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

The Agricultural Advisory Committees of the Commission: Access for National Lobbying or Coordinating Supranational Policies?

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Content

Abstract

This paper comprises a descriptive and theoretical analysis of the organizational representation structure within the Agricultural Advisory Committees of the European Commission. The descriptive analysis is focused on two main structural components: (1) share of seats held by organizations and (2) centrality of an organization within the AACS. While in the theoretical part these two structural components are combined in one consistent social capital index corresponding to the political influence, an organization could gain from its structural position within the AACS. On the basis of the introduced social capital concept further analyses regarding the impact of organizational representation structures on political influence of organizations have been undertaken. Main results of the analyses are the following: (1) The overall structure of organizational representation within the AACS is characterized by a high relative and absolute concentration of the seat distribution in favor of the organizations of the agricultural lobby; (2) A cross-national comparison within the agricultural producer category implies that as long as the number of seats distributed by interest groups is variable, a decentral interest representation through multiple organizations is more effective compared to a central interest representation through one global organization. While a comparison between the different economic categories implies that if the total number of seats held by an interest group is exogenously determined and fixed, a central interest representation through one global organization seems to be more effective in comparison to a decentral interest representation through multiple organizations.

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1 Introduction

One of the special institutional characteristics of the political system of the EU can be seen in the so-called 'Comitology', which denotes a system of different committees institutionally established to support and advise the Commission and the Council by formulating and implementing policies. While committee systems are widely established also in national democratic systems of Western Europe (see Rasch, 1995), a very specific feature of the Comitology is that there exist institutionally established committees in which interest groups are ordinary members, e.g. the Agricultural Advisory Committees of the European Commission. Such an institutionalized embeddedness of nongovernmental organizations into the political decision and implementation process seems innovative compared to established national democratic systems in Western Europe, in which interest groups have no or only very limited formal access to political decision-making, e.g. through hearings.

One reason for excluding interest groups from the institutionalized political decision process can be seen in the commonly recognized hypothesis that lobbying efforts of interest groups are rent seeking activities that favor the interest groups to the expense of society at large (Olson, 1965). On the other hand, there exist also other positions in the social science literature regarding the role of interest groups in political decision-making of societies, e.g. Bentley (1908), Coleman, (1986) or most recently Ball (1995). Bentley was most pioneering in the direction to incorporate interest groups into the institutional decision-making process of societies to improve the intermediation and representation of society's interest in political decisions. Coleman was inspired by Bentley's expositions and formalized his basic idea. The main argument of Coleman in favor of a formal incorporation of interest groups is that even in classical democratic systems interest groups influence political decisions using informal access channels and hidden resources, e.g. bribing. „In a body in which their [interest groups] participation was direct and explicit, their resources are those they receive from the citizens through votes, and their activities are less hidden....It would mean that the members of the legislative body would be direct representatives of individual interest, rather than actors interposed between interests and collective decisions, as are geographically-based legislators in existing political systems." (Coleman, 1986, pp. 184). While Bentley and Coleman emphasize the role of interest groups as more efficient institutions to represent and intermediate interests, Ball focused more on the role of interest groups as „service bureaus, providing policy-makers

with specialized knowledge or expertise and enabling them to craft better informed public policies" (Ball, 1995, p. 119). In more specific terms Ball demonstrated on the basis of game-theoretical models that although interest groups are rent-seekers, i.e. try to influence policy outcome to their favor and to the detriment of society at large, there exist specific framework settings which result in 'the paradox of possible welfare improvement by lobbying', as the social value of information provided by the interest groups outweighs the welfare reductions of policy distortions (Ball, 1995).

The argumentations of both approaches can be found in the formal justification of the implementation of the agricultural advisory committees. For example in the act of the Commission to implement an advisory committee for cereals (87/70/EWG, Amtsblatt Nr. L45/1) the following two reasons are given as a justification for the implementation: 1. The Commission is interested in the position of relevant interest groups as experts for producer and consumer preferences regarding common cereal policies; 2. All interest groups concerned by these policies should have the opportunity to influence the position of the Commission.

The policy domain of Common Agricultural Policy as a European policy domain has a very specific multi-level structure comprising simultaneously both different economic interests corresponding to actor's position in the marketing chain, e.g. organizations of the agricultural input industry, farmers, processing industry, wholesale & retail trade as well as of consumers and workers and different national interests corresponding to the territorial affiliation of actors. Therefore, despite of the final social evaluation of lobbying, the agricultural advisory committee system can be understood as an additional institution involved in the formulation and implementation of policies, which is an important point of access to political decision making for national and supranational organizations intermediating their specific economic and national interest. Given these facts, it is of interest to analyse the representation structure in the Agricultural Advisory Committees. In particluar, the following topics are of interest analysing the representation structure of the advisory committees:

- As the Common Agricultural Policy is still the most important and most integrated policy domain of the EU, it is interesting to analyse the degree of integration within the agricultural policy domain. The more important the relevant supranational organizations in comparison to their corresponding national members, the higher the actual political integration. In case that supranational organizations are the key members of the Advisory

Commitees it could be concluded that national interest differences decline against economic interest differences and that supranational organizations are efficient institutions to coordinate divergent national interests.

- Identification of different interest mediation structures and stratagies. Here, two separating lines, on the one hand a national comparative analyis of interest mediation and on the other hand a comparative analysis of interest mediation among different economic groups (agricultural producers, processing industry, trade or consumers) is interesting. For example, can different structures of interest mediation be identified for different member states or different economic groups? What are more efficient, what are less efficient structrures of interest mediation? What is a more efficient strategy of interest representation: central/global or decentral/specialized representation?

To this end the paper is structured as follows. In chapter 2 a short overview of the Agricultural Advisory Committees is given. Chapter 3 presents a descriptive analyis of the representation structure measured by seat distributions within the Advisory Committees, while in chapter 4 the communication structure in the Agricultural Advisory Committee-System (AACS) is analysed using network analytical methods. In chapter 5 different representation strategies are derived theoretically and their efficiency is analysed simulating corresponding representation structures on the basis of the collected empirical data.

2 The Agricultural Advisory Committee-System

In 1995 the AACS comprised of 27 different committees and 3 subcommittees (see table 1). Given a total number of committees within the European Union of more than 1000 and a total number of 368 committees having been on the budget plan of the Commission in 1994, AACS seems to have only minor importance. But, it is besides the ESC the only institutional point of access for nongovernmental organizations in the agricultural policy domain. Following a general categorization of committees suggested in the literature (Commission Bulletin 2/1980, Schmitt von Sydow, 1980, Berlin, 1987, Pappi/Schnorpfeil, 1996) committees can be subdivided into different categories according to four main criteria. One criterium is their position within the policy cycle, i.e. if the committee is consulted within the phase of policy formulation or implementation. Another is the degree of institutionalization of committee consultance. The consultance can be a constitutional part of the decision procedure or not, in the first case the Committee is called obligatory, while it is called nonobligatory otherwise. A third criterium focuses on the status of committee members, it can be only national and supranational civil servants or administrators, both administrators and representatives of nongovernmental organizations or only representatives of nongovernmental organizations, while as a fourth criterium the time of existence is taken. In regard to the fourth criterion permanent and ad-hoc-committees can be separated. According to these criteria the AAC's are permanent, nonobligatory committees, mainly consulted in the phase of policy formulation and comprising only of nongovernmental members.

Legal basis

According to the treaty of the EEC and the Maastricht treaty, respectively, the European Commission has the right to set up advisory committees per Commission decision. Most of the agricultural advisory committees have been set up at an early stage of the EEC, only the advisory committees for cork, veal&goat and rice have been set up after 1980. According to the Commission decision subcommittees can be set up by the committee in accordance with the Commission. Further, setting up a committee, the share of seats appointed to representatives of different economic groups (e.g. producer, processing industry, trade, consumers, unions), appointment procedure of presidency, chairman and secretary of the committee as well as the

task and call for meetings are regulated by Commission decision. In detail, the following regulations have been made.

Members

The total number of members of the AACS amounts to 1003 in 1995, with a share of 49,8%, 13,4%, 14,5%, 11,4% and 9,4% for the economic groups (categories) producers, trade, industry, consumers and unions. Thus, the AACS is concentrated on the interest representation of the farmers, while other economic groups, especially consumers have only a minor share of seats. Regarding the seat distribution by committees, one can find a close correlation between the size measured in seats of a committee and the relative economic importance of the agricultural subsector within the EU the committee corresponds to. Thus, the committees for cereals, beef meat, pork, milk or wine, have the highest amounts of seats. Further, administratorsof the Commission participate in the meetings of a committee or subcommittee.

Table 1: Members of the advisory committees for agriculture

Date May 1995 (formation according to ABI. L45 from February 14th 1987)

Committee/Group	Cooperatives	Industry	Trade	Unions	Consumer	Other
Cereals	27	8*	7**	6	6	
Rice	14	4	3	4	3	
Milk and Dairy Products	26	9*	6	5	6	
Beef	25	4	9***	6	6	
Pork	24	4	9***	5	6	
Sheepmeat and Goatmeat	15	1	6***	4	4	
Poultrymeat	15	3	4	4	4	
Eggs	17	4	5	4	4	
Fats: Oil seeds	22	10*	3	3	6	
Fats: Olive Oil	12	4	3	3	2	
Sugar	26	13*	3	5	5	
Fruit and Vegetables	23	6*	7	5	5	
Vine	24	5	7	6	6	
Raw Tobacco	22	9°	4	6	3	
Hops	16	5	5	3	3	
Live Plants	20	-	10	5	5	
Flax and Hemp	20	10*	2	4	4	
Silkworm	7	2	1	2	2	
Seeds	21	1	16	3	1	
Cork	9	3	3	2	1	
Cotton	14	6	2	3	3	
Feedingstuffs	15	5	4	3	3	
S.S. Approximation of law	2+2	2	2	2	2	
S.S. Approx. of law on Seeds	2+2	-	3	2	2	
Veterinary Committee	2+2	2	2	2	2	Vet. Med.
Agricult. Structure Policy	25°°	4	4	11°°°	-	10*°
Social Questions affecting	22°°			7		3 farm
Total number of members in	500	146	135	115	94	13

* different branches of manufacturing industry

** of that 1 representatives of storing firms

*** of that 3 rep. of cattle trade, 3 for meat wholesale, 2 of butcher's trade, 1 of super-markets

° of that 4 of public enterprises

°° of that 4 young farmers (S.S. social questions without cooperatives)

°°° of that 4 nonfarmers

...J.W.G = Joint Working Party

S.S = Special Section

*° of that 2 landowner, 5 rep. of agricultural credit institutes, 3 farm families

Source: European Commission, GD 6, Bruxelles - October 1994 - VI-A-1 : Bericht Über Die Arbeit Der Beratenden Ausschüsse im Bereich Landwirtschaft, Unpublished.

Appointment procedures for members, committee chairman and presidency

While the distribution of seats by the economic groups is determined directly by the decision of the Commission, the interest groups are concerned with the appointment of individual members. According to the appointment procedure determined in the Commission decision, individual members are appointed by the Commission under the suggestion of the supranational organizations which are considered as most representative regarding the relevant economic groups. In practical terms, COPA/COGECA, CELCA, CIAA, BEUC and EFA, are responsible for the proposal of members representing producer, trade, industry, consumers and worker interests, respectively. For each seat two canditates of different nationality have to be suggested, while the Commission makes the final appointment. The members are appointed for 3 years and the list of appointed members has to be published in the Amtsblatt of the EU. Regarding the internal nomination procedure of canditates within an economic group, a questionnaire of the relevant supranational organizations is supposed to guarantee that the main determinants for nominating a canditate are his/her personal or organizational qualification and to a lower extent a propotional representation of national members.

The chairman of a committee is elected for 3 years by the members under a 2/3 majority rule in the first vote and, if no decision is reached in the first vote, with a simple majority in following votes. Moreover, two deputies of the chairman are elected following the same voting procedure as described above. Further, members of the presidency can be elected, if required by economic groups represented in the committee. At maximum, the presidency can comprise one representative for each economic group. The task of the presidency is to prepare and organize meetings of the committee, while the chairman takes the chair in the meetings. The work in the committee is not compensated financially.

Meetings

In general, meetings are called on request by the Commission. According to table 2, in 1993 the average meetings of AAC's and its subcommittees was 3 with a maximum of 5 for the committee for cereals and a minimum of 0 for the subcommittee for hop. Compared to other nonobligatory committees, e.g. the committee for Sicherheit, Arbeitshygiene und Gesund-

heitsschutz am Arbeitsplatz, which also comprises nongovernmental members, with an average the meeting frequency of about 40 meetings/year the meeting frequency is relatively low.

Task of Committee

The main task of the Committee is to evaluate specific Commission proposals. The statements are made in a written form by a meeting protocol including the different positions of all economic groups represented in the Committee. The meeting protocol is submitted to the Commission. On request the Commission informs the Council or an administrative committee on the results of the Committee consultations.

Table 2: Number of meetings of the advisory committees for agriculture

Committee/Group	1994		1993		1992		1991	
	AC	SC	AC	SC	AC	SC	AC	SC
Cereals	5	-	5	-	6	-	5	-
Rice	2	-	2	-	2	-	1	-
Milk and Dairy Products	3	-	2	2	3	3	3	3
Beef	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	2
Pork	3	3	3	3	3	1	3	3
Sheepmeat and Goatmeat	3	2	2	2	3	2	3	6
Poultrymeat	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2
Eggs	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2
Fats: Oil seeds	3	-	3	-	3	1	3	2
Fats: Olive Oil	3	2	2	2	3	-	2	-
Sugar	3	-	3	-	3	-	3	-
- J.W.G- Sugar	5	-	3	-	3	-	3	-
Fruit and Vegetables	3	2	3	1	3	3	3	-
Wine	3	1	3	1	3	-	3	-
Raw Tobacco	2	-	2	-	2	-	2	-
-J.W.G. Raw Tobacco	2	-	2	-	2	-	1	-
Hops	2	-	2	-	2	-	2	1
-J.W.G. Hops	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-
Live Plants	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2
Flax and Hemp	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	-
Silkworm	0	2	0	2	0	1	0	1
Seeds	2	-	2	-	2	-	2	2
Cork	2	-	2	-	1	-	2	-
Cotton	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	1
Feedingstuffs	2	7	1	7	2	7	2	6
S.S. Approximation of law on Feedingstuffs	2	-	1	-	1	-	2	-
S.S. Approx. of law on Seeds	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-
Veterinary Committee	2	1	2	2	2	-	1	1
Agricult. Structure Policy	3	1	1	-	2	-	3	-
Social Questions affecting Farmers and their families	1	-	1	-	1	1	1	-
Total number of meetings	**69**	**30**	**60**	**31**	**65**	**26**	**62**	**34**

AC = Advisory Committee

SC = Subcommittee

Source: European Commission, GD VI-A-1, 1994

3 Descriptive Analysis of the representation structures in the Advisory Committees of the European Commission

3.1 Data basis and methodological outline of the study

The data used in the following analyses are based on the list of members of the 30 Advisory Committees and sub-committees from 15th of May 1995[1]. This list has been subdivided by categories, e.g. producers, cooperatives, trade, industry, consumers and unions, and submitted to the main interest groups representing the different categories at the supranational level which identified the relevant national and supranational organizations the members are affiliated with. In detail these main interest groups are **COPA** for the producers, **COGECA** for the cooperatives, **CELCAA** for the trade category, **CIAA** for the industry category, **BEUC, COFACE** and **EURO-COOP** for the category of consumers and **EFA and EURO-C (CES)** for the unions[2]. All identified national and supranational organizations are presented in the appendix.

The descriptive analysis incorporates an analysis of the seat distribution among the national members, the economic groups and the relevant supra- and national organizations. While the seat distribution among the diffrent economic groups (categories) is legislatively determined by the corresponding Commission decision, the seat distribution among the national members as well as among the different organizations is generally unrestricted and thus gives some insights into the strategies and potentials of different member states and organizations, respectively, in representing their interests.

Regarding the national rerpresentation structures, the national percentages of seats within the Committee-system is of interest. For example, does the observed national seat distribution differ from the national representation in other Euorpean institutions, e.g. the European Parliament or the Council? Further, under this topic it should be analyzed if the national representation structures can be classified into more general clusters, e.g. do the representation

[1] At this point I would like to thank the GD VI, especially Mr. Heine, Mr. Korkas and Mr. Ruoff, for supporting this study by providing not only the list of committee members, but also a lot of other valuable information.

[2] At this point I would like to thank again these organizations very much for their support and active cooperation without which the study would not have been successfully undertaken.

shares in the single committees correspond to the national agricultural production structures or do the national shares in different categories correspond to the general economic and political importance of these categories in these member states.

Regarding the organizational representation structure it is on the one side of interest which type of organizations, supranational or national, are the most relevant members. On the other hand it is of interest to analyze the organizational represenation structure, e.g. number of organizations, type of organizations (peak or branch organizations), representing different economic groups or national member states.

According to the applied methodological approach, only the organizations which had at least one seat in the AACS at 15th of May 1995 are taken into account. As the seats in the Committees could generally rotate among different organizations representing the same category, this approach might be considered as an arbitrary snap shot which is not representative for the underlying representation structure in general. To check for this argument, the above mentioned peak organizations which are responsible for the seat distribution for each category have been asked for the main determinants of their selection procedure. In particular, they have been asked to what extent national or organizational quotas determine the appointment of members in comparison to personal or organizational qualifications. Accoding to the answers of the peak organizations, the main determinant of the appointment of members is the personal/organizational qualification followed by national quotas, while organizational quotas, i.e. an equal representation of all member organizations in the committees is not relevant. According to the first criterion of personal qualification there should be no difference in the seat distribution at a given point in time and the seat distribution over a longer time period, as the qualification differences can be expected to be stable over a longer time period. Regarding the second criterium of national quotas there might be a bias between the distribution of seats at a given point in time in comparison to a longer time period if an organization controls not enough seats to distribute among its national member-organization at a given point in time. In this latter case, a national quota can only be implemented by rotating seats among national member organizations over time. But as long as each peak organization controls a sufficient number of seats, the general structure of representation can be analysed on the basis of the seat distribution at a given point of time, even if both criteria apply. According to table 1, the minimum number of seats held by a category is 94 (for the consumers). Thus, at least an analysis of the national representation

structure at the aggregate level seems to be reasonable using this „static" data basis. Since the number of seats held by the different supranational organizations representing different economic branches (see chapter 3.3) is generally very low, the used data base seems to be useful only to a limited extent for an analysis of the national representation structure at branch level.

Furthermore, general differences between representation strategies of different economic groups (categories) in terms of central and global interest representation by one peak organization versus decentral and specialized represenation of interests by a number of branch organizations can be analysed on the basis of the data without any restrictions, as this general representation patterns will not change frequently over time.

3.2 National representation structures

National percentages in total seats

Although in contrast to the ESC the system of the AAC's are not consitutionally embedded into the legal decision process of the EU, it is considered as an important point of access for interest groups (Pappi/Schnorpfeil, 1996). Further, it can be assumed that the committee statements have at least some reasonable impact on the concrete policy options finally proposed by the Commission and therefore on the final policy decisions made within the EU. Therefore, it is of interest to analyse the national shares in the AACS and compare the national representation structure with the national representation in other European institutions, e.g. the European Parliament (EP) or Council of Ministers.

According to table 3 the percentage of seats is with 14,7% the highest for Italy, followed by France with 14,5%. , while the other two large members, Germany and United Kingdom, have a lower share of 12,8% and 10,2%, respectively. Spain as a medium size member has even a higher share of 12,9% compared to these large members.

