Party Choice in Different Political-Structural Environments.

Evidence from the 1989 European Elections Study.

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1. Introduction.

Cross-national comparative analyses of voting behaviour are rather scarce. The few studies that are available, such as Lewis-Beck’s (1988) on the relationship between economics and voting behaviour, or the volume by Franklin, Mackie, Valen et al. (1992) on the relationship between social structure and voting behaviour are, moreover, largely engaged in spotting similarities between countries rather than in identifying system-specific factors. But it is the system-specifics rather than the similarities in the determination of party choice which are able to teach us about the impact of political variables on the process of party choice. As a consequence, we know very little about the role of different political contexts, of different institutional arrangements, and of different party roles in the formation of the vote.

Based on an analysis of voting behaviour in the European Parliament elections of 1989, this paper attempts to expand this knowledge. Given the poor state of theorising in this domain (Rosenstone et al. 1993; Thomassen, Rosenstone et al. 1994), I will begin with a review of the state of the art in the study of voting behaviour in general. The discussion of the scholarly debate of two central concepts - party identification and issue voting - is thought to help develop the tools necessary for designing a model of party choice which, in turn, will be fitted to the data obtained in different countries and for different parties. Party identification and issue voting, the concepts to which we will turn shortly, have mainly been used for the analysis of national first-order elections. Applying them to an analysis of voting behaviour in European Parliament elections will necessitate a brief discussion of the specifics of this type of election, as well as an answer to the question of whether the analysis of voting behaviour in these elections requires indeed special tools.

Insights into political-structural effects on the act of voting are expected to emerge from the configuration of results across systems and parties. These configurations will not emanate by themselves. Rather, our inspection of country-specific results will be guided by three very basic hypotheses. One is that the age of a democratic polity should affect the mode of party choice; another is that the degree of ideological polarisation of a party system should make a difference in the act of voting; and a final hypothesis states that the governmental role of political parties should influence the considerations of the voters.


Research on the impact of partisanship on the vote goes back to the roots of elections studies based on representative mass surveys. Yet, there is hardly anything about it which is not the subject of dispute. Scholars, of course, disagree over the question of what partisanship is. The basic and now classic notion of it goes back to the American Voter. There, partisanship is conceived as an individual’s psychological identification with, or affective orientation towards, an important group object in his or her environment.
(Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960:121 ff). This psychological party membership is assumed to
be acquired through primary political socialization (i.e. parental transmission), and to crystallise into stable
alignments as a consequence of growing electoral experience (i.e. repeated voting for the same party;
Converse 1969). Party identification was originally conceived as an exogenous variable in models of party
choice, colouring attitudes about issues and candidates as they are formed and thus affecting the vote both
directly and indirectly (Campbell et al. 1960:136 ff).

A totally different understanding is formulated about two decades later (cf. Page & Jones. 1979;
Fiorina, 1981; Franklin & Jackson 1983; Franklin 1984). Party identification is now portrayed as an
endogenous variable, affecting current political evaluations and the vote, and being affected by them at
the same time. Much of the work establishing this revisionist view runs well in line with the rational choice
paradigm and attributes changes in partisanship to result largely from cognitive processes of issue
evaluation. Time-series evidence recently indicates, however, that issue evaluations cannot account for
everything and certainly not for short-term changes in partisanship, which should rather be seen to go back
to changing affective or emotional views (Whiteley 1988). Irrespective of what causes the observed
dynamics in partisanship, this round of debate conveys that there is no conceptual need for partisanship to
be fundamentally stable over time.

The phenomenon of partisanship is of course not restricted to the U.S. But applications of the Ann-
Arbour model of vote choice to Europe have proved troublesome. Early studies regarded European party
identifications as mere reflections of the voter's position in the cleavage structure rather than as an
Modifications of the US survey instrument, induced to cope with the European multi-party systems, have
led to irritations about the reliability of measurement and the validity of operationalisation, and in places
even to principal doubts about the measureability of the concept. Overall, European operationalisations lead
to less stable results than those obtained by the American prototype (Butler & Stokes 1969; Kaase 1970;
identification and vote choice cast doubt on the conceptual independence of European party identifications
from the act of voting itself (Thomassen 1976).

Today, these objections are being re-evaluated. The continuous weakening of social-structural
contours in voting behaviour in many West European countries (e.g. Franklin, Mackie & Valen 1992;
Chapter 19) suggests, that the case for social partisanship is to be taken less seriously in the 1990s than
three decades earlier (for Germany see Baker, Dalton & Hildreth 1981:230; Schmidt 1992:250). Even
the lack of stability in European measures of party identification causes less concern after the concept of
partisanship was redefined by American revisionists in the 1980s. In a number of countries, though not in
all, recent studies have demonstrated the utility of the concept of party identification in analysing European
voting behaviour. Cross-national comparative studies have come to much the same conclusions. Based on
the Political Action panels in the US, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, Barnes (1989)
found the formation of party identification to be similar in all three countries, while, in the two European countries the effect of party identification on the vote is different to that observed in the U.S. Richardson (1991) arrives at the same conclusion in his comparative analysis of British, Dutch and German national election studies data. However, whilst Richardson attributes the characteristic difference to the US to the cleavage base of most European parties, Barnes points to the existence of smaller parties in European party systems and the differential impact of party identification on voting for large and for small parties.

3. Issues and Voting Behaviour

Another important factor in empirical studies of electoral behaviour are the attitudes of voters on political issues and their perception of parties in this respect. While this is so in both the social-psychological and the rational choice tradition of electoral research, there are nevertheless grave differences in the respective conceptualisations of the relationship between issue orientations and the vote.

