While multicameralism is often coordinating interests of different societal groups at the domestic level, state actors of international politics are beginning to institutionalise multicameral decision making procedure. Since the erosion of the dominant unidimensional, bipolar interest configuration of the Cold War, multicameral systems have an increasing importance for the international coordination of multidimensional interests. From a political perspective, the division of chambers enables to represent different interests of particular groups in an adequate manner. Regarding efficiency, multicameral decision making procedures coordinate conflicting interests between those groups. This project aims to investigate, whether, and if so how, international multicameralism may help to coordinate interests at the international level, and are thus a possible instrument for conflict resolution. For the purpose of analysis, two international negotiations on multicameral decision making procedures will be studied empirically: First, the successful ratification of the International Seabed Authority, second, the failure of the Convention of the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources. Both cases concern the regulation of the economic use of common heritage resources but their different outcome indicates that multicameralism can not always been applied to coordinate multidimensional interests at the international level.