Table 3: The Committee membership of the nations

(Percentage of a nations share in the committee)

	Bel.	Den.	Fra.	Ger.	Gre.	Ir.	Ita.	Lux.	Ned.	Por.	Spa.	UK	Tot.
1	7,5	3,8	17	13,2	3,8	3,8	13,2	1,9	5,7	3,8	13,2	13,2	5,3
2			14,3	3,6	10,7		32,1			7,1	28,6	3,6	2,8
3	9,6	7,7	13,5	13,5	3,8	5,8	9,6	1,9	13,5	3,8	5,8	11,5	5,2
4	8	6	16	14	2	10	14	2	4	4	8	12	5
5	10,4	8,3	12,5	14,6	2,1	4,2	8,3	2,1	14,6	2,1	12,5	8,3	4,8
6	3,3	6,7	16,7	10	3,3	3,3	10		13,3	3,3	6,7	23,3	3
7	2,9	5,9	8,8	11,8	2,9	8,8	11,8		11,8	2,9	11,8	20,6	3,4
8	9,1	2,3	18,2	15,9	2,3	2,3	18,2		6,8	2,3	13,6	9,1	4,4
9	9,6	3,8	17,3	17,3	3,8	3,8	9,6		9,6	3,8	7,7	13,5	5,2
10	2,2	2,2	15,2	13	6,5	2,2	19,6		8,7	4,3	15,2	10,9	4,6
11	2,1		20,8	12,5	6,3		22,9	4,2	2,1	8,3	18,8	2,1	4,8
12	11,6	2,3	14	14	16,3		16,3		2,3	7	14	2,3	4,3
13	12,5	3,1	9,4	34,4		3,1	3,1			3,2	12,5	18,8	3,2
14	7,5	2,5	12,5	15	2,5	2,5	20		17,5	2,5	10	7,5	4
15	17,5		27,5	7,5		5	15		12,5	2,5	10	2,5	4
16		3,4	17,2	3,4	6,9	13,8	10,3		6,9	10,3	10,3	17,2	2,9
17	7,1		28,6		7,1		42,9					14,3	1,4
18	7,1	7,1	14,3	16,7	4,8	4,8	11,9	2,4	14,3	2,4	4,8	9,5	4,2
19	7,4	5,6	13	11,1	3,7	5,6	18,5	1,9	7,4	7,4	13	5,6	5,4
20	8,3	8,3	16,7	16,7		16,7			8,3			25	1,2
21	6,3	6,3	12,5	9,4	3,1	3,1	18,8	6,3	3,1	9,4	12,5	9,4	3,2
22	6,7	3,3	13,3	13,3	3,3	6,7	10	3,3	10	10	6,7	13,3	3
23	8,3			16,7		8,3	8,3		25	8,3	8,3	16,7	1,2
24			4,2		16,7		33,3			8,3	33,3	4,2	2,4
25		9,1	9,1	27,3		9,1	9,1			9,1		27,3	1,1
26			11,1	5,6			16,7			33,3	33,3		1,8
27	3,6		3,6		32,1		7,1		3,6	7,1	35,7	7,1	2,8
28	13,6	9,1	13,6	9,1	9,1	9,1	9,1		9,1		9,1	9,1	2,2
29	11,1		16,7	11,1	16,7		16,7			11,1	11,1	5,6	1,8
30	14,3		7,1	35,7						7,1	14,3	21,4	1,4
Col.	7,2	3,8	14,5	12,8	5,5	4,2	14,7	1,1	7,6	5,5	12,9	10,2	100

AV=Advisory Committee,
TG=technical Group
1 = AV cereals
2 = TG of the AV cereals
3 = AV milk and milk products
4 = AV beef meat
5 = AV pork meat
6 = AV poultrymeat
7 = AV eggs
9 = AV fats
10= AV sugar
11= AV wine
12= AV raw tobaco
13= AV hop
14= AV live plants
15= AV flax and hamp
16= AV sheep&goat
17= TG silkworm
18= AV seeds
19= AV Ouestions of Agri-cultural Structure policy
20= AV veterinary committee
21= AV Social questions affecting farmers and mem. of their families
22= AV feedingstuffs
23= TG feed.stuff: approx. of laws
24= AV fats TG olives and products
25= TG seeds: approx. of laws
26= AV cork
27= AV cotton
28= AV sugar equal representation
29= AV tobaco equal representation
30= AV hop equal representation

In more specific terms, compared to the percentage of seats in the European Parliament, United Kingdom, Germany and France have a considerable lower share of seats, while The Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and Spain have a considerable higher share of seats. Although a difference of 5,6% for United Kingdom seems to be significant, the correlation between the percentages of seats held by nations in the Committee system and the parliament, respectively and the voting weights of the members in the Council is still very high (above 0.9) and statistical significant (see table 4). Thus, all in all one can conclude that the national representation structure in total does not differ from that in the EP and the Council.

Table 4: Correlation between national share in the advisory committee system
the European Parliament and the Council

(second row in cell = 2-tailed significance level)

	Council of Ministers (voting weights)	European Parliament (seats distribution)
Total Share	0,95 (0)	0,93 (0)
Share in categories:*		
Producers	0,8 (0,00)	0,79 (0,00)
Cooperatives	0,86 (0)	0,84 (0,00)
Industry	0,89 (0)	0,87 (0)
Trade	0,69 (0,01)	0,67 (0,01)
Unions	0,65 (0,02)	0,63 (0,03)
Consumers	0,55 (0,07)	0,59 (0,04)
Council of Ministers	1 (0)	0,99 (0,0)
European Parliament	0,99 (0,0)	1 (0)

* Categories are classified on the basis of the organisational affiliation of members.

National representation within categories

Under this topic it is analysed if or to what extent the national represenations in terms of national shares of seats varies across different categories. Since the economic groups, e.g. producers, consumers, etc. have different relative economic and political importance in the different national member states, it seems reasoanable that this different importances induce different relative national representation shares within the different groups. According to table 5 there exist indeed different relative national shares within different categories. For example, Luxembourg focuses its representation on the producer category with a share of 72,7% of total national members, while Luxembourg has no representative in the industry, trade and union category. In contrast, The Netherlands observes a relatively low share of 23,7% for the producer category and the highest share an be found for the trade category with 26,3%.

To get a more systematic approach to the question whether systematic differences in the relative national representation within categories exist, a cluster analysis has been run using the percentages of member seats in the different categories for each nation as input data. The results of the cluster analysis suggest a 4 cluster solution with Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and Spain being in one cluster and France, Greece, Ireland and United Kingdom in a second cluster. Luxembourg and Portugal could not be clustered and each have to be indicated to a single cluster.

To analyse the systematic feature of category represenation for the single clusters a discriminat analysis has been run using the 4 clusters as category variable and the relative national shares in the categories as explaining variables. According to the results of this analysis, the main differences between the first and the second cluster can be seen in the different shares of the union, trade and consumer category. For the first cluster a relative high share with an average of 18.47% and of 13.45%, respectively is obeserved for the union and trade category, respectively, the relative share of the consumer category is relatively low with an average share of 2.85 in cluster 1 compared to a total share of 5,8% (see table 5)[3].

[3] Notice that the basis of table 5 in contrast to table 1 is not the distribution of seats by categories as indicated by the list of members published by the Commission, but the actual identified organizational affiliation of the Committee members. For example there exist a lot of members indicated to the consumer category according to the list of members, which are affiliated to CES, the supranational union organization. In table 5 these members are indicated to the union category and not as indicated by the list of members to the consumer category, since it seems more reasonable that a member will represent the interest of the economic group he/she is affiliated to than the economic group she/he is indicated to by the Commission.

Table 5: National representation within categories

Total Count / Row Percentage / Column Percentage	Producers	Cooperatives	Industry	Trade	Unions	Consumers	Other
Belgium	30	1	7	18	2	14	1
	41,7	1,4	9,7	25	2,8	19,4	
	8,1	0,8	6,1	10,5	3,4	9,2	
Denmark	19	1	4	5	1	8	1
	50	2,6	10,5	13,2	2,6	21,1	
	5,1	0,8	3,5	2,9	1,7	5,2	
France	49	20	16	31	12	16	2
	33,8	13,8	11	21,4	8,3	11	
	13,3	15,2	14	18,1	20,7	10,5	
Germany	39	20	28	22	7	12	1
	30,5	15,6	21,9	17,2	5,6	9,4	
	10,6	15,2	24,6	12,9	12,1	7,8	
Greece	34	8	3	9	1		2
	61,8	14,5	5,5	16,4	1,8		
	9,2	6,1	2,6	5,3	1,7		
Ireland	18	5	1	6	9	3	2
	42,9	11,9	2,4	14,3	21,4	7,1	
	4,9	3,8	0,9	3,5	15,5	2	
Italy	57	19	11	18	3	39	1
	38,8	12,9	7,5	12,2	2	26,5	
	15,4	14,4	9,6	10,5	5,2	25,5	
Luxembourg	8	1			2		3
	72,7	9,1			18,2		
	2,2	0,8			3,4		
Netherlands	18	11	20	13	2	12	1
	23,7	14,5	26,3	17,1	2,6	15,8	
	4,9	8,3	17,5	7,6	3,4	7,8	
Portugal	14	15	3	6	1	14	4
	25,5	27,3	5,5	10,9	1,8	25,5	
	3,8	11,4	2,6	3,5	1,7	9,2	
Spain	54	18	10	21	2	24	1
	41,9	14	7,8	16,3	1,6	18,6	
	14,6	13,6	8,8	12,3	3,4	15,7	
United Kingdom	29	13	11	22	16	11	2
	28,4	12,7	10,8	21,6	15,7	10,8	
	7,9	9,8	9,6	12,9	27,6	7,2	
Column	369	132	114	171	58	153	
Total	36,9%	13,2%	11,4%	17,1%	5,8%	15,3%	
Average in Cluster	37,77	10,17	16,83	13,45	18,47	2,85	1
Average in Cluster	41,73	13,23	18,42	7,43	7,23	11,8	2
Average in Cluster	72,7	9,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	18,2	3
Average in Cluster	25,5	27,3	10,9	5,5	25,5	1,8	4

Row Percentage = Percentage of categories in total national seats
Column Percentage = Percentage of national seats in total category seats

In contrast, the relative share of the union and trade category is relatively low for the second cluster with an average of 7.23% and 7.43%, respectively, while the share of the consumer category with an average of 11.8% is relatively high. Thus, broadly speaking the first cluster focuses relatively more on the representation of trade and union interests in comparison to the second cluster which focuses more on the representation of consumer interests. Note, in this context that the overall interest representations for both clusters focus on the producer interests with an average share of 38% and 42% for cluster 1 and cluster 2, respectively. A further interesting point in this context can be seen in the fact that the member states of the first cluster in comparison to the member states in the second cluster are characterized by more central strong national peak organizations for the union category, while for the members of the second cluster the national represention of worker interests are more fragmentary due to the existence of strong branch unions (United Kingdom and Ireland) or different competitive regional or ideological union organizations (France and Greece) (see Benninghaus, 1995).

In contrast to cluster 1 and 2, the interests representation of Luxembourg is segmented, as Luxembourg is only represented in 3 of the 6 categories (see table 5). Within the three represented economic groups, the represenation is extremly focused on producer interests with a share of 72%, followed by consumer interest with a share of 18.2%. Analogously, Portugal cannot be clustered neither together with cluster 1 nor together with cluster 2. In comparison to cluster 1 and 2 Portugal has a significant lower share for the industry and producer category with 10,9% and 25,5%, respectively. Further, the share of the cooperative category is relatively high compared to both clusters. In comparison to cluster 2, for Portugal analogously to cluster 1 a high share for the union category and a low share for the consumer category is observed, which all in all implies a representation structure for Portugal which is closer to cluster 1 than 2.

So far, the relative share of the categories in total number of national members have been analysed. A second aspect of the national representation within the categories can be seen in the analysis of the national share in total number of members representing a special category in the AACS. In this context, it is of interest whether the national representation varies over the different categories, e.g. if the share of seats of a given nation, e.g. Germany, is different for the consumer category compared to the producer category. According to table 5 significant variances of the relative national shares in the different categories can be observed for all national members. But, nevertheless the overall national representation structure is still

correlated highly and significantly with the corresponding representation structure of the EP and the Council, although the correlation coefficients are generally lower for the single categories compared to the total AACS, this holds in particular true for the consumer category with a correlation coefficient lower than 0.6 for both the EP and the Council.

National representation within committee-blocks

According to the agricultural subsectors, the committees and subcommittees of the AACS can be separated into different committee-blocks. In detail, the distinctions made are listed as the row labels of table 6.

Given the defined committee-blocks, the question arises to what extent the national members do adapt their specific agricultural production structure measured in production shares of the agricultural subsectors in representing their interest in the AACS. In table 6 the percentage of seats of national members per committee-block is listed. At a first glance, the figures seem to support the hypothesis that the relative national seat distribution by committee-blocks correspond to the national agricultural production structure, e.g. Greece has the highest share in the tobacco and textile block, while Denmark has its highest shares for the meat, cereal, milk and poultry block.

Table 6: National representation within committee blocks

	Belg	Den	Fra	Ger	Gre	Ird	Italy	Lux	Ned	Por	Spa	UK	Tot
Milk	9,6	7,7	13,5	13,5	3,8	5,8	9,6	1,9	13,5	3,8	5,8	11,5	**5,2**
	6,9	10,5	4,8	5,5	3,6	7,1	3,4	9,1	9,2	3,6	2,3	5,9	
Cereals	5,2	4,5	14,9	13,4	5,2	3,7	16,4	1,5	6,7	4,5	12,7	11,2	**13,4**
	9,7	15,8	13,8	14,1	12,7	11,9	15	18,2	11,8	10,9	13,2	14,7	
Fish	7,1	6,3	15	11,8	3,1	8,7	11	1,6	8,7	4,7	10,2	11,8	**12,7**
	12,5	21,1	13,1	11,7	7,3	26,2	9,5	18,2	14,5	10,9	10,1	14,7	
Poultry	3,1	6,3	12,5	10,9	3,1	6,3	10,9		12,5	3,1	9,4	21,9	**6,4**
	2,8	10,5	5,5	5,5	3,6	9,5	4,8		10,5	3,6	4,7	13,7	
Wine	2,1		20,8	12,5	6,3		22,9	4,2	2,1	8,3	18,8	2,1	**4,8**
	1,4		6,9	4,7	5,5		7,5	18,2	1,3	7,3	7	1	
Feeding-	7,1	2,4	9,5	14,3	2,4	7,1	9,5	2,4	14,3	9,5	7,1	14,3	**4,2**
stuffs	4,2	2,6	2,8	4,7	1,8	7,1	2,7	9,1	7,9	7,3	2,3	5,9	
Fruit &	2,2	2,2	15,2	13	6,5	2,2	19,6		8,7	4,3	15,2	10,9	**4,6**
Vegetable	1,4	2,6	4,8	4,7	5,5	2,4	6,1		5,3	3,6	5,4	4,9	
Flower	7,5	2,5	12,5	15	2,5	2,5	20		17,5	2,5	10	7,5	**4,0**
	4,2	2,6	3,4	4,7	1,8	2,4	5,4		9,2	1,8	3,1	2,9	
Sugar	10,8	5,4	16,2	14,9	5,4	5,4	9,5		9,5	2,7	8,1	12,2	**7,4**
	11,1	10,5	8,3	8,6	7,3	9,5	4,8		9,2	3,6	4,7	8,8	
Oilk &	5,9	1,5	13,2	10,3	7,4	1,5	23,5		4,4	4,4	20,6	7,4	**6,8**
Fat	5,6	2,6	6,2	5,5	9,1	2,4	10,9		3,9	5,5	10,9	4,9	
Hop	13	2,2	8,7	34,8		2,2	2,2			4,3	13	19,6	**4,6**
	8,3	2,6	2,8	12,5		2,4	0,7			3,6	4,7	8,8	
Tobacco	11,5	1,6	14,8	13,1	16,4		16,4		1,6	8,2	13,1	3,3	**6,1**
	9,7	2,6	6,2	6,3	18,2		6,8		1,3	9,1	6,2	2	
Textiles	11		19,5	3,7	12,2	2,4	17,1		7,3	3,7	19,5	3,7	**8,2**
	12,5		11	2,3	18,2	4,8	9,5		7,9	5,5	12,4	2,9	
Cork			11,1	5,6			16,7			33,3	33,3		**1,8**
			1,4	0,8			2			10,9	4,7		
Column Total	**7,2**	**3,8**	**14,5**	**12,8**	**5,5**	**4,2**	**14,7**	**1,1**	**7,6**	**5,5**	**12,9**	**10,2**	**100**

To get a further insight to what extent the relative national distribution of seats by committee-blocks correspond to the national production structures, the national production shares of the

agricultural subsectors corresponding to the committee-blocks [4]have been correlated with the shares of seats in the committee-blocks.

Table 7: Correlation of the production structure with the seat distribution by committee categories (second row in cell = 2-tailed significance level)

Country	Producers	Cooperatives	Industry	Trade	Unions	Consumers	all categ.
Belgium	0,56	-0,16	0,58	-0,45	-0,24	0,53	0,29
	(0,07)	(0,64)	(0,06)	(0,19)	(0,48)	(0,09)	(0,39)
Denmark	0,74	0,98	-0,16	-0,14	0,98	0,83	0,76
	(0,01)	(0)	(0,63)	(0,69)	(0)	(0,00)	(0,02)
France	0,25	0,7339	0,59	0,41	0,8	0,61	0,78
	(0,46)	(0,01)	(0,06)	(0,2)	(0,00)	(0,05)	(0,00)
Germany	0,36	0,3	0,084	0,1	0,62	0,42	0,41
	(0,28)	(0,38)	(0,81)	(0,77)	(0,04)	(0,202)	(0,21)
Greece	-0,30	0,51	-0,3	-0,61	0,69		-0,19
	(0,37)	(0,11)	(0,37)	(0,04)	(0,02)		(0,59)
Ireland	0,56	0,9	0,99	0,20	0,78	0,99	0,9
	(0,07)	(0)	(0)	(0,54)	(0,00)	(0)	(0,00)
Italy	0,35	0,15	0,71	0,06	0,05	0,39	0,39
	(0,29)	(0,65)	(0,014)	(0,87)	(0,87)	(0,23)	(0,24)
Lux	0,44	0,99			-0,11		0,36
	(0,18)	(0)			(0,75)		(0,64)
Ned	0,57	0,10		0,47	-0,15	0,12	0,56
	(0,07)	(0,76)		(0,14)	(0,65)	(0,73)	(0,1)
Portugal	0,52	-045	0,43	-0,23		0,13	0,42
	(0,1)	(0,89)	(0,19)	(0,49)		(0,7)	(0,2)
Spain	0,31	-0,16	0,29	-0,01	-0,12	0,49	0,24
	(0,35)	(0,65)	(0,38)	(0,97)	(0,73)	(0,13)	(0,47)
UK	0,71	0,49	0,7031	0,34	0,11	-0,06	0,63
	(0,01)	(0,12)	(0,01)	(0,30)	(0,75)	(0,86)	(0,04)

The results of this correlation analysis are presented in table 7. As it seems reasonable that this correlation varies for the different categories, in table 7 the correlation coefficients are

[4] The production shares are calculated on the basis of data taken from the agricultural report of the European Commission, 1994.

presented separately for the single categories. Looking first at the correlation coefficients at the total level, one observes miscellaneous results. While for Denmark, France and Ireland the correlation is high and significant, for Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain the correlation is low and insignificant. For the other four member states: Greece, United Kingdom, Luxembourg and The Netherlands the correlation is relatively low, but statistically significant. More or less the same picture appears at the category level. Since from a pure theoretical point of view a correspondence between the national representation structure within the committee-blocks and the national agricultural pruduction structurers seems most resonable for the producer category, it might be useful to analyse this category more carefully. According to table 7 for this category one observes a significant and high correlation only for Denmark, and United Kingdom. At least a significant, but only moderate correlation can be found for Belgium, Ireland and The Netherlands, while for all other member states the correlation is low and insignificant. For Greece even a negative correlation can be observed (see table 7). Thus, all in all a correspondence between the national shares in the committee-blocks and the national agricultural production structure cannot be falsified totally, but on the other hand the correspondence has to be considered as rather weak and also other factors seem to play a role in determinating the national representation structure in the committee-blocks of the AACS.

Nevertheless a weaker, but still interesting correspondence between national production and representation structures could be expected on a more aggregate level, e.g. it could be assumed that at least the relative comparative advantages of the southern and northern member states in producing typical southern and typical nothern agricultural products, respectively are reflected in the national representation structures in the AACS.

To examine this hypothesis empirically, a cluster analysis has been run on the basis of the national shares in the committee-clusters. Indeed the cluster analysis resulted in two main clusters, the one including all southern member states: France, Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal and the second including all northern member states: Beligum, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands, United Kingdom. The only state that could not be clustered is Luxembourg which is mainly due to extremely concentrated representation of Luxembourg (Luxembourg is only represented in 5 of 14 committee-blocks).

In a next step a discriminant analysis has been undertaken using the clusters as a category variable and the national shares in the committee-blocks as explaining variables. The main purpose of this analysis was to identify the relevant differences in the representation structure discriminating the southern from the northern cluster.

The result of the discriminant analysis is presented in table 8. According to the discriminant function coefficients presented in table 8 the main differences between the two clusters can be seen in their relative shares in the hops, flower, wine and textile block. The southern cluster has a relatively higher share in the textileand wine block and a relative lower share in the flower and hops block compared to the northern cluster. Also most of the discriminant function coefficients for the other blocks (which are not presented in table 8) seem intuitively reasonable, since they are high or positive for more northern products like cereals, milk or meat and low or negative for more southern products like fruit&vegatables or oil seeds. Thus, overall, at least a correspondence between national representation structures in the AACS and national production structures could be confirmed in terms of a northern and southern representation structure corresponding to general comparative advantages in agricultural production of the southern and northern member states.

Table 8: Discriminant Analysis (Selected Results)

Explaining Variables	Cluster1	Wilks' Lambda	Cannonial Correlation
HNAT	**6,75946**	**0,0147032**	**0,9926212**
BLNAT			
TEXNAT			
WNAT			

HNAT = Hop committee
BLNAT = Flowers and living plants committee
TEXNAT = Cotton, hemp & flax committee
WNAT = Wine committee

3.3 Organizational representation structures

3.3.1 Total shares of seats of identified supra- and national organizations

In the empirical study a total number of 60 supranational and 154 national organizations to which the committee members are affiliated, could be identified. In detail, all identified organizations including their committee seats in total and percentages are listed in the appendix.

While the affiliation to supranational organizations could be identified for 90% of the total 1003 committee members of the AACS, the affiliation to national organizations could only be identified for 71% of all committee members.

Analyzing the seat distribution among the identified supranational organizations one observes a very asymmetric distribution. While the COPA together with COGECA holds with 351 and 134 seats, respectively, 52.6% of 921 total identified committee seats, 18 of the identified supranational organizations (which means 30% of all identified supranational organizations) hold only one seat. Thus, together the lowest 18 supranational organizations hold less than 2% of total identified committee seats. Beside the two main organizations, COPA and COCEGA, the next important supranational organizations are the union organizations, EFA and CES, with 76 and 46 seats, respectively, followed by the consumer organizations, COFACE and BEUC, with 26 and 20 seats, respectively (see appendix). In terms of seats held in the AACS, the largest supranational organization of the trade and industry category, respectively, are COCERAL, the organization of wholesale cereal tardes, and CEFS, the organization of sugar processing industries, with 14 and 18 seats, respectively. More than 50% of all identified supranational organizations hold less than 5 seats which equals less than 0,5% of total seats of the AACS. Thus, the distribution of seats is relatively unequal measured in terms of relative concentration with a Gini-coeficient of 0.6, also the absolute concentration with a share of 68.7% for the largest 5 supranational organization seems relatively high(see figure 1)[5].

[5] The Gini-coeficient is defined as the normalized diffrence between the area under the actual curve of cummlative frequency given in figure .. and the area under a curve of cummulative distribution assuming a total equal distribution. Thus, a Gini-coeficient of „0" indicates a total equal, while a Gini-coefficient of 1 indicates a total unequal distribution.

Figure 1: Seat distribution among supranational organizations



20 largest organizations of 60 identified

A significantly asymmetric distribution of seats can also be found among the identified national organizations (see appendix). Here, the 10 largest organizations hold 33.8% of the 711 total identified seats, while in comparison the smallest 10 organizations hold together only 1.3% of the 711 identified seats. The largest amount of seats is held by FNSEA, one of the 3 French COPA-members, with 45 seats, followed by the DBV, the German farmer organization and the only German member of COPA. Corresponding to the distribution of seats among supranational organizations, the 10 largest national organizations include only organizations of the agricultural producers and cooperatives. In detail, these are beside FNSEA and DBV already mentioned above, the British and the Spanish farmer organization and COPA-member, NFU and the „Asociacion Agraria-Jovenes Agricultures", respectively, both holding 25 seats, the German DRV, as the largest COGECA-member, with 20 seats, followed by the French COCEGA-member, CFCA with 19 seats. Further, the two Italian farmer organizations, COLDIRETTI and CONFAGRICULTURA, with 17 and 18 seats, repsectively, as well as the BELGISCHE BOERENBUND (BB), one of the two Belgian COPA-members, with 17 seats. The last of the 10 largerst national organizations is „Federatie van Land- en Tuinbouworganisaties", which is with 16 seats the most important farmer organization of The

Netherlands and interestingly the only important farmer organization which is not a member of COPA. Only 23 of the 154 identified national organizations hold more than 10 seats which equals 1% of total seats of the AACS, while 111 of the 154 identified national organizations hold less than 5 seats which equals less than 0,5% of total seats of the AACS. Moreover, 51% of the national organizations hold even only one seat. In other words the lowest 51% of the national organizations hold together only 11% of the total 711 seats identified regarding member's affiliation to national organizations which corresponds to 7,9% of the 1003 total seats of the AACS. The relative concentration measured by a Gini-coefficient of 0.78 is extremely high, while the absolute concentration of seats seems to be modest compared to the supranational level.

Figure 2: Seat distribution among national organizations



30 largest organizations of 154 identified

Summing up, the distribution of seats in the AACS among the identified supra- and national organizations is very asymmetric and, especially at national level, heavily biased in favor of the farmer organizations. In general, this is not a surprising result as in the corresponding legal acts the membership of the AACS is focused on farmer organization (see chap. 2). In contrast, the

fragmentation of the supranational and national organizations of the remaining economic groups, especially of the trade and industry organizations, seems unexpectedly high and demands for further analysis.

3.3.2 Organizational representation of economic groups

I. Agricultural Producers and Cooperatives

The producer category is mainly represented by one major supranational organization, COPA, incorporating 27 of the 29 national farmer organizations holding altogether 351 of the total 367 seats which equals 95.6% and implies an average size of 13 seats per identified national COPA-organization.The remaining 4.4% are controlled by two Dutch farmer organizations. As already mentioned, the most important of these is the „Federatie van Land- en Tuinbouworganisaties" with 16 seats. The other Dutch non-COPA farmer organization is „Landbouwschap" which plays a minor role with only 1 seat. It is interesting and significant that the Dutch farmers in contrast to the farmers of all other EU-member states do not represent their interests via COPA, the 3 Dutch member organizations of COPA are not represented in the AACS, but via a separate national organization.

Regarding the national COPA organization 27 out of 34 could be identfied holding together 338 of the 351 total seats indicated to COPA, while only 3 of the 351 seats could actually be identified as controlled by COPA-staff[6]. In more specific terms, the 339 seats are subdivided by 5 Spanish, 4 Italian and 4 Danish, 3 French and 3 Belgian, 2 British and 2 Greek as well as 1 Luxembourgian, 1 German and 1 Irish and 1 Portuguese farmer organization. As already mentioned, the highst share of seats is observed for the French FNSEA and the German DBV with 45 and 38 seats (see figure 3), respectively, followed by the British NFU and the Spanish Asociación Agraria both with 25 seats. Further, a medium size group of 16-18 seats can be found including the Belgian BB, the Danish LB, the Greek GESASE, the Irish IFA and the Italian COLDIRETTI and CONFAGRICOLTURA (see figure 3). A lower sized group of 5-14 seats includes the remaing Belgian, Italian and Greek organizations as well as the Spanish UFADE and UPA and the Luxembourgian organizations CPL and the Portuguese CPL. The

[6] The concrete organizational affiliation of the remaining 10 seats indicated to COPA could not be identified.

remaining 3 Danish, 2 French, 2 Spanish and 1 British organizations have only minor importance holding each less than 5 seats. According to figure .3 the seat distribution among the national organizations of the producer category is characterized by a comparatively high relative concentration measured by a Gini-coefficient of 0.47 and a modest absolute concentration as the 5 largest organizations hold 42% of total seats.

Figure 3: Seat distribution among the producer category - national organizations



A similar picture can be found regarding the representation structure of the agricultural cooperatives. The cooperatives' interests are represented by one supranational organization, COGECA, incorporating 15 national organizations holding altogehter 135.

Figure 4: Seat distribution among the cooperatives category - national organizations



all identified organizations

Regarding the national COGECA organization 15 out of 22 could be identifed holding together 117 of the 135 total seats indicated to COGECA , which implies in average an amount of 7.8 seats held by a national cooperative in the AACS.[7]. In more specific terms, the 135 seats are subdivided by 2 Spanish, 2 Italian ,2 Dutch and 2 Danish, 1 French, 1 Belgian, 1 British, 1 Greek, 1 Luxembourgian, 1 German and 1 Irish organizations. As already mentioned, the highst share of seats is observed for the German DRV with 20, followed by the French CFCA with 19 seats (see figure 4). Further, a medium size group of 12-14 seats can be found including the British FAC, the Portuguese CONFAGRI and the Spanish UCAE (see figure 4). A lower sized group of 5-8 seats includes the Greek PASEGES, the Dutch NCR, the Italian ANCA-LEGA and the Irish ICOS. The remaing Danish, Italian, Spanish and Dutch organizations as well as the Luxembourgian CPL have only minor importance holding each less than 5 seats. The relative and in particular the absolute concentration of seats is higher compared to the producer category with an Gini-coefficient of 0.48 and a share of 73% in total seats held by the 5 largest national cooperatives (see figure 4).

[7] The concrete organizational affiliation of the remaining 8 seats indicated to COGECA could not be identified.

II. Trade Category

In contrast to the categories of agricultural producer and cooperatives, the organizational representation of the trade category seems much more fragmented given a total number of seats of 128 faced by a relatively large number of 22 and 55 of identified supranational and national organizations, respectively (see figure 5). For the trade category the affiliation to a supranational organization could be identified for 105 of the 128 seats indicated to this category, while at national level only for 69 member-seats the affiliation to a national organization could be identified. Looking at the overall pattern, one can see from figure 5 that the average seats held by a supranational organization is rather low with 4.7 in comparison to the producer and cooperative category. With 1.4 the average seat held by a national organization is extremely low. On the other hand, the distribution of seats seems to be relatively equal at both the national and surpanational level (see figure 5 and 6). This is especially true for the distribution of seats among the identified national organizations as 46 of the 55 identified organizations hold only one seat. Indeed, one observes comparataively low relative and absolute concentration at the surpanational and national level with a Gini-coefficient of 0.39 and 0.18, respectively, and a share of 44% and 12% for the largest 5 supranational and national organizations.

Further, a very special feature of organizational representation of interests can be found due to the existence of CELCAA as a supranational peak organization incorporating different supra-national branch organizations. 11 supranational branch organizations out of the 22 identified supranational organizations are members of CELCAA holding together 50.4% of the 113 total seats indicated to the trade category as a whole. According to table A8 and A 9 in the appendix one can conclude that the CELCAA-organizations are real branch organizations as all organizations hold their seats in one committee block corresponding to one special subsector. An exception seems to be COCERAL which holds seats in the cereal block and in the block of feed-stuff, but noticing that feed grains are important feeding stuff, these are both related to the cereal subsector. Accoding to Table A 8 and A 9, CELCAA does not incorporate all relevant branch organizations, e.g. none of the identified organizations of the special cultures like wine, tobacco, hops and textiles are members of CELCAA[8].

[8] To be correct, CELCAA has some member organizations of these special branches, e.g. FETRATAB as organization of the tobacco branch, but none of the 921 identified comittee members is affiliated to these organizations.

Figure 5: Seat distribution among the trade category - supranational organizations



all identified organizations

In contrast to the CELCAA member organizations, the picture is more heterogeneous for the non-CELCAA organizations (see figure 6). On the one hand we have similar to CELCAA members classical branch organizations, which focus their interests on one subsector, e.g. the trade organization of the above mentioned branches not represented by CELCCA in the AACS, e.g. wine, hops and vegetable oils&fats. Further, we have branch organizations competitive to the CELCAA organizations, e.g. UIDA, AVEC and COSEMCO representing the subsector of milk and milk products, poultry&eggs and flowers&other living plants, respectively.

On the other hand, the non-CELCAA group includes the wholesale and retail trade organizations FEWITA, EUROCOMMERCE and CECD that are naturally interested in more than one branch. While CECD represents in particular the interests of retail trade, FEWITA and EUROCOMMERCE can be understood as organizations representing the general political interests of the trade category as a whole[9]. This can be seen for example from the fact that

[9] In this context it might be of interest that both organizations are closely related, e.g. is FEWITA member of EUROCOMMERCE and there exist several organizations which are members in both organizations.

these organizations are the only trade organizations represented in nonbranch committee blocks, e.g. the committee of 'agricultural structure policy' or 'social questions of the farm families'. Further, FEWITA includes the ETV, which represents the tobacco traders within the AACS.

Figure 6: Seat distribution among the trade category - national organizations



20 largest of 69 identified organizations

III. Category of agricultural processing industries

Similarly to the trade category, the organizational representation of the industry category seems much more fragmented at least on the surpanational level given a total number of seats of 156 faced by a relatively large number of identified supranational organizations (32 see figure 7). In contrast to all other categories it was generally impossible to identify member's affiliation to national organizations. Only five national organizations could be identified holding together less than 4% of the total seats indicated to the industy category. Regarding the affiliation to a supranational organization 130 of the 156 seats indicated to this category could

be identified[10]. Looking at the overall pattern, one can see from figure 7 that the average seats held by a supranational organization is rather low with 4.1 in comparison to the producer and cooperative category. 13 of the identified organizations hold only one seat (see figure 7), while the largest 19 organizations hold over 90% of the 130 identified seats. Compared to the trade category, the distribution of seats among the supranational organizations seems more distorted (see figure 7) with a relatively high absolute concentration as the largest five organization representing 15% of all organizations and holding 50% of total seats. Comparing figure 7 with (trade) figure 5 also the relative concentration seems to be higher for the industry category compared to the trade category. Indeed, the calculated Gini-coefficients of 0.39 and 0.49, respectively indicate a higher relative concentration for the industry category. The largest organization measured in seats held in the AACS is CEFS, representing the sugar processing industry, holding 18 seats, followed by CBMC representing the brewers industry at supranational level with 13 seats as well as ECCM, a supranational organization of tobacco industries, with 11 seats.

Further, analogously to CELCAA, CIAA can be understood as a supranational peak organization incorporating different supranational branch organizations. Although, in contrast to CELCAA, CIAA has only national member organizations representing corresponding national agro-industrial complex of the member states, while the different supranational branch organizations are so-called CAM's: CIAA Affiliated Members. Out of the 32 identified supranational organizations including CIAA itself, 17 of the supranational branch organizations are affiliated to CIAA holding together 54% of the 130 total seats identified within the industry category. Further 5 of the largest 10 supranational organizations are affiliated to CIAA, including the two largest CEFS and CBMC. Further, the seed chrushers and oil process, represented by FEDIOL with 8 seats, the chocolate, biscuit and confectionery industry, represented by CAOBISCO with 6 seats and the vegetable processing industry, represented by OITEL with 5 seats are relatively strong branches within the CIAA (see figure 7). The other branches, e.g. meat processing industry, magarine industry or soft drink industry, have only minor importance holding only 1-2 or at most 4 seats in the AACS. CIAA itself as the peak

[10] Comparing the number of 156 controlled by the industry category with 146 originally indicated to this category per decision of the Commission, one observed a slight difference. The same is true for other categorys, e.g. the trade, consumer and union category. These differences might be interpreted as an indicator for different influence of this categorys, but one has to be careful in interpreting this figures as not all member seats have been identified in regard to their organizational affiliation. Thus, for example it might turn out that some of the 26 seats indicated to the industry category in fact are affiliated to trade organizations implying a seat distribution of 139 and 145 for the trade and industry category, respectively which would perfectly correspond to the one indicated by the Commission.

organization of the agricultural processing industry holds explicitly also only 4 seats, but analogously to CELCAA plays a more central role, since it is organizing the seat distribution among the organizations representing the industry category and functioning as the main point of communication vis-à-vis the Commission.

Figure 7: Seat distribution among the industry category- supranational organizations



all identified organizations

Analogously to the trade category, special branches like tobacco, textile industries are not represented by CIAA in the AACS (see table A 10 and A 11 in the appendix). Thus, the largest supranational organizations which are not affiliated to CIAA (non-CAM's) are ECCM, the supranational organization of the tobacco industry with 11 seats, followed by the organizations of the textile industry, CILC, the supranational organization of the line and hemp industry with 10 seats and EUROCOTON with 7 seats. Further FEFAC, the European federation of the compond feed manufactors plays a major role among the non-CAM's) with 9 seats. Intersecting branches represented by both CAM's and non-CAM's are milk&milk products, meat processing, vegetable oils&fats and cereals. While milk industry is mainly represented by non-CAM's (6 to 1 seats), the subsector of vegetable oils& fats is mainly represented by

CAM's only the branch of olive oil processors is represented by the non-CAM organization FEDOLIVE with 4 seats. Regarding the meat subsector the meat processing industries are represented by CIAA, while the European abattoir union is not affiliated to the CIAA (see table A11).

IV. Consumers and unions

These categories are the less important regarding their seats indicated by decision of the Commission (see table 1). Furthermore , these two economic groups are often put together, since in general the economic interest of consumers seems to correspond to that of workers. But, in regard to the special case of agricultural policy one has to be careful taking this general preoccupation, as the agricultural workers in contrast to the consumers should have an interest in high agricultural producer prices similar to the agricultural producer having in mind that e.g. the sectoral wage level increases with agricultural producer prices. Thus, at least the agricultural workers should have different interests regarding agricultural policy in comparison to the consumers. This might be different in case of workers in nonagricultural sectors, for this special subgroup of workers one can assume that a general correspondence of interests to the consumers exists. Therefore, it seems useful to differentiate in the following analysis between unions representing interests of agricultural and nonagricultrual workers, respectively.

Consumers

Starting with the consumer category, an analysis of the seat distribution implies that only 60% of the 96 seats indicated to this category per decision of the Commission are really held by consumer organizations. The other 40% is held by CES, the general European supranational union organization. The total 58 seats are subdivided by the 3 main supranational consumer organizations, BEUC, COFACE and EURO-COOP, with 20, 26 and 12 seats, respectively. Within these 3 consumer organizations BEUC can be interpreted as the only pure supranational consumer organization, while COFACE is in fact a supranational family organization and EURO-COOP a supranational organization of consumer cooperatives which at the national level often are closely related to the unions. For example, this was the case in Germany until 1986, when the national Consumer Cooperative „Konsum" has been dismantled.

At the national level, 22 organizations could be identified holding together 52 seats, while for 6 member seats it was impossible to identify the affiliation to a national organization (see figure 8). The major part of the identified national organizations are members of COFACE incorporating 12 of the 22 identified consumer organizations. EURO-COOP incorporates only 4 and BEUC 7 of these national consumer organizations. The largest national consumer organization is the „Irish Country Women's Association" holding 8 seats, followed by the German EURO-COOP member, BDK with 6 seats and the French COFACE member,CEFA. The largest national BEUC organization is the British CECG with 3 seats, while BEUC itself holds explicitely 5 seats in the AACS (see figure). In regard to the distribution of seats among national organizations a more unequal distribution can be found in comparison to the trade category measured in terms of an absolute concentration of 44% of seats held by the 5 largest organizations and a Gini coefficent of 0.4 for the relative concentration. In comparison to the producer category one observes, in contrast to the trade category, a lower relative concentration with a corresponding Gini-coeffcient of 0.48 for the prodcuer category. With an average of seats of 2.1 per identified organization the importance of national consumer organizations seems to be rather low.

Figure 8: Seat distribution among the consumer category - national organizations



all identified organizations

Although one can assume a general clear and homogeneous economic interest with regard to the European agricultural market policy for the category of consumers at national level, and although no important national interest divergences exist within this group at surpanational level, the observed weak and highly fragmented organizational representation structure of the consumers seems paradox and unintelligible. Even if one assumes the relatively low number of seats indicated to this category by legal acts of the Commission as exogenously given, there still remains the question why a central and common interest representation by one supranational organization, whose main and special task would be the representation of the economic interest of consumers regarding the agricultural policy, does not exist. Instead, there exist 3 different and more general supranational consumer organizations, none of which seems to be really focused on the representation of the economic interests of consumers. Moreover, 40% of the total seats indicated to the consumer group by law is actually controlled by CES, a union organization.