In one way or another electoral studies of the rational choice variety all go back to the fundamental spatial model of party competition and vote choice suggested by Anthony Downs (1957). Policy preferences of voters as well as policy stands of parties are located on one and the same dimension. The voter maximises his utility by voting for the party with a policy position least distant to his own preferences. Parties orientated towards electoral success optimise their location on this policy dimension in order to win as many votes as possible.

This basic economic model of political behaviour has been criticised, in particular, for its unrealistic assumptions - such as the one-dimensionality of issue space, the view of parties as unitary actors, or the neglect of information costs (see Stokes 1966; Robertson 1976; Sartori 1976). Revisions have tended to render these assumptions more realistic. Enelow and Hinich (1984) suggested a model which no longer requires the voters to know the positions of the competing parties on specific issues. They only assume that voters recognise the ideological position of the parties (say in left-right terms) and their ideologically pre-defined solution preferences for the issues at hand. Based on this, they propose the voter can deduce the issue positions of parties based on a much smaller amount of information, and so, still vote for the party nearest his own policy preferences.

For Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) these reduced assumptions still fall short of reality. They doubt that voters actually develop concrete policy preferences. According to them, many voters, at best, take a position in an issue conflict by deciding which side they are on - if at all. Thus, in their directional theory of issue voting Rabinowitz et al. purport that an issue is best understood as a choice between two alternatives, where the voter chooses one side or the other or remains neutral. In this view, for both voter and parties, the level of deviation from a neutral position on an issue dimension is interpreted as an indication of the intensity of support or opposition for one of two policy alternatives. Decisive for the party choice, here, is not the minimising of the distance between one's own position and that of a party, but
the maximising of the product of the voters’ and the parties’ deviation from the neutral scale mean. This model of issue voting has been shown to fit the data at least as well as the original Downsian model does, for both the US and European multiparty systems (e.g. Macdonald, Listhaug & Rabinowitz 1991).

Electoral analysts in the rational choice tradition use issue positions of voters and parties as their maia - if not their only - tool for the explanation of party choice. This is different in social psychological models of voting. There, issues typically occupy a less central role. Alongside candidate orientations, they are understood as short-term effects on the vote, which are assumed to be moderated by a more fundamental and stable impact of party identification.

The authors of the American Voter came to rather sceptical conclusions concerning genuine issue effects. According to them, three conditions must be met before an issue can possibly have an impact on the vote: voters must be aware of the issue; they must have an opinion on it; and they must perceive one of the competing parties to be better able to deal with it (Campbell et al. 1960:170ff). For large majorities of voters - between 2/3 and 4/5, depending on the issue - these conditions were not provided. Accordingly, the contribution of issue orientations to the explanation of voting behaviour was found to be limited.

This view did not remain uncontested. Prominent among the early critics was V. O. Key. Based on a secondary analysis of survey data on the presidential elections between 1936 and 1960, he maintained that ‘voters are no fools. To be sure, many individual voters act in odd ways indeed; yet in the large the electorate behaves about as rationally and responsibly as we should expect given the clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the character of the information available to it.” (1966:7) An evaluation of this study must take into account, however, that Key did not analyse the behaviour of voters in general, but that of vote switchers. His observations are largely based on the motivations and the behaviour of a minority of the electorate and what is more, a decidedly atypical minority at that. As Philip Converse (1990:378) put it: “Understanding their changes is noble work. There is no other subset of voters as important. But this accounting alone is different from that of accounting for voting in general, and obviously so.”

If only a few individuals are well informed and hold fixed opinions on political issues, how then can collective opinion of a society still react quite sensitively to political events and new policy proposals (e.g. Page & Shapiro 1992)? The seeming paradox of individual ignorance and collective wisdom becomes less mysterious in a low-information rationality (or gut rationality: Popkin 1992; view of how people relate to politics. In such a view, policy preferences are based on “some fundamental needs and values that are relatively enduring; on some uncertain beliefs concerning how public policies relate to those needs and values; and on some incomplete fragments of information that tend on the whole - though not, perhaps, with total consistency - to support those beliefs.” (Page and Shapiro 1992:15) New incoming information, for example, can change policy preferences of individuals in a seemingly random manner and produce, if measured in a panel survey, the kind of fluctuating responses which was interpreted to originate from nonattitudes. Changes in individual preferences reported in a panel study can also be caused by conflicting
values and needs, or simply result from measurement problems inherent in survey research (Page & Shapiro 1992; similarly Inglehart 1990: Chapter 3). Whatever the causes of the eventual deviation of an individual from his long-term opinion, these causes will be cancelled out in large enough samples. "As a result, the measurement of collective public opinion is largely free of random error associated with individual attitudes" (S. 16).7

The reasoning which inspires this recent debate about nonattitudes (see also Feldmann 1988; Zaller & Feldman 1992) concerns in a way the earlier work of Donald Stokes (Stokes 1966, 1992; Butler & Stokes 1972; see also Klingemann 1973). Stokes maintains that not all issues are equal. He distinguishes between position issues and valence issues. Position issues are those where the voter, in accordance with the Downsian model, can (a) locate the different parties, (b) his own preference, and (c) deduce from the comparison of both his party choice. One should not overestimate issue effects on the vote resulting from position issue mechanisms, according to Stokes. This mechanism requires well informed voters (or at least ideologically competent ones, if we consider Hinich's reformulation of the original model), and there are not many of this kind; and it presupposes bipolar policy alternatives, which even in the American two-party system cannot always be taken for granted. Yet, this does not mean that the influence of issues on voting behaviour is necessarily poor. There is, according to Stokes, a further class of issues with a far smaller demand on the voters' analytical capabilities. He calls these valence issues. They "merely involve the linking of the parties with some condition that is positively or negatively valued by the electorate ... It will not do to simply exclude valence issues from the discussion of party competition. The people's choice too often depends on them." (1986:170-171)

In their study on *Political Change in Britain* (Butler and Stokes 1969, 1972), it is the perceived importance of an issue that becomes the central precondition for a possible influence of issue evaluations on the vote. "If an issue is to sway the elector it must not only have crossed the threshold of his awareness; he must also have formed some genuine attitude towards it. The more an issue is salient to him and the subject of strong attitudes, the more powerful will be its influence on his party choice. Indeed, given the multiplicity of influences upon the individual elector, only issues that excite strong feelings are likely to have much impact." (1972:288) Further preconditions for an issue influencing the choice of party are a sufficiently uneven distribution of voters preferences and markedly differentiated voter perceptions of issue positions and issue competences of the parties.

