Constitutional Courts as Veto Players: Composition, Absorption and Decisions at the German Court | Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung

Christoph Hönnige, Thomas Gschwend, Benjamin G. Engst, Caroline Wittig
Constitutional Courts as Veto Players: Composition, Absorption and Decisions at the German Court

9th ECPR General Conference, Université de Montréal, August 26th to August 29th, 2015

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Christoph Hönnige, Thomas Gschwend, Benjamin G. Engst, Caroline Wittig
Constitutional Courts as Veto Players: Composition, Absorption and Decisions at the German Court

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Christoph Hönnige, Thomas Gschwend, Benjamin G. Engst, Caroline WittigConstitutional Courts as Veto Players: Composition, Absorption and Decisions at the German Court

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Christoph Hönnige, Thomas Gschwend, Benjamin G. Engst, Caroline Wittig
Constitutional Courts as Veto Players: Composition, Absorption and Decisions at the German Court