Unions

For the unions two supranational organizations could be identified, EFA, the supranational organization of the agricultural workers and CES (or EURO-C) the general European union organization. Altogether, the union category incorporates 154 seats. The EFA holds 76 and CES holds 47 seats and for 31 member seats no explicit supranational affiliation could be identified. It is of interest to notice that the empirically identified seats for the union category includes 41 seats more than originally indicated by generating acts of the AACS. As already mentioned above, this difference can be explained by the fact that CES holds some of the seats originally indicated to the consumer category underlying the above formulated hypothesis of the interest correspondence between these two economic groups. Interestingly, the EFA holds none of these seats originally indicated to the consumer category which again can be interpreted as a further empirical confirmation of the hypothesis formulated above that in contrast to the nonagricultural worker organization, the agricultural workers generally do not have intersecting interests with the consumers regarding agricultural market policy.

At national level, 27 organization could be identified which implies an average seat per identified national organization of 4.2. Out of the total 27 national organizations only 8 are members of CES, while the majority is a member of EFA. On the other hand, the number of average seats with 4.9 held by the CES-members is sligthly higher compared to the EFA-

member organizations. Also the largest national union organization is with the German peak union organization, DGB, a CES-member, DGB, with 12 seats (see figure 9). The largest national branch union of the agricultural workers is the Spanish SETTA with 10 seats, followed again by a CES, member the Spanish UGT with 9 seats. The concentration of the seat distribution at national level in comparison to the consumer category is slightly higher measured in terms of a absolute concentration of 47% of total seats held by the largest 5, but slightly lower measured in terms of a relative concentration given by a Gini coefficient of 0.39.

Figure 9: Seat distribution among the union category - national organizations



all identified organizations

Summing up the analysis of the representation structure of the different economic groups, one can conclude the following points:

1. The overall structure of organizational representation within the AACS is characterizes by a high relative and absolute concentration of the seat distribution among both the 60 supranational and 154 national organizations. Corresponding to the seat distribution

indicated by legal acts of the AACS, also the organizational representation is biased in favor of the organizations of the agricultural producers and cooperatives.

2. In comparison to the agricultural producer and cooperatives all other categories observe a relatively high fragmentation of supranational organizations within the AACS implying a relatively low average of seats held by organizations for these categories in comparison to the producer and cooperative category. While this fragmentation seems understandable for the trade and industry categories due to a separation into different economic branches as well as for the unions due to a separation into agricultural and nonagricultural worker interest, this fragmentation seems unintelligible for the consumer category, as especially for this category a homogeneous economic interest even over different national member states should be expected.

3. For the trade and industry categories supranational peak organization could be identified which do not exist for the other categories. While for the trade category the peak organization (CELCAA) is a real supranational peak organization incorporating different supranational branch organizations, the peak organization of the industry category (CIAA) is a supranational organization of national peak organizations, each of these national peak organizations incorporating different branch organizations of the agricultural processing industry at the national level. At the supranational level the different supranational branch organizations of the industry category are only affiliated to this peak organization (CIAA).

4. CIAA, the supranational peak organization of the industry category, can be understood as both a 'technical organization' coordinating the communication of the different branch organizations vis-à-vis the Commission, and as the main political organization representing the general political interests of the agricultural processing industry sector as a whole. In contrast, CELCAA seems to be more a 'technical organization' coordinating the communication of the different branch organizations vis-à-vis the Commission, while the general political interests of the trade sector as a whole are represented by EUROCOMMERCE and FEWITA the supranational wholesale and retail organizations incorporating analogously to CIAA both national peak organizations and supranational branch organizations.

5. For the consumer and union category a significant difference between the number of seats actually held by organizations of these categories and the number of seats indicated to these categories by decision of the Commission could be obeserved. In more specific terms, 31 seats originally indicated to the consumer category are held by CES, the supranational union organization, which therefore can be interpreted as the largest organization representing consumer interests in the AACS.

6. At the organizational level, the national quota system which is characteristical for the potilical institutions of the EU, seems to apply for the agricultural producers and cooperatives, as the largest 12 national organizations of these categories incorporate the main national organizations of the member states. An exception in both cases is Luxembourg, as neither for the producers nor for the cooperatives its national organization is under the top 12. In contrast, the national quota system does not apply for the consumer category and only to a limited extent to the trade and union category. In general these structures correspond to the nomination principles indicated by the main organizations of these categories, since COPA and COGECA indicated national quotas as very relevant, while the consumer organizations BEUC, COFACE indicated national quotas as slightly relevant for the nomination of members of the AACS. Interestingly, the EFA was the only organization who indicated national quotas as absolutely relevant for the nomination of AACS canditates. But looking at the actual distribution of seats among its national member organization in figure 9, one can find a totally different picture. Under the largest 12 organizations, there are 5 different Italian agricultural union organizations, while other national members, e.g. Greece or Germany, are not represented or only with one seat.

4. Analysing Centrality in the AACS

In chapter 3 we have analysed the number of seats held by different units of action, e.g. nations, economic groups or organizations. According to the task of the AACS to advise the Commisssion by written statements as well as to the procedure to formulate the statements (see chap. 2) it seems reasonable to interprete the share of seats held within the ACCS as an institutional resource comparable to the seats held in a legislative body, e.g. Parliament.

Beyond this, the AACS can be understood as an institutional basis for communication among the different organizations and the Commission (Pappi and Schnorpfeil, 1996). In the light of policy network analysis the process of policy proposal formulation within the Commission and the AACS as a complex social process in which communication networks, e.g. information exchange networks, plays a prominent role (Pappi et.al 1995, Knoke et al., 1996). Moreover, it is a well-known result from Policy Network Analysis that the influence potential of a corperate actor within a policy domain increases the more central the actor is in the relevant communication network (Pappi and Schnorpfeil, 1996, Schneider, 1988). For example, it seems reasonable to assume that an organization holding seats in a large number of committees corresponding to different agricultural subsectors entertains an information advantage compared to other organizations holding seats only in one committee. This information advantage can be used to carry through the own preferred policy position in the common statement of committees. Another possible advantage combined with centrality is that more central organizations might function as brokers between other less central organizations which have no direct contact to each other. Further, centrality implies multiple points of access to the Commission and thus more opportunities to influence the Commission formulating political proposals.

Given the expositions above, it seems reasonable to analyse the underlying structure of communication within the AACS. In general, the possibility of communication among organizations results from their joint membership in a committee. Thus, the number of communication possibilities increases with the number of committees in which an organization holds seats. Special branch organizations holding seats in only one committee corresponding to its specific branch are located less central and more at the periphery of the communication system. In general the observed centralities of organizations and the observed communication structure as a whole depends on the relevant concept of the organizational affilitation of the

persons being committee members, i.e. the question is which organization is considered as the relevant principal for which the members of the AACS function as agents. In this respect the following formal analysis will be undertaken for 3 different affiliation concepts: the concept of primary, secondary and tertiary affiliation. According to the concept of primary affiliation it is assumed that the relevant principals are the identified national organizations. If no national organization could be identified it is assumed that the principal is the identified suprantional organization. According to the concept of secondary affiliation it is assumed that the relevant principal is the identified suprantional organization. If an identified national organization is no member of any supranational organization, the national organization is considered as the relevant principal. According to the concept of tertiary affiliation it is assumed that the identified supranational peak-organization, in which supranational organizations are a member or an affiliated member, are the relevant principals. Again, in case that no supranational peak-organizations could be identified, the relevant suprantional organization is considered as the relevant principal.

To get a systematic insight into the communication structure within the AACS as a whole and the centrality of different organizations, a network of communication density among the organizations has to be created. Formally, this has been done in two different ways. On the one side, a binary communication network has been derived, where '1' indicates that two organizations have a joint membership in at least one committee and '0' indicates that two organizations have no joint membership. On the basis of this binary network a 'blockmodel analysis' could be run to identify the overall communication structure within the AACS.

On the other hand the actual number of joint committee memberships is used as a measurement of communication possibilities. Thus, given a number of 30 committees and subcommittees the maximum of joint memberships is 30, while the minimum is 0. Thus, the number of joint committee memberships could be used as a measurement of similarity among the organizations. This measurement of similarity has been used as an input for Multidimensional Scaling (MDS).

The graphical results of both analyses are presented and discussed in the following. Further, both approaches allow the calculation of different centrality measurements for the relevant organizations which also will be presented and discussed in the following.

The general communication structure of the AACS

All analyses imply that the communication structure within the AACS is organized by two principles: the integrative centrality and sector-specific differentiation (Laumann und Pappi, 1976). In its clearest form, this structure can be seen from the cobloc analysis undertaken under the concept of secondary affiliation, e.g. it has been assumed that each personal member represents and is affiliated to his corresponding supranational organization. As can be seen from figure 10, the commiuncation structure of the AACS corresponds to a bordered block-diagonal matrix. While the border of the matrix can be interpreted as the integrative element of the whole communication system, the block-diagonal core of the matrix represents the principle of sector-specific differentiation.

In detail, the border of the matrix contains a group of central broker organizations with multiple committee-memberships having contacts to all other organizations. This group comprises COPA and COCEGA as well as the supranational organizations of the consumers, BEUC, COFACE and EURO-COOP. Further, also the main dutch non-COPA organization FLT can be found in this group. On the other side, one observes in the core of the matrix a perfect block diagonal structure, where the blocks of the diagonal correspond to the main agricultural subsectors, e.g. milk, meat (pork&beef), flowers, wine, poultry&eggs, feed stuff, Oil&Fats, Cereals, vegetable&fruits, and sugar. The supranational organizations within one block have contact to each other as well as to the broker organizations, but in general only few or no direct contacts to organizations of other subsector blocks.

According to figure 10, some organizations seem not to fit into the blockdiagonal structure. In detail these are the organizations: ECCM,FEDOLIVE, EEPF, UARCEE and EUROCOTON. A closer analysis shows that all of these organizations are representants of special subsectors or branches, e.g. hop, tobacco (ECCM), olive oil (FEDOLIVE), cork (EEPF), rice or cotton, and thus each one alone corresponds to one subsector block. Therefore, even these organizations fit into the general block-diagonal structure. Further, the border of the matrix contains the retail organization CECD as well as the FEFAC and CAOBISCO. These organizations seem to differ from the general broker group as they do not have contact to all subsector blocks. In detail, CECD has no contact to the milk, cereal and oil&fat block as well as to the special subsector blocks of hops, tobacco, cork, milk, cotton and rice. CECD is a retail organization, thus this structure seems intelligible as the subsectors mentioned above are more important at the wholesale level. Interestingly one can observe a very similar structure for EURO-COOP and CECD which can be interpreted that EURO-COOP represents more interests of retail trades than general consumer interests.

Figure 10: Cobloc-Plot of Communication structure within the ACCS
- Communication under assumption of secondary affiliation -



1 = common membership in at least one committee

In contrast to the COBLOC-analysis the MDS-anaylsis, which is presented for the concept of secondary affiliation in figure 11., takes also into account the degree of joint committee memberships as a measurement of similarity. Looking at figure 11 the result of the MDS corresponds to that of the COBLOC-analysis. The central broker group is in the center of the coordination system observing in average the lowest distances to all other organizations, while the specialized branch organizations of the trade and industry category can be found more at the periphery. One advantage of the MDS analysis in comparison to the COBLOC analsyis is that it allows a direct measurement of the degree of centrality and the degree of isolation. For example, COPA is the center of communication as it is located closest at the (0,0) position. The retail organization CECD together with EURO-COOP is located between the outer perimeter of subsector blocks and the center group and thus can be understood as broker between center and periphery. The same is true for CAOBISCO and CEFS, the association of chocolate, biscuit and confectionary industries and the organization of sugar processing industries, respectively. Further, one can see from figure 11 that the periphery itself is structured in two perimeters. An inner center including the subsector block of milk, cereals, feed stuff, poultry&eggs, meat (without poultry), sugar and oil&fats. While the subsector blocks of the special cultures: tobacco, rice, hops, olive oil, cork, as well as the subsector of flowers, wine and vegetable&fruits as well as the butchers' organization COBCCEE seem to be the less central organizations of the periphery building the outer periphery.

Furthermore, even within each single subsector block one observes different degrees of centrality for the member organizations. For example, within the cereal subsector, COCERAL or SEMOULIERS are more central compared to GAM or EUROMALT.

Figure 11: MDS-Plot of the Communication Structure in the AACS (secondary affiliation)



Legend:

- Sugar
- Milk block
- Textil block
- Meat: beef,pig,sheep&goat
- Flower&living plants
- Fruit&vegetable
- Cereal block
- Oel&fat
- Poultry&Eggs
- wine block

Applying the concept of primary affiliation, the picture remains more or less the same. Still the communication structure is organized by the two principles of integrative centrality and sector-specific differentiation (see figure 12). Concerning to the sector-specific differentiation, a more detailed specification can be found. For example the subsector block of meat is more subdivided into meat processing industry (B6) and trade, where trade is further subdivided by pork, beef and sheep and goat meat (see figure 12). Analogously, a further differentiation can be observed for the Oil&Fat-subsector. Here, the olive-oil trader UCOGRAS, ESTIVE and FNCO are diffrentiated from traders of the other oil-seeds, SFNOP and GROFOR.

Under the concept of primary affiliation, the organizations can be subdivided by descending degree of centrality into 4 main groups: a inner and outer cycle, containing the most central organizations, as well as an inner and outer periphery. These 4 groups are marked by common centered cycles in figure 12.

According to figure 12 a first interesting result is that the major central organizations of the inner cycle are all national organizations. Only COPA99 which is comprised of all members, for which a primary organizational affiliation could not be identified, is located in the inner cycle.

The majority of supranational organizations lies in the outer periphery. The most central supranational organization is BEUC being placed at rank 40 due to the MDS-Centrality measurement. Thus, the thesis that at the supranational level of the EU a trend towards a transnational pluralism can be observed (Streek and Schmitter, 1992) can not be supported for the European agricultral policy domain. This result corresponds to the result of Pappi and Schnorpfeil analysing the communication structure with in the European Social and Labor policy domain. Obviously, the European agricultural policy domain is dominated by national organizations.

Figure 12: MDS-Plot of the Communication Struture and Centrality in the AACS



Legend:

- CIAA Group
- Milk block
- Wine block
- Meat trader: beef
- Meat trader:beef and sheep&goat
- Meat trader: pork/pork and sheep&goat
- Olive Oil: trade
- Oel&fat: trade
- Tobacco block

Supranational organization printed in bold, national organization printed in normal font

B4 = block of milk processing industries
B5 = block of cereal processing industries
B6 = block of meat processing industries
B8 = wine block (trade + industry)
B9 = block of feeding stuff-industries
B10 = block of fruit&vegetable processing industries
B11 = block of flower traders
B12 = block of sugar processing industries
B13 = block of oil&fat processing industries

A next question to be analysed is how centrality differs among the different economic groups. Can one observe the same picture as for the shares in total seats or are there significant differences between centrality and share of seats?

Before this topic is analysed, the communication structure assuming the concept of tertiary affiliation should be discussed shortly. The MDS-Graph resulted under the assumption of tertiary affiliation is persented in figure 13 As could be expected, the principle of the sectoral differentiation is less important in comparison to integrative centrality, since under the concept of tertiary affiliation the main branch organizations of the trade and industry category are united in their supranational peak organizations CELCAA and CIAA, which is therefore promoted to a more central broker role (see figure 13).

All in all, the structure of an inner and outer center and periphery, respectively, remains. But in contrast to the structure under secondary or primary affiliation, the organizations of the inner and outer perimeters are more interconnected with each other under tertiary affiliation. Therfore, a bi-centered center can be seen in figure 13. The inner circle (and main center) comprises COPA, COCEGA, the union organizations EFA and CES, BEUC as the most central supranational consumer organization and CIAA the supranational peak organization. While CELCAA can be found just above the center together with the other consumer organizations, COFACE and EURO-COOP and the dutch farmer organization FLT.

Also the periphery is less structured under the concept of tertiary affiliation in comparison to the structure derived under primary or secondary affiliation. At the outer periphrie, the highly specialized branch organizations which are not organized in CIAA or CELCAA, are located, e.g. EUROCOTTON (Cotton), ECCM (tobacco) or FEDOLIVE (olive oil) or URACEE (rice).

Further, the milk- sector organziations and the organizations of the flower-subsector, which are both not organized in supranational peak organizations, are located at the outer periphery. The members of the inner periphery correspond more or less to the members of the outer center derived under the concept of secondary affiliation, e.g. CEFIC, CECD, FEFAC and FEWITA are located at the inner periphery functioning as brokers between outer periphery and center. Additionally, the most central non-CIAA and non-CELCAA of the meat, oil&fat sector, UEEA and ANGO, respectively, could be found in the inner periphery.

Figure 13: MDS-Plot of the Communication Structure in the AACS (tertiary affiliation)



Legend

– – – – milk group

Centrality of organizations

The main question to be analyzed concerning the computed centrality measures is, if the importance of organizations differ measured by centrality in the underlying communication sytem of the AACS from the importance measured by relative shares in total seats of the AACS. Although all four calculated centrality measurements are presented in the tables of the appendix, the following expositions will mainly refer to the binary centrality measurement Degree. Although from a pure theoretical perspective the centrality measurement derived from the MDS-analysis seems more sophisticating the following emprical analysis focuse on the binary centrality measurements as the estimation error of the two dimensional MDS-analysis is with a stress-value of ca. 0.30 not too good[11]..

Primary Affiliation

The identified organizations ranked according to the Degree-centrality are presented in table A2 in the appendix. A first glance to the top ranks seems to imply that the same national organizations appear as in figure 2 presenting the 30 largest national organization measured in total seats hold. But, beside this similarity, for specific cases the rank position of national organizations has changed significantly according to centrality in comparison to percentages of seats.

In particluar, one observed that the national consumer and union organizations occupy generally higher ranks according to their centrality than according to their percentages of total seats hold in the AACS. For example, while the ICA, a COFACE member, is with 8 seats only ranked at position 40, it is listed at rank 24 in table A2 according to degree-centrality. This is mainly due a rleative efficient seat distribution by committees observed for the ICA, which spreads its total 8 seats over 8 different committee, including main important committees like the committee of cereal, meat and oil& fats. Further, for most of the national unions a rank shift can be observed, e.g. for the portugesian EFA member SETTA ,spanish CES member,UGT or the German union DGB, the last is the most central national union with 12

[11] It should be noticed that the analysis would not change in general, as a high and significant correlation and rank-correlation between the different centrailty measurements could be found for the used empirical data. Nevertheless, as indicated in the tables below in specific cases, especially in regard to the consumer and union organizations the centrality rank-order differes among the different Centrality measures, where the rank order according to the binary measurements correspond more to the rank order of share of seats hold in the AACS. This is mainly due to the relatively high estimation error of the MDS-analysis, since the spatial distriubtion is forced into two dimensions. In turn this imply that also the derived MDS-Centrality measurement incorporates a relatively high estimation errow.

seats (rank 23) found at rank 19 according to the degree centrality. Also the German EURO-COOP member BDK is still found in the inner center of the most central organizations with an rank position 31, while with 6 seats the BDK is only of minor importance measured in share of seats hold in the ACCS.

The two largest organizations in terms of total seats hold in the AACS, the French cooperative FNSEA and the German farmers organization DBV, are still ranked at position 1 and 2, respectively, also in terms of centrality. In contrast most of the organizations of mthe industry and trade sector observe decline in ranks comparing their rank position for share of seats to centrality. For example, block of feed stuff industries (labeled B9 in figure 12) ranked at position 32 with 9 seats according to share of seats and as the most central industry block it is only ranked at 41. A more extreme decline of rank position can be observed for the block of cereal processing industries (labeled B5 in figure 12) with a decline from position 6 to position 53 of the seat share and centrality rank-order, respectively. A simliar picture appies for the sugar processing industries ranked with 25 seats at position 3 and with a degree centrality of only 0,34 at rank 58. The same is true for the ceral trader organization COCERAL declining from rank 39 to rank 63.

According to the MDS-centrality measures the results remain in general the same, i.e. the consumer and union organizations gain political importantance measured by the centrality in comparison to the agircultural farmers and cooperative organization, which seem to dominate the European Agriculutral Policy Domain according to their share of seats hold in the AACS. While the organizations representing the processing industries and the trade mainly, which in general hold only a relatively small share of seats, seem to be faced with a even smaller political importance in terms of centrality.
Moreover, in terms of the MDS-centrality measures these trends seems to be even stronger compared to the binary centrality measurements (see table). But, again, it has to be noticed that the MDS-Centrality have to be interpreted with caution due to the relatively low goodness of fit of the MDS-anaylsis.