4. Peculiarities of European Elections.

The European Parliament is still more of an advisory assembly than a traditional legislature. It does not elect nor support an executive, a fact which clearly moderates the relations between parliamentary groups. An essentially consensual style of policy formulation and of parliamentary behaviour generally stands in sharp contrast to the situation in most national parliaments which is dominated by fierce party competition.
Inter-group consensus is promoted by the philosophy of the house which maintains that the strengthening of its powers (mostly vis à vis the Council) can best be achieved by parliamentary unanimity. Without the foundation of established issue conflicts between parliamentary parties and, in most countries, without controversies about EU policies between national parties, party manifestos in European terms are mostly vague. Based on these observations, one would expect the voting behaviour of EU citizens at the occasion of European Parliament elections to be shaped by party loyalties rather than issue considerations.

However, it may be useful at this point to refer to two things. One is that issue effects on voting behaviour in European Elections must not necessarily originate from EU policies. European Elections have been characterised from the beginning as second-order national elections (Reif & Schnitt 1989). This was done under the impression that national position issues (the evaluation of national government parties' policies in particular) rather than European ones, influence the vote in these elections. Because national position issues are not voted on in European Parliament elections, some electors, at least, must vote strategically to make the national policy differential between voter and parties a relevant datum for the European vote.

Following Stokes, however, we must not assume issue effects on the vote to be restricted to the position issue mechanism. There are, in addition, valence issues whose impact on the vote is derived from the different levels of competence attributed to the competing parties regarding goal attainment and value realisation. For this kind of issue, it is of no major import if policy conflicts are not in fact carried out in that particular political arena where a parliament is to be chosen. This type of issue lives more from general performance impressions and from general ideological differences between parties which can be traced back to their different social bases, and hence, their different societal designs and policy emphases.

The study of European elections, then, starts out from the following. As the election does not serve the function of filling central political office, the probability of an influence of candidate effect on voting behaviour is negligible. The situation is less clear regarding the effects of party identification and issue preferences. On the one hand, it has been argued that the usual cohesion of party loyalties is impaired in this second-order election because "nothing is at stake" and so, in contrast to national first-order elections, the potential for issue effects is higher. Yet on the other hand, and for the very same reason that "nothing is at stake," it can also be argued that a large number of voters follow their standing party preference more often than in more important elections, which suggests a strengthened role of party identification in the determination of vote choice.

Party identification and issue orientations apparently play a chief role in the explanation of party choice in European Parliament elections - perhaps even more so than in national first-order elections. These two concepts will constitute the centre of the model of party choice in European Parliament elections to be elaborated on in the following section.
5. Data and Methods.

5.1 Data base and operationalisation of issue competence and party identification.

The following analyses are based on the data sets of the European Elections Study of 1989 (EES89). EES89 is made up of three consecutive independent representative mass surveys (two ahead of election day, one after) in all EU countries. All but one of the analyses reported in this paper are drawn from the second pre-electoral wave of surveys conducted in April and May 1989, as only at this stage of the overall study could the full set of issue questions be administered. These issue questions are based on a list of problem areas (e.g. unemployment) which come close to the Stokesian definition of valence issues (see also Kuechler 1991). Based on this list, respondents were asked to rate the issues in terms of being "very important" or "not very important"; to rank the three most important of them; and to indicate which party in their eyes is best able to solve the first, second and third most important problems. From this information an additive index was constructed for each party which counts the number of times this party was mentioned as best being able to solve the most important problems. We will refer to this variable as the issue competence evaluation of a party.

The strength component of party identification is a standard instrument in Eurobarometer surveys. In the European Election Study 1989, the question on the strength of party identification was complemented by a question on its direction. Based on this information, a variable will be constructed, which indicates for each party the intensity of identification with it (from "0=no identification" to "3=identify very closely with party XY").

5.2 Strategy of analysis.

One of the problems which have complicated the application of US models of voting behaviour elsewhere is the different format of party system found in most other places: a pure two-party system rarely exists outside the US and in any case not in the European Union. This leads to conceptual problems (Pappi 1994) as well as measurement complications. Party identification scales, or issue competence measures, are simpler (and extend farther) in the two-party case. Here, a measure of support for one of the two party alternatives is often construed in a way that implies the rejection of the other. I will not deal here with the full complexity of choice options presented to the European voter. Rather, I will try to predict the vote for just the one party in each of the systems, for which this endeavour appears to be most promising. Relying on party identification and issue competence as the main predictors of the vote, large government parties are considered to be the best choice for this. Earlier studies have shown that party identification is strongest among voters of large parties and that their vote choice is heavily shaped by it (Barnes 1989; Schnitt 1990; van der Eijs & Oppenhuijse 1991; Schnitt & Holmberg
1985). Issue competence evaluations, on the other hand, may be better grounded and are possibly more consequential for governing parties, as they can draw upon the accumulated experience of past performance for those parties only. Such a large government party can be identified in all but one member-state of the European Union for the time when our surveys were conducted (see Table 1). Belgium is the exception. Two factors complicate the Belgian case for our purposes. One is the grand coalition between Socialists and Christian Democrats ruling the country in early 1989, presenting us with more than one large governing party; the other is that, due to the far reaching regionalisation/decentralisation of the Belgian political system, a party can not be supported throughout the whole country. The following analyses therefore compare determinants of voting behaviour in only ten countries - in Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal. Belgium and Luxembourg are left out, the latter due to the small number of interviews carried out there.

- Table 1 about here -

5.3 The model

Models of party choice utilising our two core instruments can be distinguished according to how they conceive causal relationships. In one view, issue orientations are the central factor which determine the vote both directly and indirectly through their contributions to party identification. In another, party identification itself is the main factor. Functioning as a catalyst for all sorts of social-structural impacts on the vote, party identification, here, is assumed to determine the vote both directly and indirectly through its effects on issue preferences and on general ideological orientations of the voters. It is an empirical question which of these different perspectives comes closer to reality. Non-recursive regression models are an appropriate method of testing this (see e.g. Page & Jones 1979). My own efforts to model the relationship between party identification and issue orientations in a non-recursive way have failed in a number of countries due to the lack of suitable instrument variables. Alternatively, I have specified a model following the premises of the classic Ann Arbor approach; the perceptions of issue competence of political parties are influenced by party identification (rather than vice versa), as are ideological self-locations on the left-right dimension (Inglehart & Klingemann 1976).

Of course, one may have different views on this. Following Fiorina (1981), one may see party identification as a running tally of past policy performance; issue competence evaluations as emanating from accumulated experiences with party government; and the Ann Arbor model as being misspecified. Dissent may also be voiced with regard to the relationship between party identification and ideological orientations. As van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983, 1985) demonstrated in their analyses of Dutch voting behaviour, one may understand (as they suggest: multiple) party identifications as ensuing from an individual's identification with a wider ideological tendency, rather than the other way around. I have settled
here for the more traditional view of the relationship between the core variables of the model. This notwithstanding, we will come to see in the following that indications arise which for some countries suggest reconsidering this decision.

- Figure 1 about here -

Two further blocks of variables play a role, if a more remote one, in our model of party choice: they comprise of the indicators of the social-structural location and of the ideological orientation of voters. In terms of social structure, I choose church attendance as a behaviourally relevant indicator of the virulence of the religious cleavage, trade union membership as a behaviourally relevant indicator of the class cleavage and subjective social class as an indicator of a more general top-bottom self-location. As indicators of political socialisation, social-structural characteristics are expected to affect party identification, and they are expected to directly influence the vote as indicators of specific interests.

With regard to ideological variables. I have included the left-right placements, which, in most countries covered here, is the overarching pattern of political classification and ideological orientation; Inglehart's post-materialism index, which I take as a very basic general indicator of preferences for "new politics"; and the Eurobarometer measure of satisfaction with democracy, which in my mind, is an indicator of specific support based on the performance of party governments rather than as expression of diffuse support for the political system in general (Schnitt 1983).

We need not discuss the structure of relationships between these variables in any detail. Two general rules have guided the model fitting process: (1) indicators of socialisation - as the social-structural measures - act on political attitudes and not the opposite; (2) general orientations and preferences (such as the left-right self-placement and Inglehart's index of post-materialism) influence more specific attitudes (such as issue competence evaluations) and not vice versa.

5.4 The Statistical Procedure

"The not so simple act of voting" (Dalton & Waterberg 1993) demands complex explanatory models, both on the theoretical and empirical level. The estimation of linear structural equation systems seems to be a suitable method for uncovering such complex relationships. This technique allows the data analyst both to test whether postulated relationships between variables do in fact exist and whether the model can adequately account for the covariance found in the data. The results I report below are computed with Bentler's EQS (Bentler 1989) applying a maximum likelihood algorithm. Wald-tests to determine which of the theoretically meaningful paths are empirically irrelevant and Lagrange Multiplier-tests indicating substantial covariances, yet unspecified, were used to fit the model to the data sets.
Linear structural equation models set high demands on the measurement level and the distribution of variables analysed. Dichotomous dependent variables are particularly undesirable (Hanushek & Jackson 1977:chapter 7.2.). Yet, such ipsative measurements typically constitute the dependent variable in models of vote choice. As a principal alternative, the data-sets of the European Electoral Study 1989 include a measure of the probability of party choice for each relevant national party (for a conceptual discussion of the instrument see van der Eijk et al. 1986). This probability is coded on a ten-point-scale (from 1=very unlikely to 10=very likely to vote for the party in question). For the parties investigated here, the distribution of these probabilities closely approaches a normal distribution. It is these probabilities of party choice that constitute our dependent variables in the analyses which follow.

6. Results.


Levels of party identification and of perceived issue competence of parties vary considerably between the EU countries. If we accept the proportion of non-identifiers as a point of reference, we find a particularly high level of party identification in the Netherlands (81%); and relatively high levels, between 60 and 70 per cent, in Denmark, Greece, Italy, France, Portugal and Germany. Low levels - less than 50 per cent - are recorded in Great Britain, Ireland and Spain (see Table 2). This picture should not be over-estimated; it represents a snapshot in a changing environment at the time of the second pre-election survey of the European Electoral Study 1989.16

- Table 2 about here -

Issue competence attributions show a different pattern. Whilst the Germans in particular, but also the British, Danes, French and Irish see their parties as relatively capable of solving the most important problems, such a view is less common in the countries of Southern Europe. Notably in Spain and Italy respondents tend to be critical about their parties' capability of solving the most important problems.

On the aggregate level, we find the level of party identification of a country and the average competence attribution to its political parties to be largely independent from one another.

6.2 Direct Effects.

For seven of the ten parties analysed, one or both of our two core variables has a deciding influence on the vote. Left-right orientations are of equal importance for two parties - for the French Socialists alongside
party identification and for the British Conservatives together with issue competence. Left-right orientations are dominant and party identification and issue competence of only secondary importance amongst the direct effects on the vote for the Danish Conservatives. Direct effects of the indicators of social-structural location are mostly negligible (Table 3).

- Table 3 about here -

Concerns occasionally expressed about an outsized proximity of party identification to the actual vote are unfounded, according to these results. There are no deterministic effects. For a number of parties (such as the PSD in Portugal, see FF in Ireland, the CDU/CSU in the Federal Republic of Germany or PASOK in Greece), the direct influence of issue competence attribution rules the scene at least as impressively as party identification does elsewhere.

6.3 Four Patterns.

Our model of vote choice when fitted to the data reveals four basic patterns: (1) a pattern of social partisanship characterised by socially rooted party identifications with a strong direct impact on the vote; (2) a pattern of predominant left-right orientations; (3) a pattern of predominant issue competence attributions; (4) and a pattern of autonomous political effects.

The pattern of social partisanship applies to two of the three Christian Democratic parties included in this analysis - the Italian DC and the Dutch CDA. Church attendance plays an absolutely central, albeit mainly indirect role for the vote of these parties (see Figures 2 and 3); it affects any other variable in the Italian model - with the exception of social class; in Dutch model, union membership is a further exception. In both cases, the strongest direct effect of church attendance is on party identification, and party identification in turn has the strongest direct effect on party choice. All in all, behind party identification, church attendance is the second most powerful predictor of the vote for these two parties. Issue competence attribution and left-right orientation are left well behind (see Table 4).

- Figures 2 and 3 and Table 4 about here -

The pattern of predominant left-right orientations is characteristic for the vote of British and Danish Conservatives and of French Socialists (see Figures 4-6). Party identification here does not occupy as dominant a position as in the social partisanship pattern. It is rather left-right orientations which in Denmark alone, in Great Britain together with issue competence and in France together with party identification, have the greatest direct effect on the vote. Moreover, it is not church attendance but social status variables which play some background role. In the Danish model, social class contributes notably to
party identification and left-right orientations. In the French model, it has some impact on left-right orientations. The class effect on party identification is minor in the British context, but in addition to it, union membership helps to shape partisanship.

- Figures 4, 5, and 6 about here -

All three models reveal a strong correlation between party identification and left-right orientations, which we have decided to interpret in the Ann Arbor tradition as originating from party identification. In light of the centrality of left-right orientations in these three models one is indeed tempted to revise this decision. If one bides by the decision, however, the total effects of left-right orientations and party identification on the vote for the Danish Conservatives are about equally strong and the strongest overall, followed by social class and then issue competence attribution. In Great Britain and France the total effect of party identification outweighs those of left-right orientations and these in turn outweight the total effect of issue competence attribution.

We turn to the pattern of predominant issue competence attribution which is identified in the models of vote choice for the German CDU/CSU, the Irish Fianna Fáil and the Portuguese PSD (Figures 7 to 9). Although in all three models church attendance does play a certain role, it is not, in contrast to the DC and CDA, party identification tied to religious attachment that has the main effect on voting behaviour. Identification with CDU/CSU and Fianna Fáil are only modestly supported by church attachment, while they are independent of it in the case of the PSD. Party identification has an only moderate direct effect on party choice in all three models. Moreover, the influence of left-right orientation and social status on the vote is negligible here - in sharp contrast to the models for the Danish and British Conservatives and the French Socialists. The best direct predictor of the vote cast for the CDU/CSU, Fianna Fáil and PSD is the attribution of issue competence; in terms of total effects, party identification and issue competence attribution do about equally well.

- Figure 7, 8, and 9 about here -

The PSD model, in a way, opens the door to our fourth pattern characterised by the autonomy of politics. Here, "political" variables such as party identification, issue competence attribution and party choice are largely independent from the social structure. Identification with, and issue competence attribution to the PSD are indeed independent of social structural factors, but not the vote itself. The decision to vote PSD is impressively shaped by religious attachments; the direct effect of church attendance on the vote is stronger here than anywhere else.

The autonomy of politics is characteristic of the vote for the Spanish PSOE and the Greek PaSoK (Figures 10 and 11). Social background variables play hardly any role in the vote of both parties. (While in
the Greek case social class and union membership affect left-right orientations, these ideological orientations are themselves irrelevant for the PaSoK vote and thus can not carry any indirect social-structural effect. The vote for tSOE and PaSoK are determined by party identification and issue competence attributions, to a lesser extent also by feelings of satisfaction with the way democracy works. Left-right orientations do not play any significant role. Party identification, issue competence considerations and feelings of satisfaction with democracy are meaningfully and strongly related to one another and also to left-right orientations. Party identification in both models has the strongest total effect on the vote - which is overwhelming in the PaSoK case due to the extraordinary impact of party identification on issue competence there.

- Figures 10 and 11 about here -

7. Understanding the Differences.

Table 5 summarises again the main characteristics of the four patterns. On reading this table, one cannot escape asking why the different parties/countries are placed where they are. In the last section of the paper, I will come back to the three basic hypotheses spelled out at the beginning.

- Table 5 about here -

The age hypothesis.

The first hypothesis stated that the age of a democratic polity is to be expected to affect the mode of party choice. It is based on the observation that the shorter the period of uninterrupted democratic politics is in a country, the weaker the socio-political coalitions between societal groups and political parties, and the more volatile the electorate (e.g. Gunther, Montero and Richardson 1994). It is perfectly plausible and fits this reasoning very well that voting in the “new democracies” of Greece and Spain (and to some degree in Portugal) was found in our analysis to be characterised by the autonomy of politics. In these countries, clearest socio-political coalitions could not (yet?) be restored after the re-introduction of competitive democratic processes. As a consequence, socially heterogeneous electorates seem to base their party choice solely on political considerations which lack the kind of social-structural regularity found in older democracies and in more strongly segmented societies.

The opposite phenomenon is identified in a way by the pattern of social partisanship found in Italy and the Netherlands. In the past, even more than today, both countries were typified by an extraordinary high degree of socio-cultural segmentation. The Dutch discussion of this phenomenon centred around the
notion of pillarisation - and subsequently of depillarisation - of society (see Lijphart 1968; Daalder & Irwin 1989), while Italian political sociologists identified phenomena of regionally embedded subcultures and sociocentrism (see Galli et al. 1968; Mannheimer 1989). The findings of the 1989 European Elections Study point towards the continued existence of these structures, which, as far as the religious pillar or the catholic subculture were concerned, still determined political attitudes and behaviour to an impressive degree. The *Democrazia Cristiana*, evidently, disappeared from the political arena despite a well-structured social partisanship, not as a result of a lack of it.

**The polarisation hypothesis.**

The second hypothesis, stated at the outset of this paper, proposes that the degree of ideological polarisation of a party system should affect the mode of party choice. To be somewhat more precise than that, we expect the impact of party identification on the vote to be stronger in ideologically polarised systems, while more sober issue considerations should predominate in more moderate environments. Earlier, we have argued that the virulence of party identification is directly related to the ideological distance, and thus to the heat of political debates, between parties. The greater this distance between parties, the more polarised a society is, the more numerous are its party identifiers and the closer attached they are to their party (Schmitt & Holmberg, forthcoming 1995). Voting against the party one identifies with in ideologically polarised systems means the bridging of far greater political divides than elsewhere. As a result, party identification should not only be more frequent in polarised systems; it should have a stronger impact on the vote there as well.

In the third wave of surveys of the 1989 European Electoral Study, the perceptions of voters of the left-right position of political parties were established. Based on this information, we can classify the ten party systems involved in ideologically polarised and moderate ones. If we cross-tabulate the pre-eminence or otherwise of direct party identification effects on the vote, we find that our hypothesis is confirmed in eight out of ten cases. In the class of polarised systems, we find only the British Conservatives deviating in the sense that a predominant party identification effect on the vote is not found there; for the non-polarised systems, the one exception is the Greek PaSoK which does display a strong effect of party identification on the vote (Table 6).

- Table 6 about here -

**The accountability hypothesis.**

Our third hypothesis postulated a relationship between the governmental role of a party and determination of party choice. The influence of issue considerations on the vote is expected to be greater for parties
governing alone than for those participating with others in a coalition government. The reason for this is obvious. One-party governments can easily be held accountable, electorally, for what they have done and what they have not, while coalition government performance is more difficult to attribute to individual parties (see e.g. Laver & Shepsle 1990, Strom 1990). A similar logic applies for the party of the president in presidential systems. The French PS, for example, cannot plausibly be made responsible for the policies of its President (who has an independent electoral base of legitimacy) to the same extent as applies to the British Conservative Party and its Prime Minister.

Leaving aside the French PS, we find party choice for all five parties which form a government on their own to be essentially based on issue competence attribution. The decision to vote for a party participating in a government coalition is relatively free of issue consideration in three of four cases. Thus, eight out of nine cases inspected show the accountability of individual parties for government performance and deficits to run in line with the electoral relevance of issue considerations. The exception is the CDU/CSU, which, as the only coalition government party, is mainly voted for on the grounds of attributed issue competence.

8. Conclusions.

This paper addresses the old question of why people vote the way they do. Data surveyed in the countries of the EU on the eve of the European Parliament elections in 1989 constitutes the empirical base. It is hard to channel its results into one general answer. A number of more specific answers are easier to give. And, how could it be otherwise expected, a number of questions remain open and require further research.

One result of this study is that, contrary to earlier fears and findings, the application of the Aalbor-model of party choice proved a viable tool in explaining European voting behaviour. Our analysis of the vote for ten large European government parties demonstrates, in particular that the concept of party identification can be fruitfully transferred to non-US settings.

Party identification and issue competence attribution are relevant, though not always the predominant predictors of party choice. In all of our models. Socio-structural characterized, by contrast, are found to have an only modest and mostly indirect impact on the vote. In the young democracies of Southern Europe in particular, social structure is close to irrelevant for the vote. Ideology is more important, for the vote than social structure. Voters ideological orientations are found to play an immensely important role in the vote for three of the ten parties studied, namely the Danish and British Conservatives and also the French PS. Just why this should be the case for these particular parties is one of the questions that deserve further research.

The relationship between party identification and ideological orientations is another area where further research is needed. The results presented here suggest that this relationship is not necessarily the
same across systems and cultures. Where ideological orientations rather than party identification are found to be shaped by political socialisation processes - as is the case for the Greek PaSoK and French PS - party identification should probably be understood as a reflection of ideological orientations rather than the other way round. Covariance structures, unfortunately, seldom deliver messages as clear as in these two cases.

At the end of the paper an attempt is made to understand inter-party differences in the mode of party choice. Three hypotheses are corroborated. The age of a polity affects the mode of vote choice: the vote in young democracies is largely independent of social-structural contours. The degree of ideological polarisation of a party system affects the mode of vote choice: party identification is a more important predictor in ideologically polarised systems than elsewhere. And the governmental role of parties affects the mode of vote choice: issue competence considerations determine the vote for parties governing alone to a greater extent than in the case for parties participating with others in a coalition government.

These insights are based on the analysis of ten parties only. Moreover, analysing only one party in a political system makes it difficult to distinguish reliably between party-specific and system-specific factors. Indeed, in this respect further research is needed as well. As preliminary as this analysis may therefore be, it should have demonstrated that the mode of party choice obviously correlates with a hitherto neglected class of variables. These are political variables describing properties of the political system. the structure of the party system and the governmental role of the parties. Sufficient variation in all these variables is only to be established in cross-national comparative electoral research. This is where we should concentrate our future efforts.
Notes

1 This is a revised English version of a paper published earlier this year in German (Schmitt 1994).


3 The biggest problems with the concept of party identification have been reported for the Dutch multiparty system. Following on from the influential verdict of Thomassen (1976), van der Eijk and Niegöller (1983, 1985) demonstrated that a sizeable section of Dutch voters are affiliated to multiple parties which typically are ideologically close. They conclude that the Dutch are identify with an ideological tendency rather than with a party.

4 This was already indicated by Downs, albeit as a theoretical safeguard. If one takes the danger of asking too much of the voter/respondent less seriously, one may turn the process around and determine by factor analysis the 'ideological structure of party competition based on voters' perceptions of parties' issue positions. This was the approach adopted by Franz U. Pappi in his analysis of the first all-German elections after re-unification (1991, 1992).

5 This is so for advocates of the closestanchise model following Downs, as well as for its critics promoting a directional theory of issue voting. This debate is only of consequence for the interpretation of survey results, not for the operationalisation and design of the survey tools.

6 Based on panel survey evidence, Converse (1964, 1970), in particular, alerted us to the lack of consistency in issue orientations. According to him, this lack of consistency results from the limited ideological competence of the average American voter, whose opinion on numerous questions is best characterised as a "non-attitude". He maintains that "...large portions of an electorate do not have meaningful beliefs, even on issues that have formed the basis for intense controversy among elites for substantial periods of time" (1964:245). This has not changed much since then (Smith 1989). European studies have come to comparable conclusions (Schmittweg 1980).

7 See also Converse (1990:382) who speaks of the hidden power of aggregation and the miracle of aggregation.

8 Analysing attitudes on abortion, Hans Rattinger (1993) has recently confirmed this on the basis of a German sample.

9 A strategic voter casts a protest vote in a second-order election in order to teach his "actually" preferred party a lesson, with whose policies or personnel he is currently dissatisfied.

10 This may still have been different at the first direct election, when party chairmen and union leaders topped party lists in the endeavour to lend the election more weight.

11 Fieldwork was conducted each time as a module within the Eurobarometer surveys of the European Commission. Funding of the two pre-electoral waves was secured from a European consortium of mass media, while the post-electoral survey was made possible by a grant from the British ESRC and the French government. Study design and instrumentation were jointly elaborated by a core group of European social scientists comprising of Roland Callard, Paris; Cees van der Eijk, Amsterdam; Mark Franklin, Houston; Manfred Kuckel, New York; Renato Mainheimer Milano; Collette Yamal, Paris; and this author, who served as co-ordinator of the group. The director of Eurobarometer surveys, Karlheinz Reif, though being prevented from formal group membership, was a continuous supporter of the study and inspired many of the analyses which emanated from it. The data-sets of EES89 can be obtained from Steinmetz Archives in Amsterdam (Steinmetz study numbers P1093-5).

12 The question wording is as follows: Are you close to any particular party? If so, are you very close, fairly close or merely a sympathiser? The "directional" follow-up question simply asks: 'Which party?'

13 As in the case of the American party identification index, which ranges over seven categories from strong democratic to strong republican.

14 With the possible exception of Ireland where, due to the superposition of the industrial conflict by the national conflict, the left-right dimension hardly discriminates between the central political powers.
The question wording is as follows: Some people always vote for the same party. Others make up their minds each time. Please tell me for each of the following how probable it is that you will ever vote for this party in European elections.

Levels of party identification are known to be volatile, and the estimation of developmental trends provides more valid information. It is particularly troublesome to compare levels of party identification cross-nationally, as the functional equivalence of survey questions on party identification in the various language versions of a questionnaire may always be queried (see Schmitt 1988; Schmitt & Holmberg 1995).

Reported are "fitted models" which can describe the country-specific covariance structure with satisfactory precision. The fit between model and data is indicated by so-called fit indices. The Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index and the Comparative Fit Index is given at the bottom of each graph. Both indices range between 0 and 1 and values above .9 are said to be desirable (see Bentler 1989:93). When interpreting the strength of effects we refer to standardised path coefficients (shown in Figures 2 to 11). As the comparison of standardised coefficients over different samples is not without problems (Hinesbeck & Jackson 1977:Chapter 4.2), we concentrate on the comparison of the relative predominance of effects within individual samples (Athe 1976:44). For the central dependent variable, we report non-standardised coefficients in addition to the standardised ones (see Tables 3 and 4).

In the British data we also found a substantial effect by left-right orientation on satisfaction with the working of democracy (which itself, however, makes only a small contribution to the explanation of Conservative voting behaviour).

References


Table 1: Parties which have been chosen for analysis.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Det Konservative Folkeparti</td>
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<td>coalition leader</td>
</tr>
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<td>Christlich-Demokratische Union/</td>
<td>second</td>
<td>coalition leader</td>
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<td>Parti Socialiste</td>
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<td>governing alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Panellenio Socialistico Kinima</td>
<td>first</td>
<td>governing alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>The Conservative Party</td>
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<td>governing alone</td>
</tr>
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<td>Fianna Fail</td>
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<td>governing alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>coalition leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Appeal</td>
<td>second</td>
<td>coalition leader</td>
</tr>
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<td>Partido Social Democratic</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Obrero Español</td>
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a) Position in national rank order defined by approval rates found in the European Election Study 1989.

