Is Unequal Responsiveness Caused by High-Income Earners Having More Informed Opinions? An Empirical Test

Time: 
04.03.2025 - 12:15 to 13:30
Location : 
A 5,6 Raum A 231
Type of Event : 
AB B-Kolloquium
Lecturer: 
Jesper Lindqvist
Lecturer affiliation: 
University of Gothenburg
Description: 

Previous research has shown that the affluent see more of their preferred policies realized, which scholars of opinion—policy responsiveness attribute to unequal influence. A rival theory instead states that the reason is informational asymmetry: High-income earners have more informed opinions, which align better with policymakers’ decisions. We test this rival theory in a most-likely case, where the possibility of unequal influence is minimized: Monetary policy, set by an independent central bank. Analyses of survey data from more than 100,000 UK respondents initially reveal several findings in line with the theory: The official interest rate develops in ways relatively more favored by high-income earners, and high-income earners also exhibit better understanding of central bank policy and the economy. Nevertheless, informational asymmetries can only explain part of the observed unequal opinion—policy congruence, even in this most-likely setting. Inequality in political representation is thus unlikely to be a mere artifact of informational asymmetry.