Overall, the correlation and rank-correlations among the different centrality measurements as weel as among these and the share of seats seems relatively high. This imply the expected intuitively intelligible result that in general there is a correspondence between number of seats hold and centrality in the AACS (see table A6-A7 in the appendix). On the other hand the

correlation coefficient are also not high engough to conclude that centrality and share of seats both measure the same phenomenum. Moreover, centrality seems to focus on a different aspect of political influence which goes beyond the pure share of seats hold by an organization.

Secondary Affiliation

According to table A3 in the appendix, under the secondary affiliation concept the supamational organizations of the farmers, cooperatives consumers and unions are the most important ones, while the supranational branch organizations of the trade and industry category are less important compared to the former general broker organizations. Thus, at a first glance the picture seems to be very similar to the share-distribution. An Analysis of the correlation between the percentage of seats hold by an organization and the various centraility measures ranges seems to support this first impression only in a limited extent, as the correlation coefficient are relatively low ranging from 0.51 to 0.69. Indeed, a closer analysis shows some significant differences between these two approaches to political importances. For example, the tobacco organization ECCM, is with 13 seats ranked at position 12 according to seats hold in the ACCS, while it is ranked at position 61 according to the MDS-centrality. Here, the two different concepts of political importance becomes clear, although ECCM has a relatively high amount of seats, it is not very central as ECCM holds all its seats within the tobacco-committees and therefore observes only limited communication opportunities.

Interpreting also the absolute values of percentages of seats hold and centrailty, respectively, the actual distribution of seats by commiittees seems to be more efficient for the consumer and union organizations in comparsion to COPA and COCEGA. For example, the relative differences bewteen COPA and EFA declines significantly from 38/8=4.75 as the quotient of percentages of seats hold in the AACS to 1/0.98=1.02 as quotient of degree-centrality in the AACS (see table A3).

In more general terms, this implies that measuring political influence or importance by relative seat-shares, COPA and COCEGA seems to be the dominant supranational organizations leaving not much space for political influence of other economic groups. In contrast, the picture changed assuming centrality is the main source of political influence. In this case the distance between the main consumer, producer and union organizations vanish to marginality implying a more or less equal political competitiveness among these groups. On the other hand, especially according to centrality, the supranational organizations of the industry and trade

category seems to be less influencial as none of the organization is in the center. The highest rank for the industry category can be found for CAOBISO at position 9, followed by FEFAC, while for the trade category CECD is most central ranked at position 11, followed by FEWITA and EUROCOMMERCE at position 12 and 14, respectively (see table A3).

Again, there is a difference between the rank orders generated by the different centrality measures (see table A3). In contrast to the primary affiliation, under the assumption of secondary affiliation the rank order generated by MDS-Centrality seems to be closer related to the rank order of share of seats.

Overall, the correlations of centrality and shares of seats, especially the rank correlation, are relatively low compared to the one derived under primary affiliation. This result again supports the hypothesis that centrality and share of seats in the AACS are different approaches to political influence of interest groups represented in the AACS.

Tertiary Affiliation

According to table A 4 in the appendix the main difference bewteen the secondary and tertiary affiliation is that supranational peak organization CELCCA and CIAA promoted to general broker organizations. But, while these organizations are the fourth and fith largest organizations measured in the share of seats hold in the ACCS, these organizations range only at rank 6 and 8 according to their centrality measurements (see table A4). Thus, although the peak organization CIAA and CELCAA comprises of different branch organizations and holding togehter a noticeable amount of seats (70 and 57) their actual distribution of seats is still less efficient compared to the supranational consumer, union and also agriucltural producer organizations. This is especially true for CELCAA which holds seats in only 8 of the total 20 committee-blocks.

5 Towards a theory of organizational representation?

In general, an optimal organizational representation structure can only be derived under a given objective function, i.e. a general goal or goal system for organizational representation. Obviously, under different objective functions different organizational structures could be optimal. Thus, a clear definition of the objective functions is crucial for the derivation of optimal representation strategies, as well as for the evaluation of existing organizational structures.

In the context of this paper, it seems reasonable to focus on the central objective of all economic interest groups represented in the AACS to gain political influence vis-à-vis the Commission. Therefore, in the following analysis optimal and empirical observed organizational representation structures will be derived and evaluated, respectively, in terms of the goal of gaining political influence. Since in general there exist also other objectives of the organizations, this approach corresponds to a partial analysis, leaving out other determinants of organizational structures.

5.1 A theoretical approach to political influence

To be able to draw some theoretical conclusions and implications concerning the impact of organizational representation structures on political influence, a theoretical model of political influence is needed. In the literature several approaches tackling this task can be found (see for example literature quoted in Van de ZEE, 1992). One of the most prominent approaches to political influence is Becker (1982) who conceptualized the process of political influence as a non-cooperative game among competing interest groups. In Becker's approach the political agents are reduced to a pure distribution machinery distributing scare political resources, defined as political budget, among competing economic interests. A core element of this politico-economic model is the political influence function. Influence functions are defined as a transformation of scarce resources controlled by an interest groups, e.g. money or time, into the capacity to determine political decisions, i.e. an influence function can be interpreted as a (political) production function of political influence. Similar to Becker's influence functions, the political power function of Zusman's approach (Zusman, 1976) or political support functions first introduced by Stigler (1971) and more recently by Grossman and Helpman (1994) can be interpreted as (political) production functions of political influence.

Common to all these approaches is that the relative political influence of an interest group is determined by the efficiency of the political production function. Although these politico-economic approaches deliver a lot of interesting insights into the process of political influence, they seem, at least in their original form, not appropriate in the context at hand, since they do not take into account structural properties of the political sector, e.g. the organizations' position in the political communication or access network, as relevant determinants of political influence.

These properties are explicitely taken into account in form of a political captial index in a game-theoretical approach derived by Henning (1994 and 1996). According to this approach, the network position of an organization is interpreted as a quasifixed factor shifting the efficiency of the political production function (Henning, 1994). Thus, the political influence of an interest group is ceteris paribus the higher, the higher its political capital, e.g. the more favorable its position in the relevant access or communication network of the policy domain. Political capital has been conceptualized as a special form of social capital, which generally can be defined as a resource corresponding to a given social structure (Coleman, 1990).

Given this theoretical conception of political capital the main question arises what are favorable structures in the context of political influence. This question has so far not been analysed very much in the literature, at least not as an empirical problem.

A first promising empirical test of a political capital index has been made by Henning/Uusikylä (1995) analysing budget cuts in the Finish social & health policy. One of the main results of Henning/Uusikyla is that no general transformation of given network structure into a social capital index seems to exist. Moreover, a consistent transformation depends on the specific context conditions under analysis (Henning/Uusikylä, 1995).

5.2 Transforming the representation structure of the AACS into Social Capital

In regard to the AACS, two main components of the communication structure have been analysed: the distribution of seat shares and centrality. Taking each single component, the relation to the political influence on the Commission seems quite simple: the more seats an organization controls and the more central an organizations is, the higher is ceteris paribus the political influence vis-à-vis the Commission. It has been shown in the chapter above that these

two components do not correspond perfectly to each other, e.g. there exist organizations like ECCM, the tobacco industry, having a relatively high amount of seats, but simultaneously a very low centrality. Therefore, the question arises how these two components might be aggregated to one consistent social capital index corresponding to the relative advantage in terms of political influence an organization can draw from its structural position in the AACS.

Obviously, a seat held by an organization in a committee has higher value in the system the more central this organization is. Thus, to make the structural position of different organizations competing for political influence comparable, one can define the following share of effective seats (ε_i) of an organization i[12]:

$$\varepsilon_i = \frac{(1+\beta C_i)S_i}{\sum_k (1+\beta C_k)S_k} \qquad (1)$$

S_i denotes the number of seats controlled by the organization i and C_i is the centrality of organization i. β is a shifting parameter corresponding to the importance of centrality vis-à-vis the number of seats held. The higher β, the more the actual social capital is determined by centrality[13]. According to eq.(1), the social capital measured in terms of effective share of seats is the higher, the higher the amount of seats and the higher the centrality of an organization. Further, the social capital is 0 if and only if an organization has no seats in the AACS, while it is not 0 if the centrality is 0. The last property seems reasonable noticing that the centrality of an organization holding the total seats of one special committee, and no seats in any other committee, observes a centrality of zero, while its influence should not be completely meaningless, especially if the committee is controlled by the focal organization.

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[12] This conception has been inspired by Burt's measurement of effective size of a ego-centered network (see Burt, 1992).

[13] Notice that letting β increase to its limit, the limit of ε comes with : $\lim_{\beta\to\infty} \varepsilon_i = \frac{C_i S_i}{\sum_k C_k S_k}$. Therefore, a relative lower number of seats hold by an organization i in comparison to an organization j can only be compensated by proportionally higher centrality of organization i.

Analysing the relative advantages of different organizational representation strategies

Tackling the problem of organizational representation, there are a lot of interesting questions to be asked and answered. The most prominent approach is that of Mancur Olson (Olson, 1965) analyzing the determinants of establishing an organization to represent a common economic interest. Olson mainly focused on the free-rider problem inherent in the building of organizations to represent common economic interests shared by a group of individual actors. One of Olson's well-known results is that large and heterogeneous groups observe a more serious free-rider problem compared to small and homogeneous groups which imply ceteris paribus to lower transaction cost of organization building for the latter type of group.

Beyond Olson focusing on the organization building among individual members of society, one could ask for the logic of supranational or peak-organization building, e.g. the building of organizations by already existing organizations. Although this is a very interesting question of its own, which so far has barely been analysed, we should abstract from this kind of problems of organizational representation assuming a perfectly homogenous economic group with consistent preferences controlling a given amount of resources. The question which should be analysed in the following is that of the optimal organizational structure to represent economic interests applied by an idealtypcial economic group observing no transaction cost of organization building. Given the theoretical framework of political influence introduced in section 5.2, this question corresponds to the determination of the organizational representation structure that maximizes the social capital of an idealtypical organization.

At a first glance, this problem may appear trivial, as the optimal strategy seems (naturally) to be a representation by one common organization. A first hint that the problem is indeed more complex can be seen in the results of a regression analysis presented in table 9. The explained variable is the number of seats held by a nation in the AACS, while the explaining variables are the general size of a nation measured by the national voting weights in the Council and the number of national organizations represented in the AACS.

Table 9: Regression Analysis of Total Number of Seats by Number of Organizations

Multiple R	0,97509				DF
R Square	0,95080			Regression	2
Adjusted R Square	0,93986			Residual	9
Standard Error	11,23018			F = 86,958	
Variables	B	SE B	Beta	t-value	Sig t
General size of a nation	8,66254	2,02231	0,583497	4,283	0,0020
Total number of organizations	3,03763	0,957485	0,432159	3,173	0,0113
(Constant)	-14,30943	8,141317		-1,758	0,1127
Durbin-Watson Test	2,04561				

According to table 9, controlling for the general size of nation there exists a significant and reasonable positive partial correlation between number of seats held in the AACS and total number of organizations. A more specific example for this unexpected relation can be taken from analysing the seat shares of national COPA members. Although the largest single national organization is the French FNESA with 45 seats followed by the German DBV with 38 seats, the highest national share can be observed for Italy followed by Spain with 56 and 54 seats. Notice that for both of the latter national members a large number of national farmer organizations can be observed (4 for Italy and 5 for Spain compared to 1 for Germany and 3 for France).

These empirical results might imply that even if a group of national farmers may have completely identical economic interests, which empirically might not be the case neither for the Italian nor for the Spanish farmers, they might still be well advised to represent their common interests by multiple national organizations to gain more seats overall.

In this context, it has to be pointed out that the total number of seats is only one of two components of the social capital index defined in eq. (1), while centrality is the other. According to table A7 - presented in the appendix, centrality is positively correlated with the number of seats held by an organization. For example, the Italian COPA-members are less central compared to the German DBV. Therefore, depending on the actual β-value, the social capital might still be higher for a representation by one central organization, but, the other way round, it also might be lower in comparison to a representation by multiple less central organizations.

Further, one should notice that the centrality of other organizations is simultaneously effected by a change of the organizational representation of a given economic group. Holding the total

number of seats controlled by an economic group constant, one could expect that a reduction of the number of organizations representing the interest of a specific economic group implies in average a higher centrality for this economic group. But, as any change of individual organizational representation patterns changes the complete communication structure at large, it also effects the centrality measures of all other economic groups. As will be demonstrated by a simple example, it might happen that a merger of organizations can imply an increase in average centrality combined with a decrease in relative social capital of a specific economic interest group.

To illustrate this point, consider a simple communication system comprising three actors A,B,C and the following communication matrix (M):

	A	B	C
A	-	1	0
B	1	-	1
C	0	1	-

The matrix M corresponds to the following degree-centralities (Ci) and amounts of social capital measured in terms of effective seats (ε_i): C_A=1,C_B=0.5 and C_C=0.5; ε_A=2/3, ε_B =0.5/3, ε_C=0.5/3. Assume actor A and B represent the same economic interest. In this case, their common social capital (ε_{AB}) amounts to: ε_{AB}=2.5/3=0.83, while the social capital of c amounts to ε_C=1-ε_{AB}=0.5/3=0.17. Now, assume the coalition of A and B would be respresented by one common organization D, this results in the following communication matrix (M'):

	D	C
D	-	1
C	1	-

Matrix M' implies a centrality of 1 for both actors D and C, while the social capital is: ε_{AB}=3*1/4=0.75 for the coalition of A and B and ε_C 1/4=0.25 for C. Notice that the social capital of the coalition AB decreases compared to the social capital of actor C, while in average the centrality of the coalition AB increases from 0.83 to 1. These results imply ceteris paribus a higher political influence and thus a more efficient organizational structure in the first case of two organizations representing the coalition of A and B.

6 Conclusions

In the descriptive analysis of the representation structure within the AACS focused on two main structural components: (1) share of seats hold by organizations and (2) centrality of an organization within the AACS. In the theoretical part these two structural components could be combined into one consistent social capital index corresponding to the political influence an organization could gain from its structural position within the AACS. On the basis of the introduced social capital concept further analyses regarding the impact of organizational representation structures on political influence of organizations have been undertaken.

Overall, the descriptive analysis implies the following results:

1. The overall structure of organizational representation within the AACS is characterizes by a high relative and absolute concentration of the seat distribution among both the 60 supranational and 154 national organizations. Corresponding to the seat distribution indicated by legal acts of the AACS, also the organizational representation is biased in favor of the organizations of the agricultural producers and cooperatives.

2. In general, this pattern remain analysing centrality, although the absolute dominance of farmers' and cooperative organizations seem to shrink in terms of centrality compared to the distribution of total seats. Especially the consumer and union organization seem to improve their rank positions according to centrality compared to their rank position according to total number of seats, while the branch organizations of the trade and industry category seem relatively isolated observing in general a decline in their rank positions.

3. Regarding the effectiveness of organizational representation strategies, a cross-national comparision within the agricultral producer category implies that as long as the number of seats distributed by different interest groups is variable, a decentral interest representation through multiple organizations is more effective compared to a central interest representation through one global organization. While a comparision across the different economic categories implies that if the total number of seats indicated to an interest group is exogenously determined and fixed, a central interest representation through one global organization seems to be more effective in comparision to a decentral interest representation through multiple organizations.

Theoretically the following general conclusions can be drawn concerning a committee-system with delegated seats to different economic interest groups:

1. The total number of seats held by an economic group in a committee-system ceteris paribus increases with the number of organizations representing the group.

2. Holding the total number of seats of an economic group constant, the average centrality of the organizations representing the economic group decreases with the number of organizations.

3. Although a monopolistic representation ceteris paribus increases the centrality of an organization holding the total number of seats constant, it still can lead to a decrease of its social capital, as the centrality of other economic groups might be increased in an even higher proportion.

4. In general., the centrality of an organization is determined interdependently by the organizational representation of all relevant economic groups. Thus, due to the competition among interest groups for political influence, the choices of an optimal strategy of organizational representation by the single groups are strategically interdependent and thus turn out as a complex bargaining problem, where the optimal strategies are mutually interdependent from each other.

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- ANNEX -

Table A 1: List of Organizations in Alphabetical Order

(supranational organizations printed in bold font)

Label	Name	Seats	orgsys[1]	Country
AAB	Aliance Agricole Belge	5	10101	BEL
AAC	**ASSOCIATION DES AMIDONNERIES DE CEREALES DE LA CEE**	**1**	**480**	
AAJA	Asociacion Agraria - Jovenes Agricultores	25	10132	SPA
AAWTG	Agricultural and Allied Workers Trade Group	6	60120	UK
AC	Association des Consommateurs	1	50101	BEL
ACD	The Agricultural Council of Denmark	1	10131	DAN
ADOC	ADOC	8	60237	ITA
AECEC	Asociacion Espanola de Comercio Exterior de Cereales	1	31606	SPA
AECGV	**ASSOCIATION EUROPEENNE DU COMMERCE EN GROS DES VIANDES**	**7**	**308**	
AEVP	Associacao dos Exportadores de Vinho do Porto	1	34118	POR
AFP	Action Familiale et Populaire	1	50355	LUX
AFVF	Arbeitsgemeinschaft Freie Vieh- und Fleischwirtschaft e.V.	1	30705	GER
AIJN	**ASSOCIATION D L'INDUSTRIE DES JUS ET NECTARS DE FRUITS ET DE LEGUMES DE LA CEE**	**1**	**472**	
ANACER	Associazione Nazionale Cerealisti	1	31611	ITA
ANCA-LEGA	Associatzione Nazionale Cooperative Agricole	8	20110	ITA
ANCEF	Associazione Nazionale Commercianti Esportatori	1	33004	ITA
ANGO	**ASS.DU NEGOCE DES GRAINES OLEAGINEUSES, HUILES ET GRAISSES A.ET V. DE LA CEE**	**5**	**326**	
ANIHORT	Association Nationale Interprofessionelle de l'Horticulture	1	33003	FRA
API	**ASSOCIATION DES PRODUCTEURS D'ISOGLUCOSE DE LA CEE**	**1**	**482**	
ASFALEC	**ASSOCIATION DES FABRICANTS DE LAITS DE CONSERVE DE LA CEE**	**1**	**413**	
ASOCARNE	Asociacion Espanola de Empresas de la Carne	1	30707	SPA
ASSIFONTE	**ASSOCIATION DE L'INDUSTRIE DE LA FONTE DE FROMAGE DE LA CEE**	**1**	**414**	
ASSILEC	**ASSOCIATION DE L'INDUSTRIE LAITIERE DES CE**	**4**	**412**	
ASSOCARNI	ASSOCARNI	1	30806	ITA
ASSUC	**ASSOCIATION DES ORGANISATIONS PROFESSIONELLES DU COMMERCE SUCRES POUR LA CEE**	**3**	**325**	
ASTA	United Kingdom Agricultural Supply Trade Association Ltd.	1	46411	UK
AVEC	**ASS. DES CENTRES D'ABATTAGE DE VOLAILLES ET DU COM. D'IM. ET D'EXP. DE LA CEE**	**4**	**310**	
AWES	Agriculture Wallonie - Entente Syndicale	6	10134	BEL
BB	Belgische Boerenbond	17	10102	BEL
BB	Belgische Boerenbond	1	20101	BEL
BDGA	Bundesverband des Deutschen Gross- und Aussenhandels e.V.	4	34312	GER
BDK	Bund Deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften	6	50202	GER
BDP	Bundesverband Deutscher Pflanzenzüchter e.V.	1	32208	GER
BDWW	Bundesverband der Deutschen Weinkellereien und des Weinfachhandels	1	34107	GER
BEUC	**BUREAU EUROPEEN DES UNIONS DE CONSOMMATEURS**	**20**	**501**	
BGB	Bedrijfschap voor de Groothandel in Bloemkwerkerijprodukten	1	33005	NED
BGEEE	Bedrijfschap voor de Groothandel in Eieren en Eiprod. en de Eiprod.industrie	1	31314	NED

1 Orgsys comprises five numbers: the first indicates the category, where 1 denotes producer, 2 cooperatives, 3 trade ,4 industry, 5 consumer and 6 union organizations. The next two numbers indicate the supranational organization the organization is a member of, while the last two indicate the national organization.