Table 2: Party identification and perceived party competence in resolving the most important problems (percent).

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<th>I</th>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>fairly close</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
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</table>

Parties' issue competence (index values)

Source: European Election Study 1989, 2nd wave. The index of issue competence is calculated as the relation between the mean number of issues mentioned in the rank order of importance (a value near three, because three rankings have been asked for) and the mean number of parties mentioned as best being able in resolving the problem (mostly clearly below three). The index value can be interpreted as a percentage; it indicates the probability with which the competing parties in a country are perceived to be capable to resolve the three most important problems.
Table 3: Determinants of voting behaviour in ten Western European countries: direct effects (first unstandardized and below standardized path coefficients).

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<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>valid cases (N)</td>
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<td>762</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>480</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Election Study 1989; 2nd wave; empty cells indicate no significant direct effect. The dependent variable is the probability of voting for the [conservatives etc.] in European Elections; the higher the value the higher the probability. The independent variables have the following coding: Party identification: (3) respondent feels very close to the selected party; (2) ... close to any party. Issue competence: respondent considers the mentioned party being best able to resolve the three most important problems; (2) ... best for resolving one of the three most important problems; (0) ... unable to resolve any of the three most important problems. Left-Right-Orientation: Self-placement between 1=left and 10=right. Postmaterialism: Inglehart’s 4-item indicate from (1) materialist through (2) mixed to (3) postmaterialist orientations. Satisfaction with democracy: (1) very satisfied; (2) fairly satisfied; (3) fairly unsatisfied; (4) very unsatisfied. Social class based subjective identification with (1) working class; (2) lower middle class; (3) middle class; (4) upper middle class and (5) upper class. Church attendance: (5) several times a week; (4) once a week; (3) several times a year; (2) seldom; (1) never or without denomination. Union membership: (1) Respondent or member of household is member of union; (0) not.
Table 4: Determinants of voting behaviour in ten Western European countries: overall effects (first unstandardized and below standardized path coefficients).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>.08</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union membership</td>
<td>-.66</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>-.48</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

valid cases (N) 732 706 762 644 732 645 686 795 480 577

Source: European Election Study 1989; 2nd wave; empty cells indicate no significant overall effect. For the coding of variables see footnotes of Table 3.
### Table 5: Summary of patterns of vote determination in Western Europe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern</th>
<th>Dominant direct effect(s)</th>
<th>Secondary direct effect(s)</th>
<th>Social background factors</th>
<th>Found in party (country)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pattern 1: Social partisanship</td>
<td>Party identification</td>
<td>Issue competence &amp; left-right</td>
<td>Church attendance (strong)</td>
<td>DC (I), CDA (NL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern 2: Left-right-orientation</td>
<td>Left-right &amp; issue competence resp. party identification</td>
<td>Party identification &amp; issue competence</td>
<td>Class, union membership</td>
<td>KONS (DK), CONG (GI), PS (F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern 3: Issue competence</td>
<td>Issue competence</td>
<td>Party identification</td>
<td>Church attendance (weaker)</td>
<td>CDU/CSU (D), FF (RL), PDS (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern 4: Autonomy of the political</td>
<td>Party identification &amp; issue competence</td>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>PSOE (E), PASOK (GR), PDS (P)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Graph 1: The basic model.

Graph 2: Determinants of the vote for the Democrazia Cristiana (DC) in Italy.

Note: Effects below/equal .10 are not shown. The model fit is .926 according to the Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index and .941 according to the Comparative Fit Index. For the coding of variables see footnotes of Table 3.
Graph 3: Determinants of the vote for the Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA) in the Netherlands.

Note: Effects below/equal .10 are not shown. The model fit is .998 according to the Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index and .990 according to the Comparative Fit Index.

Graph 4: Determinants of the vote for the Konservative Folkeparti (KONS) in Denmark.

Note: Effects below/equal .10 are not shown. The model fit is .998 according to the Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index and .997 according to the Comparative Fit Index.
Graph 5: Determinants of the vote for the Conservative Party (CONS) in Great Britain.

Note: Effects below/equal .10 are not shown. The model fit is .928 according to the Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index and .937 according to the Comparative Fit Index.

Graph 6: Determinants of the vote for the Parti Socialiste (PS) in France.

Note: Effects below/equal .10 are not shown. The model fit is .974 according to the Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index and .983 according to the Comparative Fit Index.
Graph 7: Determinants of the vote for the Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich-Sozialen Union (CDU/CSU) in Germany.

Note: Effects below/equal .10 are not shown. The model fit is .986 according to the Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index and .994 according to the Comparative Fit Index.

Graph 8: Determinants of the vote for the Fianna Fáil (FF) in Ireland.

Note: Effects below/equal .10 are not shown. The model fit is .913 according to the Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index and .989 according to the Comparative Fit Index.
Graph 9: Determinants of the vote for the Partido Social Democrata (PSD) in Portugal.

Graph 10: Determinants of the vote for the Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE) in Spain.
Graph 11: Determinants of the vote for the Panellinio Socialistiko Kinima (PaSoK) in Greece.

Note: Effects below/equal .10 are not shown. The model fit is .969 according to the Bentler-Bonnet Normed Fit Index and .981 according to the Comparative Fit Index.
Appendix Table 7: Voters' left-right selfplacement and perceived left-right positions of parties
(Figures are means).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>GB</th>
<th>Ir</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>GR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean position of the voters</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean position of the parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECO</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rad</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance between the two most extreme parties (A)</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance between the two main parties (B)</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B in percent of A</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Election Study 1989, 3rd wave.