RISKOPIA: Coping With Uncertainty in Representative Democracy

Research question/goal: 

 

As it is never entirely certain what the consequences of political decisions will be, both citizens and politicians need to deal with risk. How does this affect decision-making and accountability of voters and elected representatives in representative democracies? To answer this question, the project investigated the role of risk perceptions, risk preferences, and risk behaviour of representatives and citizens/voters in the political delegation process. Specifically, the project tested whether the delegation process is disturbed by a divergence in risk perceptions and preferences between principals and agents, a lack of responsiveness of representatives to the public’s risk preferences, and/or a failure of the latter to hold representatives accountable for their risk behaviour. To do so, the project draws on survey and lab experiments, complemented by a qualitative analysis of selected decision-making processes in health, social, and environmental politics.

To test basic assumptions about the role of risk preferences in the delegation process, several rounds of online experiments were conducted. Specifically, the experiments focused on exploring the existence of a potential "outcome bias" among voters when judging representatives based on their decisions made under uncertainty. More precisely, we examined whether risk preferences affect voting decisions in an incentivized online experiment. Subjects assigned the role of politicians decide for the voters how much to invest in a risky policy, whereas subjects assigned the role of voters learn about the risk profiles of the politicians and decide whether to re-elect the incumbent or to elect the challenger. We found that voters are significantly more likely to elect politicians who propose policies that are in line with the voters’ risk preferences and that politicians adapt to the assumed risk preferences of the voters. If a voter learns that the politician’s decision led to a negative outcome, despite a low probability of such an outcome, she is less likely to re-elect this politician. Furthermore, the results suggest an incumbency advantage independent of institutional advantages.

 

Current stage: