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Jürgen Hofrichter

Public Opinion on EC Membership of  
Turkey and the Turkish People in the  
Countries of the European Community

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**Jürgen Hofrichter**

**Public Opinion on EC Membership of Turkey and the  
Turkish People in the Countries of the European  
Community**

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## Inhalt

<b>1.</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2.</b>	<b>Public Opinion on Internationalized Governance</b>	<b>1</b>
2.1.	Classification of Orientations Towards Internationalized Governance	2
2.1.1.	Objects of Orientation	3
2.1.2.	Modes of Orientation	4
<b>3.</b>	<b>Strategy of Investigation and Data Base</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>4.</b>	<b>EC Citizens' Orientations Towards the Admission of Turkey to the European Community 1976, 1986, 1988-1989</b>	<b>7</b>
4.1.	Which Countries Should be Admitted to the European Community? EC Citizens' Preferences in 1976 and 1988	7
4.2.	Importance of European Community Expansion Towards Turkey in EC Member Countries 1988 - 1989	9
4.3.	Evaluation of Turkish EC Membership in European Community Countries in 1986	10
4.4.	Evaluation of Membership Candidates of the Southern Enlargement	12
<b>5.</b>	<b>Trust in the Turkish People 1986 and 1990</b>	<b>13</b>
5.1.	Theoretical Background and Operationalization	13
5.2.	Results	15
<b>6.</b>	<b>Summary and Discussion</b>	
6.1.	Summary	20
6.2.	Discussion	22
	<b>References</b>	<b>25</b>

## 1. Introduction

This chapter investigates European public opinion towards Turkey and the Turks in the framework of analyzing the relationship between European Political Cooperation (EPC) and Turkey. It complements the institutional/political perspective by providing information about orientations of the individual citizen. In analyses of individual orientations towards issues of international politics it has to be kept in mind that the average citizens' interest in politics and knowledge about politics is rather limited. The European Community is for most people a remote and non-transparent political entity and it can be assumed that most EC citizens are not aware that EPC is the foreign policy "régime" (Leipzig 1991: 77) of the governments of European Community countries. On this background, the analysis of the perception of Turkey and the Turks concentrates on orientations towards a possible Community membership of Turkey and the image of the Turkish people in the member countries of the European Community. A framework which classifies orientations towards internationalized governance is applied for this analysis of public opinion in the EC. No data regarding orientations of Turks towards EC peoples or EC countries were available to the author.

## 2. Public Opinion on Internationalized Governance

In the debate about the dimensionality of public opinion on international affairs different approaches have been developed. A recent approach distinguishes between 'militant internationalism' on the one hand and 'cooperative internationalism' on the other hand (Wittkopf 1986, Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983). These two dimensions were identified in empirical analyses of opinions of elites and mass publics on international affairs. The two dimensions "correspond closely to the most venerable and basic theories of international relations: realism and idealism" (Holsti and Rosenau 1990: 96). The aspect of public opinion investigated refers to orientations towards cooperative interactions between nations and concentrates on the dimension of cooperative internationalism.

Different levels of cooperative interactions between nations can be identified. In contrast to ad-hoc cooperation, there is institutionalized cooperation in systems of 'internationalized governance'. Thereby various levels of institutionalization can be

distinguished (see Niedermayer/Westle 1992: 2-4 for a conceptual discussion). The European Community is characterized as a rudimentary international governmental system. The EC is, however, far more developed and institutionalized than international regimes. The EPC is one of the most developed international regimes and the Treaty of Maastricht aims at the development of EPC (regime) and European Community (rudimentary system) into a Political Union which would be a full-fledged international governmental system.

### **2.1. Classification of Orientations Towards Internationalized Governance**

The following classification of orientations towards internationalized governance was developed by Niedermayer and Westle (1992) and is rooted in the tradition of analyzing orientations towards governance as such<sup>1</sup>. Applying a broadly defined concept of orientations, a basic distinction is made between the objects of orientation and the modes of orientation towards the European Community as an example of a system of internationalized governance.

Objects of orientation can be the European Community as a whole -- or its components

- 1) the political collectivity (membership),
- 2) the political order (institutions, philosophy),
- 3) the political authorities (incumbents),
- 4) the policies (policy aspect).

Orientations towards the European Community can reach from simple awareness of it to intentions to do some thing about it. Therefore, it is distinguished between

- 1) psychological involvement (e.g. knowledge, salience, interest),
- 2) evaluations (good-bad, for-against),
- 3) behavioural intentions (e.g. vote intention in European elections).

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<sup>1</sup> The concept is developed referring to and modifying the approaches of Almond and Verba 1953; Easton 1965, 1975; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970.

