EUROGOV
No. C-05-04
Jonathan Zeitlin
Social Europe and Experimentalist Governance: Towards
a New Constitutional Compromise?
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Published: May 30, 2005
Abstract
This paper examines the normative, empirical, and constitutional
debates surrounding the use of the Open Method of Coordination
(OMC) in European social policy. The OMC is an experimentalist
approach to European Union governance, based on benchmarking
national progress towards European objectives and organized
mutual learning. Its potential benefits include reconciling
the pursuit of common European concerns with respect for legitimate
national diversity, and encouraging cross-national learning
through comparison of different approaches to similar problems
across the EU's 25 Member States. The paper responds to three
critical questions concerning the OMC’s legitimacy (its
relation to subsidiarity, the ‘Community Method’,
and democracy), before going on to assess the findings of
recent empirical research on its effectiveness in terms of
policy change, governance, and mutual learning. I argue that
both the democratic legitimacy and the practical effectiveness
of existing OMC processes could be improved by reflexively
applying to its own procedures key elements of the method
itself, such as benchmarking, peer review, monitoring, and
iterative redesign. The paper concludes by reviewing the debate
over the incorporation of the OMC into the new Constitution,
and considering its implications for the future of experimentalist
governance in the EU.
Keywords:
open coordination, social policy, governance, legitimacy,
subsidiarity, democracy, participation, policy learning, European
Convention, Constitution for Europe
Jonathan Zeitlin
– University of Wisconsin-Madison
e-mail:
jzeitlin@wisc.edu
© 2005 Jonathan Zeitlin
Citing this EUROGOV
paper:
Zeitlin, Jonathan. 2005. Social Europe and
Experimentalist Governance: Towards a New Constitutional Compromise?
European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) No. C-05-04,
http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-05-04.pdf
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