The complex feature of European legislation - the combination of differences concerning the actors, the decision rules and the institutional settings for European bodies, which are linked by different procedural rules - is based on a simultaneous internal and inter-institutional coalition problem which is refelcted by the European multi-chamber regime structure. The internal coalition problem of European politics refers to the competing interests of the Menber States in the Council and - in some cases - of national party delegations in European Parliament which are counterbalanced by the Commission. Due to the variation in the participation and decision rules in European legislation, the actors involved have different formal voting power positions from which to influence decision making. Since the foundation of the Europan Communities in 1958, modifications of the institutional framework, either by Treaty reforms or by the accession of new Member States have changed the voting power distribution. Our chronological analysis throws light on intergovernmental or supranational tendencies as well as on party politics in European legislation. Our results indicate a future institutional framwork of Policy Domain Bicameralism in European legislation.