### 2.1.1. Objects of Orientation

People may have orientations towards the European Community as a whole or towards its components. The first component 'political collectivity' refers to the aspect of membership in the Community and to the units participating. The system of internationalized governance comprises a group of countries and peoples bound together by a political division of labour. There are, however, some special aspects of membership in such an international collectivity. On the one hand, nation states are members of the European Community. On the other hand, the peoples of the member states as well as individual citizens can also be seen as members. Taking these two aspects of membership into consideration, a territorial element is distinguished from a personal element of the political collectivity. The Spanish proposal to introduce a citizenship of the European Political Union and the steps agreed upon in the Maastricht Treaty refer to this personal element of membership in the European Community. The personal element regards individuals, groups or peoples, i.e. the socio-political or social system in an international perspective. The territorial element refers to the membership of states as the political subunits in the Community and the physical borders of the Community. This allows to distinguish social orientations from political ones. For instance, orientations towards the membership of countries (own country or other member countries, candidates for membership) are classified as political ones. Evaluations of one's own membership (e.g. feeling as a European citizen) or orientations towards other peoples (e.g. images of other peoples) are classified as social orientations towards the collectivity. These -- social and political -- orientations are of course mixed and are difficult to separate in empirical work. However, orientations towards social characteristics of the Community or its components might have greater impact than orientations towards political characteristics. For example: images of peoples of other countries might have more impact on the general perception of membership in the European Community than political orientations.

Social orientations can be directed towards the own people and one's own nation (e.g. trust in the own people, national pride) as well as towards other member countries and their peoples (e.g. trust in other peoples). This refers to orientations towards peoples or countries which are already members of the European Community but it can also refer to countries and peoples applying for membership.

The second component is the 'political order' of the European Community. This component refers to the EC's institutions and its political philosophy. Orientations can be directed towards individual institutions (e.g. European Parliament). They can also concern the division of labour between the Community institutions on the one hand and between national and EC-institutions on the other hand. This institutional aspect of 'how the Community functions' has to be seen together with the question 'how it should function'. Because the European Community is a community of democratic states, political philosophy refers to the values and norms of democratic systems which should also be applied on the international level. One of the conditions for membership in the European Community is a democratic political system. In democratic systems, the political roles are distinguished from the incumbents of these positions. The third component 'political authorities' therefore refers to orientations towards the politicians and administrators on the EC level. The fourth component refers to policies (Niedermayer/Westle 1992: 15-20).

### **2.1.2. Modes of Orientation**

Orientations are mental positions individuals can take with respect to the various objects. These mental positions are organized according to their relevance for actual behaviour. The first mode 'psychological involvement' refers to knowledge of the European Community, interest in it, salience of it and non-normative expectations related to it. In contrast to the non-evaluative first mode of orientation, the second one 'evaluations' refers to the assessment of objects on a positive-negative dimension. Evaluations can be guided by affective and diffuse feelings towards an object. They can also be expressed on the basis of concrete interests and cost/benefit considerations. These different backgrounds of evaluations have led to the distinction between 'specific' or 'utilitarian' evaluations on the one hand and 'diffuse' or 'affective' evaluations on the other hand. The third mode of orientations 'behavioural intentions' refers to possible actions a person is prepared to do, for example voting in a European election (Niedermayer and Westle 1992: 21-30).

In short, citizens can be aware of the European Community, evaluate it or can be prepared to act with respect to it. Such kinds of orientations can also be directed towards the membership of states or people(s) in the Community. They may



concern 'how the Community functions' (institutions) or 'how it should function' (norms, values) and may further refer to politicians and administrators and policies.

### 3. Strategy of Investigation And Data Base

Applying this classification of orientations towards the European Community, EC citizens orientations towards Turkey and the Turks are investigated. The analysis concentrates on the political collectivity component and its territorial and personal elements as objects of orientation. In a first step, political/territorial aspects, i.e importance and evaluation of Turkish membership are analysed. The second step refers to the social/personal element and investigates trust in Turks, whereby indicators of psychological involvement (salience) and 'diffuse' evaluation of the Turkish people are available. Graph 1 places the indicators into the classification concept of objects and modes of orientation.

Graph 1: **ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS TURKEY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY**

		Modes of Orientation		
Objects of Orientation		psychological involvement	evaluations	behavioural intentions
EC as a whole				
<b>COMPONENTS</b>	<b>ELEMENTS</b>			
political	territorial	Importance of Turkish membership	Favour/oppose Turkish membership	
collectivity	-----			
	personal	Salience of Turkish people	Trust in Turkish people	
political order				
political authorities				
policies				

The data base are the bi-annual Eurobarometer surveys of the European Commission. They are conducted since 1973 in Spring and Autumn of each year in all member states of the European Community. Eurobarometer surveys consist of samples of about 1000 interviewees in the EC member countries (300 in

Northern Ireland and Luxembourg up to 1991). The nation-specific results presented in the paper are weighted when weight variables to improve representativity were provided by the national fieldwork institutes in the data sets. With respect to the Community-wide average, an additional weighting algorithm has been used which adjusts national sample sizes to the relative proportion of each country's adult population within the EC citizenry<sup>2</sup>.

In a recent comprehensive analysis of EC citizens' orientations towards the territorial dimension of the Community, Westle (1992) argues that the issue of EC enlargement has largely been a topic of political elites and here mostly EC authorities and institutions rather than national ones. As a consequence, such questions have hardly been present in most national media systems due to the lack of political controversy between parties regarding such membership issues. In line with empirical results of a generally low salience of EC affairs, her analysis shows that the issue of EC enlargement is no prominent topic among EC citizens and that people have hardly developed explicit and stable orientations towards it. There is a lack of information and a lack of reference groups promoting political positions for people to orient themselves on. Since attitude-shaping factors responsible for different orientations in different social or socio-political groups are hardly at work, no outstanding differences in orientations between societal groups emerged. Exceptions from this general pattern only occurred if the membership of a country has become a political issue present in the media system in another country or if a specific relationship between two countries -- in the past and/or present -- existed (Westle 1992: 4, 8-10, 38). On this background, a descriptive analysis of orientations towards Turkey and the Turks is presented and the possible role of individual level determinants or the influence of aggregate factors is shortly referred to in the concluding remarks.

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2) The empirical analyses have been performed with data sets which the ZEUS institute (Zentrum für Europäische Umfrageanalysen und Studien) hosts on behalf of the European Commission. ZEUS is a scientific institution at the University of Mannheim, which carries out international comparative secondary analyses on behalf of third parties, in particular the European Commission. It is directed by Oskar Niedermayer and the author.

#### **4. EC Citizens' Orientations Towards the Admission of Turkey to the European Community 1976, 1986, 1988-1989**

EC citizen's preferences regarding the admission of Turkey to the Community will be investigated in the mid-1970ies and at the end of the 1980ies, when questions concerning membership of countries in the Community also referred to Turkey. Approval rates for an admission of Turkey are compared with approval rates for the admission of other countries. Then, the importance of the topic 'European Community expansion towards Turkey' at the end of the 1980ies is investigated. In a final step, support and opposition to Turkish membership in 1986 is analysed and compared with EC citizens' orientations towards countries previously admitted in the Southern enlargement.

##### **4.1. Which Countries Should be Admitted to the European Community? EC Citizens' Preferences in 1976 and 1988**

In Autumn 1976, the citizens in the then nine members states of the European Community were asked which other countries they "would like to see joining" the EC in the near future. As table 1 displays, a first result is that nearly half the interviewees (with a range 73% in Denmark to 35% in Germany) did not respond

Table 1

to this open-ended question -- indicating the low salience of the issue to them. In a Community-wide perspective, Switzerland was named most often (58%) among those answering the question, followed by Spain (50%) and Austria (45%). Greece and Portugal were named by about one out of four (27% and 26%) and Turkey was mentioned least often (11%).

In comparison to the Community-wide average, Turkey was mentioned more often in Belgium. It was mentioned less often than on average in France, Great Britain, Ireland and the Netherlands. In general, the results reveal a clear preference pattern with Switzerland, Austria and Spain being the most preferred candidates for joining the Community and Turkey the least preferred candidate.

A preference pattern comparable to the one of the mid-1970ies also emerged in 1988 (excluding of course Spain, Portugal and Greece). Switzerland again topped the list and was mentioned by two out of three respondents (66%) in a Community-wide perspective (table 2). Austria and the three Scandinavian

#### Table 2

countries Sweden, Norway and Finland were named by a majority of respondents (between 55% and 61%). The admission of Turkey was welcomed by about two

out of five respondents (39%) and the country again ranked at the bottom of the preference list. The results of 1988 can not directly be compared with the results of 1976 because of the different formats of the questions. In 1976, people had to name countries in an open-ended question. Such a question makes higher demands on respondents than a closed one like in 1988 where countries had to be chosen from a list presented during the interview. Moreover, the respondents could mention 'all' or 'none' of the countries on the list<sup>3</sup>. The mentioning of Turkey was mostly due to those willing to admit all countries and only very few respondents choose it as a specific country.

The comparison of approval rates for a Turkish EC membership between the individual EC member countries identifies three groups of countries. In Italy (48%) and Spain (47%) approval was highest; in France, Greece and Denmark approval was by far lowest (26%, 20%, 18%). The other countries do not outstandingly deviate from the European average of 39 percent.

#### **4.2. Importance of European Community Expansion Towards Turkey in EC Member Countries 1988-1989**

The wish to admit Turkey to the European Community is not very pronounced among EC citizens and the topic is not a very important issue on the political agenda. In three consecutive Eurobarometer surveys in 1988 and 1989<sup>4</sup>, the importance of four nation-specific issues (differing between countries) and eight international issues (identical in all countries) was inquired. The eight issues included the four international problems 'unemployment', 'environmental protection', 'inflation', 'arms limitation' and the four European issues 'political unification of European Community', 'agricultural surpluses', 'Realisation of the Single European Market by 1992' and 'European Community expansion towards Turkey'. The three ratings of the issues as either 'very important' or 'not very important' indicate the salience of these twelve issues at the end of the 1980ies. The first result is a stable structure of public opinion regarding the issues. The results were rather similar in the three surveys, the rank order of the issues was

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3) The categories 'all' and 'none' were, however, not included in the cards presented to the respondents except in Belgium.

4) The surveys are Eurobarometer 30 in Autumn 1988, Eurobarometer 31 in Spring 1990 and Eurobarometer 31A in Summer 1990. EB 31A was a special Eurobarometer after the European elections.

largely identical. Without going into details, it can be said that the four European issues were in all countries in the group of issues to which the lowest importance was attributed and the issue 'EC expansion towards Turkey' was by far the least important one in all countries<sup>5</sup>. In a Community-wide perspective, it was 'very important' for 25 percent in all three surveys. By contrast, there was only one country (United Kingdom) where two other European issues ranked substantially below a 50% importance level.

Three groups of countries can be distinguished in comparison with the Community-wide average (25%). Since the results were rather similar in the three surveys, the following figures are combined percentages over three surveys. In Germany (32%), Spain (34%) and Portugal (36%), importance was above the EC-wide average. Importance was far below the Community average in Denmark (8%) and the United Kingdom (13%). In the other countries it was comparable or slightly below the EC average (between 18% and 24%).

There is one outstanding exception from this grouping of countries which is Greece, where importance of the issue was by far highest with 48 percent. In addition, one of the four nation-specific issues in Greece was 'Relations with Turkey', which was 'very important' for 85% of the Greeks. These Eurobarometer results are a clear indication of the prominence of the issue of Turco-Greek relations in Greek public opinion.

#### **4.3. Evaluation of Turkish EC Membership in European Community Countries in 1986**

With respect to an explicit evaluation of a Turkish EC membership, we dispose of only one data point in Spring 1986, when support of and opposition to a possible admission of Turkey were measured. In a Community-wide perspective, a Turkish EC membership was favoured by 21 percent and opposed by 30 percent of respondents. One out of two (49%) was either indifferent (33%) or did not answer the question (16%). The fact that only half of the respondents evaluated the issue of Turkish membership (in Spain, Portugal and Great Britain only 30% to 40%) again documents the low issue salience (table 3).

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5) For a comprehensive analysis of the issues patterns see Kuechler 1991

table 3 about here

### Table 3

With respect to the individual countries different groups can be identified (graph 2). In three countries support was higher than opposition. In the Netherlands, support was above the EC average and opposition below. In Spain and Portugal, support was about or above average but opposition far below, whereby it has to be kept in mind that the two countries had the highest level of indifference. The second group comprises Germany, Italy and Denmark where support was somewhat above average and opposition was comparable to it or above it. In Belgium, both support and opposition were about EC average and in Great Britain they were below. In France (44%) and Greece (50%) substantial majorities were against a membership of Turkey in the European Community and only small minorities were in favour of it. The Greeks had the lowest level of indifference and the highest amount of opposition. This is an expression of the Turco-Greek antagonism in Greek public opinion.

Graph 2 about here

#### **4.4. Evaluation of Membership Candidates of the Southern Enlargement**

EC citizens' evaluations of the three membership candidates of the Southern enlargement can serve as a reference point of comparison. In April 1979, the interviewees were asked in six countries if they thought that Greece, Portugal and Spain should be allowed to join (yes or no) the Community<sup>6</sup>. Spain was welcomed by substantial to absolute majorities in all six countries, which was also the case for Greece and Portugal in Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Great Britain. Opinions regarding Greece were divided in France and Germany. A majority of Germans was against the admission of Portugal, i.e. the only such case of a rejection. The extent of indifference was between 20 and 30 percent in all countries. These results are in line with the pattern of the admission question in 1976 where Spain ranked substantially before Greece and Portugal (see 4.1.).

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6) The question was not asked in Denmark, Luxembourg, Ireland and Northern Ireland.



The above reported evaluation of Turkish membership in 1986 can be compared with the evaluation of the admission of Spain and Portugal in Spring 1985. In a Community-wide perspective, three out of five interviewees (61%) were strongly or somewhat in favour of Spanish membership, 18 percent were somewhat or strongly against it and 21 percent did not respond. The results for Portugal were rather similar. Absolute majorities (between 58% in France and 79% in Luxembourg) in the original six founding members welcomed a Community membership of the two countries. In the three countries of the Northern enlargement and Greece the countries were welcomed by majorities (between 40% and 52%) and non-response was highest in these countries (Commission, Eurobarometer 23, pp. 33-36). The comparison between the evaluation of a possible Turkish membership and the membership of Spain and Portugal has to take into account the different situation of the countries with the forthcoming membership in the latter two. Their admission was most probably a more prominent media topic than Turkish membership and moreover the question did not include an 'indifferent' category in Spring 1985. Keeping this in mind, the results, nevertheless, show the far-reaching willingness to accept Spain and Portugal as new members in the European Community countries. This had not been the case with respect to Turkish membership where the majority position was either opposition or indifference.

## **5. Trust in the Turkish People 1986 and 1990**

### **5.1. Theoretical Background and Operationalization**

Trust between peoples is an important indicator of social integration. Discussions about European integration, normally refer to institutional integration. It has, however, been stressed in approaches of integration theory that institutional integration should be accompanied by social integration which refers to public orientations towards the personal element of the political collectivity. In the transactionalism approach of Deutsch and his colleagues social integration is characterized as the attainment of a 'sense of community' within a territory. This sense of community is specified as "a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of 'we-feeling', trust, and mutual consideration" (Deutsch et al 1957: 36).

Concentrating on the concept of mutual trust, the development of trust between the peoples of the European Community has been analysed (Hofrichter/Niedermayer 1991, Niedermayer 1992). Since trust questions have also been asked with respect to non-EC peoples -- among them the Turkish in 1986 and 1990 -- an analysis of trust into Turks will provide information about the social orientations of EC citizens towards the Turkish people.

The feeling of trust or its absence influence one's expectation under normal conditions of imperfect information. In this case, trust is the expectation that another's behaviour will be predictably friendly (Inglehart 1991: 145-146). An individual's perception of possible objects of trust like other peoples is influenced by images and stereotypes, whereby stereotypes are oversimplified images. Images of other peoples or states are often transferred from generation to generation and are mostly based on emotion. Images or stereotypes are beliefs about ingroups and outgroups and create, preserve, or enhance the distinctiveness of the own group vis-a-vis other groups. According to approaches of social psychology images/stereotypes should be rather stable over time though they can be subject to change (Hewstone 1986: 77-81; Kunczik 1989: 167, 170-171).

Eurobarometer surveys have repeatedly included the following question on 'trust in other peoples': "Now, I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust in them, some trust, not very much trust, or no trust at all?"<sup>7</sup> The question requires an instant judgement of another people and thus measures the respondents' underlying emotional predispositions or images/stereotypes of the peoples to be evaluated.

Since no Turkish data are available we cannot refer to mutual trust but have to concentrate on EC citizens' trust in the Turkish people. With respect to the trust indicator, the dimension of the 'level of trust' is distinguished from the dimension of 'salience'. The level of trust indicates to what extent another people is evaluated in a positive or negative way. The salience dimension refers to the extent the judging people has developed an orientation towards the judged people. The trust

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7) The wording of the question changed somewhat between 1986 and 1990. Though it cannot be totally excluded that this change has influenced the results, it is assumed that the wording is functionally equivalent (Hofrichter and Niedermayer 1991: 5).

question thus provides two indicators referring to the personal element of the political collectivity. The amount of people answering the questions on trust in Turks is an indicator of salience (psychological involvement) whereas the reported level of trust in the Turkish people is an evaluation.

The trust scale has no neutral middle category and the question does not explicitly mention an opposite pole to trust like, for instance, distrust. Because no dichotomy is included in the question, the answers have been recoded assigning '0' to 'no trust at all', '1' to 'not very much trust', '2' to 'some trust' and '3' to 'very much trust'. A summarizing measure of the level of trust in a people is the mean value of this scale. A mean of '0' would indicate 'no trust at all' in a people and a mean of '3' would result if all interviewees have 'very much trust' in another people. A mean of 1.5 (the central point of the scale) denotes that responses expressing trust and lack of trust add up to an overall neutral evaluation of a particular people. A mean above 1.5 signals that positive responses predominate and a mean below 1.5 indicates that lack of trust predominates.

The salience of the Turkish people is operationalized by the percentage of respondents in the EC member countries using the trust scale for an evaluation of the Turkish people. The indicator has a range from 0 to 100. It has been demonstrated that non-response is predominantly due to lack of information to answer the question so that a high amount of non-response means lower salience (Hofrichter and Niedermayer 1991: 7-8).

## 5.2. Results

In a first step, the level of trust in Turks is compared with trust in other non-EC peoples. In 1990, most peoples of Eastern Europe were included for the first time in addition to the Americans, Russians, Japanese, Chinese, Swiss and Turks. Graph three presents the results in a Community-wide perspective in Spring 1990. The comments also refer to the results in 1986, which are not displayed. The Community-wide level of trust was highest in the Swiss, and the Americans ranked second at both time points. The overall impression of graph three is that most non-EC peoples receive a rather neutral evaluation in 1990 with either a positive (e.g. Ex-GDR, Japan, Hungary) or a negative tendency (like Romanians and Bulgarians).

Graph 3 about here

The level of trust in the Turkish people, however, was lowest at both time points in a Community-wide perspective. On average, the Citizens of the twelve member countries of the European Community had 'not very much trust' in Turkish people at the end of the nineties (1.0 in 1986 and 1.04 in 1990). It ranked at the bottom of the list behind the Chinese (1.15) in 1990 and behind the Russians (1.17) in 1986.

With respect to the evaluation of the Turkish people in the individual EC member countries, however, considerable differences can be identified (table 4). In 1986, the Turkish people was evaluated neutrally in Denmark (1.48) and the Netherlands (1.45). Compared with the Community-wide average of 1.0, Turks were evaluated less sceptical in Spain, the United Kingdom, West Germany and Portugal (1.12 to 1.19). Trust in Turks was far below the Community-wide average in Italy (.56) and it was by far lowest in Greece (.44). In France, Belgium and Luxembourg the level of trust was comparable with the EC-wide average.

table 4 about here

Turning to the results in 1990 (graph 4) and the development of trust in the Turkish people between 1986 and 1990, shows that the level of trust was rather stable with a very slight increase from 1.0 to 1.04 in an EC-wide perspective. The grouping of countries above, about or below average was mostly comparable to the one in 1986. There were, however, notable developments in some of the countries. Graph four displays the results by country in comparison with the EC average in Spring 1990. In the group of countries where trust levels were above EC average in 1986 and in 1990, trust in Turks decreased in the Netherlands and Denmark from a neutral evaluation (about 1.5) to a predominance of negative

evaluations (1.2 to 1.3). In Spring 1990, trust in Turks was highest in Portugal after an increase from 1.12 to 1.42 resulting in a nearly neutral evaluation of Turks by the Portuguese. A slight increase occurred in three other countries with trust levels above average (United Kingdom, West Germany and Ireland). In Luxembourg trust also increased and the country moved from average in 1986 to a position above average in 1990. In Belgium and France, trust in Turks was about average as it was the case in 1986. In Spain, trust in Turks decreased considerably between 1986 and 1990 (from 1.19 to .81). The country moved into the group with trust levels below average and trust in Turks was lower in Greece only. Though an increase of the Italians' trust in Turks emerged (from .58 to .88), the country still ranked considerably below average. Between 1986 and 1990, trust of Greeks in Turks decreased from an already very low level of .44 to .29. In other words, eighty percent of the Greek respondents had 'no trust at all' in Turkish people in Spring 1990.

graph 4 about here

The results in Greece mirror the Turco-Greek antagonism and the development of the relations between the countries in Greek public opinion. Ninety-six percent of

the Greek interviewees evaluated the Turkish people and moreover the very negative evaluation was the most uniform evaluation in the Community in 1990<sup>8</sup>. The increase in salience and the corresponding further decrease of the little enough trust between 1986 and 1990 indicate a growing distance between the two peoples at the end of the 1980ies. A likely interpretation of this pattern in Greek public opinion is that the Aegean crisis in 1987 and the resulting problems in the relations between the two countries has further deepened the Turco-Greek antagonism on the Greek side.

Coming to the second dimension of trust, the Turkish people was 'salient' to about seven out of ten EC citizens in 1986 in a Community-wide perspective (table 4). Salience increased between 1986 and 1990 (from 69 to 81) and was comparable or somewhat higher than salience of the Eastern European peoples in 1990. With respect to the individual countries, however, outstanding differences emerged. In 1986, salience was by far lowest in Ireland (38) and it was substantially below average in Denmark, the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal and Luxembourg (47 to 55), where only about one out of two respondents answered the question. Salience was above average in Germany, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands and France (74 to 88). In 1990, the grouping of countries was comparable with the one in 1986. Denmark was the only exception because salience increased from 47 to 87 and the country ranked above the EC-wide average in 1990. Apart from the outstanding result in Greece, salience was again above the EC average in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands in 1990.

These results concerning salience of the Turkish people are in line with the amount of Turkish citizens who are residents in EC member countries. Ignoring Greece as a special case, shows that salience is related to the proportion of Turkish residents in the various countries with the exception of the Danish case in 1986. Salience was above average in those countries where the proportion of Turkish residents among foreign residents from non-EC-member countries was highest: Germany (46%), Netherlands (38%), Denmark (23%), Belgium (9%), France (6%)<sup>9</sup>. In countries with no notable amounts of Turkish residents the level of salience was substantially lower. A higher amount of Turkish residents

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8) With respect to the concept of trust, a third dimension 'uniformity/diversity' of judgement can be distinguished, which was not included in the present analysis. Using the standard deviation of the trust scale as a measure of this dimension shows, that the evaluation of the Turks was most uniform in Greece (.67 compared to .87 EC-wide)

9) My own calculation using the absolute figures of Eurostat Population Statistics 1991, p. 152-153

increases the chances for interactions and communication between Turks and the people of the host country. It can also lead to conflicts and politicization of the issue of Turkish foreign residents. In such cases salience is higher than in countries with not many Turkish residents.

This contact hypothesis can also be applied with respect to the level of trust which should increase with an increase of interactions and communications between different peoples. In this respect, the results are, however, not unequivocal. In those three countries with the highest proportion of Turkish residents, i.e. Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany, the level of trust was above the Community-wide average; in Belgium it was below average. The level of trust was, however, also above average in countries without a significant proportion of Turkish residents like Portugal, Ireland and the United Kingdom.

With respect to the relationship between salience and evaluation of the Turkish people, the data do not indicate a systematic relationship between the two. An increase in salience does not uniformly lead to an increase or a decrease in the level of trust.

## **6. Summary and Discussion**

### **6.1. Summary**

The analysis of public opinion in the European Community regarding Turkish EC membership and trust in Turkish people shows that Turkish membership was welcomed only by minorities and that trust in Turks was very low compared to trust in other non-EC peoples. The expansion of the EC by the admission of Turkey was not a salient political issue in public opinion of the EC member countries at the end of the 1980ies. The comparison of approval rates of Turkish EC membership with approval rates regarding other European countries in 1976 and 1988 showed that Turkish membership was considerably less welcomed than membership of other countries. Turkey always was the least preferred candidate. In 1986, Turkish membership was favoured by about twenty percent of EC citizens and rejected by thirty percent. Half of the respondents were indifferent or did not express an opinion. In contrast to opposition and indifference as the



dominating pattern regarding Turkish membership, Spain and Portugal were widely accepted as new members of the European Community in 1985. Trust in the Turkish people was by far lowest in comparison with trust in all other peoples included in the question in 1986 and 1990.

With respect to differences between the individual EC member countries, the question arises if their grouping in comparison with the EC-wide average was consistent over various indicators, i.e. if the orientations towards Turkish EC membership and the Turkish people were congruent in the various countries. Taking the percentages of interviewees being for or against Turkish membership in 1986 and the percentages answering the trust question in 1986 and 1990 as indicators of salience, reveals that salience is related to the proportion of Turkish residents in EC member countries. It is mostly higher in countries with a higher proportion of Turkish residents than in the others but there are exceptions like Denmark (in the trust indicator in 1986) and Belgium (in the membership question in 1986). Importance of the issue of Turkish EC membership at the end of the 1980ies does not correspond to the proportion of Turkish residents in EC countries. In addition to indicating the overall low salience of the territorial dimension, the results are probably more influenced by general orientations towards the European Community than by orientations towards Turkey.

Coming to the evaluations, a Turkish EC membership was welcomed in the Netherlands to a considerably higher extent than on EC average. Opposition to Turkish membership was rather high in Denmark, it was by far highest in Greece and France. In most other countries, a pattern comparable to the Community-wide average emerged with relative majorities against Turkish membership. A largely comparable country pattern occurred regarding the willingness to admit Turkey in 1988. Trust in Turks was considerably above the Community-wide average in the three countries with the highest proportion of Turkish residents (Germany and especially in the Netherlands and Denmark in 1986). It was however, also above average in countries with no notable proportion of Turkish residents like the United Kingdom and Portugal. Comparing the evaluation of Turkish membership in 1986 and trust in Turks in 1986 reveals that they do not closely correspond. Support was highest in the Netherlands, i.e. a country with a high proportion of Turkish residents, but opposition was also rather high in such a country, i.e. Denmark. In France, an average trust rate goes along with strong opposition to Turkish membership.

## 6.2. Discussion

The proportion of Turkish residents does not correspond very closely with trust in Turks on the aggregate level, though trust levels were above average in the countries with the highest proportions of Turkish residents. The evaluation of Turkish membership does neither closely correspond to the proportion of Turkish residents in a country nor to the level of trust in Turks. On the aggregate level, these factors did not reveal strong and clear-cut effects which could explain the differences between the judging countries.

Analyses to identify the determinants of orientations on the individual level did not reveal outstanding differences between socio-structural and socio-political groups regarding the evaluation of Turkish EC membership. With respect to the relationship between social and political orientations, trust in the Turkish people was related with the evaluation of Turkish membership in 1986 on the individual level. In multi-variate analyses, however, it turned out that its influence on the attitude towards the admission of Turkey was considerable only in those countries with a high proportion of Turkish residents (except in France)(Westle 1992: 27).