Table A 1: List of Organizations in Alphabetical Order
...continued

Label	Name	Seats	orgsys	Country
CPL	Centrale Paysanne Luxembourgeoise	1	20111	LUX
CSF	Confederation Syndicale des Familles	1	50328	FRA
CVNW	Centrale Vereniging van Nederlandse Wijnhandelaren	1	34117	NED
DBV	Deutscher Bauernverband e.V.	39	10107	GER
DDF	Det Danske Fjerkræraad	2	31003	DAN
DDL	De Danske Landboforeninger	2	10105	DAN
DECO	Associacao Portuguesa para a Defesa do Consumidor	1	50114	POR
DGB	Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund	11	60207	GER
DHF	Danske Husmandsforeninger	3	10106	DAN
DI	Industrieraadet (Federation of Danish Industries)	1	40602	DAN
DMFO	Danske Mejeriers Faellesorganisation	1	10004/ 704	Dan
DRV	Deutscher Raiffeisenverband	20	20103	GER
EAGF	Evangelische Aktionsgemeinschaft für Familienfragen	1	50314	GER
ECCM	**European Tabaco Federation**	**11**	**486**	
EFA	**FEDERATION EUROPEENNE DES SYNDICATS DE TRAVAILLEURS AGRICOLES**	**76**	**601**	
EFAPIT	**EUROMARKET FEDERATION OF ANIMAL PROTEIN IMPORTERS AND TRADERS**	**2**	**317**	
ELA-STV	Federacion de la Agricultura	1	60106	SPA
ESVITE	Association Grecque des Artisans de Normalisation d'Huile d'Olive	1	32607	GRE
EUCOFEL	**UNION EUROPEENNE DU COMMERCE DE GROS D'IMPORTATION ET D'EXPORT. EN FRUITS ET Leg.**	**6**	**318**	
EUCOLAIT	**UNION EUROPEENNE DU COMMERCE DES PRODUITS LAITIERS ET DERIVES**	**3**	**312**	
EURO COOP	**COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DES COOPERATIVES DE CONSOMMATEURS**	**12**	**502**	
EUROCOMMERCE	**EUROCOMMERCE**	**2**	**345**	
EUROCOTON	**COMITE DES INDUSTRIES DU COTON ET DES FIBRES CONNEXES DE LA CEE**	**7**	**485**	
EUROMALT	**COMITE DE TRAVAIL DES MALTERIES DE LA CE**	**1**	**471**	
EUWEP	**UNION EUROPEENNE DU COMMERCE DE GROS D OEUFS, PRODUITS D'OEUFS, VOLAILLE ET GIBIER**	**7**	**313**	
FAC	Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives Ltd	14	20114	UK
FBVS	Federation Belge des Vins et Spiritueux	1	34101	BEL
FDB	Faellesforeningen for Danmarks Brugsforeninger	1	50201	DAN
FDC	Federation of Danish Co-operatives	1	20121	DAN
FDF	Fachverband Deutscher Floristen e.V.	1	32803	GER
FEDERALIMENTARE	Federazione Italiana dell'lndustria Alimentare	1	40609	ITA
FEDERCONSORZI	Federazione Italiana dei Consorzi Agrari	8	10121	ITA
Federconsumatori	Federconsumatori	2	60236	ITA
FEDIAF	**FEDERATION EUROPEENNE DE L'INDUSTRIE DES ALIMENTS POUR ANIMAUX FAMILIERS**	**1**	**466**	
FEDIOL	**FEDERATION DE L'INDUSTRIE DE L'HUILERIE DE LA CEE**	**8**	**402**	
FEDOLIVE	**FEDERATION DE L'INDUSTRIE DE L'HUILE D'OLIVE DE LA CEE**	**4**	**404**	
FEFAC	**FEDERATION EUROPEENNE DES FABRICANTS D'ALIMENTS COMPOSES**	**9**	**464**	
FEIAB	Federacion Espanola de Industrias de la Alimentacion y Bebidas	1	40605	SPA
FENSCOPA	Fed Nat. des Synd. de Com. de Gr en Prod Avic. Gibiers Agneaux de Lait e Che.	1	31306	FRA
FEUPF	**FEDERATION EUROPEENNE DES UNIONS PROFESSIONNELLES DES FLEURISTES**	**2**	**328**	
FEWITA	**FEDERATION DES ASSOCIATIONS EUROPEENNES DU COMMERCE DE GROS ET EXTERIEUR**	**7**	**343**	
FGA-CFDT	Federation Generale Agro-alimentaire 26	2	60108	FRA
FGTA-FO	Fed. Gen. des Travailleurs de l'Agric. de l'Alimentation et secteurs connexes	7	60107	FRA

Table A 1: List of Organizations in Alphabetical Order

...continued

Label	Name	Seats	orgsys	Country
BIVEX	BIVEX	1	30801	BEL
BUTTERDANE	United Danish Butter Export Associations MD Foods	2	31204	DAN
BWGGA	Bundesverband des Wild- und Geflügel- Gross- und Aussenhandels e.V.	1	31302	GER
CAOBISCO	**ASSOCIATION DES INDUSTRIES DE LA CHOCOLATERIE, BISCOTTERIE ET CONFISERIE DE LA CEE**	**6**	**448**	
CAP	Confederacao dos Agricultores de Portugal	13	10127	LUX
CBMC	**COMMUNAUTE DE TRAVAIL DES BRASSEURS DU MARCHE COMMUN**	**13**	**470**	
CCAE	Confedracion de Cooperativas Agrarias de Espana	4	20119	SPA
CCAS	Centrale Chretienne de i'Alimentation et des Service	3	60102	BEL
CCDF	**Comite Central de la Propriete Forestier de la CEE**	**3**	**10001**	
CCEEIV	**COMITE DE LA COMMUMAUTE ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE DES INDUSTRIES ET DU COMMERCE DES VINS**	**9**	**341**	
CD	La Centrale Generale	1	60101	BEL
CDC	Comitato Difesa Consumatori	2	50111	ITA
CECD	**CONFEDERATION EUROPEENNE DU COMMERCE DE DETAIL**	**7**	**342**	
CECG	Consumers in the European Community Group	3	50121	UK
CEFIC	**Conseil Europeen Des Federations De L'Industrie Chimique**	**2**	**481**	
CEFS	**COMITE EUROPEEN DES FABRICANTS DE SUCRE**	**17**	**421**	
CES	**CONFEDERATION EUROPEENNE DES SYNDICATS**	**46**	**602**	
CFCA	Confederation Francaise de la Cooperation Agricole	18	20105	FRA
CFDT	Confederation Francaise Democratique du Travail	4	60213	Fra
CIAA	**CONFEDERATION DES INDUSTRIES AGRO-ALIMENTAIRES DE LA CEE**	**4**	**406**	
CIBEP	**ASSOCIATION DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL DE BULBES A FLEURS ET DE PLANTES**	**2**	**329**	
CIC	Confederazione Italiana Coltivatori	11	10122	ITA
CILC	**CONFEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DU LIN ET DU CHANVRE**	**9**	**483**	
CIS	Children in Scottland	1	50367	UK
CLITRAVI	**CENTRE DE LIAISON DES INDUSTRIES TRANSFORMATRICES DE VIANDES DE La CEE**	**4**	**408**	
CNC	Conseil National du Commerce	1	34208	FRA
CNCF	Confederation Nationale de la Charcuterie de France	1	34606	FRA
CNJA	Centre National des Jeunes Agriculteurs	2	10115	FRA
CNMCCA	Confederation Nationale de la Mutualite de cooperation et du Credit Agricole	1	10113	FRA
CNV	Industrie- en Voedingsbond	1	60117	NED
COAG	Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Agricultores y Ganaderos	11	10109	SPA
COBCCEE	**COMITE DES ORGANISATIONS DE BOUCHERIE ET CHARCUTERIE DE LA CEE**	**1**	**346**	
COCER	**COMITE DU COMMERCE DES CEREALES ET DES ALIMENTS DU BETAIL DE LA CEE**	**14**	**316**	
COFACE	**CONFEDERATION DES ORGANISATIONS FAMILIALES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE**	**26**	**503**	
COGECA	**COMITE GENERAL DE LA COOPERATION AGRICOLE DE LA CEE**	**132**	**201**	
COLDIRETTI	Confederazione Nazionale Coltivatori Diretti	17	10119	ITA
CONFAGRI	Confederation Nationale des Federations d Cooperatives Agricoles du Portugal	12	20113	POR
CONFAGRICOLTURA	Confederazione Generale dell Agricoltura Italiana	18	10120	ITA
COOU	Co-operative Union Ltd.	3	50209	UK
COPA	**COMITE DES ORGANISATIONS PROFESSIONELLES AGRICOLES DE LA CEE**	**354**	**101**	
COSEMCO	**COMITE DES SEMENCES DU MARCHE COMMUN**	**1**	**322**	
COV	Centrale Organisatie voor de Vleesgroothandel	1	30809	NED
CPIV	**COMITE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL DU VINAIGRE - MARCHE COMMUN**	**1**	**432**	
CPL	Centrale Paysanne Luxembourgeoise	7	10123	LUX

Table A 1: List of Organizations in Alphabetical Order
...continued

Label	Name	Seats	orgsys	Country
FGTB	Federation Generale du Travail de Belgique	4	60201	BEL
FIPA	Federacao das Industrias Portuguesas Agro -Alimentares	1	40611	POR
FISBA-CISL	Federazione Italiana Salariati Braccianti Impiegati e Technici Agricoli	5	60113	ITA
FLAI-CGIL		8	60115	ITA
FLT	Federatie van Land -en Tionbouworganisaties	15	10002 702	NED
FNCAA	Fed. Nazionale delle Cooperative Agricole ed Agroalimentari	4	20120	ITA
FNCBF	Federation Nationale des Commercants en Bestiaux de France	1	30710	FRA
FNCO	Federazione Nazionale del Comercio Oleario	1	32608	ITA
FNFR	Federation Nationale de la Famille Rurale	3	50327	FRA
FNSEA	Federation Nationale des syndicats d Exploitants Agricole	45	10114	FRA
FNV	Voedingsbond	3	60116	NED
FTT-UGT	Federacion de Trabajadores de la Tierra	7	60105	SPA
GAFTA	The Grain and Feed Trade Association Ltd.	1	31615	UK
GAM	**GROUPEMENT DES ASSOCIATIONS MEUNIERES DES PAYS DE LA CEE**	**1**	**437**	
GEMZU	Stichting Gemeenschappelijk Zuivelsekretariaat	1	31215	NED
GEMZU	Stichting Gemeenschappelijk Zuivelsekretariaat	1	31215	NED
GENH	**GROUPEMENT EUROPEEN DU NEGOCE HOUBLONNIER**	**5**	**324**	
GESASE	General Confederation of Greek Agrarian Associations	16	10117	GR
GGLF	Gewerkschaft Gartenbau Land- und Forstwirtschaft	1	60104	GER
GROFOR	Deutscher Verband des Grosshandels mit Olen Fetten und Ölrohstoffen e.V	1	32602	GER
HMA	The Hop Merchants Association	1	32404	UK
ICA	Irish Countrywomen's Association	8	50350	IRL
IDACE	**ASSOCIATION DES INDUSTRIES DES ALIMENTS DIETETIQUES DE LA CEE**	**1**	**455**	
IFA	Irish Farmer Association	16	10118	IRL
IMACE	**ASSOCIATION DES INDUSTRIES MARGARINIERES DES PAYS DE LA CEE**	**1**	**403**	
IMTA	International Meat Trade Association	2	30810	UK
IOS	Irish Cooperative Organisation Society Ltd	5	20107	IRL
IRJA	Iniciativa Rural - Jovenes Agricultores	2	10133	SPA
ITGWU	Irish Transport and General Workers Union	1	60109	IRL
IVU	Irish Veterinary Union	1	60110	IRL
KBNB	Kring Bloemenwinkeliers bijde Nederlandse Bloemisterij	1	32808	NED
KVCG	Koninklijke Vereniging het Comité van Graannandelaren	2	31613	NED
LB	Landburgsradet	17	10104	DAN
LBS	Lanbouwschap	1	10003/ 703	NED
LFG	Ligue des Familles de Grece	1	50369	GR
LO	Landsorganisationen i Danmark	3	60205	DAN
NBHV	Nederlandse Bond van Handelaren in Vee	1	30716	NED
NC	Consumentenbond	2	50113	NED
NCR	Nationale Cooperatieve Raad voor Land- en Tuinbouw	8	20112	NED
NFU	National Farmers Union of England and Wales	25	10128	UK
NFUS	National Farmers Union of Scotland	4	10129	UK
NFWI	National Federation of Women's Institutes	1	50362	UK

Table A 1: List of Organizations in Alphabetical Order

...continued

Label	Name	Seats	orgsys	Country
OEICT	**ORGANISATION EUROPÉENNE DES INDUSTRIES DE LA CONSERVE DE TOMATES**	**1**	**419**	
OEITFL	**ORGANISATION EUROPEENNE DES INDUSTRIES TRANSFORMATRICES DE FRUITS ET LEGUMES**	**5**	**417**	
ORGECO	ORGECO	1	50107	
PASEGES	Agricoles	7	20106	GR
PASEGES	Confederation Panhellenique des Unions des Cooperatives Agricoles	14	10116	GR
RC	Retail Consortium	2	34218	UK
RFG	Raad voor het Filiaal en Grootwinkelbedrijf	3	34213	NED
SEMOULIERS	**Semouliers**	**16**	**487**	
SETAA	Sindacato dos Empregados Tecnicos e Assalariado Agricolas	10	60118	POR
SFCS	Syndicat Francais du Commerce des Sucres	1	32504	FRA
SFNOP	Syndicat Francais des Negociants en Oleagineux et Proteagineux	1	32606	FRA
SID	Specialarbejder Forbundet	2	60103	DAN
UARCEE	**UNION DES ASSOCIATIONS DES RIZIERS DE LA CEE**	**3**	**425**	
UCAE	Union de Cooperativa Agrarias de Espana	10	20104	SPA
UCNAHE	Union Civica Nacional de Amas de Hogar de Espana	1	50317	SPA
UCOGRAS	UCOGRAS	1	32601	BEL
UDA	Union Detallistas Alimentacion	1	30608	SPA
UECBV	**UNION EUROPEENNE DU COMMERCE DU BETAIL ET DE LA VIANDE**	**8**	**307**	
UEEA	**UNION EUROPEENNE DES EXPLOITANTS D'ABATTOIRES**	**4**	**407**	
UEFA	Union de Escuelas Familiares Agrarias	1	50319	SPA
UFADE	Union de Federaciones Agrarias de Espana	2	10110	SPA
UFCS	Union Feminine Civique et Sociale	4	50332	FRA
UGC	Unione Generale Coltivatori	5	60114	ITA
UGT	Uniaò Geral de Trabalhadores	3	60229	POR
UGT	Union General de Trabajadores	9	60208	SPA
UIDA	**UNION INTERNATIONALE DES ORGANISATIONS DE DETAILLANTS DE LA BRANCHE ALIMENTAIRE**	**1**	**306**	
UIMEC	Unione Italiana Mezzadri e Coltivatori Diretti	6	60112	ITA
UISBA-UIL	Uni. Ita. Salariati Braccianti Agri. e Maestranze Specializzate Agri. e Forest	5	60111	ITA
ULC	Union Luxembourgeoise des Consommateurs	1	50112	LUX
UNAFPA	**UNION DES ASSOCIATIONS DE FABRICANTS DE PATES ALIMENTAIRES DE LA CEE**	**2**	**427**	
UNEGA	**UNION EUROPEENNE DES FONDEURS ET FABRICANTS DE CORPS GRAS ANIMAUX**	**2**	**401**	
UNESDA	**UNION DES ASSOCIATIONS DE BOISSONS GAZEUSES DES PAYS MEMBRES DE LA CEE**	**1**	**474**	
UNFREO	Union Nationale des Maisons Familiales Rurales d'Education et d'Orientation	2	50368	FRA
UNICEB	Unione Imp. Esport. Ind. Com. Gros. Ingra. M. Spediz.	1	30714	ITA
UNION FLEURS	**UNION INTERNATIONALE DU COMMERCE DE GROS EN FLEURS**	**4**	**330**	
UNIVINI	Unione Italiana Vini	1	34115	ITA
UPA	Union de Pequenos agricultores	13	10111	SPA
VBR	Verbindungsbüro der Rohtabakhandelsverbände	2	34302	GER
VDBGI	Verband des Deutschen Blumen- Gross- und Importhandels E.V.	1	33001	GER
VDGAVF	Verband des Deutschen Gross- und Aussenhandels mit Vieh Fleisch	1	30802	GER
VDZ	Verband des Deutschen Zuckerhandels e.V.	1	32503	GER
VGHB	Verein der Getreidehändler der Hamburger Börse e.V.	2	31702	GER
VHH	Verband der Hopfenkaufleute und Hopfenveredler e.V.	4	32402	GER
VNG	Verbond van de Nederlandse Groothandel	1	32508	NED
ZFDG	Zentralverband des Deutschen Getreidefutter und Dungemittelhandels e.V.	1	31604	GER

Table A2: Centrality measures under the conception of primary affiliation

		Centrality Measures				Total	Rank Position				
Orgsys	Organization-label	MDS	Degree	Close	Between	Seats	MDS	Degree	Close	Between	Seat
10114	FNSEA	0,86	0,93	0,89	0,04	45	8	1	1	1	1
10107	DBV	0,85	0,92	0,88	0,03	38	9	2	2	2	2
20103	DRV	0,84	0,88	0,85	0,03	20	11	3	3	7	7
10132	AAJA	0,87	0,87	0,84	0,03	25	6	4	4	6	5
10119	COLDIRETTI	0,84	0,84	0,82	0,03	17	10	5	5	3	12
10128	NFU	0,82	0,83	0,82	0,03	25	16	6	6	5	4
10120	CONFAGRICOLTURA	0,87	0,82	0,81	0,03	18	7	7	7	4	9
10104	LB	0,81	0,78	0,78	0,02	16	18	8	8	9	14
10118	IFA	0,82	0,78	0,78	0,02	16	14	9	9	13	16
20105	CFCA	0,97	0,78	0,78	0,02	19	1	10	10	14	8
10102	BB	0,81	0,76	0,77	0,02	17	17	11	11	8	11
20114	FAC	0,80	0,75	0,76	0,02	11	21	12	12	15	26
10002	FLT	0,76	0,71	0,74	0,01	16	26	13	13	16	13
10109	COAG	0,82	0,69	0,73	0,02	12	13	14	14	10	19
10111	UPA	0,72	0,69	0,73	0,02	12	29	15	15	11	20
10117	GESASE	0,77	0,69	0,73	0,02	16	24	16	16	12	15
10127	CAP	0,82	0,68	0,73	0,01	13	15	17	17	22	18
20104	UCAE	0,70	0,66	0,72	0,01	12	34	18	18	25	21
60207	DGB	0,83	0,66	0,72	0,01	12	12	19	19	36	23
20113	CONFAGRI	0,76	0,65	0,71	0,01	12	27	20	20	28	22
10122	CIC	0,69	0,63	0,70	0,01	11	35	21	21	20	25
20106	PASEGES	0,88	0,62	0,70	0,01	7	5	22	22	26	44
10123	CPL	0,66	0,61	0,69	0,01	7	37	23	23	21	43
50350	ICA	0,95	0,60	0,69	0,01	8	2	24	24	31	40
60118	SETAA	0,61	0,60	0,69	0,01	10	42	25	25	35	31
60208	UGT	0,93	0,60	0,69	0,01	9	3	26	26	37	35
20110	ANCA-LEGA	0,90	0,59	0,68	0,01	8	4	27	27	27	38
60115	FLAI-CGIL	0,77	0,59	0,68	0,01	8	25	28	28	34	41
10116	PASEGES	0,71	0,56	0,67	0,01	14	32	29	29	18	17
10134	AWES	0,70	0,56	0,67	0,01	6	33	30	30	23	50
50202	BDK	0,79	0,56	0,67	0,01	6	23	31	31	30	52
60107	FGTA-FO	0,65	0,56	0,67	0,01	7	39	32	32	33	48
10199	COPA99	0,81	0,52	0,65	0,01	10	19	33	33	24	30
20199	COGECA99	0,72	0,52	0,65	0,01	18	31	34	34	29	10
448	CAOBISCO	0,55	0,50	0,64	0,00	6	47	35	35	38	49
10121	FEDERCONSORZI	0,72	0,50	0,64	0,01	8	30	36	36	19	37
60105	FTT-UGT	0,58	0,50	0,64	0,01	7	45	37	37	32	47

Table A2: Centrality measures under the conception of primary affiliation
...continued

		Centrality Measures				Total	Rank Position				
Orgsys	Organization-label	MDS	Degree	Close	Between	Seats	MDS	Degree	Close	Between	Seat
60112	UIMEC	0,52	0,50	0,64	0,00	6	51	38	38	167	53
20112	NCR	0,80	0,48	0,63	0,00	9	20	39	41	65	34
60299	CES99	0,80	0,48	0,63	0,00	8	22	40	43	180	42
20107	ICOS	0,60	0,47	0,63	0,00	6	43	41	40	63	51
B9	B9	0,50	0,46	0,63	0,01	9	54	42	39	17	32
20120	FNCAA	0,54	0,46	0,63	0,00	4	50	43	42	67	64
60120	RAAW-TGWU	0,40	0,45	0,62	0,00	6	64	44	49	172	54
60201	FGTB	0,76	0,45	0,62	0,00	4	28	45	50	174	69
10129	NFUS	0,55	0,44	0,62	0,00	4	48	46	45	59	62
50332	UFCS	0,63	0,44	0,62	0,00	4	41	47	46	152	68
60113	FISBA-CISL	0,56	0,44	0,62	0,00	5	46	48	47	168	60
60114	UGC	0,46	0,44	0,62	0,00	5	60	49	48	169	61
10101	AAB	0,51	0,43	0,62	0,00	5	52	50	44	53	56
50100	BEUC	0,64	0,42	0,61	0,00	5	40	51	51	133	58
50209	COOU	0,36	0,41	0,61	0,00	3	69	52	52	143	77
B6	B6	0,65	0,40	0,60	0,00	10	38	53	54	41	27
60111	UISBA-UIL	0,45	0,39	0,60	0,00	5	61	54	55	166	59
B5	B5	0,50	0,38	0,60	0,00	22	53	55	53	40	6
60116	FNV	0,32	0,38	0,60	0,00	3	74	56	56	170	80
60213	CFDT	0,50	0,35	0,59	0,00	4	55	57	57	176	70
B12	B12	0,58	0,34	0,58	0,00	25	44	58	58	46	3
60237	ADOC	0,21	0,34	0,58	0,00	2	101	59	62	179	107
B13	B13	0,66	0,33	0,58	0,00	9	36	60	59	47	33
50121	CECG	0,36	0,32	0,58	0,00	3	70	61	60	140	76
50327	FNFR	0,45	0,32	0,58	0,00	3	63	62	61	150	78
31699	COCERAL	0,39	0,31	0,57	0,00	8	66	63	64	97	39
34213	RFG	0,45	0,31	0,57	0,00	3	62	64	65	116	75
60205	LO	0,35	0,31	0,57	0,00	3	72	65	68	175	81
10105	DDL	0,25	0,30	0,57	0,00	2	84	66	63	54	86
50113	NC	0,22	0,30	0,57	0,00	2	96	67	66	138	101
60102	CCAS	0,35	0,30	0,57	0,00	3	71	68	67	159	79
60236	FEDERCONS.TORI	0,47	0,30	0,57	0,00	2	58	69	70	178	106
60229	UGT	0,47	0,29	0,57	0,00	3	59	70	69	177	82
30810	IMTA	0,39	0,28	0,56	0,00	2	67	71	74	81	91
10106	DHF	0,32	0,27	0,56	0,00	3	73	72	72	55	73
30799	UECBV99	0,48	0,27	0,56	0,00	3	56	73	73	76	74
60108	FGA-CFDT	0,48	0,27	0,56	0,00	2	57	74	76	163	105
481	CEFIC	0,40	0,26	0,56	0,00	2	65	75	71	50	85

Table A2: Centrality measures under the conception of primary affiliation ...continued

		Centrality Measures				Total	Rank Position				
Orgsys	Organization-label	MDS	Degree	Close	Between	Seats	MDS	Degree	Close	Between	Seat
50199	BEUC99	0,37	0,26	0,56	0,00	4	68	76	75	141	67
10115	CNJA	0,20	0,25	0,55	0,00	2	106	77	78	58	88
10133	IRJA	0,21	0,25	0,55	0,00	2	102	78	79	61	89
20119	CCAE	0,55	0,25	0,55	0,00	4	49	79	80	66	63
34312	BDGA	0,26	0,25	0,55	0,00	4	83	80	89	120	66
50368	UNFREO	0,20	0,25	0,55	0,00	2	105	81	93	156	103
60103	SID	0,20	0,25	0,55	0,00	2	104	82	94	160	104
50299	EURO COOP	0,16	0,24	0,55	0,00	2	118	83	92	144	102
34599	EUROCOMMERCE	0,16	0,23	0,55	0,00	2	116	84	90	122	99
50111	CDC	0,25	0,23	0,55	0,00	2	86	85	91	136	100
B7	B7	0,16	0,22	0,55	0,00	2	117	86	77	42	83
10110	UFADE	0,22	0,22	0,54	0,00	2	93	87	100	56	87
20121	FDC	0,25	0,22	0,55	0,00	1	85	88	81	68	111
30705	AFVF	0,23	0,22	0,55	0,00	1	91	89	82	71	113
30710	FNCBF	0,26	0,22	0,55	0,00	1	82	90	83	73	115
30714	UNICEB	0,19	0,22	0,55	0,00	1	109	91	84	74	116
30801	BIVEX	0,28	0,22	0,55	0,00	1	75	92	85	77	118
30802	VDGAVF	0,22	0,22	0,55	0,00	1	95	93	86	78	119
31003	DDF	0,15	0,22	0,55	0,00	2	120	94	87	83	92
34218	RC	0,14	0,22	0,55	0,00	2	121	95	88	117	96
60109	ITGWU	0,17	0,22	0,55	0,00	1	114	96	95	164	171
B16	B16	0,21	0,21	0,54	0,00	10	97	97	98	49	29
10100	COPA	0,08	0,21	0,54	0,00	3	157	98	99	52	72
31604	ZGDG	0,11	0,21	0,54	0,00	1	129	99	113	92	128
31606	AECEC	0,10	0,21	0,54	0,00	1	142	100	114	93	129
31611	ANACER	0,12	0,21	0,54	0,00	1	123	101	115	94	130
40602	DI	0,08	0,21	0,54	0,00	1	154	102	122	127	149
40609	FEDERALIMENTARE	0,08	0,21	0,54	0,00	1	152	103	124	129	151
40611	FIPA	0,08	0,21	0,54	0,00	1	159	104	125	130	152
50328	CSF	0,08	0,21	0,54	0,00	1	150	105	129	151	163
60104	GGLF	0,08	0,21	0,54	0,00	1	151	106	131	161	169
B4	B4	0,10	0,20	0,54	0,00	8	138	107	96	39	36
B8	B8	0,12	0,20	0,54	0,00	5	126	108	97	43	55
10131	ACD	0,28	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	76	109	101	60	109
20111	CPL	0,19	0,20	0,54	0,00	2	107	110	102	64	90
30608	UDA	0,10	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	134	112	104	70	112
30707	ASOCARNE	0,19	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	108	113	105	72	114
30716	NBHV	0,27	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	80	114	106	75	117

Table A2: Centrality measures under the conception of primary affiliation ...continued

		Centrality Measures				Total	Rank Position				
Orgsys	Organization-label	MDS	Degree	Close	Between	Seats	MDS	Degree	Close	Between	Seat
30806	ASSOCARNI	0,28	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	77	115	107	79	120
30809	COV	0,24	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	88	116	108	80	121
30899	AECGV99	0,28	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	78	117	109	82	122
31204	BUTTERDANE	0,10	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	139	118	110	84	123
31215	GEMZU	0,10	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	141	119	111	85	124
31299	EUCOLAIT99	0,09	0,20	0,54	0,00	2	144	120	112	86	93
34101	FBVS	0,10	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	137	121	116	110	141
34107	BDWW	0,10	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	130	122	117	111	142
34115	UNIVINI	0,10	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	133	123	118	112	143
34117	CVNW	0,12	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	124	124	119	113	144
34118	AEVP	0,09	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	143	125	120	114	145
34208	CNC	0,09	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	146	126	121	115	146
40605	FIAB	0,09	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	145	127	123	128	150
50112	ULC	0,10	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	132	128	126	137	156
50201	FDB	0,23	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	92	129	127	142	158
50300	COFACE	0,09	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	147	130	128	145	159
50362	NFWI	0,09	0,20	0,54	0,00	1	148	131	130	154	165
32602	GROFOR	0,15	0,18	0,53	0,00	1	119	132	140	106	137
32606	SFNOP	0,14	0,18	0,53	0,00	1	122	133	141	107	138
46411	UKASTA	0,12	0,18	0,53	0,00	1	125	134	142	131	153
32503	VDZ	0,23	0,17	0,53	0,00	1	90	135	137	102	133
32504	SFCS	0,22	0,17	0,53	0,00	1	94	136	138	103	134
32508	VNG	0,23	0,17	0,53	0,00	1	89	137	139	104	135
50314	EAGF	0,21	0,17	0,53	0,00	1	99	138	144	146	160
B10	B10	0,26	0,16	0,53	0,00	2	81	139	132	44	84
B11	B11	0,27	0,16	0,53	0,00	10	79	140	133	45	28
31613	KVCG	0,17	0,16	0,53	0,00	2	113	141	134	95	94
31702	VGHB	0,19	0,16	0,53	0,00	2	111	142	135	98	95
31899	EUCOFEL	0,25	0,16	0,53	0,00	7	87	143	136	99	45
50107	ORGECO	0,21	0,16	0,53	0,00	1	103	144	143	135	155
50317	UCNAHE	0,10	0,16	0,53	0,00	1	140	145	145	147	161
50369	OFB	0,21	0,16	0,53	0,00	1	98	146	146	157	167
10113	CNMCCA	0,07	0,15	0,52	0,00	1	163	147	147	57	108
31314	BGEEE	0,18	0,15	0,52	0,00	1	112	148	150	89	127
31399	EUWEP99	0,21	0,15	0,52	0,00	5	100	149	151	90	57
34606	CNCF	0,08	0,15	0,52	0,00	1	153	150	154	126	148
50355	AFP	0,06	0,15	0,52	0,00	1	167	151	156	153	164
50367	CIS	0,06	0,15	0,52	0,00	1	165	152	157	155	166

Table A2: Centrality measures under the conception of primary affiliation ...continued

		Centrality Measures				Total	Rank Position				
Orgsys	Organization-label	MDS	Degree	Close	Between	Seats	MDS	Degree	Close	Between	Seat
31302	BWGGA	0,11	0,14	0,52	0,00	1	128	153	148	87	125
31306	FENSCOPA	0,12	0,14	0,52	0,00	1	127	154	149	88	126
31615	GAFTA	0,10	0,14	0,52	0,00	1	136	155	152	96	131
34299	CECD	0,06	0,14	0,52	0,00	1	168	156	153	118	147
50319	UEFA	0,19	0,13	0,52	0,00	1	110	157	155	148	162
60117	CNV	0,07	0,12	0,52	0,00	1	164	158	158	171	173
486	ECCM	0,17	0,11	0,51	0,00	11	115	159	159	48	24
34302	VBR	0,08	0,11	0,51	0,00	2	156	160	166	119	97
34399	FEWITA	0,10	0,11	0,51	0,00	2	131	161	167	121	98
50101	AC	0,07	0,11	0,51	0,00	1	161	162	169	134	154
20101	BB	0,07	0,09	0,51	0,00	1	162	163	160	62	110
32402	VHH	0,07	0,09	0,51	0,00	4	160	164	161	100	65
32404	HMA	0,08	0,09	0,51	0,00	1	155	165	162	101	132
32601	UCOGRAS	0,05	0,09	0,51	0,00	1	169	166	163	105	136
32607	ESVITE	0,04	0,09	0,51	0,00	1	172	167	164	108	139
32608	FNCO	0,06	0,09	0,51	0,00	1	166	168	165	109	140
48599	EUROCOTON	0,08	0,09	0,51	0,00	7	158	169	168	132	46
60101	CG	0,08	0,09	0,51	0,00	1	149	170	170	158	168
60110	IVU	0,02	0,06	0,50	0,00	1	174	171	174	165	172
60199	EFA99	0,0178	0,06	0,5	0	1	175	172	175	173	174
701	CCDF	0,04	0,05	0,50	0,00	3	170	173	171	51	71
50114	DECO	0,04	0,05	0,50	0,00	1	171	174	172	139	157
60106	ELA-STV	0,03	0,05	0,50	0,00	1	173	175	173	162	170

Table A3: Centrality measures under the conception of secondary affiliation

Orgsys	Organization-label	Centrality Measures				Total	Rank Positions				
		Degree	Closeness	Between	MDS	Seats	Degree	Close	Between	MDS	Seat
101	COPA	1,00	1,00	0,11	0,95	351	1	1	1	1	1
201	COGECA	0,98	0,98	0,10	0,93	134	2	2	2	5	2
601	EFA	0,98	0,98	0,10	0,93	76	3	3	4	2	3
602	CES	0,98	0,98	0,10	0,93	47	4	4	5	3	4
501	BEUC	0,97	0,97	0,10	0,93	20	5	5	3	4	6
503	COFACE	0,89	0,90	0,07	0,83	26	6	6	6	7	5
702	FLT	0,78	0,82	0,04	0,86	15	7	7	7	6	8
502	EUROCOOP	0,70	0,77	0,03	0,74	12	8	8	8	8	42
448	CAOBISCO	0,59	0,71	0,02	0,67	6	9	9	9	9	24
464	FEFAC	0,52	0,68	0,01	0,50	9	10	10	11	13	15
342	CECD	0,44	0,64	0,01	0,49	7	11	11	10	14	21
343	FEWITA	0,32	0,59	0,00	0,43	8	12	13	13	18	18
316	COCERAL	0,30	0,59	0,00	0,29	14	13	12	12	24	9
345	EUROCOMMERCE	0,30	0,59	0,00	0,44	2	14	14	22	15	11
417	OEITFL	0,30	0,59	0,00	0,36	5	15	15	14	21	27
427	UNAFPA	0,30	0,59	0,00	0,26	2	16	16	15	27	44
306	UIDA	0,29	0,58	0,00	0,23	1	17	17	28	30	63
312	EUCOLAIT	0,29	0,58	0,00	0,20	4	18	18	30	35	32
412	ASSILEC	0,29	0,58	0,00	0,28	4	19	19	45	26	28
413	ASFALEC	0,29	0,58	0,00	0,22	1	20	20	46	32	49
414	ASSIFONT	0,29	0,58	0,00	0,15	1	21	21	47	41	50
455	IDACE	0,29	0,58	0,00	0,14	1	22	23	52	42	58
481	CEFIC	0,29	0,58	0,00	0,66	2	23	24	17	10	40
704	DMFO	0,29	0,58	0,00	0,16	1	24	25	64	40	54
421	CEFS	0,27	0,58	0,00	0,59	18	25	22	18	11	7
407	UEEA	0,25	0,57	0,00	0,34	4	26	26	19	23	34
470	CBMC	0,25	0,57	0,00	0,22	13	27	28	20	33	10
423	SEMOULIE	0,25	0,57	0,00	0,28	1	28	31	23	25	62
437	GAM	0,24	0,57	0,00	0,11	1	29	27	51	52	57
471	EUROMALT	0,24	0,57	0,00	0,11	1	30	29	54	48	55
480	AAC	0,24	0,57	0,00	0,10	1	31	30	57	56	46
307	UECBV	0,22	0,56	0,00	0,23	8	32	32	24	31	19
308	AECGV	0,22	0,56	0,00	0,24	7	33	33	25	29	20
325	ASSUC	0,22	0,56	0,00	0,44	3	34	34	35	16	36
402	FEDIOL	0,22	0,56	0,00	0,53	8	35	36	16	12	17
474	UNESDA	0,22	0,56	0,00	0,25	1	36	37	56	28	64
482	API	0,22	0,56	0,00	0,36	1	37	38	58	22	48

Table A3: Centrality measures under the conception of secondary affiliation ....continued

Orgsys	Organization-label	Centrality Measures				Total	Rank Positions				
		Degree	Closeness	Between	MDS	Seats	Degree	Close	Between	MDS	Seat
326	ANGO	0,21	0,56	0,00	0,43	5	38	35	21	17	25
310	AVEC	0,19	0,55	0,00	0,18	4	39	39	29	39	29
313	EUWEP	0,19	0,55	0,00	0,18	8	40	40	31	37	16
318	EUCOFEL	0,19	0,55	0,00	0,10	7	41	41	32	54	22
322	COSEMCO	0,19	0,55	0,00	0,18	1	42	42	33	36	52
328	FEUPF	0,19	0,55	0,00	0,11	2	43	43	36	49	43
329	CIBEP	0,19	0,55	0,00	0,13	3	44	44	37	44	38
330	UNIONFLE	0,19	0,55	0,00	0,12	4	45	45	38	46	35
401	UNEGA	0,19	0,55	0,00	0,14	2	46	47	41	43	45
403	IMACE	0,19	0,55	0,00	0,36	1	47	48	42	20	59
408	CLITRAVI	0,19	0,55	0,00	0,12	4	48	50	44	45	31
419	OEICT	0,19	0,55	0,00	0,11	1	49	51	48	50	61
472	AIJN	0,19	0,55	0,00	0,11	1	50	52	55	51	47
703	LB	0,19	0,55	0,00	0,09	1	51	53	63	57	60
346	COBCCEE	0,17	0,55	0,00	0,10	1	52	46	40	55	51
406	CIAA	0,17	0,55	0,00	0,38	4	53	49	27	19	30
317	EFAPIT	0,16	0,54	0,00	0,12	2	54	54	26	47	41
701	CCEEIV	0,16	0,54	0,00	0,18	3	55	55	39	38	37
432	CPIV	0,16	0,54	0,00	0,08	1	56	56	50	58	53
466	FEDIAF	0,13	0,53	0,00	0,08	1	57	59	53	60	56
483	CILC	0,13	0,53	0,00	0,20	10	58	60	59	34	13
324	GENH	0,10	0,53	0,00	0,11	5	59	57	34	53	26
404	FEDOLIVE	0,10	0,53	0,00	0,08	4	60	58	43	59	33
425	UARCEE	0,08	0,52	0,00	0,04	3	61	61	49	63	39
485	EUROCOTON	0,08	0,52	0,00	0,05	7	62	62	60	62	23
486	ECCM	0,08	0,52	0,00	0,06	11	63	63	61	61	12
341	CCPF	0,05	0,51	0,00	0,00	9	64	64	62	64	14

Table A4: Centrality Measures under conception of Tertiary Affiliation

		Centrality Measures				Total	Rank Position				
orgsys	Organization-label	MDS	Degree	Closeness	Betweeness	Seat	MDS	Degree	Closeness	Betweeness	Seat
201	COPA	0,98	1	1	0,1	351	1	1	1	1	1
401	COCEGA	0,96	0,97	0,97	0,08	134	3	2	2	3	2
704	EFA	0,94	0,97	0,97	0,08	76	4	3	3	2	3
602	CES	0,96	0,97	0,97	0,08	47	2	4	4	4	6
501	BEUC	0,94	0,95	0,95	0,07	20	5	5	5	5	8
406	CIAA	0,91	0,84	0,86	0,04	70	6	6	6	6	4
330	COFACE	0,80	0,84	0,86	0,03	26	7	7	7	7	7
301	CELCAA	0,71	0,76	0,8	0,03	57	10	8	8	8	5
317	EUROCOOP	0,74	0,76	0,8	0,02	12	9	9	9	9	10
464	FLT	0,78	0,7	0,77	0,02	15	8	10	10	10	9
485	FEFAC	0,55	0,57	0,7	0,01	9	11	11	11	11	14
342	CECD	0,47	0,49	0,66	0,01	7	14	12	12	12	16
404	FEWITA	0,48	0,49	0,66	0	8	13	13	13	13	15
601	EUROCOMMECE	0,27	0,49	0,66	0	2	18	14	14	15	29
425	UIDA	0,22	0,46	0,65	0	1	21	15	15	18	38
412	ASSILEC	0,22	0,46	0,65	0	4	20	16	16	27	20
413	ASFALEC	0,21	0,46	0,65	0	1	23	17	17	28	31
414	ASSI	0,27	0,46	0,65	0	1	17	18	18	29	32
322	DMFO	0,20	0,46	0,65	0	1	24	19	19	38	35
419	UEEA	0,39	0,38	0,62	0	4	15	20	20	16	23
481	CEFIC	0,48	0,32	0,6	0	2	12	21	21	17	27
310	AVEC	0,14	0,3	0,59	0	4	29	22	22	19	21
503	COSEMCO	0,12	0,3	0,59	0	1	31	23	23	21	33
326	ANGO	0,33	0,3	0,59	0	5	16	24	24	14	18
306	UNIONFLE	0,14	0,3	0,59	0	4	30	25	25	23	24
407	UNEGA	0,16	0,3	0,59	0	2	26	26	26	25	30
324	OEICT	0,19	0,3	0,59	0	1	25	27	27	30	37
702	LB	0,15	0,3	0,59	0	1	28	28	28	37	36
341	CCEEIV	0,15	0,27	0,58	0	9	27	29	29	24	13
101	CPIV	0,21	0,27	0,58	0	1	22	30	30	32	34
486	EFAPIT	0,10	0,24	0,57	0	2	32	31	31	20	28
483	CILC	0,23	0,22	0,56	0	10	19	32	32	33	12
343	GENH	0,08	0,16	0,54	0	5	33	33	36	22	19
502	FEDOLIVE	0,08	0,16	0,54	0	4	34	34	37	26	22
703	UARCEE	0,04	0,14	0,54	0	3	37	35	33	31	26
345	EUROCOTO	0,06	0,14	0,54	0	7	35	36	34	34	17
432	ECCM	0,04	0,14	0,54	0	11	36	37	35	35	11
701	CCDF	0,00	0,08	0,52	0	3	38	38	38	36	25

