Positive integration among states, defined as the correction of negative externalities from liberalisation or the creation of new markets, is generally assumed to be very difficult to realise on the European level, let alone on an international or global level. The political transaction costs to come to positive integration legislation indeed seem daunting in an organisation with a membership of over 140 sovereign states that operates under conditions of unanimity, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Yet, member states seem to have crossed the Rubicon and have concluded a number of agreements imposing positive obligations to adopt new policy measures in fields traditionally restricted to the reserve of the sovereign nation state. There has been consistent political pressure to graft other, non-trade issues onto the WTO framework, i.e. to enlarge a formerly trade-only organisation to a governance structure that equally has regulatory competence. WTO member states have indeed introduced the obligation to internationally protect intellectual property rights, and concluded agreements on health, technical barriers to trade, and investment. There have further been – hitherto unsuccessful – calls to bring labour rights, environmental standards, or competition policy under the jurisdiction of the WTO. This raises the question: why and under which conditions is positive integration possible in the WTO? The present research proposal seeks to formulate theoretically embedded hypotheses that answer this until now open question. I argue that judicialisation – the presence of binding third party enforcement – makes every single WTO commitment more credible. As judicialisation facilitates enforcement, it exerts a pulling power on political actors in the legislative arm of the organisation to bring positive integration issues under the jurisdiction of the WTO. It is the aim of the present research proposal to test the explanatory force of this general hypothesis in empirical cases of positive integration (intellectual property, health, technical barriers to trade, and investment) and to come to new theoretical and empirical insights about the sources of and conditions for international cooperation. The proposal thus envisages to contribute to interdisciplinary research on judicialisation in international trade governance and its impact on the emergence of global governing structures.