Orientations towards Turkish EC membership are probably more influenced by macro-political aspects, political events and characteristics of the evaluated country than by personal orientations towards Turks. Therefore, the following section refers to the possible influence of such macro-variables on the image of countries rather than discussing individual level determinants of trust.

Buchanan and Cantril (1953: 39ff.) classified the relationships between nations relevant for mutual friendliness into five 'contexts': The Bi-polar World, World War II, Common Boundaries, Common Language/Culture and Neutrality. Nincic and Russett (1979: 70ff.) distinguished between 'similarity' (race, language, religion, political system, level of economic development) and 'interest' (economic interest and security interest). A recent approach grouped the factors influencing international trust into three major categories: a) primordial ties (race, religion, language, geographic proximity); b) societal learning (historical experiences like war, neutrality, military and economic alliances, exchanges, communication flows) and c) economic development (Inglehart and Rabier 1984, Inglehart 1991). In

Inglehart's analysis, a common language group was the only primordial variable with an impact on trust, which was interpreted to be due to its function in facilitating communication for societal learning<sup>10</sup>. Economic development of the judged countries had the highest impact on trust in their peoples. This was interpreted as an effect of societal learning, based on the assumption that economic development needs as preconditions predictability and reliability within a nation. Such nations are then more trusted than others.

Before discussing macro-factors possibly influencing the sceptical evaluation of Turkey and the Turks, the special case of the Turco-Greek relationship is referred to. The Turco-Greek antagonism is outstandingly documented in the results. The highest salience goes along with the most negative and most uniform evaluation in 1990, a likely impact of the Aegean crisis. Thus, macro-variables like the historical background of the relationship (e.g. Cyprus question), the high politicisation and dramatic political events probably dominate Greek orientations towards Turkey and the Turks, which appear to be highly stereotyped.

Among the factors which might be responsible for the generally sceptical orientations of EC citizens towards Turkey and the Turks are economic development, human rights issues and religion. Economic considerations have always been very important regarding the question of EC membership on the elite level. The state of the Turkish economy was a central argument of the Commission to strengthen the association between the EC and Turkey before beginning with admission negotiations (Axt 1991: 383-384). The wish for an inclusion of Turkey with a rather weak economy was also not very pronounced in mass publics whereby fears of millions of Turkish migrant workers might have played an important role.

The factor 'human rights' is listed here because of two reasons. The first is the speculation that news concerning Turkey in the electronic and print media in EC countries include to a substantial proportion critical references to the human rights situation in Turkey. Without content analyses of news, however, no definite evidence can be presented here. The speculation is, however, supported by the analysis of von Leipzig in this volume which shows that human rights have been an important aspect in EPC-Turkey relations and have been an important issue for

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10) Inglehart's (1991) analysis combines Eurobarometer data and macro-variables. Since the focus of his analysis are the 1980 Eurobarometer results, trust in Turks was not referred to.

the European Parliament during the 1980ies (see also Axt 1991: 363). The second reason is the development of the image of China between 1986 and 1990. In 1986, the Chinese were evaluated nearly neutral in the trust question in a Community-wide perspective (mean value of 1.47). In 1990, negative evaluations by far predominated (mean value of 1.15). The dramatic deterioration of the Chinese image was most probably due to the brutal suppression of the pro-democracy movement in June 1989. Thus, sensibility of West European public opinion regarding human rights issues might also be responsible for the sceptical evaluation of Turkey and the Turks.

Though religion did not play a prominent role in Inglehart's analysis, it probably is a very important factor influencing orientations towards Turkey. Turkey is an Islamic country. As the Commission's study on racism and xenophobia in the EC showed, the 'other religion' clearly is the Islam for EC citizens. It was spontaneously mentioned by forty percent of EC citizens. In France and Belgium it was mentioned by more than half the respondents and in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands by more than seventy percent (Commission 1989: 39), i.e. the countries with the highest proportion of Turkish residents. Their Islamic religion thus could be a factor contributing to the sceptical orientations towards Turks especially in view of the development of fundamentalism in the Islamic world.

These and other factors are probably responsible for the rather sceptical evaluation of Turkish EC membership and the Turkish people in EC countries. They can influence orientations towards Turkey in different ways in the different countries, whereby factors referring to the judging country and factors concerning the judged country are relevant. A more complex design including variables from different levels in order to assess the relative impact of various factors would be necessary to come to more definite conclusions. The mutual images of countries remained rather stable in the European Community (Hofrichter and Niedermayer 1991) which was also the case regarding the image of Turks in EC countries at the end of the 1980ies. However, as the dramatic deterioration of the image of China demonstrates, images of countries and peoples are also subject to change in times of modern mass communication. Moreover, those countries with the highest proportion of Turkish residents were in the group with above average trust, which indicates the possibility and importance of societal learning.

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