Table A 5: Social Capital of organizations under the reference scenario

Orgsys	Organizations-label	Social Capital measured in % of effective Seats				% of total seats	Rank Position	
		MDS	Degree	Closeness	Betweeness		SC-	
		SC-MDS	SC-DEG	SC-Close	SC-Between		DEG	Seat
10114	FNSEA	6,90	8,44	6,43	16,90	4,91	1	1
10107	DBV	5,73	7,05	5,37	10,70	4,14	2	2
10132	AAJA	3,88	4,39	3,37	7,04	2,73	3	5
10128	NFU	3,66	4,18	3,29	7,04	2,73	4	4
20103	DRV	2,98	3,55	2,73	5,63	2,18	5	7
20105	CFCA	3,29	2,99	2,38	3,57	2,07	6	8
10120	CONFAGRICOLTURA	2,78	2,98	2,34	5,07	1,96	7	9
10119	COLDIRETTI	2,55	2,88	2,24	4,79	1,85	8	12
10102	BB	2,46	2,61	2,10	3,19	1,85	9	11
10104	LB	2,31	2,52	2,00	3,00	1,74	10	14
10118	IFA	2,33	2,52	2,00	3,00	1,74	11	16
1	FLT	2,17	2,29	1,90	1,50	1,74	12	13
10117	GESASE	2,20	2,23	1,88	3,00	1,74	13	15
20199	COGECA99	2,31	1,89	1,88	1,69	1,96	14	10
10127	CAP	1,90	1,78	1,52	1,22	1,42	15	18
11	B12	2,60	1,71	2,33	0,00	2,73	16	3
4	B5	1,95	1,69	2,12	0,00	2,40	17	6
10109	COAG	1,74	1,67	1,41	2,25	1,31	18	19
10111	UPA	1,53	1,67	1,41	2,25	1,31	19	20
20114	FAC	1,58	1,66	1,34	2,07	1,20	20	26
20104	UCAE	1,50	1,60	1,39	1,13	1,31	21	21
60207	DGB	1,76	1,60	1,39	1,13	1,31	22	23
10116	PASEGES	1,78	1,58	1,51	1,31	1,53	23	17
20113	CONFAGRI	1,62	1,57	1,37	1,13	1,31	24	22
10122	CIC	1,35	1,40	1,24	1,03	1,20	25	25
60118	SETAA	1,08	1,21	1,11	0,94	1,09	26	31
60208	UGT	1,49	1,09	1,00	0,85	0,98	27	35
10199	COPA99	1,45	1,05	1,04	0,94	1,09	28	30
50350	ICA	1,36	0,97	0,89	0,75	0,87	29	40
20110	ANCA-LEGA	1,28	0,95	0,87	0,75	0,87	30	38
60115	FLAI-CGIL	1,09	0,95	0,87	0,75	0,87	31	41
20106	PASEGES	1,10	0,88	0,79	0,66	0,76	32	44
20112	NCR	1,28	0,87	0,91	0,00	0,98	33	34
10123	CPL	0,83	0,86	0,78	0,66	0,76	34	43
8	B9	0,81	0,83	0,91	0,85	0,98	35	32
5	B6	1,16	0,81	0,96	0,00	1,09	36	27
10121	FEDERCONSORZI	1,03	0,81	0,82	0,75	0,87	37	37
60107	FGTA-FO	0,81	0,79	0,75	0,66	0,76	38	48
60299	CES99	1,14	0,77	0,81	0,00	0,87	39	42
60105	FTT-UGT	0,72	0,71	0,72	0,66	0,76	40	47
10134	AWES	0,75	0,68	0,65	0,56	0,65	41	50
50202	BDK	0,84	0,68	0,65	0,56	0,65	42	52
2	CAOBISCO	0,59	0,60	0,62	0,00	0,65	43	49
60112	UIMEC	0,56	0,60	0,62	0,00	0,65	44	53
12	B13	1,06	0,60	0,84	0,00	0,98	45	33
20107	ICOS	0,64	0,57	0,61	0,00	0,65	46	51
60120	RAAW-TGWU	0,43	0,54	0,60	0,00	0,65	47	54
31699	COCERAL	0,56	0,50	0,73	0,00	0,87	48	39
60113	FISBA-CISL	0,50	0,44	0,50	0,00	0,55	49	60

Table A 5: Social Capital of organizations under the reference scenario .....continued

Orgsys	Organizations-label	Social Capital measured in % of effective Seats				% of total seats	Rank Position	
		MDS	Degree	Closeness	Betweeness		SC-	
		SC-MDS	SC-DEG	SC-Close	SC-Between		DEG	Seat
60114	UGC	0,41	0,44	0,50	0,00	0,55	50	61
10101	AAB	0,45	0,43	0,50	0,00	0,55	51	56
14	b16	0,38	0,42	0,87	0,00	1,09	52	29
50100	BEUC	0,57	0,42	0,49	0,00	0,55	53	58
60111	UISBA-UIL	0,40	0,39	0,48	0,00	0,55	54	59
20120	FNCAA	0,39	0,37	0,40	0,00	0,44	55	64
60201	FGTB	0,54	0,36	0,40	0,00	0,44	56	69
10129	NFUS	0,39	0,35	0,40	0,00	0,44	57	62
50332	UFCS	0,45	0,35	0,40	0,00	0,44	58	68
3	B4	0,14	0,32	0,69	0,00	0,87	59	36
10	B11	0,47	0,32	0,85	0,00	1,09	60	28
60213	CFDT	0,36	0,28	0,38	0,00	0,44	61	70
50209	COOU	0,19	0,25	0,29	0,00	0,33	62	77
13	ECCM	0,33	0,24	0,90	0,00	1,20	63	24
60116	FNV	0,17	0,23	0,29	0,00	0,33	64	80
31899	EUCOFEL	0,31	0,23	0,60	0,00	0,76	65	45
50199	BEUC99	0,27	0,21	0,36	0,00	0,44	66	67
7	B8	0,11	0,20	0,43	0,00	0,55	67	55
20119	CCAE	0,39	0,20	0,35	0,00	0,44	68	63
34312	BDGA	0,18	0,20	0,35	0,00	0,44	69	66
50121	CECG	0,19	0,19	0,28	0,00	0,33	70	76
50327	FNFR	0,24	0,19	0,28	0,00	0,33	71	78
34213	RFG	0,24	0,19	0,27	0,00	0,33	72	75
60205	LO	0,19	0,19	0,27	0,00	0,33	73	81
60102	CCAS	0,19	0,18	0,27	0,00	0,33	74	79
60229	UGT	0,25	0,18	0,27	0,00	0,33	75	82
10106	DHF	0,17	0,16	0,27	0,00	0,33	76	73
30799	UECBV99	0,26	0,16	0,27	0,00	0,33	77	74
31399	EUWEP99	0,19	0,15	0,42	0,00	0,55	78	57
60237	ADOC	0,07	0,14	0,19	0,00	0,22	79	107
10100	COPA	0,04	0,13	0,26	0,00	0,33	80	72
48599	EUROCOTON	0,10	0,13	0,57	0,00	0,76	81	46
10105	DDL	0,09	0,12	0,18	0,00	0,22	82	86
50113	NC	0,08	0,12	0,18	0,00	0,22	83	101
60236	FEDERCONS.TORI	0,17	0,12	0,18	0,00	0,22	84	106
30810	IMTA	0,14	0,11	0,18	0,00	0,22	85	91
60108	FGA-CFDT	0,17	0,11	0,18	0,00	0,22	86	105
15	CEFIC	0,14	0,10	0,18	0,00	0,22	87	85
10115	CNJA	0,07	0,10	0,18	0,00	0,22	88	88
10133	IRJA	0,07	0,10	0,18	0,00	0,22	89	89
50368	UNFREO	0,07	0,10	0,18	0,00	0,22	90	103
60103	SID	0,07	0,10	0,18	0,00	0,22	91	104
50299	EURO COOP	0,06	0,10	0,18	0,00	0,22	92	102
34599	EUROCOMMERCE	0,06	0,09	0,18	0,00	0,22	93	99
50111	CDC	0,09	0,09	0,18	0,00	0,22	94	100
6	B7	0,06	0,09	0,18	0,00	0,22	95	83
10110	UFADE	0,08	0,09	0,17	0,00	0,22	96	87
31003	DDF	0,05	0,09	0,18	0,00	0,22	97	92
34218	RC	0,05	0,09	0,18	0,00	0,22	98	96

Table A 5: Social Capital of organizations under the reference scenario .....continued

Orgsys	Organizations-label	Social Capital measured in % of effective Seats				% of total seats	Rank Position	
		MDS	Degree	Closeness	Betweeness		SC-	
		SC-MDS	SC-DEG	SC-Close	SC-Between		DEG	Seat
20111	CPL	0,07	0,08	0,17	0,00	0,22	99	90
31299	EUCOLAIT99	0,03	0,08	0,17	0,00	0,22	100	93
32402	VHH	0,05	0,07	0,33	0,00	0,44	101	65
9	B10	0,09	0,06	0,17	0,00	0,22	102	84
31613	KVCG	0,06	0,06	0,17	0,00	0,22	103	94
31702	VGHB	0,07	0,06	0,17	0,00	0,22	104	95
20121	FDC	0,05	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	105	111
30705	AFVF	0,04	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	106	113
30710	FNCBF	0,05	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	107	115
30714	UNICEB	0,03	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	108	116
30801	BIVEX	0,05	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	109	118
30802	VDGAVF	0,04	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	110	119
34302	VBR	0,03	0,04	0,16	0,00	0,22	111	97
34399	FEWITA	0,04	0,04	0,16	0,00	0,22	112	98
60109	ITGWU	0,03	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	113	171
31604	ZGDG	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	114	128
31606	AECEC	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	115	129
31611	ANACER	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	116	130
40602	DI	0,01	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	117	149
40609	FEDERALIMENTARE	0,01	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	118	151
40611	FIPA	0,01	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	119	152
50328	CSF	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	120	163
60104	GGLF	0,01	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	121	169
10131	ACD	0,05	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	122	109
30608	UDA	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	123	112
30707	ASOCARNE	0,03	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	124	114
30716	NBHV	0,05	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	125	117
30806	ASSOCARNI	0,05	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	126	120
30809	COV	0,04	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	127	121
30899	AECGV99	0,05	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	128	122
31204	BUTTERDANE	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	129	123
31215	GEMZU	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	130	124
34101	FBVS	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	131	141
34107	BDWW	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	132	142
34115	UNIVINI	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	133	143
34117	CVNW	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	134	144
34118	AEVP	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	135	145
34208	CNC	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	136	146
40605	FIAB	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	137	150
50112	ULC	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	138	156
50201	FDB	0,04	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	139	158
50300	COFACE	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	140	159
50362	NFWI	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	141	165
32602	GROFOR	0,03	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	142	137
32606	SFNOP	0,03	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	143	138
46411	UKASTA	0,02	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,11	144	153
32503	VDZ	0,04	0,03	0,09	0,00	0,11	145	133
32504	SFCS	0,04	0,03	0,09	0,00	0,11	146	134
32508	VNG	0,04	0,03	0,09	0,00	0,11	147	135

Table A 5: Social Capital of organizations under the reference scenario .....continued

Orgsys	Organizations-label	Social Capital measured in % of effective Seats				% of total seats	Rank Position	
		MDS	Degree	Closeness	Betweeness		SC-	
		SC-MDS	SC-DEG	SC-Close	SC-Between		DEG	Seat
50314	EAGF	0,04	0,03	0,09	0,00	0,11	148	160
50107	ORGECO	0,04	0,03	0,09	0,00	0,11	149	155
50317	UCNAHE	0,02	0,03	0,09	0,00	0,11	150	161
50369	OFB	0,04	0,03	0,09	0,00	0,11	151	167
16	CCDF	0,02	0,03	0,24	0,00	0,33	152	71
10113	CNMCCA	0,01	0,03	0,08	0,00	0,11	153	108
31314	BGEEE	0,03	0,03	0,08	0,00	0,11	154	127
34606	CNCF	0,01	0,03	0,08	0,00	0,11	155	148
50355	AFP	0,01	0,03	0,08	0,00	0,11	156	164
50367	CIS	0,01	0,03	0,08	0,00	0,11	157	166
31302	BWGGA	0,02	0,03	0,08	0,00	0,11	158	125
31306	FENSCOPA	0,02	0,03	0,08	0,00	0,11	159	126
31615	GAFTA	0,02	0,03	0,08	0,00	0,11	160	131
34299	CECD	0,01	0,03	0,08	0,00	0,11	161	147
50319	UEFA	0,03	0,03	0,08	0,00	0,11	162	162
60117	CNV	0,01	0,02	0,08	0,00	0,11	163	173
50101	AC	0,01	0,02	0,08	0,00	0,11	164	154
20101	BB	0,01	0,02	0,08	0,00	0,11	165	110
32404	HMA	0,01	0,02	0,08	0,00	0,11	166	132
32601	UCOGRAS	0,01	0,02	0,08	0,00	0,11	167	136
32607	ESVITE	0,01	0,02	0,08	0,00	0,11	168	139
32608	FNCO	0,01	0,02	0,08	0,00	0,11	169	140
60101	CG	0,02	0,02	0,08	0,00	0,11	170	168
60110	IVU	0,00	0,01	0,08	0,00	0,11	171	172
60199	EFA99	0,00	0,01	0,08	0,00	0,11	172	174
50114	DECO	0,01	0,01	0,08	0,00	0,11	173	157
60106	ELA-STV	0,01	0,01	0,08	0,00	0,11	174	170

Table A 6: Correlation between different social capital and centrality measures and share in total seats of the AACS - reference scenario -

	SC-MDS	*SC-DEG*	*SC-close*	*SC-bet*	*Seat*	*MDS*	*Degree*	*Close*	*Between*
SC-MDS	1,00								
SC-DEG	0,98	1,00							
SC-close	0,99	0,99	1,00						
SC-bet	0,90	0,95	0,92	1,00					
Seat	0,97	0,95	0,99	0,85	1,00				
MDS	0,76	0,68	0,70	0,52	0,72	1,00			
Degree	0,85	0,81	0,80	0,68	0,80	0,93	1,00		
Close	0,89	0,87	0,86	0,76	0,84	0,89	0,99	1,00	
Between	0,90	0,90	0,87	0,87	0,83	0,72	0,86	0,91	1,00

Table A 7: Rank-correlation between different social capital and centrality measures and share in total seats of the AACS - reference scenario -

	Rank-MDS	*Rank-Degree*	*Rank-Close*	*Rank-Betw*	*Rank-seat*	*Rank-SC*
Rank-MDS	1,00					
Rank-Degree	0,90	1,00				
Rank-Close	0,91	0,99	1,00			
Rank-Between	0,53	0,51	0,54	1,00		
Rank-Seat	0,81	0,79	0,81	0,68	1,00	
Rank-SC	0,88	0,92	0,92	0,58	0,94	1,00

Table A8: Seat distribution across Committees of CELCAA member-organizations

Organization-label	Orgsys	Committee-Number																						Total
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9	10	14	16	19	20	22	23								
UECBV	307				3							2												8
AECC	308				3																			7
EUCOLAIT	312			3																				4
EUWEP	313						2	6																8
COCERAL	316	7	3												3									14
EUCOFEL	318									6			1											7
ASSUC	325								3															3
FEURP	328										2													2
CIBEP	329										2		1											3
COBCOEP	346																							1
	Column		3		6		2		3		4		2		3									57
	Total %		5,3		10,5		3,5		5,3		7		3,5		5,3									100

Table A9: Seat distribution across Committees of Non-CELCAA member-organizations

Organization-label	Orgsys	Committee-Number																								Total
		3	6	7	8	10	11	12	13	14	16	18	19	20	22	23	24	25								
UIDA	306	1																								1
AVEC	310		3	1																						4
EFARU	317														1											2
COSEMCO	322																									1
GENH	324								5																	5
ANGO	326				2												3									5
UNION FLEURS	330																									4
CCFE-V	341						9																			9
CECD	342		2				1				1															7
FEWITA	343												1													8
EUROCOMMERCE	345																									2
	Column		5		2		10		5		1		1		1		3									48
	Total %		10,4		4,2		20,8		10,4		2,1		2,1		2,1		6,3									100

Table A10: Seat distribution across Committees of CIAA affiliated organizations

Organization-label	Orgsys	Committee-Number																	Total
		1	3	4	5	7	8	9	10	11	13	15	19	22	23	27	28	30	
FEDIOL	402						6												8
IMACE	403						1												1
CIAA	406									1			3						4
CLITRAVI	408			2	2														4
CEITHIL	417							1	4										5
CEFS	421							8									9		18
SEMOULIERS	423																		1
UNAFPA	427																		2
GAM	437																		1
CAOBISCO	448		1				1										1		6
IDACE	455		1																1
FEDIAF	466														1				1
CBMC	470										5								13
EUROMALT	471																		1
AIJN	472								1										1
UNESDA	474																		1
AAC	480																		1
ACI	482																		1
	Column		2		2		8		5		5		3		1		10		70
	Total %		2,9		2,9		11,4		7,1		7,1		4,3		1,4		14,3		100

Table A11: Seat distribution across Committees of organizations not affiliated to CIAA

Organization-label	Orgsys	Committee-Number																		Total
		1	2	3	4	5	8	9	10	11	12	15	16	20	22	23	24	27	29	
UNEGA	401				1															2
FEDOLIVE	404																4			4
UEEA	407				1								1							4
ASSILEC	412			4																4
ASFALEC	413			1																1
ASSIFONTE	414			1																1
OEIC	419								1											1
UARCEE	425		3																	3
CPIV	432										1									1
FEFAC	464	1		1			2								3					9
CEFIC	481						1													2
CILC	483											10								10
EUROCOTON	485																	7		7
ECCM	486										6								5	11
	Column		3		2		3		1		6		1		3		4		5	30
	Total %		5		3,3		5		1,7		10		1,7		5		6,7		8,3	50

***Legend of table A8-A11**

AV=Advisory Committee,
TG=technical Group
1 = AV cereals
2 = TG of the AV cereals
3 = AV milk and milk products
4 = AV beef meat
5 = AV pork meat
6 = AV poultrymeat
7 = AV eggs
9 = AV fats
10= AV sugar
11= AV wine
12= AV raw tobaco
13= AV hop
14= AV live plants
15= AV flax and hamp
16= AV sheep&goat
17= TG silkworm
18= AV seeds
19= AV Ouestions of Agri-cultural Structure policy
20= AV veterinary committee
21= AV Social questions affecting farmers and members of their families
22= AV feedingstuffs
23= TG feedingstuff: approximation of laws
24= AV fats TG olives and products
25= TG seeds: approximation of laws
26= AV cork
27= AV cotton
28= AV sugar equal representation
29= AV tobaco equal representation
30= AV hop equal representation