allow greater freedom of possibilities for the family are on the political agenda. Thus part-time work concepts are first to be found in the electoral platforms of the ÖVP and the FPÖ in 1970. Additionally, the ÖVP demands a kindergarten place for every child from the third year onwards (Wahlprogramm der SPÖ 1970). But in contrast to Germany, the topic of public child care is not such an important issue on the political agenda. If one used the existence of this topic in electoral platforms as an indicator, this item could be found in German party platforms since 1953, whereas it was first mentioned in Austria only in 1970. Counting the number of items concerning this topic in party platforms between 1953 and 1990, this issue is to be found eight times in Austria as compared to eighteen times in Germany.

Public child care in Germany was also highly discussed in historical perspective. The reason therefore can be found in the intensity of the state-church conflict in the 19th century. The question of responsibility since then was controversial. The Catholic Church considered public child care as a chance to socialize children. Through kindergarten and nursery school, they could increase the social integration of their community. Thus, Catholic children should be educated in Catholic institutions if the mother was not available. In contrast to that concept, the Socialists preferred public education. In June 1920, a conference about the educational system in the Reich (Reichsschulkonferenz) took place, where also members of church
organizations and confessional associations participated. In discussing the issue of preschool education with respect to a potential law in the future, the Church was especially interested in the question of family versus public education. Thus, they emphasized the priority of the family for the education of the child and were consequently against a concept of compulsory preschool education. They also fought successfully for the priority of voluntary associations’ work against Socialist and Liberal ideas. State intervention on the national or community level should only take place if there were not enough voluntary associations (Hermanutz 1977: 176). This principle is to be found in the Law for the Welfare of the Youth in the Reich (Reichsjugendwohlfahrtsgesetz), but the state got the right to control. This went against the interests of the Church and is to be interpreted as a signal of the compromise character of this law. The importance of this law explains why voluntary associations in Germany are so important in providing kindergarten places. Also today the discussion about kindergartens is of high importance when the constitutional court demanded a right for a place in a kindergarten for every child 3 to 6. In comparison to Germany, this issue has not been so controversial in Austria up to now. Since 1979, parental leave for fathers is on the agenda of public discussion in Austria (Neyer 1984). The ‘father leave’ that has been enacted is a compromise following the demands of the women’s movement.

VI. Conclusion
It was the aim of this paper to study the division of labour between family, government and civil society on the one hand, and their consequences for the division of labour within the family in the field of child care on the other. The cross-national differences were to be explained by an institutional analysis comparing Austria and Germany. It has been shown that differences in the developmental paths could not be accounted for by approaches deducing those differences from the context of the differences in the party systems as does Esping-Andersen most prominently. A comparison of the German and the Austrian case, in contrast, shows that Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in both societies prefer a model of the social division of labour in which child care is primarily regarded as in the duty of the family, especially of the child’s mother. This ‘Leitbild’ of the family is even legitimized by the constitution in both countries. According to this idea, both societies built an encompassing system of maternity protection, maternity and/or parental leave, and child-care facilities. But in contrast to Germany, the maternity protection law from the period of the Empire was revised much earlier and in quite a different form: already in 1957, the political parties and social partners agreed upon introducing a corporative model, in which maternity leave receives half of its financing from the unemployment insurance fund, two-thirds of which is paid by employers’ and employees’ contributions, and the other half from the family allowance fund, of which 75% is financed by employers. The question of a parental leave instead of a pure maternity leave was much more heavily discussed in Austria than in Germany, where maternity leave could be easily transformed into a parental leave without greater political conflicts. In contrast to Austria, the maternity/parental leave that had been introduced in 1979 was state-financed, a model upon which all political parties came to agree. This model also found consensus among the family organizations and the trade unions.

The comparatively low provision of day-care places in Austria and in Germany expresses the societal preference for a model in which the mother primarily takes care of children under 3. In both societies, kindergarten attendance is only seen as a supplement to family care. But there are far fewer places offered in Austrian kindergartens than in Germany. This difference is to be accounted for by the different societal developmental paths in public child care. In Germany, the Catholic Church took a huge interest in having a strong impact on the socialization of infants. To a large extent, these differences can be explained from the state-church relationships in Austria and
Germany. From a historical point of view, the conflict between state and church had been much more intense in Germany than in Austria. In its aftermath, the Catholic Church promoted the primacy of voluntary associations in child education and care and saw this model enacted in the Law for the Welfare of the Youth in the Reich in 1924. These measures were taken over into the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus, the predominance of voluntary associations and particularly of the church as operators of kindergartens in Germany can be accounted for. In contrast, kindergartens in Austria are mostly operated by the state, especially by the local communities, which promote the expansion of kindergarten places. In Germany, the constitutional court has obliged governments to implement the right of every child to a kindergarten place. Voluntary associations and the government take huge joint efforts for its implementation. To conclude, this analysis shows clearly that developmental paths in child care can only be accounted for if not only the ideas and interests of political parties, but of all relevant social actors are taken into consideration.

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